No description available.

In the literature, some studies argue that affluence and the financial sector encourages low-carbon investments which result in lower emissions while others find that they enhance emissions. Contemporary studies barely consider agriculture, employment generation and the degree of financial development as determinants of emissions. In view of these, the thesis investigates the impact of economic and financial development on CO2 emissions in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Applying the EKC and STIRPAT framework, the study modelled three functional forms which were estimated using an unbalanced panel data of 45 SSA countries by employing static and dynamic analytical methods. The models were re-estimated for 24 low (LIC), 13 lower-middle (LMIC), six upper-middle (UMIC) and two high-income countries (HIC). The study found evidence that empirical results differ in terms of the (sub-) sample of countries, estimation methods and functional forms. In detail, the study found different CO2 emissions-economic development relationships for the income groups. However, there is evidence of a linkage between later developments of the economies with lower emissions in LIC and UMIC while this linkage does not exist in LMIC and HIC. The study also found that financial development lowers CO2 in UMIC while it enhances emissions in LIC, LMIC and HIC. Despite this, there is evidence of a linkage between later developments of financial sectors with higher emissions in LIC and HIC and a linkage between later developments of financial sectors with lower CO2 in UMIC in SSA meanwhile no linkage was found for LMIC. The study concludes that not all economic development increases the level of CO2 emissions and not all financial development limits CO2 emissions in SSA during the study period. Generally, the main contributory variables to CO2 emissions are income, trade openness, energy consumption, population density and domestic credit to private sector to GDP. The main reducing factors of CO2 emissions are agriculture and official exchange rate. The thesis recommends that SSA needs to be more responsive to a cleaner CO2 environment by moving away from the conduct of unclean development strategy to intensified green investments. / Economics / D. Phil. (Economics)

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2006. / The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law in May 2000 by President Clinton to allow sub-Saharan countries to export designated products duty-free into the US. AGOA is a temporary measure that is non-reciprocal and not negotiated by the participating parties. The initiative was launched to liberalise the markets of developing countries on the road to become integrated in the global economy. The initial success of AGOA was limited, with only a few countries making use of AGOA to increase their exports into the US markets. Problems encountered were high levels of protectionism from the US and the existence of technical trade barriers (including sanitary measures in agriculture) and nontariff barriers (including quotas). African countries are using shipment as the main transport for exports, and the US barred transshipment due to corruption that occurred in the past. The AGOA also made provision for 'special provisions' measures to enable AGOA eligible countries to export apparel and textile to the US. The export of apparel was very successful until the Multifibre Agreement expired in 2005, leading to relocation of apparel factories to lower cost bases. The real beneficiaries from AGOA are oil-exporting countries that make up more than 90% of total AGOA benefits. South Africa is the only country who succeeded in diversified AGOA exports. AGOA has been supplemented by AGOA II (extending the product range) and AGOA III (extending the expiry date to 2015). After the EU-SA Free Trade Agreement has been concluded in 1999, the US started with FTA negotiations with the South African Customs Union (SACU) to improve the exposure of US products to the SACU market and to decrease the trade deficit. However, the agenda of the FTA negotiations included second generation issues of intellectual property rights, trade in services, investment and government procurement. The SACU negotiators learnt some lessons from the EU-SA FTA and progress was slow. The extension of AGOA to 2015 saw a decrease in the urgency of striking a SACU-US FTA. Negotiations slowed down and the decision was made in April 2006 to conduct talks on a lower level. This breathing time can be used by the SACU negotiators to develop an aggressive offensive strategy for future negotiations, and to build competency against the efficient and offensive US negotiators. The US-SACU FTA must still be pursued to ensure that the benefits of AGOA are locked in. It will be beneficial for SACU if the different needs for all the SACU countries are addressed and the negotiations are done in incremental steps .

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2007. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The SACU bloc, which accounts for one-half of the subcontinent's GDP, is the largest market for the US exports in SSA (Langton, January 2005). Wide differences exist among the economies of SACU - while SA has developed a significant manufacturing and industrial capacity, the other countries remain dependent on agriculture and mineral extraction. The grouping is dominated by SA, which accounts for 87% of the population, and 93% of the GDP of the customs area. SACU member states had a combined real GDP of $201bn in 2003. Services made up 65% of SA Trade in 2003 and had become a major player. In 2003, SACU was the 32nd largest trading partner of the US with two-way trade equivalent \ $7.3bn. Merchandise imports from SACU totaled $5.6bn in 2003, a 17.3% increase from 2002 and a 126% increase from 1996. They were composed of minerals such as platinum, diamonds, and titanium, textiles and apparel, vehicles, and automotive parts. Major US exports to the region include aircraft, vehicles, computers, and construction and agricultural equipment. Services trade between the US and SA has increased dramatically for both countries, with US exports increasing 154% and service imports from SA increasing by 383% respectively since 1992. The stock of US FDI in SA totaled $3.9bn in 2003 and was centered around manufacturing chemicals and services. The main economic objective of FTAs is to reduce trade barriers between member countries and liberalize trade and investment rules (Kanoute, November 2005). This improves market access which is the key to foreign export earnings and investment. But market access is a door that swings both ways, opening local markets to a flood of imports. This can undermine domestic production and employment, and thus exacerbate poverty. Some US civil society organizations have expressed concern that a SACU FTA could have negative consequences for poor Southern Africans, citing potential adjustment costs for import-competing farmers, poor enforcement of labour rights, privatization of utilities, and increased restrictions on importing generic drugs to treat HIV/AIDS (Langton, January 2005). The proposed FTA is ambitious, especially given the tight deadline and the broad range of topics on the negotiating table (Zunckel, Tralac). These include not only tariffs on goods, as is traditional in trade talks, but the wider global economic panoply of agriculture, rules of origin intellectual property, trade in services, investment, government procurement, trade remedies, labour, environmental standards and trade dispute settlement. The US gains reciprocity by gaining improved access to the SACU market than it currently enjoys under AGOA. The IP and "TRIPS plus" provisions are of particular concern to consumers (www.tralac.org.) Ongoing developments at the multilateral level bode against the advisability of entering into binding bilateral agreements with less favourable provisions on essential medicines. Foreign investment could lead to greater industrialization within SACU and competition within local industry, boosting efficiency. But safeguards and industrial policy must be utilized effectively to protect the region's developmental goals. Reliance on domestic courts as the forum of first instance (and state-to-state dispute settlements should those fail) is preferable, as it allows greater possibilities of defending the public interest of SACU citizens over investors' interests (Langton, January 2005). Reaching consensus on negotiating strategy in SACU is no easy feat. Formal negotiations began in June 2003, but talks have made little progress over the past years. The interests of the five different countries, at differing stages of development, have to be reconciled (Draper. 2004). No doubt SA, with its diverse array of interests relative to its BLNS partners in the customs union, will drive this. SACU negotiators, in common with those in many developing countries, have great difficulty in understanding, let alone mobilizing, their services sectors. Hence they have adopted a defensive posture, favouring liberalization only in those (few) sub-sectors that are well understood. SACU has formally accepted an offer made by the US to progress a so-called trade and investment cooperation agreement (TICA). Prior negotiation will be needed among SACU countries, who clearly have an interest in coordinating its negotiation with other US bilateral negotiating partners (Whalley & Leith, December 2003).

No description available.

Doctorat en sciences psychologiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2015 / ENGLISH ABSTRACT : This study investigated the political role of the Weekend Nation newspaper in the democratisation of Malawi between 2002 and 2012 within the context of its foundational and ownership structures by a politician. Bearing in mind that the newspaper was founded by a politician belonging to the first democratically elected ruling party, the United Democratic Front (UDF), this research sought to examine the impact of media ownership on the political role of the Weekend Nation’s journalistic practices in Malawi’s democratisation. Between 2002 and 2012, Malawi was governed by three presidents – Bakili Muluzi of the UDF from 1994 to 2004, Bingu wa Mutharika of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) from 2004 to 2012, and Joyce Banda of the People’s Party (PP) from 2012 to 2014 – all of whom were hostile to the Weekend Nation. Taking into cognisance the ownership of the Weekend Nation by a politician, the critical political economy theory of the media was deemed to be the most appropriate theoretical framework for this study. In media research, the critical political economy theory asserts that owners are able to regulate the output of the media institution either by intervening in the day-to-day operations, or by establishing general goals and understandings and appointing managerial and editorial staff to implement them within the constraints set by the overall allocation of resources. The study employed a qualitative research methodology, in particular in-depth interviews and qualitative content analysis. Research findings indicate that overall, the political ownership of the newspaper had no direct bearing on the journalists’ political role in the enhancement of democracy and good governance in Malawi. It established that despite the ownership of the Weekend Nation belonging to a prominent and influential politician, the editorial independence was not compromised. Contrary to general expectations, this study established that the Weekend Nation in Malawi, was critical to the political elite in an indiscriminate manner. Although it was not the focus of this study, the research also showed that market forces, in line with the stance taken by the critical political economy theory, had some impact on the Weekend Nation’s editorial independence. The quest for more advertising revenue, to an extent, undermined the struggle for complete editorial independence. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING : Hierdie studie het die politieke rol van die koerant die Weekend Nation in die demokratisering van Malawi tussen 2002 en 2012 vanuit die konteks van sy fundamentele rol en eienaarskap deur die politieke elite ondersoek. Met as vertrekpunt dat die koerant gestig is deur ’n politikus wat lid was van die eerste demokraties-verkose regerende party, die United Democratic Front (UDF), het hierdie navorsing die impak van media-eienaarskap op die politieke rol van die joernalistieke praktyke van die koerant in Malawi se demokratisering ondersoek. Tussen 2002 en 2012 is Malawi deur drie president regeer – Bakili Muluzi van die UDF van 1994 tot 2004, Bingu wa Mutharika van die Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) van 2004 tot 2012, en Joyce Banda van die People’s Party (PP) van 2012 tot 2014 – al drie was vyandiggesind teenoor die Weekend Nation. In ag genome dat die Weekend Nation aan ’n politikus behoort, is die kritiese politieke ekonomie van die media-teorie die mees toepaslike teoretiese vertrekpunt vir hierdie studie. In medianavorsing dui dié teorie daarop dat die eienaar die inhoud van die media-instelling bepaal deur hetsy inmenging in die dag tot dag uitvoering van pligte, of deur algemene doelwitte en veronderstellings wat gestel word, en deur bestuurders en joernaliste aan te stel wat dit sal uitvoer binne die bepalings van die toegewysde hulpbronne. Die studie het kwalitatiewe navorsingsmetodologie toegepas, spesifiek indiepte- onderhoude en kwalitatiewe inhoudsanalsie. Die bevindings dui daarop dat die eienaarskap van die koerant geen direkte invloed op die joernaliste se politieke rol in die versterking van demokrasie en goeie bestuur in Malawi gehad het nie. Dit het vasgestel dat, ondanks die eienaarskap van die Weekend Nation aan ’n prominente en invloedryke politikus, die redaksionele onafhanklikheid nie gekompromitteer is nie. In teenstelling met algemene verwagtings het die studie bevind dat die Weekend Nation in Malawi krities ingestel was teenoor die politieke elite sonder om enige onderskeid te tref. Hoewel dit nie ’n fokus van die studie was nie, het dit ook aangedui dat markkragte, in ooreenstemming met die kritiese politieke ekonomie-teorie, tog ’n impak op die Weekend Nation se redaksionele onafhanklikheid gehad het. Die stewe na groter advertensie-inkomste het tot ’n mate die stryd vir algehele redaksionele onafhanklikheid ondermyn.

Thesis (Ph.D. (International Relations))--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Humanities, 2016 / This thesis examines the efforts of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to promote regional integration between 1980 and 2015 in the areas of trade and security. The conceptual framework provides a focused review of general and specific literature on two key concepts of regional integration: divergence, and convergence. Throughout the thesis, the core focus is on the divergence and convergence of COMESA and SADC. The thesis articulates two analytical frameworks: the neoclassical economics approach, and the neoclassical realist approach. A historical account focuses on the history of the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) of 1981 that evolved into COMESA by 1993. A history of Southern Africa’s Frontline States (FLS), which evolved into the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, and later into SADC in 1992, is then provided. The thesis discusses apartheid South Africa’s involvement in the Eastern and Southern African regions. The thesis provides a discussion on the debate on the rationalisation processes of these two organisations: COMESA and SADC, between 1991 and 1997. The thesis next expands on the regionalisation processes of COMESA and SADC between 2008 and 2015. The main actors and factors assessed involve South Africa’s market-led regional approach, its regional developmental role and its economic impact on both regions since it joined SADC in 1994. The thesis expands on the two main regional integration approaches adopted by the COMESA–EAC (East African Community)–SADC Tripartite bloc (created in 2008) of variable geometry and trade liberalisation, as it moved towards its Tripartite Free Trade Area that was signed in June 2015. The thesis also provides definitions and assumptions of two new theories deployed to strengthen the research: i) neoclassical economic regional integration, and ii) neorealist security convergence, which are applied in the thesis. The thesis thus expands on how COMESA and SADC (as both institution and member states) manage multiple memberships. A central argument of the thesis is that multiple memberships have become a stumbling block for convergence. In furtherance of this argument, the thesis explains the benefits of regional integration schemes. Therefore assessed, is how developing countries are likely to be better served by “North–South” than by “South–South” free trade agreements. The analysis is expanded by a discussion of economic convergence in the neoclassical economic approach of open trade in regional trade agreements within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) – whose five members all belong to SADC - with the presence of a regional hegemonic state: South Africa. To further expand the concept of regionalism to encompass security cooperation, the thesis finally assesses COMESA and SADC’s managing of regional security since the 2008 Tripartite Agreement, by employing the concept of regional security complexes. / MT2017

The Post-colonial era trade relations between Europe and Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries has been regulated by a number of economic cooperation agreements, namely the Yaoundé, Lomé, and Cotonou Conventions to the current Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that had recently been concluded in the ECOWAS and SADC sub regions respectively. The EPAs negotiations have been marred with challenges particularly in Africa; with many countries having responded by not signing Interim EPAs and Nigeria has also stated they will not be concluding the EPA. Nigeria and South Africa have responded to the current negotiations in differing ways nonetheless their responses were somewhat similar. This study will attempt to understand and systematically explain Nigeria’s and South Africa’s positions on the EPAs negotiations process. In order to gain the understanding the study investigates whether EPAs negotiations stalled due to the influence and/or responses of Nigeria and South Africa? The factors involved in the negotiations that may explain the responses. What consequences the principle of reciprocity has on the responses Nigeria and South Africa? This research is going to be desk research using process tracing to systematically analyse the development of the negotiations between the EC and ACP countries particular attention being afforded to Africa and the resulting responses by Nigeria and South Africa. Some of the findings are that in the case of South Africa the principle of reciprocity was not a major factor in shaping South Africa’s responses to the negotiations, whereas the opposite holds true for Nigeria. Regional integration played a major part in the case of Nigeria. / MT2016