The word expropriation is used in South Africa to describe the process whereby a public authority or institution takes property from a private person for public purposes against payment of compensation. The current Act regulating expropriations in South Africa is known as the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. However, it has three primary inconsistencies with the Constitution. Firstly it predates the Constitution - therefore, it does not infuse the values of equality, human dignity and the achievement of freedom. Secondly it is not consistent with comparable modem statutes elsewhere in the world. The last issue is that this Act is inconsistent with the Constitution in the sense that the Act only provides for expropriation for public purposes and the Constitution provides for expropriation in the public interest as well as for a public purpose. For these reasons it is crucial to establish a new legislative framework. In an attempt to rectify the above difficulties, an expropriation policy and a draft Bill were introduced. The primary purpose of the Bill is to harmonise the considerable amount of legislation in South Africa on the subject of expropriation, and to fill the gaps of the current Act. However, the new proposed Bill was referred back to cabinet as it had various difficulties. According to newspaper commentators, one of these reasons was that market value would not be used when determining the amount of compensation. This is not true, as market value is one of the listed factors in section 25(3) of the Constitution, and it is provided for in the Bill. Another reason was that the role of the courts will also be restricted in the new Bill. Parties will no longer be able to refer disputes concerning the amount of compensation to court. Once again this is not true, the courts role is only restricted in the sense that it would no be able to determine the amount of compensation as provided for in the Constitution, but will only be allowed to approve or decline the amount the Minister determined. This is one of the aspects that may be debatable constitutionally. After an in-depth study of the proposed Bill, the author came to the conclusion that there are actually only three aspects that might be unconstitutional namely; the definition of public interest which is to be included that widens the capacity to expropriate; departure from the notice procedure; and the fact that the courts may no longer determine the amount of compensation, but only approve or decline. Expropriation is one of the most important tools to speed up land reform in South Africa, and it is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the procedure must take place in a fair, equitable and constitutional manner. The purpose of this study will be to identify the aspects which result in expropriations that is not done on this basis, to scrutinize them and to make recommendations to these aspects. / Thesis (LL.M. (Law)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2009.

Prior to 1994, South African taxpayers had little protection from fiscal legislation or the decisions, actions or conduct of the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) that violated their common law rights. Parliament reigned supreme and in tax matters, the strict and literal approach to the interpretation of statutes was employed, with the judiciary often quoting the mantra that there is “no equity about tax”. The Income Tax Act (Act No 58 of 1962) was littered with discriminatory and unfair provisions based on age, religion, sex and marital status. Even unreasonable decisions taken by SARS could not be reviewed by the judiciary as “unreasonableness” was not a ground for review of the exercise of a discretion by SARS. On 27 April 1994, the constitutional order changed. Parliamentary supremacy was replaced with constitutional supremacy and the rights to privacy, equality, human dignity, property and just administrative action were codified in a Bill of Rights. The codification of these fundamental rights has materially changed the nature and extent of the rights of South African taxpayers. The objective of this thesis, therefore, is to identify, analyse and discuss South African taxpayers’ rights from a constitutional perspective. The following major conclusions can be drawn from the research done: - the judiciary have been forced to reappraise their approach to the interpretation of statutes from a “strict and literal” to a “purposive” approach that is in accordance with the values underpinning the new constitutional order; - new legislation has amended some of the so-called “reverse” onus of proof provisions that were constitutionally unsound – this should result in greater fairness and consistency for affected taxpayers especially in the area of when penalties may be imposed; - the concept of clean hands and good facts can influence the judiciary when arguing that a taxpayer’s right to just administrative action has been violated; and - discriminatory and unfair legislation and conduct on the part of SARS may and should be attacked on a substantive law basis, especially where human dignity is at stake. The overall conclusion is that taxpayers’ rights are more far-reaching than prior to 1994 but still have some way to go before they are fully interpreted and developed. / Accounting Science / D.Compt.

La résolution des litiges est couramment considérée comme une fonction exclusivement juridictionnelle. Les recours portés devant les juridictions sont appelés recours contentieux et la procédure juridictionnelle serait la procédure contentieuse. Devant l’administration, la procédure serait non contentieuse et les recours seraient des pétitions gracieuses. Or, tant l’administration française que l’administration colombienne tranchent quotidiennement des litiges dans l’exercice d’une fonction contentieuse qui n’est pas nouvelle. Dès lors, l’exclusivité juridictionnelle du contentieux n’est qu’une vision déformée de l’organisation du pouvoir. La résolution administrative des litiges est l’une des prérogatives de puissance publique dont dispose l’administration. Elle se caractérise par son caractère accessoire de la mission administrative principale; il s’agit d’un instrument de la réalisation des finalités de l’action administrative. L’administration tranche les litiges dans l’exercice de sa fonction administrative : les décisions administratives contentieuses n’ont pas force de chose jugée, pouvant être l’objet du contrôle juridictionnel qui décidera définitivement le litige. Cette fonction administrative est conforme à la théorie de la séparation des pouvoirs dont l’interprétation séparatiste ne se réalise ni en France ni en Colombie. Cependant, l’administration n’exerce pas sa fonction contentieuse à chaque fois qu’un recours administratif est exercé, qu’une procédure de sanction administrative est entamée ou qu’un litige opposant deux particuliers est porté à la décision de l’administration. L’activité contentieuse de l’administration exige qu’un véritable contentieux soit présenté à l’administration, que ce contentieux se matérialise devant l’administration et qu’elle tranche unilatéralement le fond du litige. Dans ce cas, l’administration n’exerce une fonction ni matériellement juridictionnelle ni quasi contentieuse, mais une véritable fonction contentieuse. / Dispute resolution activity is commonly considered as a wholly judicial function. Judicial actions against the administration and the procedure followed by Courts would be referred as “contentious”, while actions and procedures before administrative bodies would be described as “non-contentious”. Still, both Colombian and French administrations may resolve disputes on a daily basis as a result of longstanding “contentious” missions. Therefore, a vision that reduces this “contentious” to the solely judicial activity distorts this reality in power organization theory. The administrative resolution of disputes is an incidental prerogative of the public administration. It is characterized by its attachment to the main administrative mission, it is an instrument for the purposes of administrative action. The administration resolves disputes as part of its administrative function: administrative “contentious” decisions have not the force of a final judgment, and could be subject to judicial review. Administrative “contentious” missions seem to conform to a non-rigid vision of the separation of powers shared by Colombian and French systems. However, the administration does not performs a “contentious” activity every time an administrative action or an administrative sanction procedure is undertaken, or when it has to decide a controversy opposing two individuals. Administrative “contentious” activity demands a real “contentious” to be materialized before the administration, which also decides the bottom of the dispute. In that case, the administration does not perform a judicial or quasi-judicial mission, but just a real “contentious” mission

The dissertation examines the applicability of procedural fairness to actions by members of the South African National Defence Forces (SANDF). The research focuses on and uses the South African Defence Force Union v The Minister of South African National Defence Force (SANDU 2010 judgment) to illustrate how procedural fairness should find application in the SANDF, given the sui generis nature of the defence forces. This judgment presented an opportunity to investigate whether the legislative framework that is available in the SANDF is adequate to protect the right to procedural fairness of the members of the SANDF encapsulated in section 33 of the Constitution, 1996. The dissertation examines the relevant sections of the Defence Act, Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act, Labour Relations Act (LRA), and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) read with sections 23 and 33 of the Constitution to determine whether there is a gap that exists in so far as the protection of the right to procedural fairness of members of the defence forces is concerned. It also examines the Military Discipline Code and the rules and regulations of the Defence Forces. The analysis of the SANDU 2010 judgment demonstrates that PAJA could find application in dismissal or employment related disputes within the SANDF. The scenario that is evidenced from the analysis of the defence force legislative framework is that the legislative framework that is available within the SANDF is inadequate to protect and deal with disputes which arise from allegations of infringement of the right to procedural fairness. This scenario is compounded by the fact that the LRA which is the empowering legislation that was promulgated to give effect to the right to section 23 of the Constitution and to deal with dismissal and employment related disputes, does not apply to members of the SANDF. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LL. M.

Prior to 1994, South African taxpayers had little protection from fiscal legislation or the decisions, actions or conduct of the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) that violated their common law rights. Parliament reigned supreme and in tax matters, the strict and literal approach to the interpretation of statutes was employed, with the judiciary often quoting the mantra that there is “no equity about tax”. The Income Tax Act (Act No 58 of 1962) was littered with discriminatory and unfair provisions based on age, religion, sex and marital status. Even unreasonable decisions taken by SARS could not be reviewed by the judiciary as “unreasonableness” was not a ground for review of the exercise of a discretion by SARS. On 27 April 1994, the constitutional order changed. Parliamentary supremacy was replaced with constitutional supremacy and the rights to privacy, equality, human dignity, property and just administrative action were codified in a Bill of Rights. The codification of these fundamental rights has materially changed the nature and extent of the rights of South African taxpayers. The objective of this thesis, therefore, is to identify, analyse and discuss South African taxpayers’ rights from a constitutional perspective. The following major conclusions can be drawn from the research done: - the judiciary have been forced to reappraise their approach to the interpretation of statutes from a “strict and literal” to a “purposive” approach that is in accordance with the values underpinning the new constitutional order; - new legislation has amended some of the so-called “reverse” onus of proof provisions that were constitutionally unsound – this should result in greater fairness and consistency for affected taxpayers especially in the area of when penalties may be imposed; - the concept of clean hands and good facts can influence the judiciary when arguing that a taxpayer’s right to just administrative action has been violated; and - discriminatory and unfair legislation and conduct on the part of SARS may and should be attacked on a substantive law basis, especially where human dignity is at stake. The overall conclusion is that taxpayers’ rights are more far-reaching than prior to 1994 but still have some way to go before they are fully interpreted and developed. / Accounting Science / D.Compt.