Thesis (MMAS) -- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. / AD-A463 803. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Erskine Theological Seminary, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 241-245).

Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009. / "AD-A512 385." "11 Dec 2009." Includes bibliographical references.

The project investigated the events that led the United States from September 11, 2001 to the current war in Iraq. The specific time frame examined was the period beginning on September 11, 2001 and ending with the first pre-emptive attacks in Iraq on March 19, 2003.

The Bush administration's decision to abandon the Kyoto Protocol can be explained by prospect theory. The change in federal climate policy between the Clinton and Bush administrations was due to the difference in domain that each president operated under. President Clinton operated under a domain of losses as he associated continued fossil fuel use with future socio-economic and environmental damages from climate change. This domain of losses increased President Clinton's risk tolerances and explains his pursuit of the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Conversely, President Bush operated under a domain of gains where he did not connect fossil fuel use with future damages, rather with continued economic growth. President Bush's domain of gains reduced his risk tolerance and resulted in his pursuit of fossil fuel intensive economic development policies. This paper defines the domain that Presidents Clinton and Bush operated under regarding climate change, the independent variable of this analysis. A total of 26 speeches on climate change by these presidents were coded to explicate domain according to two categories of beliefs. The single most salient variable is the decision makers beliefs about the perceived robustness of the current state of scientific knowledge on climate change. The second most important aspect of these decision makers beliefs revolve around the role of fossil fuels in economic growth. Once domain has been defined through the cognitive maps and each decision makers corresponding risk tolerance explicated, the dependent variable of policy preferences are analyzed. Two policy options are analyzed; the business as usual (BAU) option associated with the status quo, as well as a climate protection policy that is reflective of the emissions reductions associated with US compliance with Kyoto. These two policy options are evaluated in three case studies; the economy wide costs of compliance with Kyoto targets for greenhouse gas emissions, the public health impacts of greenhouse gas reductions, and finally against a component of the Kyoto Protocol that allows for international trading of permits to emit greenhouse gases.

Bien que les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 aient pris place aux États-Unis, la réaction du gouvernement canadien a été de proposer la Loi C-36 (la Loi anti-terroriste), une loi qui apporte plusieurs changements au Code criminel canadien et modifie d'autres lois. L´adoption de cette loi s'est faite dans un temps record. Afin de mieux comprendre cette rapidité (du 11 septembre à sa sanction royale en 99 jours) et de mieux cerner la relation avec un événement survenu à l´étranger, ce mémoire cherche à expliquer les facteurs internes et externes qui ont influencé le moment choisi et le contenu de la loi. / Though the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, took place on foreign soil, the Canadian government reacted to this event by proposing Bill C-36 (the Anti-terrorism Act), an omnibus bill outlining multiple changes to the existing Canadian Criminal Code and other acts. With an aim to better understand this anomaly of Canadian public policy in both its record speed (from 9/11 to its Royal Assent in 99 days) and its relation to a foreign catastrophe, this thesis seeks to explore both the internal and external factors that influenced the timing and the content of Bill C-36.

Scholars of human rights and constitutional law have described in great detail the abuses perpetrated by the armed forces and secret services of the United States in the context of the ‘war on terror’. There is copious literature explaining why these violations of fundamental human rights are not justifiable, and why they are not consistent with international treaties or that nation’s constitution. This thesis builds upon this research, but strikes out in a new direction. It does so by asking whether these abuses, combined with the changes to the legal order of the United States that made them possible, have produced a qualitative transformation of its constitutional structure. In particular, this thesis tracks the empowering of the executive. Increasingly, whenever it purports to act in the interests of national security, the executive claims the authority to act unilaterally in a manner that overrides even non-derogable rights. These novel constitutional reserve powers, which this thesis demonstrates were derived from President Nixon’s theory of the executive, were used to justify indefinite arbitrary detention, torture, mass surveillance without warrants, and extra-judicial execution. This thesis seeks to determine if the constitutional crisis inaugurated by this theory of executive supremacy over the laws has been terminated, or whether it has continued into the Obama Administration. If this theory is current within the executive branch, and especially if the violations of jus cogens norms has continued, it signifies a cross-party consensus about a paradigm shift in American constitutionalism. Accordingly, given the fact that the abuse of executive supremacy is what led to the development of the rule of law, this thesis will ask the question of whether the United States is being governed in accordance with its basic minimum norms. This thesis explores whether the executive is still subject to checks and balances from the legislature and the judiciary, such that it cannot violate non-derogable rights at will and with impunity. If the contrary proposition is true, it demonstrates that the crisis of the rule of law in the United States is ongoing, and this permanent state of exception demands significantly more scholarly attention. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LLD

Thesis (MPhil (Political Science))--University 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation’s primary focus is why torture is used when torture is not an effective means of gathering intelligence. To answer this question the argument for the use of torture, commonly known as the ticking time bomb argument, is discussed. Due to psychological and physiological processes during torture interrogation it was found that torture cannot be relied upon to deliver truthful information. Torture was also found to adversely affect the institutions that are needed for its establishment. After torture has been found to be of no utility in terms of the appropriation of information the question of why torture is still used is answered by means of discussing societal dynamics as well as the political process surrounding torture. On the societal front it was found that American public opinion towards torture is ambivalent. The reason for this includes a host of socio-psychological factors such as the in-group out-group bias as well the War on Terror as a political ideology in its own right. The notion that anybody is likely to torture is also explored by means of discussing the Milgram’s Obedience Experiment as well as the Stanford Prison Experiment. On the political front the notion that the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay were the work of a few bad apples is dispelled since it formed part of a deliberative political process that tried to make torture a legitimate foreign policy measure. The reason for the existence of this process is the failure of international and domestic checks and balances. On the international front U.S. unilateralism as foreign policy principle is cited as the reason for the ineffectiveness of international measures to stop torture. On the domestic front the permanent rally around the flag effect due to the permanent state of mobilization in the War on Terror is cited as the reason for the failure of domestic checks and balances. The lessons learnt from the research enables the creation of measures on how to stop torture even when it is found that the necessary political will is not present within the Obama administration. In the absence of political will it must be manufactured by means of the actions of civil society, the free press and the international community. It was found that the most effective means would be the creation of a committee of inquiry to create the political memory of the use of torture and how it was established. Additionally a memorial must be erected as well seeing that inquiries create political memories but they do not sustain it. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis se fokus is om na te vors waarom marteling gebruik word as dit nie ‘n effektiewe wyse is om inligting in te win nie. Om hierdie vraagstuk te beantwoord word die argument vir die gebruik van marteling naamlik die tikkende-tydbom-argument bespreek. Asgevolg van sielkundige en fisiologiese prosesse tydens ondervragings wat gebruik maak van marteling kan daar nie op marteling staatgemaak word om die waarheid op te lewer nie. Dit was ook bevind dat marteling die instansies, wat nodig is vir die gebruik daarvan, op ‘n negatiewe wyse beïnvloed. Nadat daar vasgestel is dat marteling geen nutswaarde aangaande die inwinning van informasie bied nie word die vraagstuk waarom marteling steeds gebruik word beantwoord. Op die samelewingsvlak kan daar gestel word dat die Amerikaanse samelewing onseker is oor of marteling gebruik moet word al dan nie. Verskeie redes vir hierdie opinie word aangevoer waarvan die in-group out-group bias en die Oorlog teen Terreur as politieke ideologie slegs twee daarvan uitmaak. Dat enige persoon in staat is tot marteling onder die regte stel omstandighede word ook bespreek na aanleiding van die Milgram’s Obedience Experiement en die Stanford Prison Experiment. Op die politiese vlak is daar vasgestel dat die menseregteskendings in Abu Ghraib en Guantanamo Bay nie die werk was van slegs `n paar indiwidue was nie, maar deel uitmaak van ‘n doelbewuste politiese proses wat marteling as ‘n legitieme buitelandse beleidskwessie wil afmaak. Die rede waarom die beleidsproses bestaan kan toegeskryf word aan die mislukking van inter- en intranasionale wigte en teenwigte. Op die internasionale vlak kan daar gestel word dat die Verenigde State se unilateralistiese modus operandi die rede is vir die mislukking van internasionale maatreëls teen marteling. Op die intranasionale front kan daar gestel word dat die Amerikaanse publiek verkeer in ‘n permanent rally around the flagtoestand asgevolg van die permanent mobilisasie in die Oorlog teen Terreur. Uit die lesse wat geleer is uit die navorsing kan daadwerklike stappe gedoen word om die gebruik van marteling stop te sit alhoewel die Obama-administrasie se politiese wil ontbreek. Met die tekort aan politiese wil moet die politiese wil geskep word deur die burgerlik samelewing, the vrye pers asook die internasionale gemeenskap. Daar was gevind dat die mees effektiewe wyse om marteling stop te sit sal deurmiddel van ‘n kommissie van ondersoek wees. Die kommissie se doel sal wees om te bepaal hoe marteling tot stand gekom het en ‘n politiese herinnering te skep. Daar moet ook ‘n bykomende maatreël wees, naamlik die oprigting van ‘n monument aangesien kommissies van ondersoek politiese herinneringe skep maar nie in stand hou nie.

This thesis responds to the longstanding call from constructivist and poststructuralist scholars for a turn to discourse. It focuses on the paradox of the ability of language to act as a constituting and constraining device within an agent-structure discussion. The Copenhagen School (CS), its attention to language and its concept of securitization is examined in terms of its strengths and weaknesses, including bringing discourse onto the security agenda to an unprecedented extent. This thesis seeks to speak security at a deeper level and move securitization beyond the moment of utterance and the notion of agents breaking free of rules that would otherwise bind, as well as beyond a singular definition of security. It is proposed that the CS framework can be theoretically complemented by Wittgenstein’s notion of language games on board. The analytical shift made by juxtaposing a speech act and a language game also foregrounds the link between language and rules. Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘acts of interpretation’ is also considered, and substantive questions are raised about what the language of security legitimates in principle and in practice. The Bush administration’s justifications for the 2003 Iraq war are taken as a point of departure, and covers how the Bush administration deployed the language of security to justify highly controversial moves. Their narrative about the use of the pre-emptive use of force without an imminent threat existing and ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ such as those seen in the Abu Ghraib photographs in the name of security exemplify that words matter. The arguments conclude that adjustments are needed in the way security is currently spoken in IR theory.

According to conventional wisdom winning hearts and minds is one of the most important goals for defeating terrorism. However, despite repeated claims about U.S. efforts to build popular support as part of the war on terror during the first seven years after 9/11, a steady stream of polls and surveys delivered troubling news. Using a counterinsurgency and social movement informed approach, I explain why the United States performed poorly in the race for Muslim hearts and minds, with a specific focus on problems inherent in the social construction of terrorism, the use of an enemy-centric model while overestimating agency, and the counterproductive effect of policy choices on framing processes. Popular support plays wide-ranging roles in counterterrorism, including: influencing recruitment, fundraising, operational support, and the flow of intelligence; providing credibility and legitimacy; and, sanctifying or marginalizing violence. Recognizing this the U.S. emphasized public diplomacy, foreign aid, positive military-civilian interactions, democracy promotion, and other efforts targeting populations in the Muslim world. To explain the problems these efforts had, this thesis argues that how Americans think and talk about terrorism, reflected especially in the rhetoric and strategic narrative of the Bush administration, evolved after 9/11 to reinforce normative and enemy-centric biases undermining both understanding of the underlying conflicts and resulting efforts. U.S. policy advocates further misjudged American agency, especially in terms of overemphasizing U.S. centrality, failing to recognize the importance of real grievances, and overestimating American ability to implement its own policies or control the policies of local governments. Finally, the failure to acknowledge the role of U.S. policies counterproductively impacted contested framing processes influencing the evolution of mobilization. The resulting rhetoric and actions reinforced existing anti- American views, contributed to the perception that the war on terror is really a war on Islam, and undermined natural counter narratives.