Sir Michael Howard has observed that Douglas Haig was a military manager in the mould of Ulysses S. Grant and Dwight D. Eisenhower rather than one of the “Great Captains” of military legend. Unfortunately, Howard did not elaborate. To date, this crucial aspect of Haig’s role on the Western Front has not been explored. The contention of this thesis is that Haig was an exceptional military manager who pursued the organising principle of unity-of-effort within the BEF on the Western Front to facilitate the defeat of the German Army in concert with the Allies. In 1909, Haig established unity-of-effort as the first principle of war organization in FSR-II.1 Haig did not define the precept possibly in the belief that it was a commonplace. However, a study to establish the contemporary understanding has revealed that unity-of-effort was, and is, the raison d’être of all forms of human organization including the military. It was regarded as a tangible and effective principle and not a mere rhetorical gesture or oratorical flourish. Its nature was immutable, and uniquely coordinative. Unity-of-effort found expression in its compound character, which had distinct mental, physical and moral components, specific to each organization. The principle was considered to be a normative ideal, and not an absolute standard. Haig strove to optimise unity-of-effort by developing operational, organizational and administrative doctrine in pursuit of unity-of-mental-effort; by inculcating the teachings of doctrine through progressive training methods to achieve unity-of-physical-effort; and by promoting the will to fight through sustained morale and discipline to attain unity-of-moral-effort. Haig managed the process to attain unity-of-effort through the coordinative function of the General Staff.

Casualties during the First World War were far higher than had been anticipated in pre-war planning. They required rapid replacement in order to maintain operational effectiveness. This Thesis considers the provision and management of British Other Rank replacements for Infantry battalions on the Western Front. The initial influx of volunteers meant a much larger Army, which in turn required an increased number of draft-finding units and changes to reinforcement procedures for its maintenance. It has previously been assumed that these changes, together with the introduction of conscription, destroyed the previous cohesion of regiments. A chronological approach is used in order to trace the evolution of changes. Although predominantly pitched at the management level, implicit in this examination are the effects of political decisions together with the impact on battalions of changes in the drafting and reinforcement process. Amongst the conclusions reached are that there is little or no evidence that the Government actively withheld reinforcements. Analysis of details of soldiers of selected Infantry battalions from the English/Welsh Marches also indicates that, despite the growing scarcity of men, drafts continued to be provided to a large extent from Western Command even at the end of the war.

This thesis concerns the mobilisation of children who lived within a clearly defined area of Scotland known as the 42nd Regimental Area during the Great War. It asserts that while these children lived through a time of enormous national and local upheaval, the majority of this numerically significant but often overlooked section of the population in terms of Great War studies were far from being helpless witnesses to the conflict on the Home Front or even passive bystanders, but were instead overwhelmingly reasonably well informed supporters of and valued net contributors to the British war effort. This thesis takes the form of a concentrated regional study, drawing heavily both on local sources and the holdings of the four Local Authority archives involved as it traces the evolution of children’s involvement in support work from their initial self-mobilisation to the eventual effective adult capture and direction of their work in the national interest. It takes the shape of a descriptive account of the local children’s war support activities which runs in parallel with analysis of the form of their physical and mental mobilisation and deployment, the limitations placed on that process, the sources of their motivation and an estimate of the extent of their financial contribution to the British war effort. This thesis attempts to strike and maintain an ongoing balance between the need to deal directly with the lived experience of local children while relating that same experience to the broader issues which dominate the historiography of the Great War on the Home Front. The final product is intended to expand current understanding of the shape of children’s mobilisation during the Great War through a study of the processes involved as well as the extent and effectiveness of that movement in one Scottish Regimental Area.

The Tenth Cruiser Squadron provided a vital element to the Blockade of Germany, patrolling the seas between northwest Scotland, Iceland and Greenland. It was the longest continuous naval operation of the war lasting from 1914-1917. The Squadron’s resources were armed merchant cruisers manned by Naval Reservists and Mercantile Marine ratings all commanded by a Flag Officer and Royal Naval Commanding Officers. The thesis follows the Royal Navy’s deliberations to establish its Reservist elements and how the Navy assumed the men of the Mercantile Marine could be brought into naval service. A parallel debate in Parliament considered the viability of taking up ocean liners for conversion to armed merchant cruisers. Both sets of discussions lasted nearly fifty years. Most existing Squadron literature is chronological, drawing heavily on official reports of proceedings. This thesis concentrates on analysing personal diaries and biographies and is focused on the crews’ daily work to reveal a broad picture of life in the Squadron. Topics included are pay, accommodation, feeding scales, daily routines, promotion, pastoral and medical welfare, and recreation. These issues were in addition to the daily threats from surface and submarine attack and the constant debilitating bad weather. Although deemed successful, the thesis concludes, the blockade could have been tightened sooner if the Government had used statistics already held on imports and exports. The conclusion is also made that the Royal Navy’s failure to understand fully the shipping industry’s unique facets and the merchant seaman, created problems that could have been avoided. The Squadron’s operational achievement was intercepting nearly 13,000 suspect vessels. Its patrols performed a constabulary function which encouraged ships to call voluntarily at examination ports to be searched effectively. Less tangible, but equally praiseworthy, was the successful cohesion built amongst crews of widely differing experience.

A number of academic studies assert that ex-servicemen were subject to intimidation, some killed as a punishment for war service, and that they formed a marginalised group in Irish society. Evidence based on records of the victims and perpetrators demonstrates otherwise; intimidation was mostly for reasons other than war service, for instance, membership of a particular class such as landowners or the judiciary, or for specific actions, including informing, supplying to or joining the Crown Forces. The violence towards ex-servicemen was geographically focussed, varying in intensity in correlation to the level of violence experienced by other sectors of the population; support for republicanism varied significantly by location. The great majority of ex-servicemen were not intimidated; many served in the IRA. With the formation of the Free State there is little evidence that either the State or community marginalised ex-servicemen. They were treated equally before the legislature and the courts. Some half of the Free State army, formed to defeat extreme republicans, were ex-servicemen. Remembrance took place with considerable community support and acceptance from the State. According to credible contemporary reports they were not discriminated against and held high positions in the civil service, army and police. They were not a homogeneous group. Neither war service nor loyalism defined them; many were supporters of Fianna Fáil. Britain fulfilled its imperial obligation to the ex-servicemen with housing and pension benefits considerably more favourable than those for their counterparts in Britain. The view that ex-servicemen were persecuted became persuasive. They became perceived through the prism of commemoration, and with the establishment of a republican historiography assigned to a national amnesia. Loyalist lobbying groups highlighted perceived discrimination to a willing press. It was a convenient collusion but at odds with the evidence. In reality the group truly marginalised after the Civil War was the anti-Treaty republicans.

The Battle of the Sambre was the last large-scale set-piece battle of the Great War. The German army was determined to hold a defensive line incorporating the Mormal Forest and the Sambre-Oise canal, hoping to buy time for a strategic withdrawal to the Meuse and thereby negotiate a compromise peace. This thesis analyses the battle at the operational and tactical levels: the BEF was no longer striving for a breakthrough – sequential ‘bite and hold’ was now the accepted method of advance. The difference between plan and reality is examined, highlighting the levels of tactical competence of units engaged and also the role of the Royal Engineers, whose tasks involved devising improvised bridging equipment to facilitate the crossing of the waterway. The competence of brigade and battalion commanders is examined: some proved capable of pragmatic flexibility in the face of stubborn enemy resistance and were able to adapt or even abandon original plans in order to ensure ultimate success. It was a decisive victory for the BEF, which irrevocably crushed the will of the German defenders, leading to the pursuit of a demoralised, broken and beaten army, whose means of continued resistance had been destroyed, and thus expedited the armistice.

This is the first monograph to be published on the work of the Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service (QAIMNS) in the Great War. The historiography of British military nursing during this period is scant, and research based monograph are negligible. What exists, does not focus specifically on the work of the Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service, (QAIMNS) the Reserve, (QAIMNSR) or the Territorial Force Nursing Service (TFNS) but tends to concentrate on the work of the volunteer, untrained, Voluntary Aid Detachment (VAD) nurses. Unfortunately, this has resulted in factually inaccurate representations of British WW1 nursing. The mass mobilisation of nurses by professional and voluntary nursing services led to rivalry between the different groups and my research addresses the relationship that develop between the trained and volunteer nurses. Also, my research examines the climatic and environmental conditions that impacted upon the effective delivery of nursing and casualty care and the mismanagement of services and supplies by the War Office and the Army Medical Services. Additionally, the political controversies and scandals over inadequate planning for the care, treatment and transportation of mass casualties is addressed. Furthermore, diseases and traumatic injuries sustained by nurses on active service are examined and, shell-shock, hitherto considered a combatants' condition is cited in relation to mental health issues of nurses on active service. Moreover, my research examines the deaths and disability rates within the ranks of nursing services. My research features individual awards for acts of bravery and mentioned in Dispatches. On the Home Front the politics of nursing are addressed. Nurses campaigned for professional recognition and many were supportive of universal suffrage and they argued for both professional and personal liberation. The struggle for professional recognition led to divisions within the civilian nursing leadership because they failed to arrive at a consensus on the content of the Nurse Registration Bill. Also, the supply of nurses for the war effort was consistently problematic and this led the Government to establish the Supply of Nurses Committee. Before it had its first sitting it had already become contentious and controversial. The issues are discussed. Using extensive primary sources, the monograph moves away from the myths, and uncritical and overly romanticised views of WW1 military nursing. It is hoped that by examining the personal, professional and political issues that impacted upon nurses the monograph will make a significant contribution to the historiography of WW1 military nursing and to the history of the Great War more generally.

La Première Guerre mondiale a fortement touché le département de la Meuse, traversé par la ligne du front occidental… Verdun, le saillant de Saint-Mihiel et l’Argonne portent toujours les cicatrices de ces années de combats. Or, plus au sud, les anciens cantons de Revigny et de Vaubécourt (réunis depuis 2014) ont également subi le feu de la guerre. Rien ne semblait les destiner à devenir un champ de bataille, mais ils se sont retrouvés sur la ligne de front de la première bataille de la Marne car ils sont sur la route des deux principales villes meusiennes, Bar-le-Duc et Verdun, principaux enjeux sur ce secteur de combat. La bataille, opposant la 3e armée française à la Ve armée allemande, y est dure. Au final, les Allemands sont contraints au repli, comme sur l’ensemble du front. Ils abandonnent les cantons de Revigny et de Vaubécourt, théâtre eux-aussi du « miracle de la Marne », mais à la notoriété moindre en comparaison du sauvetage de Paris et des « taxis de la Marne » … Après la bataille de la Marne, les deux cantons, en partie ruinés, se retrouvent dans l’arrière-front français. La ligne de feu s’est fixée plus au nord, mais les effets du conflit se font toujours ressentir. Des généraux y supervisent les opérations sur les fronts de Champagne et de Meuse. Des installations militaires sont érigées afin de soutenir et approvisionner les secteurs des combats. Elles accueillent les soldats français et alliés en partance et au retour du front. La population locale est contrainte de participer à l’effort de guerre, voyant ses principales ressources mises à disposition des armées française et américaine. Pendant l’intégralité du conflit, les habitants des cantons de Revigny et de Vaubécourt ont vécu des heures difficiles, sous le signe de l’angoisse, des privations et des relations parfois difficiles avec l’autorité militaire. Après l’armistice, des hommages sont rendus à ces territoires pour les souffrances endurées pendant les hostilités, rendus par la Nation par l’intermédiaire des deux personnalités politiques meusiennes de l’époque, Raymond Poincaré et André Maginot. Les deux cantons honorent leurs habitants morts du conflit, relèvent leurs ruines, mais font disparaitre les traces, contribuant à l’oubli de ces combats et des événements survenus pendant la Grande Guerre dans les cantons de Revigny et de Vaubécourt. Ce n’est qu’à l’occasion du centenaire de la Première Guerre mondiale que cette histoire a partiellement remise en lumière / World War I strongly affected the department of the Meuse, crossed by the Western front line ... Verdun, the salient Saint-Mihiel and the Argonne still bear the scars of these years of fighting. However, further south, the former cantons of Revigny and Vaubécourt (gathered since 2014) also suffered the fire of the war. Nothing seemed destined to become a battlefield, but they found themselves on the front line of the first battle of the Marne because they are on the road of the two main cities Meus, Bar-le-Duc and Verdun, main stakes on this combat sector. The battle between the 3rd French Army and the 5th German Army is hard. In the end, the Germans are forced to withdraw, as on the whole front. They abandon the cantons of Revigny and Vaubécourt, also theater of the "miracle of the Marne", but with less notoriety in comparison with the rescue of Paris and "taxis of the Marne" ...After the Battle of the Marne, the two cantons, partly ruined, are found in the French rear-front. The line of fire is more northerly, but the effects of the conflict are still felt. Generals oversee operations on the Champagne and Meuse fronts. Military installations are erected to support and supply the combat areas. They welcome French and Allied soldiers on their way out and back from the front. The local population is forced to participate in the war effort, seeing its main resources made available to the French and American armies. During the whole conflict, the inhabitants of the townships of Revigny and Vaubécourt experienced difficult hours, under the sign of anxiety, privations and sometimes difficult relations with the military authority.After the armistice, tributes are paid to these territories for the suffering endured during the hostilities, rendered by the Nation through the two Meusian politicians of the time, Raymond Poincaré and André Maginot. The two cantons honor their inhabitants who died of the conflict, raise their ruins, but make disappear the traces, contributing to the forgetfulness of these combats and the events which occurred during the Great War in the townships of Revigny and Vaubécourt. It was only on the occasion of the centenary of the First World War that this story was partially brought to light

En 1914-1918, les faits apportèrent un démenti cinglant aux prévisions. Au lieu d’une guerre courte, décidée par les seules forces terrestres en une ou deux batailles, les belligérants s’enlisèrent dans une lutte longue et coûteuse que les Alliés finirent par remporter en étranglant l’économie de l’Allemagne et en usant ses forces au moyen d’une succession de batailles partielles. Le cours inattendu que prirent les événements amène à s’interroger sur les représentations de la guerre de cette époque, sur la manière dont elles influencèrent les opérations et réciproquement, ainsi que sur le rôle du haut commandement dans ces relations. Une telle approche des opérations est d’autant plus justifiée que le sujet est méconnu, que la guerre est un domaine où le décalage entre réalité et représentations est très marqué, et que ceci est particulièrement vrai de la Grande Guerre. La question se pose donc de savoir si la difficile évolution des représentations, dans un sens conforme à une conduite des opérations efficace, s’est faite malgré le haut commandement, sous la pression des événements, ou s’il n’y a pas finalement concouru. L’impression prévaut qu’il a longtemps été à leur remorque et qu’il a fallu des échecs retentissants et l’action du pouvoir politique pour qu’il soit renouvelé, avec ses représentations. Cette impression est cependant trompeuse car elle repose sur une confusion entre le haut commandement et le GQG qui n’en était qu’une composante. Mis fréquemment à l’écart par ce dernier, les généraux appartenant au haut commandement contribuèrent à l’évolution de la situation à travers l’action de certains d’entre eux, même s’ils utilisèrent souvent des voies détournées / During WW1, the events bring a severe denial to the previsions. Instead of the short war won by the sole Land forces in one or two battles, the opponents bogged down in a long and costly struggle, which the Allies won eventually in choking the German economy and by the mean of successive battles of attrition.This unexpected course of events raises questions about the representations of war prevailing at this time, about the way they influenced the operations and conversely about the role of the French High Command in those relations. Studying military operations under this point of view is all the more relevant that this topic remains little known and that war is an activity where the discrepancy between reality and representations is most important. This discrepancy increased dramatically within WW1. The question is therefore to know whether the difficult evolution of war representations, in a sense compliant with the efficient conduct of operations occurred despite the High Command, under the pressure of events, or if he did not eventually concur in this evolution. The main impression is that the High Command was constantly trailing behind and that only resounding failures and the resulting decisions of the political authority caused the replacements in the staff required to change the representations. In fact, those impressions are misleading as far as they are based on a confusion between French High Command and French General HQ (GQG), which was only a component of High Command. Often put aside by the GQG, the generals belonging to the high command contributed in the evolution of this situation, through some of them, even if they did it in bypassing hierarchy

During the Great War, the horse was essential to military efficiency. Horses hauled artillery guns, transported vital supplies and ammunition, and carried men into battle. The military horse was, in fact, a weapon. Many thousands of horses were purchased and supplied to the British Expeditionary Force at great expense, because without them an Army could not function. Although the British Army was the most modern of all the belligerent forces during the Great War, the horse was nevertheless favoured because of its reliability and versatility. For example, horses coped much better than motor vehicles where the going was difficult. It was horse-power that ensured the Army’s lines-of-communication were maintained. Indeed, without an adequate supply of horses it is probable that the British Army would not have achieved victory in 1918. However, the military horse was also a weapon which quickly broke down when it was not properly maintained. The British Army had learned this to its cost during the Boer War, when more horses had been killed by bad management than by enemy action. Good horse management in the field depended upon the soldier. It was essential that he had received adequate training, and it was also essential that he take responsibility for his horse’s well-being. During the Great War, all soldiers given ‘ownership’ of a horse were taught to put their horse’s needs before their own, and to always think first of their horse. They were taught to see their horse in the same way as an infantryman would his rifle; as something he may have cause to rely upon and which it was therefore in his best interests to look after. The soldier-horse relationship developed once the soldier’s care became one of sympathetic consideration. Soldiers and their horses spent most of their lives together when on active service, and it was this close proximity which helped to bond them into a unit. Many soldiers came to see their horses as comrades; they named them, and went to great lengths to protect their horses from harm. From the Army’s perspective, the soldier-horse relationship ensured that an expensive military asset was properly maintained. At home, portrayals of the soldier-horse relationship extended this vital contribution to the war effort beyond the battlefield. For example, images and stories that told of the soldier’s kindness to his horse bolstered a positive illusion the British had of themselves as a people capable of both strength and compassion. Images of the soldier-horse relationship played an important part in helping the British people to imagine war. They also provided much-needed comfort and reassurance when friends and loved ones were in danger. Importantly, by studying these portrayals dispassionately, we find that they were never entire flights of fancy, and often bore more than a passing resemblance to the soldier’s actual experience. Indeed, it becomes possible to question whether sense and sentimentality ever did entirely part company in the British imagination. Like their flesh and blood inspiration, portrayals of the soldier-horse relationship have not received the attention they merit. By rectifying this oversight, this thesis not only contributes to study of the horse-human relationship, but also to our knowledge of the Great War. Not least, because we achieve a better appreciation of what it was like to live in the War’s shadow.