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No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

The Royal Navy during the period between the end of the American Revolutionary War and the defeat of Napoleon had a record of success that was second to none, but it has long been held that this reputation was secured at the expense of its crews, who were forced to endure atrocious conditions and brutal punishments. In recent years this accusation has been challenged, and it has been argued, instead, that the punishment regime, in particular, was consonant with the criminal justice system ashore. This thesis is a contribution to the debate, specifically addressing the question of whether or not the infliction of summary punishment was administered as a measured response to misbehaviour on board or was, as has been charged, random and harsh.The research behind it included an examination of the captains’ and masters’ logs from a sample of warships of the period in order to extract the data contained within them concerning summary punishment. The literature covering the debate is examined, leading to an explanation of the objectives of the research and the methodology employed. The data from the logs is placed in context with a discussion of the nature of the punishments concerned, and the men involved in the process. Finally, the results of the analysis of the data, and especially any patterns that shed light on the nature of the response, are presented.

In 1951-52, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation established the Southern Flank, a strategy for the defence of the eastern Mediterranean in the Cold War involving Greece, Italy and Turkey. Among its many aims, the Southern Flank sought to mobilize Greece and Turkey as allies and integrate them into the Western defence system. Throughout 1950s, the alliance developed the Southern Flank and in 1959, it was finally stabilized as fractious Greek-Turkish relations were improved by the temporary settlement over Cyprus. These events are the focus of this thesis. It examines, among other things, the initial negotiations of 1951-52, the Southern Flank‟s structure and function and relative value in NATO‟s overall policy, and its response to the challenges of the eastern Mediterranean in the early Cold War. It explores not only the military aspects of the Southern Flank (e.g. the establishment of its headquarters and NATO‟s command structure; the special role of each member state; military planning and the lack of unity in command) but also the more controversial political aspects. Hence, it analyses the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, the short-lived military cooperation between these states and Yugoslavia during 1953-55 and the deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations from 1955 due to Cyprus. It also focuses on the part played by other major members of the alliance, principally the United States and Britain, in Southern Flank politics and strategy. Thus, it considers how the US and UK viewed the power balance between the three Southern Flank members and how the Americans sought to influence affairs through financial, military and technical assistance, including the construction of US bases in Greece and Turkey. More generally, the thesis also assesses the threat posed to the Southern Flank at various points by rising tensions in the Middle East.

Many senior officers in the Royal Navy of late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries saw the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as a time of dramatic social change within the officer corps. Naval and civilian commentators alike expressed concern that the virtue of birth had replaced the virtue of merit when it came to the selection of officer recruits, and that the change adversely affected discipline and subordination. This thesis seeks to test the accuracy of these observations, and modern interpretations of them, by determining when and why changes in the social make-up of the corps of “young gentlemen” took place, and the effects of those changes on naval professionalism. This study asserts that social developments in the navy’s officer corps are most transparent at the entry level. Data on the social backgrounds of more than 4500 midshipmen and quarterdeck boys, from 1761 to 1831, shows that the presence of the social elites among officer aspirants was directly affected by states of war and peace and the popularity of a naval career for well-born sons. While contemporaries saw a growing elitism among officer recruits between 1793 and 1815, the data suggests that the scions of peers and the landed gentry were more prevalent in the peacetime service of 1771 and again after 1815, when the weight of social and political connections again became determining factors in the selection of officer trainees. The cultural changes that influenced the popularity of a naval career for young “honorables” between the Seven Years’ War and Parliamentary Reform highlight the social and political pressures that were exerted on recruiting captains and the Admiralty. Together they help to explain developments in the social make-up of the navy’s future-officer corps and the relationship between the naval microcosm and British society at large.

The present thesis is a study of the reality – and the myth – of the ‘Welsh soldier’ in the later middle ages. The final defeat of the Princes of Gwynedd in 1283 was formalised by the division of the principality of Gwynedd and the ‘feudalisation’ of its territory set out in the statute of Wales proclaimed at Rhuddlan in 1284. As Morris long ago demonstrated, and as Davies and others have since reaffirmed the ‘wars of independence’ – at least in the thirteenth century – were conducted as much between Welshmen as between ‘the Welsh’, the Marchers and the English crown. The picture of Edward I’s pragmatism driven by ‘imperial’ principle – ironically achieving Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s aim of taking Wales into the ambit of the feudal and political structure of England – without Llywelyn painted by Glyn Roberts is appropriate.1 The integration of Welshmen into Edward I’s military machine was swift, but required innovations of military organisation, chiefly, the Commission of Array. Most Welshmen served at a low level in English armies, as archers, and consequently, are far harder to trace as individuals before the regular survival of full muster accounts in the years after 1369.though global figures can be deduced more readily for the armies of Edward I, Edward II and Edward III, more precise detail cannot. Despite this, patterns of the service of Welshmen, both from the Shires of the principality of Wales and the Welsh March can be generally described over the period covered by this thesis. The concentration of military historians on the formation of royal armies has downplayed the role of military lordship and its importance in the March of Wales. Similarly, while the events of the Glyn Dŵr rebellion (1400-1410) are well understood, and the consequences of the rebellion on Welsh society have excited some interest, the immediate impact on the Welsh as soldiers has not been fully explored. The place of the Welsh at the battle of Agincourt provides a bridge between the chronological spine of this thesis and the consideration of what might be termed the cultural impression of the medieval Welsh soldier. Thanks largely to Shakespeare’s depiction of Captain Fluellen in Henry V (1599) the Welsh are inextricably linked with this battle, though contemporary evidence suggests the sum of their involvement was extremely limited. Ironically perhaps, in fifteenth century Welsh culture, Agincourt is the silent battle; uniquely there are no poetic references to this battle in a culture where war against France and the earlier battles of Crécy and Poitiers were staple metaphors for the prowess of individuals and as a source of patronage to the bards themselves. The image of Welshmen at war, and particularly, their skill with the longbow, appears to owe much to Gerald of Wales whose accounts of the men of Gwent as archers in the twelfth century has become the province of folklore rather than a reflection of historical reality. There is a striking difference between the Welsh account of their experience at war and the perspective of outsiders. Fundamentally this was because most external commentators saw the Welsh as an undifferentiated mass. Our evidence for the corresponding Welsh view is based upon literature praising the actions of individuals. The majority of their opponents, in Scotland and in France, but also in much of England, the only Welshmen who would ordinarily be encountered were soldiers. The difference in impression was preserved by later observers and the staple depiction of the Welsh as primitive and backward, ‘Wild men from the woods’ in the words of the author of the Vita Edwardi Secundi would have been recognisable to the pamphleteers of the seventeenth century who were themselves describing soldiers. The aim of this thesis therefore is to bring together these views of the ‘Welsh Soldier’ to give a better understanding of his role in later medieval warfare, and the place of war in fourteenth and early fifteenth century Welsh society.

Peter Rainier was the longest serving commander on the East Indies station by some margin, and the longest serving commander of any of the navy’s stations in the long Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. This thesis illustrates the issues that needed to be addressed on this station and considers how successfully Rainier dealt with them. It will also suggest that he remains so little known amongst the pantheon of British admirals of the Napoleonic era because the traditional measure of value of a naval commander is success in battle. Although Rainier had a reputation as a fighting captain, as a commander in chief he saw action only in combined operations. Perhaps it is time to acknowledge that skill other than fighting battles is important. Rainier’s thorough knowledge of the station, his capacity to work with people over whom he had no authority, his ability to protect a rapidly expanding and wealth creating trade, and his administrative and financial professionalism, enabled him to play an important, if secondary, part in the establishment of the Second British Empire which, arguably, had a far greater impact on British history than all but the most seminal battle. The East Indies Station had a number of unique elements that heavily influenced the actions of its commander in chief. The two-way communication process between Rainier and the Admiralty could take a whole year. Its thirty million plus square mile area meant that communication and logistics within the station needed long term planning. It was still relatively unfamiliar to British navigators, and charting it was still in progress. The relationship between the admiral and the East India Company, the official government of British India, could make or break the success of both the navy and the Company. With his diplomatic skills and wide experience of the station, Rainier worked with its officials and army commanders to defend current British possessions in the East Indies and India, to extend them to such an extent that, by his return to Britain, they were the foundation of the second British Empire. During this period the centre of power on the station moved eastwards as the value of trade with China overtook that with India – Rainier had to take this into account when allocating his resources. The constraints on navigation and timing caused by the narrow channels in the East Indies and by the weather made it easier for enemy vessels to know by which route the British trade would travel. Rainier had to cover potential threats off Macao, through the Straits of Bali, Banda, Sunda and Malacca, in the Bay of Bengal, off Madras, around Ceylon and between Bombay and the Persian Gulf. When possible he had to cover the French naval base at Mauritius. With a limited number of vessels, of which some were always in need of repair, Rainier was often on the defensive. Acquisition of new colonies opened new trading routes which, together with his commitment to trade protection, led to a steady, if often unregulated, expansion in British trade. His attention to detail and his management skills also allowed him to establish an efficient logistics, victualling and financial operation. What Rainier achieved has to be seen in the context of the complexity of his station and the role of the East India Company. Then it stands far above the level of its absolute achievement. This thesis shows that Rainier’s organization and man management skills, unruffled nature, sound strategic judgement made him a “Safe Pair of Hands”, ideal for such a detached but important command.