Texte remanié de: Diss. / Bibliogr. p. 267-276. Index.

This thesis is concerned with the development of tertiary students' experiences of learning as they progress through three years of undergraduate study in two different psychology programs. Previous research that is relevant to this topic has tended to focus either more narrowly on the development of epistemic beliefs or more broadly on the variation of learners' experiences of learning. Research on epistemic beliefs has tended to focus on the structural aspects (stages) of development and to ignore the content of thinking. In contrast, research on experiences of learning has concentrated upon the content of students' experiences, yet it can be criticised for the way in which it decontextualises students' experiences and for its limited attention to change and development. Moreover, despite evidence suggesting that learning comprises a complex of phenomena such as understanding, memorising and knowing, this line of research has tended to treat learning as a single phenomenon. In the thesis I draw on Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, Gurwitsch's view of awareness, and much of the conceptual framework of the phenomenographic perspective to argue a case for a theoretical framework and consequential practices that are more plural and inclusive of learner's experiences of learning. The new approach refocuses the relationship between researcher, knower and known in terms of the knowing relation-one that involves a dynamic iterative interweaving of first and second order perspectives. Using this new approach, students' experiences are analysed to provide rich description and ontological explanation of both change and development over time. The approach allows the unity of the partlwholelpart relation of an individual's experience to be recognised. So the method is able to take account of the contextual relevancy of the individual whilst also focusing on the experiences of the group. The results show that rather than comprising a single phenomenon, learning is itself part of a multi-dimensional (depth, spatial and temporal dimensions), multi-phenomenal field. The phenomena of learning, understanding, memorising and knowledge are described in detail, and their individual internal relations are elaborated along with the internal relations between the phenomena. Four main groups of experiences of learning are described within this framework: reproductive experiences; relational experiences; constructive experiences; and transformative experiences. Each of these categories comprises several sub- categories. This fine-grained focus on individual students' data, and the use of the phenomenographic whadhow framework, allows the development of experiences to be traced and interpreted as a gradual morphing over time. The pattern of development suggests that each part of the learners' journey plays an important role in the growth of skill and competence in learning. Thus, it may be important that curricula account for variation not by focussing upon transformative experiences of learning, as is often the case, but by facilitating shifts through all of the experiences that learners may pass through.

Ce projet de recherche entend présenter les enjeux entourant un débat relatif à l'interprétation du noème perceptif dans la phénoménologie husserlienne. Sans prétendre épuiser les tenants et aboutissants d'un tel débat, l'objectif poursuivi dans le contexte actuel consiste plutôt à exposer l'opposition qui se dessine entre deux courants qui ont marqué l'orientation des commentaires portant sur cette notion centrale de la théorie de l'intentionnalité phénoménologique. Cette opposition relève de la confrontation entre les interprétations de A. Gurwitsch et de D. Føllesdal. Tandis que le premier s'inspire de l'idéalisme transcendantal des Idées directrices, le second prend appui sur le réalisme exposé dans les Recherches logiques. Cette confrontation a donné lieu à de vives réactions et l'état actuel de la situation semble avoir donné raison à l'interprétation de Føllesdal. Néanmoins, certains commentateurs reconnaissent que quelques rapprochements sont possibles entre ces deux lectures, en dépit de leurs postulats fondamentaux qui restent irréconciliables. Parmi ces commentateurs ayant dicté en grande partie la direction des discussions subséquentes, il importe de mentionner H. Dreyfus et D. Woodruff Smith. Dans cette optique, ce projet de recherche aura pour tâche de présenter en un premier temps les principales thèses mises de l'avant par Gurwitsch et Føllesdal vers la fin des années 1960 afin de bien saisir la nature du rapport ambigu entre leurs postulats respectifs. Il sera ensuite question de la manière dont le débat s'est cristallisé à compter des années 1970 suite à la présentation qu'en font Dreyfus et W. Smith. Compte tenu de l'issue de cette confrontation, qui favorise maintenant la lecture défendue par Føllesdal, le dernier chapitre tâchera de repositionner la lecture de Gurwitsch dans son contexte d'origine afin de saisir à la fois les sources de son interprétation et les raisons suivant lesquelles cette lecture possède encore aujourd'hui une certaine valeur heuristique pour l'interprétation de ce concept central de la phénoménologie husserlienne qu'est le noème et, plus précisément, le noème perceptif. ______________________________________________________________________________

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