Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2009. / Title from PDF title page (January 11, 2010) Includes bibliographical references (p. [71]-[74])

Thesis (M.S.)--Kutztown University, 1990. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2725. Typescript.

Thesis (M. A.)--University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2006. / Title from PDF title page screen. Advisor: Jacquelyn W. White; submitted to the Dept. of Psychology. Includes bibliographical references (p. 26-29)

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Chapter 1 of Phenomenal Acquaintance is devoted to taking care of some preliminary issues. I begin by distinguishing those states of awareness in virtue of which we’re acquainted with the phenomenal characters of our experiences from those states of awareness some claim are at the very nature of experience. Then I reconcile the idea that experience is transparent with the claim that we can be acquainted with phenomenal character. In Chapter 2 I set up a dilemma that is the primary focus of the dissertation. In the first part of this chapter I argue that phenomenal acquaintance has three key features, what I call its ‘directness’, ‘thickness’, and ‘infallibility’. In the second part I argue, however, that it’s really quite puzzling how thoughts about phenomenal character (or any thoughts, for that matter) could have them. In the next two chapters I consider how we might resolve the dilemma described above. I begin in Chapter 3 by considering an account of phenomenal acquaintance inspired by Bertrand Russell’s discussion of acquaintance. The general idea here is to excise mental representation from phenomenal acquaintance, and I ultimately reject the proposal. Chapter 4 is the core chapter of Phenomenal Acquaintance. In it I propose an account of phenomenal acquaintance that doesn’t excise mental representation. My account is comprised of three theses. First, token experiences are complex and have instances of phenomenal properties as components. Second, instances of phenomenal properties are mental representations, and they represent themselves. Third, the attention relevant to phenomenal acquaintance is underwritten by self-representation. I argue that my account explains how phenomenal acquaintance is direct, thick, and infallible, thereby resolving our dilemma. I argue in Chapter 5 that my account of phenomenal acquaintance explains why there is an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and non-phenomenal truths. Accordingly, I conclude that the explanatory gap doesn’t pose a problem for physicalism. Here I implement what has come to be called the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ for responding to the challenge posed by the explanatory gap.

Yes / Trait inferences occur routinely and rapidly during social interaction, sometimes based on scant or fleeting information. In this research, participants (perceivers) made inferences of targets' big‐five traits after briefly watching or listening to an unfamiliar target (a third party) performing various mundane activities (telling a scripted joke or answering questions about him/herself or reading aloud a paragraph of promotional material). Across three studies, when perceivers judged targets to be either low or high in one or more dimensions of the big‐five traits, they tended to be correct, but they did not tend to be correct when they judged targets as average. Such inferences seemed to vary in effectiveness across different trait dimensions and depending on whether the target's behaviour was presented either in a video with audio, a silent video, or just in an audio track—perceivers generally were less often correct when they judged targets as average in each of the big‐five traits across various information channels (videos with audio, silent videos, and audios). Study 3 replicated these findings in a different culture. We conclude with discussion of the scope and the adaptive value of this trait inferential ability.

Cette thèse se concentre sur un phénomène introspectif que j’appelle introspection primitive. L’introspection primitive est un type d’introspection d’états phénoménaux qui est non classificatoire : quand on introspecte primitivement, on ne reconnaît pas l’état phénoménal introspecté comme un exemple de type d’expérience précédemment rencontrée. Je défends principalement trois thèses sur l’introspection primitive. Premièrement, elle existe : il y a un phénomène mental qui a les caractéristiques que j’attribue à l’introspection primitive et un tel phénomène est un processus introspectif réel. Deuxièmement, sa nature est plus adéquatement expliquée par une version de la théorie de l’accointance – ce que j’appelle la théorie de l’intégration. Troisièmement, elle a une valeur épistémique : elle permet au sujet d’acquérir une connaissance de ses états phénoménaux. Cette connaissance est un type de connaissance sui generis : la connaissance par accointance. La connaissance par accointance a une propriété épistémique spéciale qui est, pourrait-on dire, analogue à l’infaillibilité : elle donne au sujet un saisi complet et parfait de la phénoménologie de son expérience. / This dissertation focuses on an introspective phenomenon that I call primitive introspection. Primitive introspection is a non-classificatory kind of phenomenal-state introspection: it is a kind of phenomenal-state introspection that does not involve recognizing the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of any experience type. I defend three main claims about primitive introspection. First, it exists: there is a mental phenomenon that has the features I attribute to primitive introspection and such a phenomenon is a fullfledged introspective process. Second, its nature is best accounted for by a version of the acquaintance theory—what I call the integration account. Third, it has a distinct epistemic value: it provides the subject with knowledge of their phenomenal states. Such knowledge is a sui generis kind of knowledge: knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by acquaintance displays a distinctive epistemic property which is somewhat analogous to infallibility: it provides the subject with a complete and perfect grasp of the phenomenology of their experience.

This study was conducted to examine the experience of unwanted sexual aggression from both the male and female perspectives. Questionnaires were distributed to 325 students, and of these, 142 wrote free-response narratives describing their most sexually aggressive experience. Two raters scored and analyzed the narratives on the basis of 19 categories for male responses and 16 categories for female responses. Differences between the male and female perception of the experience of unwanted sexual aggression were found on several categories. The results of this study suggest that date rape awareness and prevention programs should emphasize the point that dating and sexual encounters can easily be fraught with miscommunication and misinterpretation, and encourage clearer communication and better understanding.

This thesis is a study of aboutness. It defends the claim that we have singular thoughts about ordinary objects and argues that an essential part of how we do so is by maintaining singular representations. This proposal allows us to avoid traditional, unsatisfying conceptions of the scope of singular thought while restoring the sense in which such thought is a distinctively epistemic achievement. Reconnecting the study of aboutness with epistemology promises to alleviate the sense of directionlessness in the contemporary literature, offering a firmer grip on the phenomenon along with new, systematic resources for its investigation. Chapters 1-2 explore the effects of contextualist machinery on orthodox views about singular thought. It is widely thought that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject's possession of a singular thought, then there can be no acquaintance requirement(s) on singular thought. Chapter 1 shows that this view rests on a faulty picture of how we talk about attitudes. Indeed, the truth of a de re attitude report cannot be taken to track the singular/non-singular distinction without collapsing it. A new, contextualist picture is needed. That there must be a distinction between singular and non-singular intentionality is emphasized in Chapter 2, where a key explanatory role for singular thought - brought out by a thought experiment due to Strawson - is examined. I show that the role does not call for any distinctive kind of mental content. Once we abandon the two widespread views questioned in Chapters 1-2, our grip on the phenomenon of singular aboutness is loosened: it is not constitutively tied to the kinds of attitude-reporting data or mental content by which it is often assumed to be revealed. Where are we to look for insight? What makes something the object of a singular thought? According to Russell, it is a datum of intuition that singular thought involves a kind of knowledge; a theory of aboutness will precisify the intuitive notion of 'knowing which thing one is thinking about' in order to capture this demand in a philosophically revealing way. If Russell is right, teasing out this connection to knowledge will allow us to see what it takes for a particular thing to be the immediate subject matter of thought. Chapter 3 discusses Evans's theory of this kind. Chapter 4 examines recent work by Dickie. While serious concerns emerge in each case, insights recovered are used to precisify Russell's requirement, leading to a novel picture of singular representation and the epistemic character of this achievement. While the chapters follow a narrative, providing an extended rationale for the proposal in Chapter 4, each may be read in isolation by those familiar with the philosophical issues. For those who are not, the Introduction provides sufficient background.

The current study sought to assess the impact of the race, gender, and ethnicity of rape victims on college students’ propensity to assign culpability to victims. Using a sample of college students (n=279) from a mid-sized Southeastern university, respondents were given a set of six different vignettes, varying only by victim characteristics. These vignettes featured alcohol-facilitated sexual assault between acquaintances, a common occurrence in college environments. Respondents were asked to evaluate the culpability of the victim through a blameworthiness scale. Through the incorporation of the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale, this study also measured the respondents’ propensity to assign blame to female rape victims and to alleviate male perpetrators of any responsibility. Results indicated that adherence to rape myth acceptance was a more significant predictor of blameworthiness than victim or respondent characteristics. This exploratory study was designed to add to the growing body of literature examining attitudes toward acquaintance rape.