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Die detaillierte Aufarbeitung der Unternehmensgeschichte von Siemens bot zum einen Möglichkeiten die kontrafaktische Analyse exemplarisch anzuwenden. Zum anderen konnte im Rahmen der Untersuchung von Pfadabhängigkeiten und der Anwendung dieses Konzepts auf die Entwicklung des Unternehmens eine solche bezogen auf das Wachstum festgestellt werden. Im Falle Siemens führten demnach die Economies of Scale zu einem Wechsel an der Unternehmensspitze.

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During the last decade, the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market altered substantially. Significant investments have been realized, traded volumes increased and contracting structures gained in flexibility. Various governance forms co-exist, including the poles of spot market transactions and vertical integration as well as numerous hybrid forms such as long-term contracts, joint ventures, and strategic partnerships. This dissertation empirically investigates, based on transaction cost economics and recent extensions thereof, which motivations drive companies towards the choice of hierarchical governance forms. First, the likelihood of vertical integration and the impact of inter-organizational trust as a shift parameter accounting for differences in the institutional environment are analyzed. Estimation results confirm transaction cost economics by showing that relationship-specific investments in an uncertain environment drive LNG companies to invest in successive stages along the value chain. Furthermore, the presence of inter-organizational trust increases the likelihood of less hierarchical governance modes. Second, alternative theories of the firm are linked in order to explain the menu of strategic positions recently observed in this dynamic market. Estimation results support the positioning-economizing perspective of the firm. The three strategic choices of target market position, resource profile, and organizational structure are interdependent. Third, the determinants of optimal contract length as a trade-off between the minimization of transaction costs due to repeated bilateral bargaining and the risk of being bound in an inflexible agreement in uncertain environments is discussed. Estimation results show that the presence of high asset specificity results in longer contracts whereas the need for flexibility in today’s LNG market supports shorter agreements. When firms have experience in bilateral trading, contract duration decreases. In addition, countries heavily reliant on natural gas imports via LNG are often willing to forgo some flexibility in favor of supply security. Contracts dedicated to competitive downstream markets on average are shorter than those concluded with customers in non-liberalized importing countries.

This paper presents results of a two year study, at Master’s level, which was undertaken to investigate how two Grade 9 Arts and Culture teachers incorporated mathematics in their Arts and Culture lessons in their classrooms in South Africa. Data from concept mapping activities and subsequent interviews with both teachers were collected and analysed using typological methods of analysis. Data collected from the study revealed that teachers still continue to grapple with the notion of integration. Lack of proper training and insufficient teacher knowledge seem to be the challenging factors for teachers to navigate successfully through the notion of integrated teaching and learning. Drawing from the theory of situated learning, this paper argues that although integration between mathematics and Arts and Culture is desirable in teaching and learning, it is problematic in practice. The analysis from this study raises important pedagogical issues about the link between ‘integrated teaching’ and ‘teacher training-and-content knowledge’.

Why does it appall us if the CEO of a German prime bank lays off his employees despite sufficient revenue? Why do we feel contempt for Klaus Zumwinkel, a well-known tax evader? Why is Bill Gates admired for donating billions of dollars to a foundation? The answer to these questions appears to be remarkably simple: Because one seems wrong whereas the other right. More precisely, it is either morally right or morally wrong. This dissertation deals with emotions that arise when we assess peoples’ actions. Such emotions can be described as moral emotions. On the one hand, I am particularly interested in how these emotions are created. On the other hand, the consequences of identifying these emotions and therefore the function of moral emotions take on a significant role for me as well. I proceed on the assumption that these emotions have a mediating role for subsequent actions. Therefore, the key issues are why we experience the emotions we have and moreover, what is to be expected when we feel these emotions. Here, moral emotions are of major importance when transitioning from thinking to acting. Weiner (2006) and Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer and Weiner (2004) previously described emotional reactions as mediating factors between cognitive processes (attributions) and subsequent behavior. Similar to this sequential model, moral emotions supposedly serve as a quick and efficient basis for decision-making regarding subsequent behavior as the heuristics advocated by Gigerenzer and Todd (1999). Here, moral emotions function as ‘heuristic cues’ that can channel our behavior. Even modern theories in computer and information science depict the human being as an “emotional machine” making use of emotionally driven programs in order to mediate between dynamic input factors from nature and adaptive output processes in terms of behavioral reactions. (Minsky, 2007) The methods of my research rely on a true role model: Charles Darwin. In his work “The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals” from 1872, Darwin also considered the question of what role emotions play and how they are created. Darwin (1872) proposed six potential methods to examine emotions in more detail (for an overview see Meyer, Schützwohl, & Reisenzein, 2008). Although Darwin mainly focused on the phylogenetic history and particularly dealt with the expression of mimicking as well as the congenital and inherited trigger conditions of emotional reactions, his findings and methods nevertheless were the role model for generations of emotion researchers and are still of great relevance (Izard, 1971, 1991, 1992; Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Rudolph, Schulz, & Tscharaktschiew, 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tomkins, 1963, 1962; Weiner, 2006). So far, Rudolph, Schulz and Tscharaktschiew (2013) have presented an empirically supported taxonomy of moral emotions and thereby have identified universally valid leading conditions of moral emotions. They are guided by attributional concepts as previously described by Heider (1958) in the context of his naïve analysis of action using forced-choice methods for selecting emotions with their subjects. Rudolph et al. (2013) divided moral emotions into emotions that assess one’s own actions (so-called actor emotions) or other people’s actions (so-called observer emotions). It becomes apparent that our moral identification of emotions depends on whether a) this action was considered as good or bad in terms of a moral standard, b) the goal of an action was or was not attained and c) the acting person made or did not make an effort in doing so. These dimensions are known as ought (a), goal-attainment (b) and effort (c). I am particularly interested in whether the dimensions discovered by Rudolph et al. (2013) will appear in autobiographical and free reports. Furthermore, I will examine more in depth the scenarios predicted by the theory and individual emotions in different test settings. All studies are conducted on an empirical basis using quantitative and qualitative methods that were previously applied by Darwin (1872) in modified form. First, I will examine whether the categories ought, goal-attainment and effort established by Rudolph et al. (2013) could be traced in recalled reports of emotional episodes using qualitative methods. Afterwards, extremely similar emotions will be distinguished in enhanced detail using a category system. Emotions such as anger, disgust and despite will be scrutinized in an experimental setting for the first time. It will be determined whether a sequential model of cognition emotion behavior already develops by the early stages using the complex emotions schadenfreude and sympathy with preschool children. For prisoners and people suffering from a personality disorder, the emotions of guilt and shame will be distinguished. In addition, the link to future behavior as well as neurological particularities of such groups of people will be taken into consideration. In my work, I will intensively scrutinize the category system assumed by Rudolph et al. (2013). Simultaneously, emotions that have been extremely similar or strongly connected thus far will be analyzed and described to a finer extent. Eventually, results will allow for a better understanding regarding the prediction of subsequent behavior.:Acknowledgments I Danksagung III Preliminary Remarks V Summary VI Zusammenfassung VIII List of Contents X List of Figures XII List of Tables XIV 1. Introduction 1 1.1. What is an Emotion? 1 1.2. The Case of Moral Emotions – Naïve Scientists and Everyday Judges 3 1.3. A Classification of Moral Emotions 4 1.4. Social Functions of Moral Emotions 7 1.5. Expanding a Coherent Theory of Moral Emotions – A Darwinian Perspective 9 1.6. Aims and Scopes / Overview of Several Chapters Within this Monograph 12 2. The Everyday Moral Judge – Autobiographical Recollections of Moral Emotions 17 2.1. Abstract 17 2.2. Introduction 18 2.3. Method 25 2.4. Results 29 2.5. Discussion 51 3. Emotional Disapproval – Cognitive and Social Determinants of Anger, Indignation, and Contempt 57 3.1. Abstract 57 3.2. Introduction 58 3.3. Method 64 3.4. Results 68 3.5. Discussion 77 4. Causes and Consequences of Schadenfreude and Sympathy: A Developmental Analysis. 81 4.1. Abstract 81 4.2. Introduction 82 4.3. Study 1: Goal-Attainment and Approach 87 4.4. Study 2: Type of Relation and Granted Benefit 98 4.5. Study 3: Valence of Behavior, Responsibility and Granted Benefit 105 4.6. Overall Discussion 116 5. Shame or Guilt – How Moral Emotions Affect the Probability of Relapse 119 5.1. Abstract 119 5.2. Outline 120 5.3. Testing the Relation of Emotional Reactions and Recidivism Rates in a Forensic Sample 127 5.4. Shame and Guilt as Predictors for Recidivism 131 5.5. Practical Implications and Outlook 135 6. Psychopathy and Spatial Abilities – Reduced Navigation-Performance as a Result of Structural Brain Changes? 139 6.1. Abstract 139 6.2. Introduction 140 6.3. Method 145 6.4. Results 151 6.5. Discussion 156 7. Overall Discussion 159 7.1. Implications for a Theory of Moral Emotions 159 7.2. A Few Concluding Remarks and Outlooks 163 8. References 165 9. Curriculum Vitae 186 10. Scientific Publications 190 10.1. Paper, Books, Book Chapter 190 10.2. Presentations, Talks 192 / Wieso empört es uns, wenn der Vorstandsvorsitzende einer deutschen Großbank trotz sprudelnder Kassen Mitarbeiter entlässt? Wieso empfinden wir Verachtung für Klaus Zumwinkel, einen prominenten Steuersünder? Warum bewundern wir Bill Gates für seine Milliardenschenkung an eine Stiftung? Die Antwort auf diese Fragen scheint denkbar einfach: Weil das eine falsch, das andere dagegen richtig erscheint. Genauer gesagt: Es ist moralisch richtig oder moralisch falsch. In meiner Arbeit geht es um eben jene Emotionen, die entstehen, wenn Handlungen von Personen bewertet werden. Solche Emotionen kann man als moralische Emotionen bezeichnen. Dabei interessieren mich einerseits die Entstehung, andererseits die Konsequenzen eines solchen Emotionsempfindens und damit die Funktion der moralischen Emotionen. Ich gehe dabei davon aus, dass diese Emotionen einen vermittelnden Charakter für nachfolgende Handlungen haben. Die entscheidenden Fragen sind also: Warum haben wir die Emotionen, die wir haben? Und: Was ist zu erwarten, wenn wir diese Emotionen verspüren? Dabei nehmen die moralischen Emotionen eine Schlüsselrolle auf dem Weg vom Denken zum Handeln ein. Bereits Weiner (2006) oder Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer und Weiner (2004) haben emotionale Reaktionen als vermittelnde Größen zwischen kognitiven Prozessen (Attributionen) und nachfolgendem Verhalten beschrieben. Ähnlich diesem Sequenzmodell sollten moralische Emotionen wie die von Gigerenzer und Todd (1999) propagierten Heuristiken als schnelle und sparsame Entscheidungsgrundlage für das nachfolgende Verhalten dienen. Bei einer solchen Betrachtung fungieren die moralischen Emotionen als ‚heuristic cues’, die unser Verhalten bahnen können. Sogar moderne Theorien im Fachbereich Informatik zeichnen das Bild vom Menschen als „emotionale Maschine“, die gefühlsgesteuerte Programme benutzt, um zwischen dynamischen Input-Größen aus der Natur und adaptiven Output-Prozessen im Sinne von Verhaltensreaktionen zu vermitteln (Minsky, 2007) Meine Untersuchungen folgen in der Auswahl der Methoden einem großen Vorbild: Charles Darwin. In seinem Werk „Der Ausdruck der Gemütsbewegungen bei dem Menschen und den Tieren“ (im englischen Original: The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals) geht Darwin (1872) ebenfalls den grundlegenden Fragen nach, welche Funktion Emotionen haben und wie sie entstehen. Dabei legt Darwin sechs mögliche Methoden vor, um sich mit Emotionen genauer zu beschäftigen (für einen Überblick siehe Meyer et al., 2008).Zwar liegt Darwins Fokus dabei eher auf der Stammesgeschichte und er beschäftigt sich vor allem mit dem mimischen Ausdruck sowie den angeborenen und vererbten Auslösebedingungen emotionaler Reaktionen. Dennoch waren und sind seine Erkenntnisse und die von ihm verwendeten Methoden das Vorbild für Generationen von Emotionsforschern (Izard, 1971, 1991, 1992; Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Ortony et al., 1988; Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tomkins, 1963, 1962; Weiner, 2006) Bisher haben Rudolph, Schulz und Tscharaktschiew (2013) eine empirisch gestützte Taxonomie moralischer Emotionen vorgelegt und damit allgemeingültige vorauslaufende Bedingungen moralischer Emotionen identifiziert. Sie orientieren sich dabei an attributionalen Konzepten, wie sie bereits Heider (1958) mit seiner naiven Handlungsanalyse beschreibt und benutzen dabei vor allem hypothetische Szenarien und vorgegebene Emotionswörter zur Untersuchung der Emotionen ihrer Probanden. Moralische Emotionen unterscheiden Rudolph et al. (2013), in solche Emotionen welche eigene Handlungen (so genannte Actor Emotionen) oder die Handlungen anderer (so genannte Observer Emotionen) bewerten. Es zeigt sich, dass unser moralisches Emotionsempfinden davon abhängt, ob diese Handlung a) bezogen auf einen moralischen Standard als gut oder schlecht gilt, b) das Ziel der Handlung erreicht wurde oder nicht und c) sich der Handelnde dabei angestrengt hat oder nicht. Diese Dimensionen bezeichnen wir als ought (a), goal-attainment (b) und effort (c). Mich interessiert in dieser Arbeit vor allem, ob sich die von Rudolph et al. (2013) gefundenen Dimensionen auch in autobiografischen Schilderungen und in freien Berichten wiederfinden. Darüber hinaus nehme ich die Voraussagen der Theorie und einzelne Emotionen in verschiedenen Untersuchungssettings genauer unter die Lupe. Alle Untersuchungen sind empirischer Natur und orientieren sich an den quantitativen und qualitativen Methoden, die in abgewandelter Form bereits Darwin (1872) benutzte. Als erstes prüfe ich anhand qualitativer Methoden, ob sich die von Rudolph et al. (2013) gefundenen Kategorien von ought, goal-attainment und effort auch in erinnerten Schilderungen emotionaler Episoden nachzeichnen lassen. Stark ähnliche Emotionen werden anschließend mithilfe eines Kategoriensystems noch besser unterschieden. Die Emotionen Ärger, Empörung und Verachtung werden in einem experimentellen Setting erstmals genauer unterschieden. Die Frage, ob sich ein Sequenzmodell von Kognition  Emotion  Verhalten bereits in frühen Entwicklungsstadien ausbildet, wird anhand der komplexen Emotionen Schadenfreude und Mitleid mit Vorschulkindern untersucht. Bei Strafgefangenen und Personen mit Persönlichkeitsstörungen werden die Emotionen Scham und Schuld näher unterschieden. Außerdem werden hier Zusammenhänge mit zukünftigem Verhalten sowie neurologischen Besonderheiten solcher Personengruppen betrachtet. Meine Arbeiten unterziehen einerseits das postulierte Kategoriensystem von Rudolph et al. (2013) einem harten Test. Gleichzeitig werden bisher stark ähnliche oder zusammenhängende Emotionen feiner analysiert und beschrieben. Schließlich ermöglichen die Ergebnisse ein besseres Verständnis für die Vorhersage von nachfolgendem Verhalten.:Acknowledgments I Danksagung III Preliminary Remarks V Summary VI Zusammenfassung VIII List of Contents X List of Figures XII List of Tables XIV 1. Introduction 1 1.1. What is an Emotion? 1 1.2. The Case of Moral Emotions – Naïve Scientists and Everyday Judges 3 1.3. A Classification of Moral Emotions 4 1.4. Social Functions of Moral Emotions 7 1.5. Expanding a Coherent Theory of Moral Emotions – A Darwinian Perspective 9 1.6. Aims and Scopes / Overview of Several Chapters Within this Monograph 12 2. The Everyday Moral Judge – Autobiographical Recollections of Moral Emotions 17 2.1. Abstract 17 2.2. Introduction 18 2.3. Method 25 2.4. Results 29 2.5. Discussion 51 3. Emotional Disapproval – Cognitive and Social Determinants of Anger, Indignation, and Contempt 57 3.1. Abstract 57 3.2. Introduction 58 3.3. Method 64 3.4. Results 68 3.5. Discussion 77 4. Causes and Consequences of Schadenfreude and Sympathy: A Developmental Analysis. 81 4.1. Abstract 81 4.2. Introduction 82 4.3. Study 1: Goal-Attainment and Approach 87 4.4. Study 2: Type of Relation and Granted Benefit 98 4.5. Study 3: Valence of Behavior, Responsibility and Granted Benefit 105 4.6. Overall Discussion 116 5. Shame or Guilt – How Moral Emotions Affect the Probability of Relapse 119 5.1. Abstract 119 5.2. Outline 120 5.3. Testing the Relation of Emotional Reactions and Recidivism Rates in a Forensic Sample 127 5.4. Shame and Guilt as Predictors for Recidivism 131 5.5. Practical Implications and Outlook 135 6. Psychopathy and Spatial Abilities – Reduced Navigation-Performance as a Result of Structural Brain Changes? 139 6.1. Abstract 139 6.2. Introduction 140 6.3. Method 145 6.4. Results 151 6.5. Discussion 156 7. Overall Discussion 159 7.1. Implications for a Theory of Moral Emotions 159 7.2. A Few Concluding Remarks and Outlooks 163 8. References 165 9. Curriculum Vitae 186 10. Scientific Publications 190 10.1. Paper, Books, Book Chapter 190 10.2. Presentations, Talks 192