Thesis (Psy. D.)--Wheaton College (Ill.), 2006. / Includes questionnaire and scenarios in Korean. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-71).

Thesis (Psy. D.)--Wheaton College (Ill.), 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-71).

Defenders of the Knowledge Argument contend that physicalism is false because knowing all the physical truths is not sufficient to know all the truths about the world. In particular, proponents of the Knowledge Argument claim that physicalism is false because the truths about the character of conscious experience are not knowable from the complete set of physical truths. This dissertation is a defense of the Knowledge Argument. Chapter one characterizes what physicalism is and provides support for the claim that if knowing all the physical truths is not sufficient to know all the truths about the world, then physicalism is false. In chapter two, I defend the claim that knowing all the physical truths is not sufficient for knowing all the truths about the world. In addition to mounting a prima facie case for the knowledge intuition, I present and defend an epistemology grounded in direct acquaintance to provide a more substantive argument to accept it. Chapters three through five address the physicalist objections to the Knowledge Argument. The first set of objections advocates that knowing all the physical truths is, in fact, sufficient for knowing all the truths about the world. The next set of objections admits that there is some sense in which knowing all the physical truths is not sufficient for knowing all the truths about the world. However, these objections maintain that the kind of knowledge that is absent from the complete set of physical truths is know-how or knowledge by acquaintance, and not factual or propositional knowledge. The final set of objections maintain that the kind of propositional knowledge that is left out of the complete set of physical truths is compatible with physicalism. My response to these objections is part of advancing my prima facie case for the Knowledge Argument. The final chapter addresses a structural question that pertains to the Knowledge Argument. Some philosophers have maintained that the structure of the Knowledge Argument invites a kind of self-refutation of any systematic account of reality. The concern is that the Knowledge Argument proves too much, and that the dualist who uses the argument to refute physicalism risks the argument defeating his own position. I will argue that the Knowledge Argument does not refute dualism.

A social network represents the interconnected relations among people. In a knowledge-intensive era as of now, people have less capability to resolve more ill-defined and complicated problems. Several researches indicate that under such a circumstance people are more likely to turn to other people through their social networks than to consult sources like databases and documents. Searching in social networks is therefore an essential issue. In addition, typical social networks are neither regular nor completely random ones, but instead, they are mixtures between these two, which are referred to as small worlds. Consequently, such an issue is also called the small world search. Search mechanism in the small world can be classified into single-attribute approach (e.g. best connected) and multiple-attribute approach (e.g. social distance). Relevant research works, however, are mostly based on acquaintance networks. And one of the problems to search in acquaintance networks is its high attrition rate that hinders further search and results in low success rate. On the other hand, in recent years several researchers focus on the constitution and propagation of trust networks that represent the trustworthy relations among people. Since trust implies much closer to what we mean friends rather than acquaintance, we believe that the attrition rate in trust networks should be lower than in acquaintance networks. Based on this belief, we propose to search in trust networks rather than acquaintance networks to enhance the quality of the search process. We design three experiments to compare the search performance in the trust networks and in the acquaintance networks. Experiment I is to examine the ¡§social-distance¡¨ search strategy we adopt in the search. The second experiment evaluates the performance comparison without considering attrition. Finally, we consider the attrition rate and attrition rate difference for the comparison. The results show that as long as the attrition rate difference is beyond 10%, search in trust networks performs better than in acquaintance networks. It therefore justifies the feasibility of our proposed approach in gaining good search performance.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 98-111).

published_or_final_version / Sociology / Master / Master of Social Sciences

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Delaware, 2008. / Principal faculty advisor: Susan L. Miller, Dept. of Sociology & Criminal Justice. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.) in Education--University of Maine, 2007. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 45-48).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-77). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-77). Also available on the Internet.