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The aim of this thesis is to examine logistic influences on the design, conduct and outcome of British operations in Burma in order to demonstrate the relative importance of logistics to the final victory. The thesis comprises three parts. Part one looks at the British retreat from Burma in 1942, as well as India’s economic and military position at that time, in order to establish the foremost logistic problems that had to be solved before the war could be taken back to the Japanese. India was ill-fitted to become the strategic base for further operations; the operational lines of communication in the north east of the country were inadequate; and, at the tactical level, suitable means of maintaining forces in the jungle were lacking. Part two examines the building of the base infrastructure in India; the improvement of the lines of communication; and the evolution of air, water and animal-borne supply during 1942 and 1943. Part three assesses the impact of these developments on the conduct and outcome of operations in 1944 and 1945. It shows that the strategic timetable of the campaign until 1944 was dictated mainly by the progress achieved in assembling the resources and solving the problems identified in part one. It reveals that the direction of operations thereafter was determined as much by the alignment and capacity of the lines of communication, and the need to control them, as by strategic intentions and enemy actions. It demonstrates the crucial importance of the methods developed in tactical supply to the achievement of success on the battlefield. Overlaid on all the above, the thesis indicates that the priority attached to maintaining and expanding the supply line to China, as well as the shortage of amphibious and air transport resources, had a decisive impact on the strategic and operational conduct of the campaign.

This major historical project concerning the German army during the First World War will provide an original, revisionist and complete series of carefully researched books, which will equip the Anglophone audience for the first time with a detailed description from the German perspective of all the major campaigns and battles along the Western Front 1914 – 1918. Each book, five of which have so far been published, stands alone, but complements those already written and those still to be produced. The books are a synthesis of a narrative historical approach, analysis and original archival materials. A major preoccupation since the research programme began some nine years ago, has been to devise ways of dealing with the loss of the bulk of the Prussian archives when Potsdam was bombed by the Royal Air Force in April 1945. The solution, which has permitted work of complete originality and lasting value to be produced, has been to exploit fully the resources of the surviving archives of the non-Prussian contingents of the old German army and to blend the analysis of these documents with material derived from the approximately 1,600 regimental and other histories which were written during the interwar period. In the process, maximum use has been made of predominantly Prussian published personal accounts, so as to compensate as far as possible for the absence of so much other primary documentation. The single book and selected chapters from two other books which comprise this submission represent only a fraction of the work I have achieved to date, but they are strong exemplars of my approach, argumentation and unique revisionist version of four turbulent years on the decisive front of the war.

This thesis analyses whether the British Army’s doctrinal approach for countering insurgency is still valid in the light of the war in Iraq. Why is this important? Insurgency remains a prevalent form of instability. In the absence of a major conventional threat to British security, it is one which is likely to confront the Army for the foreseeable future. If British doctrine for counterinsurgency has been invalidated by the campaign in Iraq, this will have profound implications for the way the Army approaches, and is organized, equipped and trained for counterinsurgency in the future. If the doctrine is found to be valid, another explanation has to be found to account for the conduct and outcome of British operations in Southern Iraq between 2003 and 2009. Using historiographical techniques, the thesis examines the principal influences on extant British doctrine, developed in 1995. It analyzes the principal British manuals, the influence on doctrine of the campaigns in Malaya and Northern Ireland and the theories of Sir Robert Thompson and Gen. Sir Frank Kitson in order to distil a ‘British Approach,’ against which both doctrine and the campaign in Iraq are judged. It examines the course of operations in Southern Iraq to determine the validity of Counter Insurgency Operations, and uses the U.S. Army’s experience in developing and applying new doctrine in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 as a comparator. The thesis concludes that there was a dichotomy between theory and practice: British doctrine provided a valid theory for counterinsurgency, yet British commanders followed it only in part to achieve, at best, mixed results. Conversely, U.S. commanders applied their new doctrine, based on British theory, to great effect. While British doctrine may be valid, the issue was the extent to which it had been assimilated.

In the contemporary era, the military forces of a state are important as an ingredient of a state's power to defend itself or as the most significant instrument for achieving its foreign policy goals abroad. This thesis provides an account of the roles and functions of the American and Russian amphibious forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Historically, amphibious forces were, in some aspects, seen as an amalgamation of army and navy or air force, thus their status was threatened by the other services or politicians in the matter of the allocation of national resources. However, during the Cold War, the two cases examined in this thesis had enormously contributed to the promotion of their national power reflecting both the geographical realities and the two blocs' strategic configurations as a means of deterrence or coercive diplomacy. In addition, the USMC has firmly occupied its status in the post-Cold War era as one of the most effective forces in achieving US foreign policy objectives. This thesis tests the conditioning factors of amphibious force buildup using a total of 6 variables at two levels: (1) general variables; international/ regional security environments and maritime dominion, (2) specific independents variables selected from the US national strategic directives; national interests/foreign policy, military strategy/policy and maritime strategy/policy. These variables are employed in order to explain how they affected the rise and fall of the two cases, and they provide the background of what kinds of roles and functions they demanded from the amphibious forces. On the bases of these explanations, this thesis sets out how the two amphibious forces contributed to obtaining their countries foreign policy objectives throughout three periods: until the end of the Vietnam War, until the end of the Cold War, and in the post-Cold War era. With time and the transitions of the general and specific independent variables, the roles and functions of amphibious forces were enormously changed. For example, the USMC moved from being a means of deterrence against Soviet expansionism during the Cold War, to a trouble-shooter reacting to any kinds of international and regional conflicts in the post-Cold War era. In the final chapter, the thesis evaluates the relationship between the examined variables and their effects on the rise and fall of amphibious forces after summarizing the worth of amphibious forces derived from their possession while waging a war. Even though there are some additional factors influencing the amphibious forces buildup, the direction of a national strategy has already included all environmental and constraining factors in the development of a policy decision-making system. Moreover, with the development of international and regional organisations, a state's military forces buildup cannot help considering the others' trends, particularly those of a potential enemy or alliance. Consequently, the decision for a state to build up its amphibious force mainly depends on the relevant state's geo-strategic condition, i.e., a necessity to project military power across the sea. Nowadays, the USMC is a shining example of how a state employs its amphibious force in achieving its national interest. In my view, the American legal protection regarding its size and organisation by the constitutional legislation of 1952 was one of the most important prime movers for the present development. In fact, what size of amphibious force a state possesses is a matter of how it allocates its national resources. However, once a state keeps its amphibious force, it is necessary to guarantee its status in order to maximize its usefulness.

This dissertation argues that in the years immediately following the Second World War, the United States Army created a set of intellectual, organizational, and ultimately institutional processes, which are essential to military innovation. Prior to the Second World War, innovation in the army had remained isolated, ad hoc, and difficult to harness towards a common goal. That changed substantively in the period after the war. Unlike most studies of military innovation, this work does not follow the efforts of a single genius but rather three interrelated activities that when fully developed provide the institutional foundations for an ability to change. First, the army adopted the field of operations research as an essential element of military analysis and decision-making. Second, the army created a set of activities known collectively as 'combat developments', where new ideas moved through a deliberate process of deliberation, analyses, testing, and prototyping in order to deliver a new military capability to the field. Finally, this dissertation describes the modernization of officer education and the change in doctrine development from a focus on near-term doctrine for a mobilizing force to forward-looking doctrine appropriate to a standing force in a time of technological change. Most historians have judged the army of early Cold War to be an innovative failure with a readiness crisis at the beginning of the Korean War, a spectacular failure with its Pentomic concept, and its supposed inability to anticipate and prepare for large-scale counterinsurgencies in the 1960s. However, as this dissertation demonstrates, it was during this same period that more fundamental changes occurred that set the pattern for how the institution would change over the course of the remainder of the century.

The thesis examines aspects of the work of three departments in Britain responsible for the conduct of war, the ordnance, the army and the navy during the period 1739-54. Similarities are observed in the size and structure of their staffs. An examination of the changes in procedure in the most important areas indicates the extent to which the departments were critical of their own performance. The measures taken touched on fundamental difficulties but were palliatives rather than lasting solutions. A more objective assessment of how effectively the departments coped with the challenge of war is attempted. It appears that, as with many other wars which Britain entered after a long period of peace, the ordnance, army and navy were not adequately prepared for war. They experienced both a crisis of confidence and a real crisis in the first two years. They then took measures to deal with the most pressing problems, and proceeded to adopt expedient measures before rushing into peacetime tranquillity. The analysis of the performance of the armed forces serves as a background to establish what evidence in administrative fact there was for the claim made by the parliamentary opposition after the war that measures taken to strengthen discipline in the army were not justified. There was sufficient evidence of slackness and abuse in the army to induce a stern commander in chief to take corrective action and a dutiful Secretary at War to assist him. Such measures were consistent with trends in the articles of war. Reforms were initiated prior to 1748, before the Duke of Cumberland could be accused of furthering his ambitions to become Regent. Nevertheless measures were pursued to an unprecedented extent and with a zeal not apparent in the period before 1748. A more general assessment on the working of the various offices would be that although there were examples of incompetence and slackness, there is nothing to suggest that administration was conducted in an unprofessional way by contemporary standards.

This thesis examines the role of Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) in the evolution of British policy towards wartime resistance in Axis-occupied Albania and Kosovo. It shows how and why Britain came to support communist elements of’ the Albanian resistance to the extent that it did, and challenges a theory that holds British communists and leftists at SOE headquarters responsible for effecting that support. The principal sources for this study are former SOE personnel, recently declassified SOE files and other hitherto untapped records. Together they illuminate SOE’s operating methods and influence on policy-makers to a greater extent than existing literature on the subject. They suggest that attempts may have been made inside SOE headquarters to manipulate the flow of information from the field to higher authority. Yet they confirm, too, that the conduct and politics of SOE staff officers had little effect on policy. The key decisions that favoured the Albanian communists were taken above the heads of SOE and to meet short-term strategic requirements and were based on an accurate assessment of the military situation on the ground. This thesis contends that Britain’s Support for Albania’s communists is best understood when placed in the broader context of Allied wartime strategy and British foreign policy. From 1940, the course and direction of SOE operations in Albania were fashioned by military requirements and constrained by the priorities of British diplomats. These factors helped ensure that, once committed to working with the Albanian resistance, Britain never pursued anything other than an impartial policy of arming all Albanians, regardless of their politics, who were genuinely engaged in action against the Axis. The communist-led ‘Partisans’ received the bulk of British support because few other Albanians, despite prolonged efforts by SOE to persuade them to come out to fight, proved willing or able to put up resistance.

Italy became one of the major exporters of arms by the early 1980s, behind only the United States, the Soviet Union, and France. Although its position was later overtaken, it remained one of Europe's main producers and suppliers, without the presence of pronounced military and foreign policy ambitions at the state level. The military industries grew as a result of Italy's close association with other Western and in particular the American defence establishment beginning in the late 1940s. The Italians had access to some of the most advanced military technology through co-production and licence arrangements with its senior allies. By the 1970s, the defence area became the fastest growing sector of the Italian economy when markets were exploited mainly in the Third World. Although about two-thirds of the industry was state-owned, Italian businessmen acted independently in selling arms through Italian trade networks which thrived with very little government direction or intervention. The absence of government assistance actually appeared to favour the export of Italian weapons, because the lack of interest in the sector also meant that Italy maintained perhaps the most lenient export legislation in the West. As the industry expanded, manufacturers availed themselves increasingly of representatives of the foreign trade ministry, the secret services and military attaches abroad in the promotion of Italian war equipment. And as Italy came into the circle of the world's major economic powers, its politicans attempted for a time to adopt the defence industry as a tool of international prestige. However supporters of the industry did not resolve the contradiction between the low priority Italy continued to give to defence and foreign policy, and the success of the country's industrialists in supplying arms to areas of tension. As business began to decline sharply in the late 1980s for Italy's defence firms, industrialists turned to the possibility of reconversion programs.

The historiography on the conduct of British military operations, 1914-1918, is geographically narrow in focus, concentrating predominately on the actions and performance of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France and Belgium. This thesis will, to an extent, attempt to fill this gap in British military history by examining the military experience of one territorial division, the 52nd Lowland, which fought in three separate theatres: Gallipoli (June 1915- January 1916), Egypt and Palestine (February 1916 - March 1918), and the Western Front (April - November 1918). It will seek to answer one principal question, namely: how, and to what extent, did the military effectiveness of the 52nd (Lowland) Division improve during the First World War? However, in order to provide a coherent and differentiated approach to answering this question, five sub-questions will also be posed, relating to infantry tactics and techniques, training, morale and unit cohesion, combined arms warfare and the operational context in which the division was employed. These questions, in addition to other issues such as the division's Scottish identity, will help focus attention on the complexity of the 'learning curve' on which the division found itself. As such, the experience of the 52nd (Lowland) Division provides an ideal case study by which it can be ascertained whether the learning process of the British Army in the First World War was centralised, and hence 'universal', or whether the tactics of units outside the Western Front developed independently of the BEF.