This thesis will assess the United Kingdom’s implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It will first focus on a contextual analysis of the problem of torture, examining the circumstances in which it has historically been used, philosophical and theoretical perspectives on the practice and the political aspects of torture, including its effect on international relations. This will illustrate the circumstances in which torture is used, the motivation behind it and the way in which it affects its victims. The argument will then be made that, in view of the uniquely grave nature of the practice of torture, it is insufficient for States to merely criminalise it and punish the offenders. They must actively seek to eradicate it from society and ultimately prevent it from occurring. It is against this aim that the thesis will examine the compliance of the United Kingdom with its obligations under the Convention. This examination will look first at the international regime for the prevention of torture, focusing on the work of the United Nations Committee Against Torture. The engagement of the United Kingdom with this body will be explored in detail and the argument made that more needs to be done in order to ensure that the Committee’s recommendations are put into effect and that treatment contrary to the Convention is prevented from taking place. The final part of the thesis will assess the United Kingdom’s State practice with a focus on key institutions of the State including the courts and the legislature. This part of the thesis will seek to explore the extent to which the practices of these institutions is consistent with an overall aim of preventing torture and the extent to which they show awareness of the Convention and its requirements of the Convention in the discharge of their functions. The conclusion will be drawn that, while the Human Rights Act has gone some way towards improving compliance, more needs to be done to insure a complete implementation by the United Kingdom of its obligations under the Convention and full prevention of torture. The State must actively engage with the Committee and the organs of the State must consider the Convention Against Torture in the discharge of all of their functions to ensure that these aims are achieved.

Vor dem Hintergrund der Allgemeinen Menschenrechte, der Kinderrechte und der UN-Behindertenrechtskonvention analysiert der Band Herausforderungen und Handlungsmöglichkeiten dieser normativen Ansprüche aus unterschiedlichen Disziplinen. Es werden ferner differente Erscheinungsformen von Ausgrenzung und Diskriminierung mit dem Blick auf unvollendete Menschenrechte und damit verbundene Vulnerabilitäten reflektiert. Schließlich zeigt ein Blick in unterschiedliche pädagogische Handlungsfelder und konkrete Praxisbeispiele verstärkte menschenrechtsbasierte Partizipationsmöglichkeiten auf.

Deference in international human rights law has provoked animated discussion, particularly the margin of appreciation doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights. Many commentators describe the practice of deference but do not explain how it affects judicial reasoning. Some approve characteristics of deference but do not provide a justification to defend the practice against criticism. Others regard deference as a danger to human rights because it betrays the universality of human rights or involves tribunals either failing to consider a case properly or missing an opportunity to set human rights standards. This thesis employs a different approach by focussing on deference as the practice of assigning weight to reasons for a decision on the basis of external factors. This approach draws on theories of second-order reasoning from the philosophy of practical reasoning. The thesis offers a conceptual account of deference that accords with the practice not only of the European Court of Human Rights, but also the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee. Additionally the thesis presents a normative account of deference, that the role of these tribunals entails permitting a measure of diversity as states implement international human rights standards. Deference in international human rights law then is the judicial practice of assigning weight to the respondent states’ reasoning in a case on the basis of three factors: democratic legitimacy, the common practice of states and expertise. This affects judicial reasoning by impacting the balance of reasons in the proportionality assessment. The account defended in this thesis dispels concerns that deference is a danger to human rights, whilst providing a theory that justifies the practice of the tribunals. The thesis thus provides the contours of a doctrine of deference in each of the three international human rights systems.

Cette thèse est un hommage rendu à tous les hommes et femmes qui risquent leur vie pour que l'état de droit triomphe sur l'arbitraire. Leur rôle important a été reconnu avec l'adoption de la Déclaration sur les défenseurs des droits de l'homme en 1998. Malheureusement, en Amérique latine, défendre les droits de l'homme reste synonyme de mort. Chaque jour, des défenseurs des droit de l'homme ainsi que leurs familles continuent d'être harcelés, menacés, arbitrairement détenus, voire assassinés au seul motif de leur engagement en faveur du respect des droits universels de tout être humain. La répression qu'ils subissent est multiforme et pernicieuse. Ils figurent désormais souvent parmi les principales cibles à abattre ou, en tout cas, à faire taire. Ils sont en ligne de mire malgré l'instauration de mécanismes de protection. Les Etats préfèrent criminaliser leur action alors qu'ils ont l'obligation de les protéger. / This thesis is a tribute to the women and men women who, every day, and often risking their lives, fight for law to triumph over arbitrariness. The impact and importance of the work of these people was universally recognised and legitimised when, on the 9th of December 1998, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. Unfortunately in Latin America working for human rights is still synonymous with death. Every day, Human Rights Defenders and their families continue to be harassed, threatened, arbitrarily detained and indeed murdered. The attacks that they suffer are multifaceted and pernicious ; and they are often the principal targets to be killed or at least muzzled. They are on the Frontline despite the establishement of mechanisms to protect human rights defenders. It is responsibility of States to protect the Human rights defenders who denounce the human rights violations but they prefer to criminalize their activities.

Le non-conventionnel, primat de la conflictualité contemporaine, modifie les voies utiles de son règlement juridique et militaire. De facto, à la traditionnelle dichotomie combattants et non-combattants, et aux notions obsolètes de déclaration de guerre et de guerre, se substituent une pluralité d’agresseurs et une superposition de cadres juridiques, fondement même de l’interaction des normes applicables en l’espèce, tant au niveau du droit local interne, que régional européen, ou encore international. La traduction juridique de cette confusion apparaît particulièrement dans les jurisprudences européennes et plus généralement dans la montée de l’Europe et de ses droits. Les connexions inter-juridictionnelles complexes, tant horizontales que verticales, s’illustrent particulièrement en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme, incarnant la mise en balance continue entre sécurité collective et protection des droits fondamentaux. En outre, le déplacement du centre de gravité des nouvelles conflictualités, du champ de la sécurité publique vers celui de la défense, revêt des conséquences en matière de respect des droits fondamentaux et de doctrine d’emploi des forces armées. Celles-ci sont les actrices principales de l’altération concrète du distinguo jus ad bellum, jus in bello, actionnées qu’elles sont sur le fondement de concepts nouveaux, qui sont autant de considérations à l’appui d’une refonte de modus operandi obsolètes, et motivant des interrogations relatives à l’interprétation du droit existant (lex lata) et de la nature des modifications à porter (lex ferenda) / The non-conventional, primacy of the contemporary conflicts, alters the useful ways of legal and military settlement. De facto, beyond the traditional dichotomy combattant versus non combattant, and to the obsolete notions of declaration of war and war, substitute a wide diversity of aggressors and a superposition of legal frameworks, the very basis of the interaction of applicable standards in this case, at the level of both the local internal law, the regional European law and the international law. The legal translation of this confusion figures particularly in european case law and more usually in the rise of Europe and its laws modifications. The complex inter-jurisdictional connections, horizontal and vertical, are particularly present in case of fight against terrorism embodying the continuous balancing test of the collective security and protection of fundamental laws. In addition, the shift in the centre of gravity of the new conflicts, from the scope of the public security to the defence, leads to consequences in the field of fundamental laws respect and doctrine of use of armed forces. They are the main agents of the practical weathering of the distinguo jus ad bellum, jus in bello, sued on the basis of new concepts, which are so many arguments to overhaul the obsolete modus operandi, explaining questions related to interpretation of existing law (lex lata) and the nature of the necessary modifications (lex ferenda)

The object of this thesis is to investigate the application of international law in municipal law, and more specifically to focus on international human rights law. A determination of the sources of international human rights law constitutes the point of departure. Treaties are the primary source of international human rights law, followed by customary law. Recent authority indicates that the formation of customary human rights law differs from that of customary international law in general. There are, however, also international documents on human rights not falling within the scope of the traditional sources as embodied in section 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Non-binding sources of law, or soft law - most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - are shown to play an important role in the formation of both treaties and custom and directly influence state practice. Theoretical explanations expounding the application of international law in the domestic law of states are examined, assessing their suitability for effective implementation of international human rights instruments. Since the application of international law in municipal law depends on, and is regulated by rules of domestic law, the relevant rules of legal systems which may, due to historical factors or regional proximity, impact on South Africa, are examined. State practice points to two primary methods of dealing with international law obligations in domestic law, namely transformation (associated with the dualist theory) or direct application (associated with the monist theory). The specific method of incorporation adopted by a state is often closely related to that state's constitutional system. The advantages and disadvantages associated with each particular method are related to the intricacies of individual legal systems. From an internationalist perspective the often misunderstood doctrine of direct application, has the advantage of making the intended protection afforded by human rights treaties to individuals directly enforceable by domestic courts with a minimum of state intervention. The position of international law in South Africa is assessed against this background. South Africa's constitutional history under British rule followed British law requiring legislative transformation of treaty obligations, but permitting customary law to be directly incorporated into common law. The position of international law became constitutionally regulated in South Africa with the introduction of a constitutional democracy. Drafting errors and practical difficulties experienced with the 1993 Constitution, were largely ironed out by the 1996 Constitution. The post-apartheid Constitutions introduced changes and new dimensions compared to the pre-1993 position of international law, including: the consideration of international law when interpreting the constitutionally protected human rights; the involvement of the legislature in the treaty-making process; and provisions for both transformation and direct application of treaties subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Customary international law is confirmed as forming part of South African law, and courts are obliged to interpret legislation in accordance with international law. An analysis of court decisions after 1993 reveals the following broad trends: (i) The impact of international law as part of South African law is still largely overlooked. (ii) The majority of references to international law by the courts are to international human rights agreements and decisions by international tribunals under section 39 of the Bill of Rights. (iii) The distinction between international law and comparable foreign case law, as directed by section 39, is often blurred. (iv) No distinction is made between international hard and soft law when deciding on human rights matters. (v) Courts have refrained from applying international human rights obligations which form part of South African law because they are self-executing or form part of customary international law. (vi) Binding international human rights obligations are only referred to for comparative purposes. (vii) The term "treaty" is interpreted in accordance with the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The intention to create legally binding obligations is therefore implicit. It has been the policy of the post-apartheid South African government to ratify or accede to the major international human rights agreements as swiftly as possible. The execution of this policy has, however, met with numerous problems. As a result, South Africa has to date not become party to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. Many treaties to which South Africa is a party have not yet been incorporated into South African law and compulsory reports on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are overdue. Despite the post-apartheid euphoria about the creation of a human rights culture in South Africa and the formal commitment by government to give effect to international human rights instruments, much remains to be done before South Africa can be regarded as formally complying with international human rights standards. / Law / LL. D. (Law)

Cette thèse s'inscrit dans un mouvement de reconnaissance de l'importance accrue de l'institution judiciaire, et de questionnement actuel sur la légitimité démocratique du juge. Dans ce cadre, elle enquête sur le rôle, dans la fonction et la pratique judiciaire, de l'opinion publique, largement considérée comme un élément de légitimité démocratique. Pour obtenir un éclairage plus complet sur cette question, une approche comparative est adoptée et appliquée à l'œuvre protectrice d'une cour nationale constitutionnelle et d'une cour internationale dans le domaine des droits et des libertés : la Cour suprême des États-Unis et la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme. Le raisonnement suivi est le suivant. Au niveau théorique, il s'agit de clarifier le concept protéiforme d'«opinion publique» et d'établir les différentes sources de la légitimité judiciaire, afin de déterminer si l'opinion publique peut en faire partie. Au niveau procédural, l'étude se penche sur la pratique judiciaire des deux cours, les différentes règles et pratiques qui permettent d'impliquer directement ou indirectement le public dans le processus judiciaire, que ce soit les parties, les tierces-parties, ou les médias. On se penche enfin sur la substance des décisions de justice, qui révèlent la manière dont les juges conçoivent le rôle de l'opinion publique dans la démocratie et dans l'évolution judiciaire des droits et libertés. L'étude de la substance des décisions se concentre d'une part sur la relation entre opinion publique et démocratie dans la protection de la liberté d'expression, et d'autre part sur le rôle de l'opinion publique dans l'évolution des droits des personnes homosexuelles. / This dissertation is part of a larger movement, both national and international, acknowledging the growing importance and inquiring about the democratic legitimacy of judicial institutions. In looking at the judicial office and its practice, it investigates the role of public opinion, largely considered an element of democratic legitimacy. To obtain a more complete perspective on judicial institutions and public opinion, a comparative approach is adopted and the United States Supreme Court, and the European Court of Human Rights are examined. This study adopts the following reasoning. At a theoretical level, it attempts to clarify The multifaceted concept of “public opinion” and to establish the different sources of judicial legitimacy, in order to determine whether public opinion can be considered such a source. At a process level, the study inquiries about the judicial practice of both courts, and the different rules and practices that allow for a direct or indirect involvement of the public, whether parties, third-parties, or the media. It then studies the substance of judicial decisions, which reveal judges' conception of the role of public opinion in democracy and in the judicial evolution of rights and liberties. The content-study of judicial decisions focuses on first on the relationship between public opinion and democracy in the protection of freedom of expression and second on the rote of public opinion in the evolution of the rights of homosexual persons.

The object of this thesis is to investigate the application of international law in municipal law, and more specifically to focus on international human rights law. A determination of the sources of international human rights law constitutes the point of departure. Treaties are the primary source of international human rights law, followed by customary law. Recent authority indicates that the formation of customary human rights law differs from that of customary international law in general. There are, however, also international documents on human rights not falling within the scope of the traditional sources as embodied in section 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Non-binding sources of law, or soft law - most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - are shown to play an important role in the formation of both treaties and custom and directly influence state practice. Theoretical explanations expounding the application of international law in the domestic law of states are examined, assessing their suitability for effective implementation of international human rights instruments. Since the application of international law in municipal law depends on, and is regulated by rules of domestic law, the relevant rules of legal systems which may, due to historical factors or regional proximity, impact on South Africa, are examined. State practice points to two primary methods of dealing with international law obligations in domestic law, namely transformation (associated with the dualist theory) or direct application (associated with the monist theory). The specific method of incorporation adopted by a state is often closely related to that state's constitutional system. The advantages and disadvantages associated with each particular method are related to the intricacies of individual legal systems. From an internationalist perspective the often misunderstood doctrine of direct application, has the advantage of making the intended protection afforded by human rights treaties to individuals directly enforceable by domestic courts with a minimum of state intervention. The position of international law in South Africa is assessed against this background. South Africa's constitutional history under British rule followed British law requiring legislative transformation of treaty obligations, but permitting customary law to be directly incorporated into common law. The position of international law became constitutionally regulated in South Africa with the introduction of a constitutional democracy. Drafting errors and practical difficulties experienced with the 1993 Constitution, were largely ironed out by the 1996 Constitution. The post-apartheid Constitutions introduced changes and new dimensions compared to the pre-1993 position of international law, including: the consideration of international law when interpreting the constitutionally protected human rights; the involvement of the legislature in the treaty-making process; and provisions for both transformation and direct application of treaties subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Customary international law is confirmed as forming part of South African law, and courts are obliged to interpret legislation in accordance with international law. An analysis of court decisions after 1993 reveals the following broad trends: (i) The impact of international law as part of South African law is still largely overlooked. (ii) The majority of references to international law by the courts are to international human rights agreements and decisions by international tribunals under section 39 of the Bill of Rights. (iii) The distinction between international law and comparable foreign case law, as directed by section 39, is often blurred. (iv) No distinction is made between international hard and soft law when deciding on human rights matters. (v) Courts have refrained from applying international human rights obligations which form part of South African law because they are self-executing or form part of customary international law. (vi) Binding international human rights obligations are only referred to for comparative purposes. (vii) The term "treaty" is interpreted in accordance with the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The intention to create legally binding obligations is therefore implicit. It has been the policy of the post-apartheid South African government to ratify or accede to the major international human rights agreements as swiftly as possible. The execution of this policy has, however, met with numerous problems. As a result, South Africa has to date not become party to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. Many treaties to which South Africa is a party have not yet been incorporated into South African law and compulsory reports on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are overdue. Despite the post-apartheid euphoria about the creation of a human rights culture in South Africa and the formal commitment by government to give effect to international human rights instruments, much remains to be done before South Africa can be regarded as formally complying with international human rights standards. / Law / LL. D. (Law)

Notre thèse analyse la protection internationale des droits de l'homme dans des «zones grises», définies comme des zones géographiques où l’État, souverain sur son territoire, ne peut ou ne veut pas exercer un contrôle effectif. Or, une fois l’État n'a plus de contrôle sur une partie de son territoire, les mécanismes de contrôle des droits de l'homme deviennent paralysés. La question principale à laquelle notre étude vise à répondre est la question de savoir si et comment le droit international des droits de l'homme peut s'appliquer de façon effective dans des zones hors du contrôle effectif de l’État, premier garant des droits de l'homme dans son territoire. La Première Partie a pour objectif d'analyser la question de l'applicabilité du droit international des droits de l'homme et de répondre aux questions relatives à son applicabilité ratione loci, ratione materiae et ratione personae. Les conclusions clarifient si cette branche du droit international continue de s'appliquer dans les «zones grises» et quelles sont les obligations qui lient les États, notamment en répondant à la question, connexe, de savoir à quels autres sujets les obligations relatives aux droits de l'homme sont opposables. La Deuxième Partie examine les questions relatives à la mise en œuvre des normes du droit international des droits de l'homme, c'est-à-dire la question de la responsabilité internationale pour violations des droits de l'homme et le défi de l'engagement de la responsabilité dans les mécanismes de contrôle. Notre thèse soutient que le droit international des droits de l'homme est capable d'imposer son applicabilité et sa mise en œuvre dans une telle situation imparfaite. / The present thesis analyzes the international protection of human rights in "grey zones", defined as geographical areas where the State, sovereign of its territory, is unable or unwilling to exercise effective control. However, once the State has no more control over a part of its territory, human rights monitoring mechanisms become paralyzed. The main question to which the present study aims to answer is whether and how international human rights law can effectively apply in areas out of the effective control of the State, primary guarantor of human rights in its territory. The First Part aims to analyze the question of the applicability of international human rights law and to answer to the questions related to its applicability ratione loci, ratione materiae and ratione personae. The conclusions clarify whether this branch of international law continues to apply in the "grey zones" and which are the obligations binding States while answering to the related question to which other subjects human rights obligations are opposable. The Second Part examines the questions related to the implementation of the norms of international human rights law, i.e. the question of international responsibility for human rights violations and the challenge of the engagement of the responsibility in control mechanisms. The present thesis claims that international human rights law is able to impose its applicability and its implementation in such an imperfect situation.

This thesis examines the status of amnesties and the duty to prosecute gross and systematic human rights violations in international law. The thesis begins by distinguishing amnesty from other related concepts, such as impunity, pardon and statutes of limitations and so on. Unlike these related concepts, amnesty aims to address major social or political crises in society, such as to resolve an armed conflict, allow the return of political refugees or bring about peaceful political transition. Amnesty is linked to the duty to prosecute, because it is so often in direct conflict with international law norms and standards on the duty to prosecute and to compensate victims of human rights violations. Before the First World War, amnesty was a well-established customary practice. Even where a peace treaty was silent on the mater, amnesty was implied. Compensation was also part of the regime of peace treaties, but not followed as consistently as amnesty. This practice changed dramatically after the First and Second World Wars, because, in a break with the past, the victors did not consider themselves to be on the same level as the vanquished. This resulted in the abolition of the traditional practice of granting amnesty and the demand rather that those responsible for aggression be prosecuted and compelled to pay compensation, as was the case with Germany. Since 1948, with the adoption of the United Nations' Charter, and other international human rights treaties, the power of states to grant amnesty gradually became constrained by the obligation to prosecute perpetrators of gross human rights violations and to pay compensation to the victims of war crimes. Nevertheless, this phenomenon did not put an end to the practice of states granting amnesty for gross human rights violations. Internal armed conflicts during and after the end of the Cold War, with no victors and no vanquished, made amnesty an inevitable option. A considerable number of states continue to utilise amnesty as a device for peace and reconciliation, and they have granted amnesty for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. In customary international law, there is a gap between the actual state practice and the existence of the customary norm creating a duty to prosecute. As a result, the status of the so-called "palatable amnesties" (à la South Africa), often granted as part of a truth and reconciliation process, still remains unclear in international law. This is further exacerbated by the inconsistent practice of the United Nations as the main depository and sponsor of human rights instruments. South Africa and Sierra Leone are used as case studies to illustrate this inconsistency in both state and UN practice on the status of amnesties in international law. As a result, the study proposes a balanced approach model, which is an attempt to strike a balance between accountability, political transformation and social stability in transitional democracies. The balanced approach model proceeds from the premise that the international criminal justice system is not flawless and, therefore, it is important to acknowledge its limitations, such as the lack of enforcement agencies, difficulties in the collection of reliable evidence and a lack of resources to prosecute. In terms of the model, consideration is given to (i) the need to respect the legitimacy of the political process that gives rise to the granting of amnesty; (ii) the amnesty must be proportional to the crimes committed and must be rationally connected to the aims of achieving peace and national reconciliation, the interests of justice, compensation for victims; and finally (iii) the general commitment of the state that grants amnesty to respect international law obligations, which includes the implementation of international obligations as part of municipal law and treaty monitoring obligations as preconditions for the amnesty to pass muster in the balanced approach model. In conclusion, the study proposes model Policy Guidelines on Amnesties Granted for Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations in International Law for the Assembly of States of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to take note of, and to commend to states and international courts and tribunals, leaving its content to be taken up in the normal processes of the application and development of international law. The status of the Guidelines is that of a code of conduct or guide to practice. In that sense, the Guidelines do not have the character of a binding legal instrument and will serve as the basis for the development of sound principles of international law on amnesties. / Constitutional and International Law / L.LD