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天台智顗之止觀與智的現象學 / Tientai Zhiyi’s Phenomenology of Meditation and Awakening李子圓, Li, Zin Yuan Unknown Date (has links)
本文以「天台智顗之止觀與智的現象學」為標題,鋪展天台智顗哲學的「智的現象學」,並以檢視天台智顗所提出的「止觀」方法為入手。藉由開顯天台智顗哲學,如何透過「止觀」實證方法,彰顯智顗對實相的態度,期盼能從現象學的角度,解讀天台智顗哲學中的「一念心」與「實相」,或是與現實世界的互動關係,借以勾勒出所謂「智的現象學」之雛型。
天台智顗與現象學之關連。擬先討論,釐清天台智顗哲學與胡塞爾現象學的理論概念思想,並著重於早期的胡塞爾現象學之核心理論;天台智顗哲學部分,鎖定於智顗的《摩訶止觀》為主,並從《摩訶止觀》來深入探討天台智顗的佛教哲學思想。希望能藉此相互借鑒、相互補充,以為「智的現象學」,透過天台哲學所提供的「止觀」方法,去實踐獲得智慧,得以如實的認識真理。
最後,借以兩者對真理的理解態度:佛教欲達到開悟、覺的境界(解脫),開顯實相,而現象學則企圖回歸到事物本身的呈顯,依此為兩者相互對話的基礎。天台宗與胡塞爾現象學共同追求一套理論方法,來開顯真理之契機相合,並討論佛教真理與方法間的問題,試圖藉由「現象學方法」概念之啟發,透過不同脈絡中的實踐哲學,揭示更多樣的哲學方法,達至真理之境,以顯現天台宗智顗之「智」的現象學。
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意義的發生學-胡塞爾與德希達對意義理論的討論 / The Genesis of Sense: The Discussion of Meaning Theory between Husserl and Derrida陳奕傑, Chen, Yi Chieh Unknown Date (has links)
本研究旨在重構胡塞爾的意義發生理論與德希達對其的詮釋與批評。首先,透過對胡塞爾文本的考察,架構出其意義理論的三個層次──意義、表達與指號,指出晚期胡塞爾的意義理論不但承繼了此三個層次,更更進一步於歷史性的角度下,一方面探討意義流傳問題所彰顯出的語言與書寫之重要性,另一方面則討論意義發生的起源中,作為形式來源的內時間意識作用與作為質料內容的前述謂經驗。其次,重構德希達對於胡塞爾的詮釋與批評,其詮釋在於利用上述意義理論的三個層次作為進路,闡明現象學如何在此現前域的核心中保有一純粹內在的意義核心;其批評則藉由想像詞語、語言的歧義性與內時間意識的自觸發作用等概念而展開,一方面指出意義結構中各環節之不可分性,另一方面則批評非現前者早已經於現前的核心中運作。除了重構胡塞爾與德希達的理論內容之外,我們將試圖一方面從胡塞爾的角度評估德希達之解讀的有效性,另一方面,從德希達的角度出發,藉著探究其概念操作,試圖指出其批評得以開展的關鍵之處,以及此一批評所引入的新的符號概念。 / This thesis is to reconstruct the theory of genesis of sense in the thinking of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and the interpretation and criticism of this theory by Jacques Derrida (1930-2004). Firstly, through the study of Husserl’s texts, we construct the three-level structure of its meaning theory: sense-expression-indication. We claim that the theory of sense in Husserl’s late thinking also inherits the same structure, but his late thinking in advanced discussed, on one hand, the sense-transmission problem, which demonstrate the importance of language and writing, under the scope of historicity; on the other hand, Husserl investigated the origin of the genesis of sense, including the internal time consciousness as the source of form and the pre-predicative experience as the content of matter. Secondly, we reconstruct Derrida’s interpretation and criticism of Husserl’s thinking. By interpreting Husserl’s theoretical moments such as monologue and the core of pre-expressive sense, Derrida reveals how phenomenology has secured a pure internal core of sense in the field of presence. His criticism is unfolded through the concepts of imaginary words, equivocality of language and the auto-affection of the internal time consciousness, claiming on one hand, the indivisibility of the moments in the structure of sense and that the non-present has already worked in the core of presence. Besides the reconstruction of the theory of Husserl and Derrida, we also intend to evaluate the validity of Derrida’s criticism and explore his operation of concepts in order to explicate the critical point which permits his criticism in which a new concept of sign is introduced.
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胡塞爾觸發概念研究─從被動性到主動朝向的觀點 / A Study on the Husserl's Concept of Affection李政國, Lee,Cheng-Kuo Unknown Date (has links)
No description available.
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論胡塞爾對「二元論」之超克周晏伊, Chou,Yenyi Unknown Date (has links)
本論文試圖以胡塞爾現象學解決哲學史以來留下的哲學難題之可能-「心物或心身二元論」(dualism),克服胡塞爾在《危機》一書中分析的二元論之根源「心靈自然化」問題。哲學層次上心物二分(斷裂)延伸出不可認識之「不可知論」;身心二分說明了理論解釋上的問題,重點是如何看待心靈與身體及其關係都是根本要待釐清。當代心靈哲學為解決心身問題出發而傾向將心靈物化,實體唯物主義為基本共識,精神自然化的思考導致精神醫學採以「器質論」立場。並且科學心理學作為物理學邏輯延續也都導向「還原」方法研究可觀察實驗的行為上。
胡塞爾的將心物關係轉換為「純粹意識中意向活動與意向對象的意向關係」,具體經驗事實世界的本來面貌為意向活動所形構的意向對象,反過來說意義賦予活動成就了事實自身。而身心問題溯回至心靈與身體原初意義而自然消解兩者二分的問題。關於二元論的解決同時是心靈自然化的克服,現象學試圖理解一門非自然化的心靈的可能,徹底批判科學化心理學處理,建構一門徹底擺心理物理科學影響之下的獨立心理學即「純粹現象學心理學」。
關鍵字:胡塞爾、心物二元論、身心二元論、心靈自然化、純粹意識、身體、心靈、現象學心理學、超驗現象學 / The thesis tries to solve the philosophical problem-mind-body dualism-in philosophical history by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, and the problem of naturalize mind or soul which causes dualism in “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental phenomenology”. Philosophically, mind-body(matter) dualism leads to agnosticism in epistemology. Mind-body dualism problem comes from the problem of interpretation in theory, and it is important to essentially understand mind, body and their relation. The philosophy of mind in modern times makes mind materialize in order to solve the mind-body dualism, and substance materialism is accepted by most of philosophers. This effects psychiatry thinks psychosis as an organic disease. Besides, scientific psychology is in logical continuity with, and relies partly upon, the physical sciences, and makes use of reductive method to research observable and experimental behavior.
Edmund Husserl turns mind-body relation into conscious relation of noesis-noema in pure consciousness. Fact world as noema is constituted by noesis, or bestowing sense achieves things themselves. Solving mind-body problem is going back to primary meaning of mind and body, and then the problem is solved naturally. Solving mind-body dualism is the same as naturalized mind. Phenomenology attempts to know anti-naturalized mind, to criticize thoroughly scientific psychology, and to establish a purely phenomenological psychology which is free of everything psychophysical.
Key words:Edmund Husserl、dualism、naturalize mind ∕soul、pure consciousness、body、mind、phenomenological psychology、transcendental phenomenology
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盧曼社會系統理論的去主體化問題 — 從自我同一性弔詭與環境同一性弔詭出發胡育祥 Unknown Date (has links)
這篇論文的目的是為盧曼社會系統理論中的一個難題提供可能的解決之道。此難題即為:社會系統既是去主體化的,又是主體化的。這個難題的出現,乃肇因於盧曼認為系統既是自我透明的,也是自我不透明的,既是環境透明的,也是環境不透明的。這兩種弔詭就是盧曼社會系統理論的自我同一性弔詭與環境同一性弔詭。因此,為了解決社會系統理論的去主體化問題,首先就必須解決自我同一性弔詭與環境同一性弔詭。對此,我們建議從盧曼與胡塞爾的比較開始。藉由此種比較以及隨之而來的清洗與重組,我們可以從他們那裡擷取有利於解決上述弔詭的概念與命題。這些概念與命題是:一、存在著諸系統;二、新的觀察概念:構造;三、社會作為內在於意識系統中的社會行動秩序,而溝通系統則作為內在於理解系統中的社會溝通秩序。 / This thesis is aimed at solving a dilemma in Luhmann's theory of social systems.The delimma is: social systems are both desubjectized and subjectized. This is because in Luhmann's theory, they are both transparent and intransparent to itself, and the environments are both transparent and intransparent to systems. These two paradoxes are self-identity paradox and environment-identity paradox. Therefore, if we want to solve the problem of desubjectization in Luhmann's theory, we must solve the self-identity paradox and environment-identity paradox at first. We suggest that it can begin with the comparison between Luhmann and Husserl. Through this comparison, and correspondingly, cleaning and recombination, we can take concepts and propositions which can be used for resolving the above-mentioned paradoxes. The concepts and propositions are: 1. there are systems; 2. new concept of observation; and 3. society as the order of social actions in a consciousness system, and communication system as the order of social communications in a understanding system.
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通往客觀世界構成的移情之路-以胡塞爾現象學中內在與超越的視野來看 / The Constitution of the Objective World Via Empathy: In the View of the Conceptions of Immanence and Transcendence in Husserl's Phenomenology吳晉緯, Wu, Jing Wei Unknown Date (has links)
本文試圖討論的問題乃是在胡塞爾現象學中,「客觀世界」是如何構成的。其問題意識乃是來自於其自身現象學方法的操作後果。在其著作《笛卡爾式的沈思》中,表明了其現象學被批評為「獨我論」的可能,故進而在此《沈思》的第五章中,透過一系列在其現象學中對「他人」的討論,試圖突破自身陷入獨我論框架。其進行的方式主要有兩個步驟:「特殊的主題性懸擱」以及「移情」。而具有「客觀性」的世界便是在「移情」的諸階序上漸次構成的「主體際」世界。而在此諸步驟的討論中,我關注的是「現象學式的獨我自我」到「他人構成」的「初步」關係如何可能。
而對此步驟的可能性討論及解讀,在本文中以舒茲 (A. Schutz)、呂格爾 (P. Ricoeur) 以及李南麟 (Lee Nam-In) 的三篇文獻做為主要對談者。通過舒茲的強力批判、呂格爾往肉身存有的解讀方式,以及李南麟以靜態、發生現象學的途徑試圖解釋胡塞爾被批判的困境,我們可以發現,雖然胡塞爾通過上述兩個步驟所進行的客觀世界構成可能,是無法成功的,但一般稱為「意識哲學」的胡塞爾現象學,其哲學意圖、深度及可能的發展,即已有後續哲學家往「世俗 (mundane)」、「存有論」發展的走向,進而給予我們不管在對胡塞爾自身或後來的哲學發展有更深刻的理解。
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