ALes indicateurs comptables publiés par les firmes demeurent une source d’information privilégiée pour le marché financier. Cependant, l’espace de liberté accordé par les règles comptables permet aux managers d’exercer leur jugement afin de publier des états financiers en fonction d’objectifs discrétionnaires. Or, même si l’on considère que les investisseurs sont rationnels dans leurs prises de décisions économiques, il n’est pas évident de distinguer les manipulations comptables opportunistes des manipulations comptables qui représentent un mécanisme par lequel les managers révèlent leurs informations privées en ce qui concerne les perspectives économiques de la firme. Ce constat est à la base de notre question de recherche: étant donné l’importance des pratiques de manipulations des chiffres comptables, quel serait le rôle de ces manipulations dans la valorisation de l’entreprise ? Nous examinerons dans le contexte américain le rôle de la composante discrétionnaire de résultat (les accruals discrétionnaires mesurés par le modèle Dechow, Richardson et Tuna (2003)) sur les rentabilités boursières en se basant sur la méthodologie des études d’association entre les composantes des résultats comptables (le cash-flow d’exploitation, les accruals totaux, les accruals discrétionnaires, les accruals non discrétionnaires et les résultats discrétionnaires) et le rendement boursier. En outre, nous examinerons la nature de la gestion de résultat. Notre échantillon est composé de 480 firmes sur la période [2000-2011]. Les résultats montrent que les accruals discrétionnaires sont valorisés par le marché financier et que cette valorisation est expliquée par des motivations informatives des dirigeants ; la gestion de résultat identifiée dans notre échantillon est informative. / AThe accounting indicators remain a privileged information source for the financial market. However, accounting rules give opportunities to managers to exercise judgment in financial reporting. Despite the rationality of investors, it is not easy to distinguish between the different incentives of accounts manipulations. Managers can use their knowledge about the business to improve the informativeness of financial statement. Manager can have also incentives to mislead their financial statement users by exercising discretions in financial reporting. This report is on the basis of our research question: given the importance of the accounting manipulations practices, what is their role on firm valuation? We will examine in the American context the role of the discretionary accruals measured by Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003) on the stock-returns building on the methodology of association studies between the components of the accounting results (The cash-flow, the total accruals, the discretionary accruals, the not discretionary accruals and the discretionary results) and the stock-returns. In addition, we will examine the nature of the earning management. Our sample consists of 480 firms over the period [2000-2011]. The results show that discretionary accruals are valued by the financial market and this valuation is explained by managers’ informative motivations.

This dissertation investigates whether short sellers establish short positions prior to accounting restatement announcements and whether the levels of short interest are related to the severity of restatements. Using 565 firms with restatement disclosure during the period of 1995 to 2002 and matched control firms with no restatements announcements, I find that the level of short interest is higher for the sample firms compared to the control firms in the months surrounding the announcements. The level of short interest increases as the restatement announcement date approaches and declines thereafter. Related to severity of restatement, I find that the level of short interest in the pre-disclosure period is higher for restatements involving fraud and the revenue accounts. There exists limited evidence that the pre-disclosure level of short interest is positively associated with the number of quarters restated and the magnitude of the restatements. Finally, I find cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcements are more negative for restatement firms that have a higher level of short interest. These results suggest that short sellers are highly sophisticated investors who can see through accounting manipulation and consequently profit from their knowledge.

This dissertation investigates whether short sellers establish short positions prior to accounting restatement announcements and whether the levels of short interest are related to the severity of restatements. Using 565 firms with restatement disclosure during the period of 1995 to 2002 and matched control firms with no restatements announcements, I find that the level of short interest is higher for the sample firms compared to the control firms in the months surrounding the announcements. The level of short interest increases as the restatement announcement date approaches and declines thereafter. Related to severity of restatement, I find that the level of short interest in the pre-disclosure period is higher for restatements involving fraud and the revenue accounts. There exists limited evidence that the pre-disclosure level of short interest is positively associated with the number of quarters restated and the magnitude of the restatements. Finally, I find cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcements are more negative for restatement firms that have a higher level of short interest. These results suggest that short sellers are highly sophisticated investors who can see through accounting manipulation and consequently profit from their knowledge.

Ce travail de recherche apporte une contribution à l’étude de la gestion des données comptables et à sa mise en évidence lors de l’utilisation du référentiel IFRS. L’objet de recherche se découpe en deux questions, le changement de référentiel comptable est-il source de plus de manipulation comptable et quels sont les moyens de mettre en évidence la manipulation comptable des comptes établis en normes IFRS ? Notre chapitre liminaire expose le contexte de la création et de l’implémentation des normes IFRS. Le chapitre 1 témoigne de leur impact sur les indicateurs de gestion des comptes consolidés des sociétés françaises cotées. Le chapitre 2 étudie le comportement des accruals à l’approche des seuils comptables, et la possible manipulation comptable des résultats. Le chapitre 3 est une étude approfondie des accruals discrétionnaires comme moyen de manipuler les données comptables. / This research aims to contribute to the study of the management of the accounting data and to its derivative using the IFRS standards. Two research questions are emerging: is the change of accounting standards a source of more accounting manipulation and what are the ways to highlight the accounting manipulation of accounts established in IFRS standards? Our introductory chapter sets out the context of the creation and the implementation of IFRS. Chapter 1 highlights their impact on the consolidated accounts of listed French companies’ management indicators. Chapter 2 studies the behavior of the accruals closed the accounting thresholds, and the possible accounting manipulation of results. Chapter 3 is a comprehensive study of the accruals discretionary to manipulate accounting data.

In response to the reported increase in accounting crime and suspected fraud in conjunction with the adjustment subsidies initialized during the covid-19 pandemic of 2020, we conducted a study examining accounting manipulation. Based on an explanatory theory for fraud, the Fraud Triangle, we theorize that the financial circumstances that companies experienced during the pandemic and the government subsidies created an environment where accounting manipulation could occur. We obtained a unique set of unpublished data from the Swedish Tax Agency. Two common models for detecting accounting manipulation were then applied to a large sample of Swedish companies. We used a version of the Jones Model to detect potential earnings management and Benford’s Law to detect fraudulent manipulation of the firms’ reported loss of revenue. Our results indicate earnings management and fraudulent reporting for some industries but no broad indication of systematic accounting manipulation across all industries. However, we suggest future research on this topic to further understand how accounting manipulation occurs in distressed industries.

Os depositantes, ao aplicarem seus recursos nos bancos, delegam a estes a função de monitoramento dos tomadores de empréstimos e, com isso, podem concentrar seus esforços em monitorar a instituição bancária. A disciplina de mercado ex-post é exercida na eventualidade de os bancos assumirem riscos excessivos, e de os depositantes, ao serem informados de tal fato, serem capazes de agir no sentido de disciplinar os bancos, seja pela requisição de taxas de juros mais elevadas, seja pelo saque de seus depósitos. A disciplina de mercado ex-ante é exercida sobre os gestores dos bancos que, conhecedores das conseqüências de assumirem riscos excessivos para suas instituições, preferem não tomar essa atitude. Um dos veículos de informação para o exercício do monitoramento, e subsídio para as ações de disciplinamento, são os demonstrativos contábeis divulgados periodicamente. A aplicação dos princípios contábeis faculta ao gestor o exercício da discricionariedade na apuração das acumulações contábeis, accruals. Essa possibilidade permite que a discricionariedade seja exercida de forma oportunística, prática conhecida genericamente na literatura contábil como manipulação contábil / gerenciamento de resultados, com o propósito de iludir o usuário da informação contábil e levar à obtenção de benefícios tanto para os bancos como pessoalmente para seus gestores. O objetivo desta tese foi verificar a existência de evidências empíricas de que as acumulações contábeis discricionárias influenciam o exercício da disciplina de mercado exercida pelos depositantes dos bancos brasileiros. O estudo efetuou a separação das acumulações contábeis não-discricionárias e discricionárias por meio da utilização das variáveis de despesas e saldo de provisão para créditos de liquidação duvidosa, saldo e sua variação das operações de crédito, saldo e sua variação das operações em atraso, operações registradas como prejuízo e, além disso, inova com a consideração do risco das operações de crédito por meio da utilização, como proxy do risco, da taxa de juros das operações de crédito. Utiliza modelos econométricos para avaliar a influência das acumulações contábeis discricionárias na disciplina de mercado, por meio da utilização das variáveis de taxa de juros e variação dos volumes de depósitos, índice de alavancagem, despesas de provisão para créditos de liquidação duvidosa, despesas de pessoal, razão das receitas de prestação de serviço e outras despesas administrativas, retorno dos ativos e seu desvio da média amostral e liquidez, além de variáveis de controle. Quanto à formulação teórica, recorreu-se, sob o aspecto econômico, à teoria do monitoramento delegado; sob o aspecto contábil, à abordagem positiva da contabilidade; e, por fim, sob o aspecto econométrico, ao método generalizado dos momentos sistêmico (GMM-sis). Obtiveram-se dados públicos e próprios do Banco Central do Brasil, relativos a 102 bancos, os quais foram tratados para contemplar os efeitos de escala das instituições por meio de normalizações pelos ativos totais e créditos totais, onde aplicável e, também, os efeitos inflacionários, por meio do deflacionamento pelo IPCA. Nos resultados obtidos, foram encontrados indícios da existência da prática de disciplina de mercado por parte dos depositantes, conforme estudos já realizados no Brasil. Também foram encontrados indícios de que a prática de manipulação contábil efetuada por meio das acumulações contábeis discricionárias tem influência no exercício da disciplina de mercado, no sentido de reduzir as taxas de juros negociadas entre os bancos e os depositantes, ocasionando transferência de renda dos depositantes para os bancos. Isso significa que os gestores dos bancos logram êxito ao manipularem os resultados contábeis, por meio da utilização das acumulações contábeis discricionárias, e iludem os depositantes ao obterem taxas de juros inferiores às que deveriam ser pagas. Isto sugere que o mercado não é eficiente para tratar as informações contábeis publicadas pelos bancos. / When the depositors invest their money in the banks they delegate the monitoring function of the borrowers to the bank and can concentrate their efforts in monitoring the banks. The market discipline ex-post occurs in the event of the bank taking excessive risks and, knowing that, the depositors can act in the sense of disciplining the banks by requiring greater interest rates or withdrawing their deposits. The market discipline ex-ante occurs when the bank managers, knowing the consequences of assuming excessive risks, decide not take them. One of the vehicles of information to exercise such monitoring, and subside the actions to discipline the banks, are the accounting reports periodically published. The use of the accounting principles allows the managers to calculate the accruals discretionary. This possibility facilitates the use of the discretionarity in an opportunistic way, known in the literature as accounting manipulation / earnings management, with the objective to mislead the user of accounting information and obtain benefits to the bank or to its managers. The objective of this study is to verify the existence of empirical evidence that the discretionary accruals influence the exercise of the market discipline practiced by the depositors of Brazilian banks. The study separates the accounting accruals non-discretionary and discretionary using the variables of allowance and provision for loan losses, outstanding loans and its changes, non-performing credits and its changes, and credit write-offs. Also, it innovates by considering the risks of credit operations through the use of the loans interest rate as credits risk proxy. It utilizes econometric models to evaluate the influence of the discretionary accruals in the market discipline, by using variables of the deposits interest rates and volume changes, leverage index, provision for loan losses, payroll expenses, the ratio services revenue and other administrative expenses, return on assets and its deviation from sample average and other control variables. The theoretical approach utilizes the theory of delegate monitoring in the economics aspects, the positive accounting approach in the accounting aspects, and the systemic generalized method of moments (GMM-sis) in the econometric aspects. Banco Central do Brasils public and private data on 102 banks was used and processed to contemplate institutions scale effects, which were normalized by dividing them by total assets or by total loans where applicable and, to contemplate the inflations aspects, by deflating the data by consumer price index, IPCA. And in fact it were found evidence in the results obtained that there is a depositors market discipline practice, confirming studies done in Brazil, and that the accounting manipulation, through discretionary accruals, influence the market discipline in the sense of lowering the interest rates negotiated between the banks and the depositors, and thus allowing a transfer of wealth between them. This means that the banks managers are successful in manipulating the accounting results through discretionary accruals and mislead the depositors, which get interest rates lower than should be paid. This suggests that the market is not efficient to process the banks published accounting information.

Os depositantes, ao aplicarem seus recursos nos bancos, delegam a estes a função de monitoramento dos tomadores de empréstimos e, com isso, podem concentrar seus esforços em monitorar a instituição bancária. A disciplina de mercado ex-post é exercida na eventualidade de os bancos assumirem riscos excessivos, e de os depositantes, ao serem informados de tal fato, serem capazes de agir no sentido de disciplinar os bancos, seja pela requisição de taxas de juros mais elevadas, seja pelo saque de seus depósitos. A disciplina de mercado ex-ante é exercida sobre os gestores dos bancos que, conhecedores das conseqüências de assumirem riscos excessivos para suas instituições, preferem não tomar essa atitude. Um dos veículos de informação para o exercício do monitoramento, e subsídio para as ações de disciplinamento, são os demonstrativos contábeis divulgados periodicamente. A aplicação dos princípios contábeis faculta ao gestor o exercício da discricionariedade na apuração das acumulações contábeis, accruals. Essa possibilidade permite que a discricionariedade seja exercida de forma oportunística, prática conhecida genericamente na literatura contábil como manipulação contábil / gerenciamento de resultados, com o propósito de iludir o usuário da informação contábil e levar à obtenção de benefícios tanto para os bancos como pessoalmente para seus gestores. O objetivo desta tese foi verificar a existência de evidências empíricas de que as acumulações contábeis discricionárias influenciam o exercício da disciplina de mercado exercida pelos depositantes dos bancos brasileiros. O estudo efetuou a separação das acumulações contábeis não-discricionárias e discricionárias por meio da utilização das variáveis de despesas e saldo de provisão para créditos de liquidação duvidosa, saldo e sua variação das operações de crédito, saldo e sua variação das operações em atraso, operações registradas como prejuízo e, além disso, inova com a consideração do risco das operações de crédito por meio da utilização, como proxy do risco, da taxa de juros das operações de crédito. Utiliza modelos econométricos para avaliar a influência das acumulações contábeis discricionárias na disciplina de mercado, por meio da utilização das variáveis de taxa de juros e variação dos volumes de depósitos, índice de alavancagem, despesas de provisão para créditos de liquidação duvidosa, despesas de pessoal, razão das receitas de prestação de serviço e outras despesas administrativas, retorno dos ativos e seu desvio da média amostral e liquidez, além de variáveis de controle. Quanto à formulação teórica, recorreu-se, sob o aspecto econômico, à teoria do monitoramento delegado; sob o aspecto contábil, à abordagem positiva da contabilidade; e, por fim, sob o aspecto econométrico, ao método generalizado dos momentos sistêmico (GMM-sis). Obtiveram-se dados públicos e próprios do Banco Central do Brasil, relativos a 102 bancos, os quais foram tratados para contemplar os efeitos de escala das instituições por meio de normalizações pelos ativos totais e créditos totais, onde aplicável e, também, os efeitos inflacionários, por meio do deflacionamento pelo IPCA. Nos resultados obtidos, foram encontrados indícios da existência da prática de disciplina de mercado por parte dos depositantes, conforme estudos já realizados no Brasil. Também foram encontrados indícios de que a prática de manipulação contábil efetuada por meio das acumulações contábeis discricionárias tem influência no exercício da disciplina de mercado, no sentido de reduzir as taxas de juros negociadas entre os bancos e os depositantes, ocasionando transferência de renda dos depositantes para os bancos. Isso significa que os gestores dos bancos logram êxito ao manipularem os resultados contábeis, por meio da utilização das acumulações contábeis discricionárias, e iludem os depositantes ao obterem taxas de juros inferiores às que deveriam ser pagas. Isto sugere que o mercado não é eficiente para tratar as informações contábeis publicadas pelos bancos. / When the depositors invest their money in the banks they delegate the monitoring function of the borrowers to the bank and can concentrate their efforts in monitoring the banks. The market discipline ex-post occurs in the event of the bank taking excessive risks and, knowing that, the depositors can act in the sense of disciplining the banks by requiring greater interest rates or withdrawing their deposits. The market discipline ex-ante occurs when the bank managers, knowing the consequences of assuming excessive risks, decide not take them. One of the vehicles of information to exercise such monitoring, and subside the actions to discipline the banks, are the accounting reports periodically published. The use of the accounting principles allows the managers to calculate the accruals discretionary. This possibility facilitates the use of the discretionarity in an opportunistic way, known in the literature as accounting manipulation / earnings management, with the objective to mislead the user of accounting information and obtain benefits to the bank or to its managers. The objective of this study is to verify the existence of empirical evidence that the discretionary accruals influence the exercise of the market discipline practiced by the depositors of Brazilian banks. The study separates the accounting accruals non-discretionary and discretionary using the variables of allowance and provision for loan losses, outstanding loans and its changes, non-performing credits and its changes, and credit write-offs. Also, it innovates by considering the risks of credit operations through the use of the loans interest rate as credits risk proxy. It utilizes econometric models to evaluate the influence of the discretionary accruals in the market discipline, by using variables of the deposits interest rates and volume changes, leverage index, provision for loan losses, payroll expenses, the ratio services revenue and other administrative expenses, return on assets and its deviation from sample average and other control variables. The theoretical approach utilizes the theory of delegate monitoring in the economics aspects, the positive accounting approach in the accounting aspects, and the systemic generalized method of moments (GMM-sis) in the econometric aspects. Banco Central do Brasils public and private data on 102 banks was used and processed to contemplate institutions scale effects, which were normalized by dividing them by total assets or by total loans where applicable and, to contemplate the inflations aspects, by deflating the data by consumer price index, IPCA. And in fact it were found evidence in the results obtained that there is a depositors market discipline practice, confirming studies done in Brazil, and that the accounting manipulation, through discretionary accruals, influence the market discipline in the sense of lowering the interest rates negotiated between the banks and the depositors, and thus allowing a transfer of wealth between them. This means that the banks managers are successful in manipulating the accounting results through discretionary accruals and mislead the depositors, which get interest rates lower than should be paid. This suggests that the market is not efficient to process the banks published accounting information.

Ce travail de recherche vise à identifier, d'une part le comportement comptable des dirigeants de la société initiatrice d'une opération de fusion acquisition et d'autre part les déterminants de ce comportement comptable. Les contributions de cette thèse sont d'ordre théorique, méthodologique et managérial. Sur le plan théorique, cette thèse permet de compléter les travaux antérieurs s'inscrivant dans le cadre des prolongements de la théorie politico contractuelle dans un contexte spécifique à savoir les fusions-acquisitions. Outre la détection de la gestion des résultats, ce travail s'intéresse à l'étude de ses déterminants notamment les déterminants contextuels qui sont rarement testés. Sur le plan méthodologique, cette recherche présente un double intérêt. Premièrement, elle commence par une étude du cas clinique, Sagem-Snecma, pour tester l'existence de la gestion de résultat dans ce contexte particulier, puis la généraliser sur l'échantillon d'entreprises françaises sur la période 2001-2007. Deuxièmement, cette thèse, utilise un modèle de mesure de gestion des résultats, qui n'a pas été utilisé dans le contexte du fusion-absorption (modèle du Dechow et al (2003)) et le compare avec le modèle de Jones modifié. Sur le plan managérial, cette recherche permet aux utilisateurs de l'information comptable lors d'une opération de fusion-acquisition de mieux interpréter les états financiers des sociétés participantes à l'opération. Elle peut contribuer aussi à faire avancer les réflexions des normalisateurs quant aux dispositions réglementant ces opérations en révélant l'ampleur des choix comptables. / This research aims to identify the accounting behaviour of managers of acquiring firms, on the one hand and the determinantes of that accounting behaviour on the other hand. The contributions of this research are theoretical, methodological and managerial. Theoretically, this research permits the completion of anterior tasks involved in the framework extensions of the political theory of contract in a specific context namely mergers and acquisitions. In addition to detection of earnings management, this research focuses on the study of the determinants of performance management including contextual determinants that are rarely tested. Methodologically, this research presents a double interest. First, it begins with a clinical case, Sagem -Snecma, to test the existence of earning management in this specific context and then generalize about the entire sample of French firms over the period 2001-2007. Second, it uses a recent measurement model of earning management, which has not been used in the context of the merger and acquisition, (model of Dechow et al (2003)) then it compares it with modified Jones model. At last, this research allows users of accounting information during a merger or acquisition to interpret better the financial statements of companies participating in the operation of mergers and acquisitions It may also help advance thinking about the normalizers provisions regulating these operations by revealing the extent of accounting choices.

Att undersöka bokföringsmanipulation är av stor betydelse bland stora företag eftersom manipulationer hos stora företag har stora risker för kunder och andra intressenter. Om många småföretagare skulle genomföra bokföringsmanipulationer, skulle konsekvenserna bli större än för stora företag. En redovisningskonsult som hjälper småföretagare att sköta löpande bokföring och rapportering till myndigheter har möjligheter att förhindra lagöverträdelse och genomföring av bokföringsmanipulation. Tidigare forskning fokuserade främst på stora företag som manipulerar för att presentera sina rapporter på bättre eller sämre sätt än det finns i verkligheten. Undersökningen har fokuserat på en redovisningskonsult och hens agerande på bokföringsmanipulation. Genom identifiering av flera utgångspunkter som kan påverka redovisningskonsultens agerande, försökte vi skapa förståelse kring redovisningskonsultens valmöjligheter och motivering till agerande.  Uppsatsen har inriktat sig att genomföra tre semistrukturerade intervjuer med redovisningskonsulterna. Intervjuerna har baserats på intervjuguide som utformats utifrån teoretiska antagande samt för att besvara undersökningens frågeställningar. Studien har abduktiv ansats eftersom den ger möjlighet att göra val mellan olika tolkningar som var antagna från respondenterna.  Resultaten visade sig att det kan förekommer bokföringsmanipulation bland företagare. Det finns olika riskgrupper bland kunder som kan försöka att manipulera med bokföringen. Om en redovisningskonsult vill driva långsiktiga verksamhet, undviker han eller hon att ta kunder som vill genomföra bokföringsmanipulationer. “Det är inte lönt” säger en av respondenterna. Det finns behov av framtida forskning kring omständigheter som nystartade redovisningsbyråer påträffar med kunder som vill genomföra bokföringsmanipulationer. Ytterligare förslag är en undersökning med liknelser och skillnader i agerande och påträffande av bokföringsmanipulation mellan kvinnliga och manliga redovisningskonsulter. / To investigate accounting manipulation is of great importance among large companies because manipulations at large companies have great risks to customers and other stakeholders. If small businesses were to carry out accounting manipulations, the consequences would be greater than for large companies. An accounting consultant who helps small businesses with accounting and reporting to authorities has the potential to prevent violations of the law and accounting manipulation. Previous research focused mainly on large companies that manipulate to present their reports in a better or worse way than they are. This thesis has focused on an accounting consultant and its actions on an accounting manipulation. By identifying several starting points that can influence the accounting consultant's actions, we tried to create an understanding of the accounting consultant's choices and motivation for action. The thesis has focused on conducting three semi-structured interviews with the accounting consultants. The interviews have been based on interview guides designed based on theoretical assumptions and to answer the survey's questions. The study has an abductive approach because it provides an opportunity to make choices between different interpretations that were adopted from the respondents. The results showed that there may be accounting manipulation among entrepreneurs. There are different risk groups among customers who may try to manipulate the accounting. If an accounting consultant wants to run a long-term business, he or she avoids taking clients who want to perform accounting manipulations. "It does not pay," says one of the respondents. There is a need for future research on circumstances that start-up accounting firms encounter with clients who want to carry out accounting manipulations. Another suggestion is an investigation comparing the differences in actions and the findings of accounting manipulation between female and male accounting consultants.