The Corps of Marines 1755-1802 (after 1802, Royal Marines) was the smallest of the three military services of the late eighteenth century British Armed Nation. Because of this, their history has largely been marginalised - or if dealt with, only in broad three hundred year studies. However, their importance has been largely underestimated. With the rise in the late eighteenth century of a more coherent ‘Blue-Water Strategy’, classified later by some historians as a uniquely ‘British Way in Warfare’, there was a need to have an operational organisation from which to implement Britain’s grand strategy. The two other contemporary military organizations (Army and Navy) were too large, had internal resistance to, or simply had one-dimensional geographic identification which prevented the full pure operational implementation of British amphibious power. With the dawn of the Seven Years War the government gave this operational priority to the Navy, which began in earnest with the formation of the British Marine Corps. The Navy, and Marines, were able to do this by constructing an operational doctrine and identity for its new Marine Corps. With the forty-seven year construction of its operational doctrine and identity, the Marines not only assisted in the implementation of British grand strategy, but also were pivotal in the protection of the empire. This dissertation is separated into two distinct parts. The first part outlines the skeleton of the Marines; their past formations, administration and manpower construct. The second part outlines the trials and tribulations of construction and institutionalisation of the Marine Corps within the British nation of the late-eighteenth century. This part reveals the non-combat usage, operational development and imperial rapid reaction force aspects of the Marines. Marines were to carry out many protection and security related duties on land and at sea. Because of this they were given direct access to weapons which in the unfortunate event of mutiny might be used against the men. Naval and amphibious combat were the main justifications for why the Marine Corps existed to begin with. Marines were to develop their own special ‘targeted’ suppression fire and a reliance on the bayonet for both of these operations. Importantly Empire; its maintenance, expansion, and protection was an essential element of the Marines existence. Marines were to become an imperial rapid reaction force that could be sent anywhere a naval ship was and used to suppress disorders. Identity was the tool of three powers (Public, Admiralty and Marine Corps) in their construction of this body of men. Marines’ identity allowed them to be relied upon for a multitude of duties, including the basic protection of order on ship. By understanding all of these areas not only will it expand historical scholarship on how the British state constructed and implemented its policy decisions, but also how an organisation creates and validates its own purpose of existence.

This thesis examines the strategic leadership, and the high level direction, of the Royal Air Force’s contribution to the strategic air offensive against Germany. It takes the conceptual thinking, the organisational aspects and the leadership required to bring it into being, from its inception in the First World War through to 1945. The thesis uses modern understanding of strategic (or senior) leadership as an analytical tool. The realm of strategic leadership is complex, and ambiguous, and the senior leaders required high levels of intellectual capacity to cope with the survival of the force and its subsequent rapid to meet the rising threat from Germany. The senior leaders, political and military, acknowledged that their methods of warfare must be just, and the thesis examines the legality and morality of the planning and conduct of the offensive. A key facet of strategic leadership is the setting of the vision and purpose of the enterprise and the thesis examines the challenges that arose from the competing views on how the offensive should be waged. Genuine strategic leadership requires dexterity in working at the interfaces with other organisations, or Allies, and the thesis examines the complexities of the Combined Bomber Offensive and Overlord.

The belief that Scotland showed undue patriotism by providing a high proportion of volunteers in 1914-16 needs to be looked at in a new light. While the New Armies of 1914-16 may have been volunteer in concept, they were not volunteer in actuality, and, while there was no doubt a proportion of men in Scotland, as elsewhere in the British Empire, who were prepared to come forward for purely altruistic or 'patriotic' ideals, the majority enlisted for more practical or realistic reasons. External forces either pushed or pulled those men and enticed or forced them to enlist. Previous analyses have been primarily top down. We know how many men served, and with what units, but not why. This thesis is an investigation of Scottish recruitment from the bottom up, to determine whether or not those who enlisted came from any particular section of Scottish society. This investigates and explains the driving forces behind voluntary recruitment in Scotland, August 1914 - December 1915, its methods, course taken, and its impact on the country as a whole.

The topic of my thesis is “The campaigns of the Norman dukes of southern Italy to Byzantium, in the years between 1071 and 1108 A.D.” As the title suggests, I am examining all the main campaigns conducted by the Normans against Byzantine provinces, in the period from the fall of Bari, the Byzantine capital of Apulia and the seat of the Byzantine governor (catepano) of Italy in 1071, to the Treaty of Devol that marked the end of Bohemond of Taranto’s Illyrian campaign in 1108. My thesis, however, aims to focus specifically on the military aspects of these confrontations, an area which for this period has been surprisingly neglected in the existing secondary literature. My intention is to give answers to a series of questions, of which only some of them are presented here: what was the Norman method of raising their armies and what was the connection of this particular system to that in Normandy and France in the same period (similarities, differences, if any)? Have the Normans been willing to adapt to the Mediterranean reality of warfare, meaning the adaptation of siege engines and the creation of a transport and fighting fleet? What was the composition of their armies, not only in numbers but also in the analogy of cavalry, infantry and supplementary units? While in the field of battle, what were the fighting tactics used by the Normans against the Byzantines and were they superior to their eastern opponents? However, as my study is in essence comparative, I will further compare the Norman and Byzantine military institutions, analyse the clash of these two different military cultures and distinguish any signs of adaptations in their practice of warfare. Also, I will attempt to set this enquiry in the light of new approaches to medieval military history visible in recent historiography by asking if any side had been familiar to the ideas of Vegetian strategy, and if so, whether we characterise any of these strategies as Vegetian?

'To bewilder the enemy and mislead him continually as to our real positions and attentions is one of our most hopeful tasks and to do this ingenuity, imagination and daring are required.'(Ronald Penrose, 1941, Home Guard Manual of Camouflage, p.13) This thesis approaches the cultures and geographies of military conflict, charting the history of military camouflage through a multi-faceted biography of this technology’s life-path. By studying the scientific biography of Dr Hugh Cott (1900-1987), eminent zoologist and skilful artist turned camoufleur in WWII, entwined with the fragmentary mobile biographies of other camouflage practioners, including artists, animals and even a magician, the sites and spacings of camouflage’s life-path from the late-nineteenth century into the Desert War are traced. The military’s enrolment of diverse outside specialists practised in visual literacy is examined to reveal that technological development led to transformations, not only in military knowledge, but also in the militarism of knowledges such as science and art. Moving through the scientists’ fieldsite, the committee boardroom, the military training site and the soldiers’ battlefield, this thesis uncovers the history of a most ambiguous military invention, exposing its darker patterning and thus subverting a long-dominant narrative of camouflage as solely a protective technology. Furthermore, this camouflage biography is narrated from the perspective of the technology’s inventors and practioners as a means to encounter the situated and also embodied nature of technological innovation in military conflict. It demonstrates that, as camouflage transformed battlefields into unsettling theatres of war, there were lasting consequences not only for knowledge and technology, but also for both the ethics of battle and the individuals enrolled in this process. Overall, this geographically structured biography explores how camouflage is a jarring technology, combining aesthetic and artistic appreciation with complex scientific theory, to guileful and deadly effect.

Counter-insurgency assumed a status during the twentieth century as one of the British military‟s fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was accumulated after World War Two, as the small wars of decolonisation offered the army of a fading imperial power the opportunity to regularly deploy against an irregular enemy. Yet this quantity of experience has been misguidedly conflated with quality. This thesis holds that the British, far from being the counter-insurgent exemplars that history has benevolently cast them, have in fact consistently proven to be slow learners and slow strategic burners in the realm of counter-insurgency warfare. The case study-based nature of this thesis, utilising the chronologically and geographically dispersed examples of Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South Yemen (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish „Troubles‟ (1969-79), culminates with an analysis of the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in southern Iraq (2003-09). This thesis will blend historical narrative with critical analysis in order to establish a new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse British inertia in counter-insurgency and help unpack the mythology of inherent British competence in the realm of irregular warfare. Three major dimensions emerge. These elements constitute a „Tri-Partite Counter-Insurgency Model‟, and were carefully selected as comprising the major causal and impacting factors contributing to success or failure in counter-insurgency, and were settled upon after an exhaustive review of primary and secondary literature relating to counter-insurgency, both historical and doctrinal. The Tri-Partite Model is constructed by three interactive and interdependent factors: the counter-insurgent, the insurgent, and the international political context.

The intention of this thesis is to investigate the circumstances and background surrounding the early development and deployment of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), Britain's clandestine secret service created by Winston Churchill in 1940 to 'set Europe ablaze.' It will examine the climate in which SOE was created, the feasibility of the tasks it was expected to perform and the relationships it established with Churchill, the Cabinet Office, the Chiefs of Staff, the Foreign Office, the Admiralty and Army, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Combined Operations. It will examine how these organisations succeeded or failed to work towards a common wartime objective. The focus of the thesis is concerned primarily with the political moves and counter-moves in London that dominated the early years of SOE's six year existence. It will concentrate therefore upon 1940-1942, the critical early years before planning for the Second Front 'militarised' SOE's clandestine role. There is thus little reference to SOE in The Balkans, in Holland or the Middle East or to the actual deployment and modus operandi of SOE agents in the field. Their stories of courage and betrayal, of penetration, capture or evasion are mentioned only in so far as they illuminate the struggle to establish a wider SOE credibility in London. The single exception to this is Operation Frankton, the 'Cockleshell Heroes' raid on Bordeaux shipping in December 1942. The planning, execution and result of this raid were determined by Combined Operations' relationship with SOE and led to an outcome that was shaped by SOE's sense of secrecy, rivalry and political encirclement. This thesis will attempt to unravel those critical and complex relationships.

Cicero‘s value as a military commentator has traditionally been obscured by his reputation as an unmilitary figure. This focus ignores the considerable quantity – and quality – of references to military matters in his writings, as well as the engagement demanded by his public profile as a senior senator and advocate during the war-torn final decades of the Republic. As a participant-witness writing as events unfolded, he provides unrivalled insight into developing contemporary issues from an equally unrivalled civilian/domestic perspective. Far from precluding meaningful discussion, this perspective draws attention to the wider consequences of the activities of the army, from their symbolic representation of Rome‘s might to their impact on domestic stability and role in imperial expansion. This thesis explores Cicero‘s contribution to the militarized culture of the late Republic, bringing together his military-themed comments in the first major study of its kind. Chapter 1 sets the scene with an examination of his military service, demonstrating that it met the standards of the day and identifying characteristics of his outlook that can be linked directly to his experience. Chapter 2 investigates his engagement with Rome‘s military heritage by way of his use of military exempla, specifically the priorities indicated by his choice and description of these figures. Chapter 3 presents a similar assessment of his relationships with contemporary military figures, noting the effect of their political influence on the interest he took in their military responsibilities. Chapters 4 and 5 assess his theory concerning military matters in the domestic and foreign spheres, respectively. Both highlight the focus on ethics which sets Cicero‘s theory apart from that of his contemporaries. Finally,chapter 6 addresses the tension between civic and military values in the previous chapters, contextualizing his pro-civic bias as a reaction to military despotism rather than anti-militarism for its own sake. The analysis of these themes confirms Cicero‘s awareness of military matters as well as his contemporary authority as a commentator. It moreover highlights the historical value of his remarks as the rhetorical product of a civilian context and an alternative discourse about the relationship between the army and the state. Although his views are broadly comparable to those of contemporary authors, his coverage of associated domestic concerns is not. The end result is an account of military matters which complements conventional military histories and manuals of military science, and deserves to be taken seriously as military commentary.

The Third Battle of Ypres was officially terminated by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig with the opening of the Battle of Cambrai on 20 November 1917. Nevertheless, a comparatively unknown set-piece attack – the only large-scale night operation carried out on the Flanders front during the campaign – was launched twelve days later on 2 December. This thesis, a necessary corrective to campaign narratives of what has become popularly known as ‘Passchendaele’, examines the course of events from the mid-November decision to sanction further offensive activity in the vicinity of Passchendaele village to the barren operational outcome that forced British GHQ to halt the attack within ten hours of Zero. A litany of unfortunate decisions and circumstances contributed to the profitless result. At the tactical level, a novel hybrid set-piece attack scheme was undermined by a fatal combination of snow-covered terrain and bright moonlight. At the operational level, the highly unsatisfactory local situation in the immediate aftermath of Third Ypres’ post-strategic phase (26 October-10 November) appeared to offer no other alternative to attacking from the confines of an extremely vulnerable salient. Perhaps the most tragic aspect of the affair occurred at the strategic level, where Haig’s earnest advocacy for resumption of the Flanders offensive in spring 1918 was maintained despite obvious signs that the initiative had now passed to the enemy and the crisis of the war was fast approaching.

From the Italian declaration of war on 10 June 1940 through to the end of December 1944, the British and their allies waged a major campaign against Axis shipping in the Mediterranean. Uniquely for the British, this campaign took the form of a combined arms offensive throughout its conduct, and utilized all four methods of attacking shipping; surface vessels, submarines, aircraft and mine warfare. This thesis approaches the campaign thematically, examining each of the four methods individually. The priority given to the campaign, the forces and equipment available throughout, the tactics used and their development, the successes achieved in numbers and tonnage of merchant vessels sunk and the losses in numbers and casualties are all considered for each method. By examining these factors and the relevant quantitative data, the efficacy of each form of attack is determined and a final comparison of the four different methods made. The thesis concludes that overall, torpedo aircraft were the most effective method due to their ratio of high success and low number of personnel casualties, despite considerable losses of aircraft. Submarines were also very successful but ultimately more costly. The thesis demonstrates that mine warfare might well have achieved significant results had a greater priority been placed on it and that surface vessels no longer retained the ability to operate successfully for sustained periods in an anti-shipping role unless in an area of aerial and naval superiority.