Abstract in English Family has been the most original economic unit for over 40000 years. However, in the past 30 years family system, population structure, marriage relation, women¡¦s role have been changed. Although marriage has been an important matter since ancient years till today, there are many potential differences between now and then especially in the past 30 years. The structural changes such as external marriage affair, competition between wife and concubine under the wife-concubine system, increasing rate of divorce, and unsymmetrical relation in the essence of marriage can not be simply described or judged right or wrong. Such changes can only be described as a life style, which also is a social culture. However, the increasing impact of such changes cannot be disregarded. This study of this article is on the main axis of marriage system. The article wishes to clarify Chinese marriage system in the past and today from economic perspective and to realize that Chinese marriage system is a collusive structure that has created endless war in a family. On the other hand, this article adopts information asymmetric to interpret matchmaker system that has created many unharmonious couple in the situation that information was not so symmetrical, which explain to us the revenge behavior accounts for the end of marriage relationship. Finally, this article employs economic model in inframarginal analysis and believes there exists many internal-deal expenses in marriage. The modal was further employed to prove that efficiency of matchmaker¡¦s word is higher than free love. In the same time, this article derived that the high expense coefficient of external marriage affair explains why general people are unwilling to try and the employ law to protect. This can reduce such coefficient and remind people of remittal of adultery. Keywords: information asymmetric¡Frotten kid theory¡F adverse selection¡Finframarginal analysis¡Finternal-deal expenses

This paper provides microstructure models of order-driven market to analyze the dynamic dependencies of order strategy, price formation and order book information. This study gradually derives three models to shed light on those dynamic dependencies: risk-neutral order-submission model, risk-averse order-submission model and revision order-submission model based on order book information. Those inferences support that the order-driven market dynamically adjusts the bid/ask at any moment to generate enough price improvement return in order to cover the fluctuations of the adverse selection risk and the non-execution risk faced by limit order submitters of both side. In risk-neutral order-submission model, the model anatomizes adverse selection cost and bid-ask spread under risk-neutral preference of order submitters. This study finds that adverse selection cost comprises three components: arrival probability of informed traders, execution probability of setting price of limit order, cost-to-benefit ratio of investment. In risk-averse order-submission model, the model analyzes the optimal order-submission behavior of risk-averse uninformed traders. This study finds that the asset volatility is the key determinant of the adverse selection risk and the non-execution risk, and thereby the bid-ask spread is associated with the asset volatility. The novelty approach of this model could connect both previous risk-neutral models of Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari (2003) and Foucault (1999), which are the special cases of the reduced form of this model. In revision order-submission model, the model analyzes adverse selection costs and price formation of bid-ask spread, dynamically adjusted by previous state of limit order book in an electronic limit order market. Using order book data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange, the empirical analysis corroborates the following findings: (1) the state of the limit order book significantly affects subsequent order aggressiveness; (2) adverse selection cost and spread are negatively associated with the precision of order book information; (3) information effects of limit order book on the bid-ask spread provide strong support for the model.

Conn., Yale Univ., Diss.--New Haven, 2005. / Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Tenn., Univ., Diss.--Memphis, 2003. / Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Submitted by Bruno Barsanetti (barsanetti@gmail.com) on 2014-04-11T21:04:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 versaofinal.pdf: 311571 bytes, checksum: 99a792cd3569838d12c1e29951f7df78 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2014-04-14T11:58:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 versaofinal.pdf: 311571 bytes, checksum: 99a792cd3569838d12c1e29951f7df78 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-04-14T12:49:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 versaofinal.pdf: 311571 bytes, checksum: 99a792cd3569838d12c1e29951f7df78 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-03-20 / We consider trade in dynamic decentralized markets with adverse selection. Unlike the literature so far, we assume that informed sellers (and not uninformed buyers) make take-it-or-leave-it offers, so that signaling through prices is possible. We establish a partial characterization of the equilibrium set, provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, and show that all equilibria involve signaling if the adverse selection problem is severe enough. Moreover, we prove the somewhat surprising result that the highest welfare achieved in equilibrium is invariant to market frictions. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of separating equilibria, completely characterize such equilibria, and show that the set of equilibrium payoffs for separating equilibria is invariant to market frictions. We conclude with a complete characterization of the equilibrium set in the two-type case, and compare our results to the those in Moreno and Wooders (2010), who analyze the case in which buyers have all the bargaining power. Our results show that signaling through prices can have a non-trivial impact on market outcomes and welfare. / Nesta dissertação, consideram-se trocas em mercados descentralizados com seleção adversa. Diferentemente da literatura até o momento, supomos que vendedores informados (e não compradores desinformados) fazem ofertas take-it-or-leave-it, de forma que sinalização através de preços é possível. Estabelecemos uma caracterização parcial do conjunto de equilíbrio, encontramos condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de um equilíbrio e mostramos que todo equilíbrio apresenta sinalização se o problema de seleção adversa for suficientemente severo. Além disso, provamos o resultado surpreendente que o maior bem-estar atingido em equilíbrio é invariante às fricções do mercado. Também apresentamos condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de equilíbrios separantes, que caracterizamos completamente. Mostramos que o conjunto de payoffs associados a equilíbrios separantes é invariante às fricções. Concluímos com uma caracterização completa do conjunto de equilíbrio com apenas dois tipos, e comparamos nossos resultados com os de Moreno e Wooders (2010), que analisam o caso em que compradores têm todo o poder de mercado. Nossos resultados mostram que sinalização através dos preços tem um impacto não trivial tanto nos resultados do mercado quanto no bem-estar.

Submitted by Henrique Brasiliense de Castro Pires (henrique.brasiliense2014@fgvmail.br) on 2016-05-04T18:32:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Limited Liability and Non-responsiveness in Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Problems (1).pdf: 525295 bytes, checksum: 0463596c60f1218d5dfffa8108178df6 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2016-05-10T19:09:38Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Limited Liability and Non-responsiveness in Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Problems (1).pdf: 525295 bytes, checksum: 0463596c60f1218d5dfffa8108178df6 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2016-05-16T19:27:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Limited Liability and Non-responsiveness in Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Problems (1).pdf: 525295 bytes, checksum: 0463596c60f1218d5dfffa8108178df6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-05-16T19:28:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Limited Liability and Non-responsiveness in Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Problems (1).pdf: 525295 bytes, checksum: 0463596c60f1218d5dfffa8108178df6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-21 / This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.

[pt] Este trabalho testa e encontra evidência de que as taxas de juros de empréstimos bancários respondem mais a aumentos do que a quedas na taxa básica de juros (Selic). A assimetria sobrevive a uma análise de evento, na qual a disponibilidade de uma base com dados diários é explorada com o objetivo de isolar o choque de política monetária sobre os juros. Dentre as potencias teorias que racionalizam essa assimetria, duas são consideradas. A primeira refere-se à existência de poder de mercado, o que permite aos bancos coordenarem um menor repasse como forma de aumentar os lucros de curto prazo. A segunda argumenta que a presença de forte seleção adversa no mercado de crédito diminui o incentivo à concorrência na dimensão preço, reduzindo o repasse de quedas no custo de captação. Como as duas hipóteses produzem implicações empíricas similares em forma reduzida, o artigo propõe e estima um modelo estrutural a fim de testar qual dos dois modelos melhor se ajusta aos preços e quantidades observados no mercado de crédito para pessoa física. / [en] This paper tests and find evidence that support the view that credit interest rates respond more to increases than to decreases in the Central Bank basic interest rate (Selic). This asymmetry is robust to an event analysis, in which the availability of a dataset containing daily information is explored in order to isolate monetary policy shocks on interest rates. Among the possible explanations for this asymmetry, two are considered in the article. The first one refers to the existence of market power, which allows banks to coordinate on a smaller pass-through in order to increase profits in the short run. The second refers to the potential existence of severe adverse selection issues in the credit market, which diminishes the incentives to compete on the interest rate dimension and consequently the pass-through from decreases in the cost of funds. Since the two theories present similar empirical implications in reduced forma analysis, the article proposes and estimates a structural model in order to test which of the competing theories better fits the observed data on prices and quantities for household credit in Brazil.

This diploma thesis discusses the problem of asymmetrically distributed information between economic agents who interact with each other. It describes the historical development of asymmetric information in economic theory. It mainly focuses on possible emergence of inefficiencies due to asymmetrically distributed information. It describes the model of adverse selection. The thesis also points out how it is possible to apply this model of adverse selection together with knowledge of contract theory to partly overcome these inefficiencies. The aim of the study is to show on concrete examples how to design optimal contract and how these optimal contract can minimize the impact of asymmetric information on economic efficiency.

The work focuses on the issues of the market solving the human organ shortage. The market solution faces the same criticism as the commercial surrogacy. The main purpose of the work is to evaluate the commercial surrogacy system efficiency. Within the solution of this question, the work focuses first on the analysis of the arguments against a market in human organs and consequently theise objections applies to the surrogate motherhood with emphasis on the problem of adverse selection, which from an economic point of view appears to be the most serious. In the applied part the paper tests the existence of the signs of the adverse selection in the countries where payment for the surrogacy is legal. The paper leads to the conclusions, despite some specifics of the market, this solution is efficient and the market itself creates sufficient mechanisms to prevent adverse selection

Titel: Relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare - Ett principal-agent-perspektiv Universitet: Malmö Universitet Kurs: TR128C – Företagsekonomi: Examensarbete i Transport Management Författare: Jens Andersson, Olle Karlsson & Mattias Pettersson Handledare: Benedikte Borgström Nyckelord: Agentteori, agentproblem, måldivergens, informationsasymmetri, moral hazard, adverse selection, programmerbarhet Syfte: Att utifrån ett principal-agent-perspektiv studera hur relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare i den studerade miljön påverkas av förekomsten av informationsasymmetri och skilda målbilder, samt hur motivationen att prestera på arbetsplatsen kan påverkas av incitamentsstrukturer kopplade till kontraktsupplägget och olika nivåer av övervakning. Metod: Studien har genomförts via en kvalitativ ansats där data insamlats genom intervjuer, observationer och textanalys. Teori: Studiens teoretiska ramverk bygger på principal-agent-teorin och dess komponenter med fokus på informationsasymmetri och skilda målbilder. Slutsatser: I den studerade miljön där relationen mellan principal och agent kännetecknas av hög informationsasymmetri, hög programmerbarhet och parterna motiveras av olika målbilder står principalen inför valet att antingen komplettera ett beteendebaserat kontrakt med tillräckliga övervakningsmekanismer för att utröna agentens beteende, eller försöka upprätta ett resultatbaserat kontrakt. Hög informationsasymmetri kopplat till ett beteendebaserat kontrakt riskerar att lägga grunden för problem kopplade till moral hazard då agenterna blir helt fria att agera efter sina egna målbilder. / Title: The relationship between managers and workers - An agency perspective University: Malmö Universitet Course: TR128C – Business Administration: Bachelor thesis in Transport Management Writers: Jens Andersson, Olle Karlsson & Mattias Pettersson Mentor: Benedikte Borgström Keywords: Agency theory, agency problem, goal divergence, information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, programmability Purpose: From an agency perspective study how the relationship between managers and workers in the studied environment is affected by the existence of information asymmetry and diverging goals, and also how the motivation to perform at the workplace can be affected by different incentive structures related to the contract form and different levels of surveillance. Methods: The study has been conducted via a qualitative approach and the data has been collected through interviews, observations and text analysis. Theories: The studies theoretical framework is based on the agency theory and its components with a focus on information asymmetry and diverging goals. Conclusion: In the studied environment the relationship between principal and agent is characterized by asymmetrical information flows, high programmability, and diverging goals. This leaves the principal to either reinforce a behavioral based contract with sufficient surveillance to uncover the agent’s behavior, or to try and establish a contract based on results. A high degree of information asymmetry in combination with a behavioral based contract runs the risk of laying the foundation for problems related to moral hazard as the agents are free to act according to their own personal goals.