The aim of the thesis is to analyse the non-bank regulatory framework with particular attention devoted to hedge funds and private equity funds. The thesis describes functioning of the funds, discusses their performance during the global financial crisis of 2007-present and, predominantly, describes and analyses the EU and U.S. regulatory reforms with respect to these institutions which have arisen as a response to the crisis. Based on the analysis of the measures incorporated in these reforms, the thesis outlines its own proposal of an alternative investment fund regulatory framework which, if applied, would lead to a more efficient functioning of the alternative investment industry than what is likely to be the outcome of the already adopted reforms. The nature of the thesis is institutional; its methodology is characterized by a broad literature survey. Hedge funds and private equity funds are considered both in pre-crisis context as well as in circumstances that have been brought about by the crisis. Several hypotheses concerning systemic risk and the approach of the regulatory reforms to it are assessed. Mostly qualitative analysis is employed to evaluate the hypotheses.

The thesis is focused on economic capital management of top-ranked world banks. A basic theoretical framework is summarised at the beginning. The theoretical framework is then utilised in the main - empirical part. Since economic capital is not a figure commonly reported in any available database, we have created our own database based on annual reports of top fifty world banks of the year 2008. Based on this database we provide an extensive empirical study focused on years 2007-2010. Even though one third of the banks disclose economic capital only, thanks to our approach combining both quantitative and qualitative analysis we were able to study the topic in detail. Within quantitative part the development of economic capital and its allocation is studied, the differences between regulatory and economic capital in time is measured, a relationship between quality of economic capital disclosure and rating is searched for and relationship between the value of economic capital and changes in profits during financial crisis is studied. The qualitative part consists of case studies of fourteen banks. It is focused on special and unique features of economic capital management of individual financial institutions.

The aim of the thesis is to analyze the evolution of hedge funds and their regulation, especially in the context of the global financial crisis. The first part focuses on defining the term "hedge fund", then it is compared with another institutional investor, mutual fund. The history and description of basic investment strategies of hedge funds are also analyzed. The second part overhauls the market of hedge funds, including its quantity, assets under management and performance. The last part is mainly devoted to the theoretical aspects of regulation and supervision of hedge funds, it analyzes the legal status of regulation and supervision of these funds in selected countries before the global financial crisis, the AIFM Directive requirements are discussed and their possible implications are analyzed; the AIFM Directive is compared with the Dodd Frank Act's requirements at the end.

Les hedge funds sont devenus des acteurs incontournables des marchés financiers et, pourtant, ils demeurent toujours inconnus ou «mal connus» à la fois par le grand public, les régulateurs et les juristes. À l’heure du bilan de la directive AIFM qui avait pour ambition de proposer une réglementation ambitieuse de l’industrie des hedge funds au sein de l’Union européenne, il convient de revenir sur ces entités dont l’histoire, les stratégies, le statut juridique, les caractéristiques et le régime juridique demeurent, encore, flous. La thèse vise à proposer une définition et un portrait-robot précis des hedge funds via leur identification par leurs caractéristiques, qu’elles soient propres ou empruntées à d’autres entités. Un hedge fund n’est pas un fonds de gestion collective ni une forme juridique à part entière. Un hedge fund peut revêtir tout type de forme sociale et sera communément considéré comme tel dès lors que l’entité s’emploiera à adopter certaines stratégies d’investissement et disposera d’une structure de rémunération et organisationnelle particulière. Ces dernières sont des indices permettant la caractérisation d’un hedge fund dont la nature juridique est quasi-exclusivement celle d’un fonds.Le hedge fund en tant que fonds est, selon le droit français, dépourvu, à tort, de la personnalité juridique alors même qu’il dispose de tous les attributs juridiques nécessaires à une telle reconnaissance. La présente étude démontre que le législateur français a ôté la personnalité juridique à la forme sociale originelle du hedge fund en droit français alors que les arguments en faveur de cette reconnaissance étaient plus convaincants. Un hedge fund en tant que fonds s’apparente davantage à une société hybride qu’à un numéro de compte. Cette théorie s’appuie principalement sur l’argument selon lequel il existe une personnalité morale embryonnaire où la personnalité juridique serait graduelle selon l’entité concernée. / Hedge funds have become key players in financial markets and are still unknown or « poorly known » by the general public, regulators and lawyers. At the time of the review of the AIFM directive which aimed to propose an ambitious regulation of the hedge fund industry within the European Union, it is necessary to return to these entities whose history, strategies, legal status, characteristics and legal regime remain, still, unclear. The thesis aims to propose a definition and an accurate robot portrait of hedge funds through their identification by their characteristics. These characteristics are both specific to hedge funds and borrowed from other entities. A hedge fund is not a collective fund or a legal form in its own right. A hedge fund can take any legal form and will be commonly considered as such when the entity strives to adopt certain investment strategies and will have a particular compensation and organizational structure. These characters are clues allowing the characterization of a hedge fund whose legal nature is almost exclusively that of a fund. However, the hedge fund as a fund is, under French law, wrongly deprived of legal personality even though it has all the legal attributes necessary for such recognition. The present study demonstrates that the French legislature removed the legal personality from the original social form of the hedge fund in French law while the arguments in favor of this recognition were more convincing. A hedge fund as a fund is more like a hybrid company than an account number. This theory is based mainly on the argument that there is a cohabiting legal personality where the legal personality is gradual depending on the entity concerned.