This thesis focuses on the role of ultra-orthodox party Shas within the Israeli state as a means to explore wider themes and divisions in Israeli society. Without underestimating the significance of security and conflict within the structure of the Israeli state, in this thesis the Arab–Jewish relationship is viewed as just one important cleavage within the Israeli state. Instead of focusing on this single cleavage, this thesis explores the complex structure of cleavages at the heart of the Israeli political system. It introduces the concept of a ‘cleavage pyramid’, whereby divisions are of different saliency to different groups. At the top of the pyramid is division between Arabs and Jews, but one rung down from this are the intra-Jewish divisions, be they religious, ethnic or political in nature. In the case of Shas, the religious and ethnic elements are the most salient. The secular–religious divide is a key fault line in Israel and one in which ultra-orthodox parties like Shas are at the forefront. They and their politically secular counterparts form a key division in Israel, and an exploration of Shas is an insightful means of exploring this division further, its history and causes, and how these groups interact politically. Focusing on Shas can also shine a light on the intra-Jewish ethnic politics of Israel. Many of these divisions rest on the history of the Israeli state and the failure of the early state and its Zionist pioneers to create the society they envisioned – a unified, civic-nationalist state with an ethnic but not religious Jewish identity. The ultra-orthodox in Israel represent a self-isolating community whose interaction with the state – while paradoxical in seeking distance from the state – has become that of a sophisticated political actor.

In Lebanon, there is a common understanding and belief among many politicians and citizens, in equal measure, that Lebanon is a democratic country. This belief is not only restricted to those inside Lebanon, but also to be found in neighbouring Arab countries and among their people. In other words, Lebanon is believed to be a country that enjoys a relatively democratic political system, rule of law, and a vibrant civil society, compared to the rest of the region. However, this is for the most part a misunderstanding, and originates from most Lebanese people’s view that a modest level of freedom should be considered democracy, and that a relatively unconstrained civil society means an effective civil society. The main purpose of this thesis is to analyse Lebanon’s political system and establish a clearer picture about whether the democratic claim is real or just an illusion. In order to build this picture, I have concentrated on the internal and external obstacles that have impeded the evolution of the Lebanese political system. The first part of the thesis discusses whether or not the Lebanese political system shares any of the features of functioning democratic political systems and whether or not it is running in a modus which reflects democratic values. In later chapters, the thesis moves on to examine the internal and external factors that have hindered the state from becoming a sovereign, authoritative state and thus without the necessary foundations for becoming a democratic state. The study will demonstrate that Lebanon suffers from the domination of a militant organisation within its borders which violates the country’s sovereignty and disrupts the government and its institutions from functioning properly and being authoritative. Moreover, it will reveal that most citizens - a key element in any democracy - continue to feel subjugated, unable to make their voices heard, and without a say in the decision making process. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that Lebanon suffers from several problems. Firstly and most importantly, it suffers from the lack of an effective state that imposes the rule of law on all of Lebanon’s territory. Secondly and equally important, Lebanon suffers from missing a major component that constitutes an essential pillar for the state, and that is sovereignty. Thirdly, election results are not taken into consideration as the public’s electoral choices are not respected, while instead powerful elite continues to rule the country illegally. These impediments and many others lead the study to conclude that the Lebanese political system currently remains far from being considered a democracy.

The transformation and internationalisation of the Kurdish political identity plays a momentous role and also determines the antagonistic relations of agent, structure and superstructure, in a cycle of violence, which has simultaneously impacted peace building and both Turkey’s EU accession and democratisation processes. Therefore, the ‘complexity’ of the Kurdish status in Turkey significantly makes the counter-hegemonic discourse, strategy, policy and ideology of the Kurdish ‘intellectual and moral leaders’ a valuable variable to consider in conceptualising the Kurdish political economy and its transformation. The Kurds’ challenging of the ‘unity’ of regional nation states by deconstructing their imposed and ‘imaginary’ national(ist) identities, in a post-nationalist or globalist era, makes it necessary to socially construct identity in relation to politically-defined identities. The aim of this research is, thus, to explore, examine and analyse the transformation and development of the Kurdish political economy and identity within a historical context through three main periods. In understanding the nature of each of these periods, the study is compelled by the respective periods’ circumstances to apply a particular theoretical framework relevant to that particular period. Hence, three distinguished theoretical frameworks are utilised to understand the macro and micro dynamics of the Kurdish political economy and identity, which help to demonstrate and present a comprehensive analysis of transformation of the Kurdi(sh) political identity. Initially, the research critically examined the social formation and political economy of Kurdish society in the late Ottoman period with the aim of demonstrating how the Kurds could not follow the ‘Great Transformation’ articulated by Karl Polanyi. After a discursive enquiry, the study concludes that the internal factors in relation to the social formation of Kurdish society as identified in its political economy did not allow the Kurds to converge towards the modern society. Therefore, the study focuses on the social structure and political economy of Kurdish society from the nineteenth century onwards by examining the linear-modernisation and institutionalisation vis-à-vis Kurdish society and the role of the internal dynamics in relation to traditional institutions. However, this era ended with modernity being imposed on the ‘centre’, with the new Turkish state under the Kemalist Republic in 1923 resulting in the disappearance of the Kurdish leadership, which led to the emergence of the hegemonic gap. In the new advanced-modern era, the Kurds created their own identity protection strategies, a resistance-oriented response by the new counter-hegemonic Kurdish socio-political agents resulting in double movement, which is explained by Antonio Gramsci’s ‘Hegemony Theory’, within ‘war of manoeuvre’ and ‘war of position’ strategies, which could be considered prevalent in Kurdish circles and dominating Kurdish activism until the 1984 period. After the observed and theorised hegemonic struggle by different actors in different sub-periods, a counter and modern Kurdi identity is socially constructed based on socialist, secular and nationalist values. Nevertheless, this identity has been challenged by various sub-agents; ‘many Kurds’, following the EU’s institutional impact in shaping the Turkish, and hence, the Kurdish political culture, emerged as various groups in the form of ‘postmodern Kurdi historical bloc’ and have competed for a share of the opportunity space with the help of the ‘EU-isation’ of the identity process since the 1990s. Therefore, the study argues, through a social constructivist approach, that the new ‘EU-ising Kurdiness’ has challenged the mainstream Kurdish political identity, while the latter have also become a member of pro-EU sides in Turkey to extend the democratic nature of the country, in terms of a ‘non-otherising democracy,’ which is non-exclusive and shaped in the context of ‘radical democracy’. This study hence argues that, since political economy and political culture are not fixed but represent a dynamic process permeating around various internal and external factors, it is not possible to explain them with only one variable or theoretical framework. Therefore, three different theoretical frameworks are utilised by this study to respond to the dynamics of each period. The Kurdish future may still seem still bleak in Turkey and beyond, and the search for the emergence of various counter-hegemonies in exploiting the available opportunity spaces created through social constructivism will remain the dynamics of the process.

This aim of this research project is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the republican credentials of the political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. To this end I have launched an extensive enquiry into the main ancient and modern theories of the republican ideology including detailed surveys of the most prominent literature of the field accompanied by individual enquiries into the conceptual line of argument of the main theoreticians of this school of the political philosophy in order to come up with a basic framework of analysis for any system claiming to be steeped in any levels of the republican credentials. I have then moved on to evaluate the main theological doctrines of state and sovereignty within Islam with specific reference to the dominant Shiʻa school of the political theology in Iran trying to identify their point of convergence and divergence with respect to the basic republican political discourse. A detailed constitutional and institutional analysis of the Islamic Republic has also been provided in an attempt to highlight their implications and interactions with regard to the previously identified principles of the republican doctrine of state. The final chapter of this project scrutinizes the role of the republican citizens and the political provisions in place to empower and protect such fundamental building blocks of the republican state.

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Post-industrial societies are distinguished by the development of knowledge and its use both as an economic commodity and as a means to create new technologies in order to attain and maintain a competitive edge. With the support of economic strength, effective institutions that include labour, product, and capital markets, and human capital, developed industrial nations have transformed their economies into knowledge-based economies (KBEs) through the allocation of funds for research and development (R&D), innovation, and technological development. The open nature of these economies with enhanced competition policies has also contributed to the development of a KBE in these particular countries. Qatar, as one of the oil-rich countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), has been focusing on strategies to diversify its economy beyond its traditional emphasis on oil and gas. Although these sources of revenue have been instrumental in the unprecedented success of the Qatari economy, even to the extent of avoiding the notion of the ‘resource curse’, the sustainability of generating wealth via alternative methods remains a challenge for Qatar and other similar countries. Indeed, the development of a KBE is perceived as such an alternative for Qatar; for which the country has initiated a number of strategies among its economic, financial, education, and regulatory sectors. This study, thus, aims to explore the notion transforming Qatar into a KBE as a means to enhance economic diversity, thereby investigating the nature of, and developments in, the macro and micro business environments of the country and its economy. The policies of the Qatari government are also similarly explored, so as to identify Qatar’s readiness to become a KBE. Further, this study aims to gauge the perceptions of Qatari university students towards the idea of a KBE, detailing their awareness of the Qatari government’s policies for such an economy and their expectations for the future of Qatar. To fulfill the research aims and objectives of this project, a quantitative research method is predominantly employed to analyse the primary data. Initially, the World Bank’s specialist Knowledge Assessment Methodology, or KAM, will be used in relation to secondary data, so as to assess Qatar’s readiness for becoming a KBE in comparison to other potential economic competitors. Despite the demonstration of Qatar’s strength arising from its economic variables, the KAM results show that when compared to other countries, Qatar faces certain challenges, including in the areas of innovation and human resources. Although the recent institutional changes have been encouraging, additional policies should be developed to reiterate these efforts. Correspondingly, developments related to education and training should also be continued in order to support this transformation into a KBE. The research was further expanded to investigate the opinions of Qataris with regard to Qatar’s need for a KBE and its readiness for this transformation; an enquiry was similarly made into these individuals’ understanding of ‘knowledge’, the concept of a KBE, and into their own efforts towards this transition. To this end, a questionnaire survey was conducted in order to gather primary data from university students; the results indicate that their awareness and attempts to develop themselves are rather limited. Further, the results illustrate that this demographic group is not absolutely convinced by the positive impact of Qatarisation, even though most of the students questioned thought that Qatar should adopt a KBE. And yet these same students’ knowledge of Qatar’s policies for the creation of a KBE was limited. Qatar’s policies for diversifying its economy should ultimately be perceived as a step in the right direction; the transition to a KBE, however, still requires further strategic planning and the bold implementation of these strategies. The economic strength of the country is considered to be a foundation on which such an aforementioned future can be built, notwithstanding the obstacles posed by human resources at present, especially when given the lack of trust displayed for the policy of Qatarisation by the participants of the questionnaire. The shortcomings in institutionalisation in the economy should also be considered as an important obstacle.

The quest for democracy in various societies has occupied modern political thinking. At the same time, the desire for democracy in developing countries has become a -, compelling issue. Iran is no exception. Many argue against this hypothesis by refening to the strong presence of Islam in Iranian society, and build their theory upon the intrinsic inconsistency between Islam and democracy. The present research attempts to challenge this assumption and examine the case of the Islamic Republic 9f Iran in pursuing democracy and its implementation: democratisation process. The inevitability of modernity as both notion and motion has made democracy the least bad way of governance. The reality of the nation-state which is politically a modern concept has incorporated functions and expectations that make democracy, not merely one option any more, but the most feasible way of governing a nation-state efficiently. The Western-liberal model of democracy is not the sole criterion for perceiving good governance. Nevertheless, non-Western attempts to reform, mainly in the Muslim societies, must not be seen as pre-determined to fail simply because reform or democracy is not indigenous. The formation of the Islamic Republic in 1979 and also the reform movement of 1997 showed a discursive development within Iranian society. Iran's troubled encounter with modernity brought about different narratives and consequences. The emergence of the liberal discourse of modernity as the first result of such an encounter failed to accommodate Iranian society and modernity and ended with a modernist but authoritative discourse. The consistent failure of secular discourse to deliver an acceptable form of modernity caused a backlash and led to the prevalence of authentic discourse ~nd profound criticism of modernity. The triumph of Islamic discourse and the installation of the concept of wilayat al-faqih theorised under Shi'ism ought to be seen as the final phase of Iran's encounter with modernity. The present experience of having a modern state with elected-although weak-government and parliament with religious (authentic) character provides the necessary ground for understanding, further practice and improvement. The analysis of the Islamic Republic's Sixth Majlis helps in establishing this hypothesis.

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