In this study, I attempt to identify a distinct role for the imagination in manipulating and organising information states. To this end, I begin with an exegesis of Aristotle's account of phantasia in De Anima. I argue against two established views of the nature of Aristotle's phantasia-the view that phantasia is merely a faculty for apprehending appearances, and the view that it is a special catch all faculty for having "non-paradigmatic sensory experiences". I then continue to argue that for Aristotle, phantasia was a distinct faculty that discriminates between experiences by virtue of recognition. Once I have established the plausibility of such a position, I move from consideration of Aristotle's idea of phantasia to an account of recent evidence provided by cognitive science for distinguishing a capacity for manipulating information which is recognition based, and conceptually distinct from reason, or "theory-driven" thought. To this end, I appeal to evidence concerning the nature of spatial reasoning, and provide an exhaustive account of the "Imagery Debate" as paradigmatic of non-theory driven cognitive capacities. Finally, I provide an account of the mechanisms that underlie the efficacy and domain of non-theory driven thought by appeal to two explanatory resources: Simulation theory, and idea of a "cognitive map".

This thesis discusses questions about the legitimacy and scope of Aristotle's metaphysics as it applies to both living and non-living substances. Resolving such questions is necessary for articulating Aristotle's philosophical anthropology, and understanding the connections between Aristotle's major works. Terence Irwin provides one approach to establishing these connections, so I defend his account of Aristotle's Metaphysics from challenges that Aristotle's metaphysics of living things is mistaken and the scope of what things count as substances. I provide supporting arguments to show how Irwin's interpretation answers the first challenge and speculate how he could answer the second. By supporting Irwin, I hope to show that Irwin's argument, that a common philosophical method unites Aristotle's works, provides strong grounds for constructing Aristotle's philosophical anthropology. / Graduate

Entre as trevas e a luz: o percurso labiríntico em Todos os nomes de José Saramago é uma dissertação que visa mostrar de que modo o caminho trilhado pela personagem protagonista do romance constitui um processo de autoconhecimento em meio às múltiplas possibilidades de um espaço que se configura como labiríntico. Os conceitos de símbolo, espaço, lugar, não-lugar, individuação, anima, advindos da diversidade teórica, da qual se destacam C. G. Jung (1967/ 2000/ 2007), Gilbert Durand (2002), Marc Augé (1994), Gaston Bachelard (1988/ 1990/ 1993/ 1997/ 2001), Michel de Certeau (2001), contribuíram e sistematizaram o percurso analítico do presente trabalho, que ora propomos. Nosso intuito primeiramente é verificar como os espaços da porta e da escada aparecem enquanto símbolos que levam a personagem de uma condição à outra, estabelecendo mudanças que variam entre o eu e o outro e entre as trevas e a luz, buscando também o sentido destes elementos. Em seguida, demonstramos como a imagem do labirinto é (re)construída, tanto mitologicamente (através de referências intertextuais) quanto individualmente (pelo próprio percurso da personagem) em sua passagem por portas e por escadas em espaços interiores e em espaços exteriores na busca de sua anima. / Entre as trevas e a luz: o percurso labiríntico em Todos os nomes de José Saramago is a study that aims at showing how the path chosen by the novels main character constitutes a process of self-knowledge among the multiple possibilities he comes across in a labyrinthic space. The concepts which structure and contribute to the development of this paper come from different theoretical backgrounds and include the notions of symbol, space, place, non-place, individuation and anima, as articulated by C. G. Jung (1967/ 2000/ 2007), Gilbert Durand (2002), Marc Augé (1994), Gaston Bachelard (1988/ 1990/ 1993/ 1997/ 2001), Michel de Certeau (2001). Our objective is first to consider how the space re-presented by the figures of the door and the stairs acquire symbolical value as they lead the main character from one stage to another, signaling the changes between the I and the other and between darkness and light, as he tries to unveil the meaning of such elements. Then, we focus on the way in which the image of the labyrinth is (re)constructed, both at a mythological level, through intertextual references, and at an individual level as we follow the course marked by the character in his journey through the doors and stairs he encounters in inward and outward spaces, in the pursuit of his anima.

Entre as trevas e a luz: o percurso labiríntico em Todos os nomes de José Saramago é uma dissertação que visa mostrar de que modo o caminho trilhado pela personagem protagonista do romance constitui um processo de autoconhecimento em meio às múltiplas possibilidades de um espaço que se configura como labiríntico. Os conceitos de símbolo, espaço, lugar, não-lugar, individuação, anima, advindos da diversidade teórica, da qual se destacam C. G. Jung (1967/ 2000/ 2007), Gilbert Durand (2002), Marc Augé (1994), Gaston Bachelard (1988/ 1990/ 1993/ 1997/ 2001), Michel de Certeau (2001), contribuíram e sistematizaram o percurso analítico do presente trabalho, que ora propomos. Nosso intuito primeiramente é verificar como os espaços da porta e da escada aparecem enquanto símbolos que levam a personagem de uma condição à outra, estabelecendo mudanças que variam entre o eu e o outro e entre as trevas e a luz, buscando também o sentido destes elementos. Em seguida, demonstramos como a imagem do labirinto é (re)construída, tanto mitologicamente (através de referências intertextuais) quanto individualmente (pelo próprio percurso da personagem) em sua passagem por portas e por escadas em espaços interiores e em espaços exteriores na busca de sua anima. / Entre as trevas e a luz: o percurso labiríntico em Todos os nomes de José Saramago is a study that aims at showing how the path chosen by the novels main character constitutes a process of self-knowledge among the multiple possibilities he comes across in a labyrinthic space. The concepts which structure and contribute to the development of this paper come from different theoretical backgrounds and include the notions of symbol, space, place, non-place, individuation and anima, as articulated by C. G. Jung (1967/ 2000/ 2007), Gilbert Durand (2002), Marc Augé (1994), Gaston Bachelard (1988/ 1990/ 1993/ 1997/ 2001), Michel de Certeau (2001). Our objective is first to consider how the space re-presented by the figures of the door and the stairs acquire symbolical value as they lead the main character from one stage to another, signaling the changes between the I and the other and between darkness and light, as he tries to unveil the meaning of such elements. Then, we focus on the way in which the image of the labyrinth is (re)constructed, both at a mythological level, through intertextual references, and at an individual level as we follow the course marked by the character in his journey through the doors and stairs he encounters in inward and outward spaces, in the pursuit of his anima.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2017-09-20T12:16:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 961847 bytes, checksum: 41778a39d7358579ee917bda56066445 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-20T12:16:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 961847 bytes, checksum: 41778a39d7358579ee917bda56066445 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-30 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The problem of the line of thought in De Anima concerns the way the human being is capable of acknowledging nature in act in view of the intellectual/thinking faculty triggered by stimuli resulting from the activity of the sense perception faculty. The investigation is aimed initially towards indispensable concepts of Aristotle’s cognitive theory. Among them, how substance is understood (form, matter and the composite of both), the definition of soul and animate being. Such notions, along with those of actuality and potentiality, are indispensable for understanding the relationship between body and soul, integrating hylomorphism. The treatment of the faculties of the soul begins with an examination of the nutritive faculty and its relationship with what is identified as life, followed by an approach towards the sense perception faculty, in which the activity consists in the reception in act of the external object’s form without matter. As a result of such activity, the one who perceives becomes in act equal to the form of that which is perceived. Besides performing an investigation pertaining to the senses, the notion of meta-perception is also approached. An analysis of the imagination as a movement that derives from the act of sense perception and that is fundamental to enable thinking is developed. Finally, to research the intellectual/thinking faculty, sense perception faculty is contrastively taken as a paradigm to attribute qualities to the faculty related to thinking. This faculty presents two functions: patient/passive intellect and active/productive intellect. From the balance of sense perception elaborated by imaginative operation, thinking, through its activity, recognizes its object: universal/ intelligible form. The result of thinking is designated as science. And the human being can only achieve such result through primarily apprehending sensitive forms related to subjects. / O problema do pensamento no De Anima diz respeito ao modo pelo qual o ser humano é capaz de conhecer em ato a natureza mediante a atividade da faculdade intelectiva/pensamento a partir de estímulos resultantes da atividade da faculdade sensoperceptiva. A investigação é voltada inicialmente para conceitos imprescindíveis para a teoria cognitiva de Aristóteles. Dentre eles, os modos de entender substância (forma, matéria e composto), a definição de alma e de ser animado. Tais noções, juntamente com as de ato e potência, são indispensáveis para a compreensão da relação entre corpo e alma, integrando o hilemorfismo. O tratamento das faculdades da alma tem início com o exame da faculdade nutritiva e com a sua relação com o que é identificado como vida. A seguir, é desenvolvida a abordagem da faculdade sensoperceptiva, cuja atividade consiste na recepção em ato da forma sensível do objeto externo sem a matéria. Como resultado de tal atividade, aquele que percebe torna-se em ato igual à forma do percebido. Além de ser feita a investigação acerca dos sentidos, aborda-se também a noção de meta-percepção. Desenvolve-se a análise da imaginação como movimento decorrente do ato da sensopercepção e que se mostra fundamental para a possibilidade do pensamento. Por fim, para a pesquisa da faculdade intelectiva/pensamento, a faculdade sensoperceptiva é tomada contrastivamente como paradigma para a atribuição de qualidades à faculdade relativa ao pensamento. Essa faculdade apresenta duas funções: pensamento paciente/passivo e pensamento ativo/produtivo. A partir do saldo da sensopercepção elaborado pela operação imaginativa, o pensamento, através de sua atividade, reconhece seu objeto: a forma inteligível/universal. O resultado do pensamento é designado como ciência. E o ser humano só chega a tal resultado através, primeiramente, da apreensão de formas sensíveis relativas a particulares.

Aristotle discusses the nature of soul in De Anima, defining it as the "form of a natural body having life potentially" or "first actuality of a natural, instrumental body." I argue that these definitions characterize soul as the capacity for the activity of life. In chapter one I examine key terminology from Aristotle’s account of soul: the terms used to discuss soul, life, and the vital functions. In particular, the soul and life terminology must be kept separate, as must the terms referring to vital capacities and those referring to vital activities. In chapter two I use these terminological distinctions to trace Aristotle’s arguments for his definition of soul, contending that they begin by positing life as the vital activities and soul as the cause of life. From that beginning, Aristotle twice argues for a definition of soul, in De Anima 2.1 and 2.2. In the transition between the two arguments Aristotle says that the first is sketched in outline and that a proper definition shows the cause. While this is usually taken to mean that Aristotle prefers the second definition, I argue that the definitions reached are the same. In chapter three I argue that Aristotle’s definitions of soul state that it is the capacity for life. He defines it as a first actuality, and upon examination this phrase means that it is a capacity. He also defines it as a form and calls form an actuality, but I explain that due to the relativity of actuality and potentiality, it is permissible to view form as a capacity as well. In chapter four I reconcile the general account of soul as a capacity with Aristotle’s discussions of a particular kind of soul, examining what he says in De Anima and his biological works about the most fundamental kind—the nutritive. Aristotle locates nutritive soul in the heart and says that it is responsible for the size of an organism, but this fits with nutritive soul also being the capacity of an organism to nourish itself. I also discuss why Aristotle says the body is the instrument of soul.

Architecture is an exhaustive act. With the Herculean efforts of the patron, the architect and the builder, a building comes into being. Materials are collected and transformed in order to create a place for Man to dwell. That is, materials occurring in their natural state are transformed by the Hand of Man and thereby enter it His realm. In turn, the Manmade becomes situated in and a part of the natural world. This relationship is a Material Reciprocity. In the Timaeus, a concept of a world soul is outlined in which all elements that compose the physical world (the "ten-thousand things" of the Tao-Te Ching) are endowed with consciousness: the Anima Mundi. How does architecture become part of Place? What role does Weathering play in this act? How does Man's understanding of Weathering's accretions enoble architecture? Sun Moon Earth BREW / Master of Architecture

Esta pesquisa se propõe a analisar os intercruzamentos entre o teatro de formas animadas e o cinema de animação por meio de suas conjecturas históricas, estéticas e operacionais, partindo do pressuposto de que as duas linguagens têm nas suas gêneses a anima. Para tal, foi realizado um mapeamento histórico e conceitual das duas linguagens, investigando os fatores que as bifurcam, as afastam e as imbricam, especialmente, por meio de uma amostragem de práticas artísticas do teatro de formas animadas, do cinema de animação e de modalidades identificadas como convergentes para o objeto, tais como os autômatos, tecnologias e virtualidade. Por uma questão metodológica da característica interdisciplinar do objeto e de sua extensão, fez-se necessário um recorte que parte do macro para o micro, elegendo uma amostragem que contempla o tripé conceitual, histórico e estético. Devido à área de cobertura do campo do objeto, a pesquisa aborda várias vertentes de conhecimentos vernaculares e atuais, teóricos e práticos, num movimento recorrentemente pendular. Assim, apresenta uma amostragem que teve como critério artistas de excelência que convergem para o objeto, entre eles: Lotte Reiniger, Ji?í Trnka, Norman McLaren, Jim Henson, Michel Ocelot, Tim Burton, Cia Lumbra e Cia Pequod, bem como outros exemplos esparsos. / This research aims to analyze the intercrosses between animation theater and animation cinema through its historical, aesthetic and operational assumptions, assuming that both languages have their genesis in the anima. For that, a historical and conceptual mapping of these languages was conducted, investigating the factors that bifurcate, and interweave them away, especially by means of a sampling of artistic practices of animation theater, animation cinema and modalities identified as converging to the object, such as automata, technology and virtuality. Because of a methodological question of the interdisciplinary characteristic of the object and its length, it was necessary that a cut of the macro to the micro were done, choosing a sample that includes the conceptual, historical and aesthetic tripod. Due to the coverage area of the object\'s field, this research addresses various aspects of vernacular and current knowledge, theoric and practical, in a recurrent pendulum motion. So, it presents a sampling that had as a criterion artists of excellence that converge to the object, including: Lotte Reiniger, Ji?í Trnka, Norman McLaren, Jim Henson, Michel Ocelot, Tim Burton, Cia Lumbra and Cia Pequod, as well as other scattered examples.

Esta pesquisa se propõe a analisar os intercruzamentos entre o teatro de formas animadas e o cinema de animação por meio de suas conjecturas históricas, estéticas e operacionais, partindo do pressuposto de que as duas linguagens têm nas suas gêneses a anima. Para tal, foi realizado um mapeamento histórico e conceitual das duas linguagens, investigando os fatores que as bifurcam, as afastam e as imbricam, especialmente, por meio de uma amostragem de práticas artísticas do teatro de formas animadas, do cinema de animação e de modalidades identificadas como convergentes para o objeto, tais como os autômatos, tecnologias e virtualidade. Por uma questão metodológica da característica interdisciplinar do objeto e de sua extensão, fez-se necessário um recorte que parte do macro para o micro, elegendo uma amostragem que contempla o tripé conceitual, histórico e estético. Devido à área de cobertura do campo do objeto, a pesquisa aborda várias vertentes de conhecimentos vernaculares e atuais, teóricos e práticos, num movimento recorrentemente pendular. Assim, apresenta uma amostragem que teve como critério artistas de excelência que convergem para o objeto, entre eles: Lotte Reiniger, Ji?í Trnka, Norman McLaren, Jim Henson, Michel Ocelot, Tim Burton, Cia Lumbra e Cia Pequod, bem como outros exemplos esparsos. / This research aims to analyze the intercrosses between animation theater and animation cinema through its historical, aesthetic and operational assumptions, assuming that both languages have their genesis in the anima. For that, a historical and conceptual mapping of these languages was conducted, investigating the factors that bifurcate, and interweave them away, especially by means of a sampling of artistic practices of animation theater, animation cinema and modalities identified as converging to the object, such as automata, technology and virtuality. Because of a methodological question of the interdisciplinary characteristic of the object and its length, it was necessary that a cut of the macro to the micro were done, choosing a sample that includes the conceptual, historical and aesthetic tripod. Due to the coverage area of the object\'s field, this research addresses various aspects of vernacular and current knowledge, theoric and practical, in a recurrent pendulum motion. So, it presents a sampling that had as a criterion artists of excellence that converge to the object, including: Lotte Reiniger, Ji?í Trnka, Norman McLaren, Jim Henson, Michel Ocelot, Tim Burton, Cia Lumbra and Cia Pequod, as well as other scattered examples.

Thesis advisor: Marina McCoy / In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the project of developing virtue and of being virtuous is always realized in one's immediate, particular circumstances. Given that perception is the faculty that gains access to the particular, Aristotle seems to afford perception a central role in ethical life. Yet Aristotle does not provide an account of ethical perception: he does not explain how the perceptual faculty is able grasp ethically relevant facts and how the perceptual capacity can do so well, nor does he explain the manner in which perception influences ethical decisions and actions. It is the project of this dissertation to provide such accounts. There are two main difficulties in the notion of ethical perception in Aristotle's thought: first, perception appears ill-suited to ethical life because the objects of perception are always perceived with respect to the individual's subjective condition--her desires, fears, etc. The information relayed by perception is always relative to the perceiver, i.e. merely the apparent good. Second, virtue is the excellence of the rational soul, while perception is a faculty shared by non-rational animals. It appears, then, that perception must be limited to playing an instrumental role in ethical reasoning and action. This dissertation addresses these difficulties by developing an account of uniquely human perception that is influenced and informed by the intellectual element of the soul. I argue that the project of ethical development, for Aristotle, is the project of integrating one's perceptual faculty with the intellectual capacity, such that one's perception transcends the natural relativity to the perceiver and gains access to the true good as it emerges in one's particular situation. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.