L’innovation est une variable souvent discutée en droit de la concurrence. L’innovation prédatrice l’est beaucoup moins. Peut-être est-ce dû au fait que les termes sont euphémiques : l’innovation est généralement conçue comme étant prédatrice par nature dans la mesure où son objectif est la création ou l’amélioration d’une chose existante dans le but qu’elle surpasse la chose d’un tiers. Peut-être est-ce parce qu’étudier l’innovation et ses mécanismes est un exercice souvent décrit comme étant complexe. Peut-être est-ce parce que le développement rapide des marchés liés aux nouvelles technologies s’est accompagné d’un courant doctrinal, en Europe comme aux États-Unis, qui prône la nécessité de retirer le droit de la concurrence de cette matière. Peut-être, enfin, est-ce parce que les décisions de justice n’ont que trop peu utilisé ce vocable d’innovation prédatrice, ce qui a conduit la doctrine à n’y consacrer que peu d’études, limitant d’autant plus son utilisation par les juridictions et autorités de concurrence.Reconnaître un régime à l’innovation prédatrice est pourtant l’une des nécessités de ce début de 21ème siècle en terme de droit de la concurrence. Les pratiques qui s’y rattachent surviennent régulièrement et visent à supprimer la compatibilité des technologies d’un tiers avec celles d’une entreprise dominante ou à altérer le fonctionnement de technologies concurrentes. Le droit de la concurrence doit y apporter une réponse. L’enjeu est considérable, mais il n’en demeure pas moins que le concept d’innovation prédatrice – que nous définissons comme l’altération d’un ou plusieurs éléments techniques d’un produit afin de restreindre ou éliminer la concurrence – est aujourd’hui ignoré ou mal compris du plus grand nombre.Les règles ainsi imaginées doivent être communes à plusieurs systèmes juridiques dans la mesure où les pratiques d’innovation prédatrice sont généralement mises en œuvre sur plusieurs continents à la fois. Notre étude prend le parti d’analyser les droits européen et nord-américain de la concurrence parce que leurs racines sont homologues et parce que les pays concernés justifient du PIB le plus élevé au monde.Le régime que nous exposons s’articule autour de deux étapes principales. Il s’agit pour commencer de rejeter toutes les règles per se en la matière, parce qu’elles ne répondent pas aux défis nouveaux du droit de la concurrence. Seule l’application d’une règle de raison structurée organisée autour de trois filtres permet le prononcé de décisions adaptées dans chaque cas d’espèce tout en éliminant les demandes pour lesquels aucun risque concurrentiel n’est envisagé.Un test amélioré de l’absence de justification économique doit ensuite être mis en œuvre pour toutes les pratiques qui ont un effet anti-concurrentiel au moins possible sur le plan théorique – celles qui ont passé les filtres – et qui méritent donc d’être analysées. Ce test, qui permet de ne condamner que les seules pratiques anti-concurrentielles, autorise par conséquent l’élimination des erreurs de type I et II. Il participe également d’une simplification d’un droit de la concurrence devenu parfois illisible. Une nouvelle étude – sur la base du test proposé – des plus grandes affaires européennes et nord-américaines en matière d’innovation prédatrice permet d’illustrer son efficacité.Il nous est enfin apparu nécessaire de traiter de la question de la sanction – ou remèdes – des pratiques d’innovation prédatrice. Il ressort de notre étude que le respect du choix stratégique de l’entreprise en matière d’interopérabilité doit être reconnu comme un principe immuable. Également, les modes alternatifs de sanction ne doivent pas être systématisés et le développement de la « soft law » doit prendre une direction nouvelle qui soit davantage centrée sur l’accompagnement des entreprises très innovantes. / Innovation is often discussed in antitrust law. Predatory innovation is less considered. Perhaps it is because predatory innovation is considered euphemistic: innovation is generally seen as being predatory by nature insofar as its objective is the creation or improvement of an existing product in order to surpass the product -another. Perhaps it is because studying innovation and its mechanisms is often described as a complex exercise. Perhaps it is because the rapid development of high-tech markets, in Europe and in the United States, was accompanied by a doctrinal movement, which preached the need to remove antitrust laws. Perhaps, finally, since court and competition authorities have only minimally termed predatory innovation, this has led the doctrine to devote minimal studies, thus resulting in the limiting of its use by courts and competition authorities.Recognizing the existence of predatory innovation is one of the great necessities of the early 21st century regarding antitrust law. Predatory innovation practices occur regularly and aim at removing the compatibility of third party technologies with those of a dominant firm or at impairing the functioning of competing technologies. As of today, antitrust law provides no answer to these strategies. The stakes are high; the concept of predatory innovation – which we define as the alteration of one or more technical elements of a product to limit or eliminate competition – is currently ignored and/or misunderstood greatly.This thesis focuses on European and North American antitrust laws because their roots are homologous and these countries represent the highest GDP in the world. With predatory innovation practices frequently implemented on several continents at once, overarching rules need to be extended to several legal systems.The regime we exhibit is organized around two main stages:The first implies to reject every related per se rule because they do not meet the new challenges met by antitrust law. Only the diligent implementation of a structured rule of evaluation organized around three filters will ensure appropriate decisions and the elimination of requests for which no antitrust issues are envisaged.Once evaluated by the three filters, an improved test of no economic sense must then be applied to all practices which have theoretical anti-competitive effects and determined fit to be further analyzed. This test, which specifically condemns anti-competitive practices, is a simplification of currently unreadable antitrust law and when applied will lead to the elimination of type I and type II errors. A new study – based on the proposed test – of the most notorious European and North American predatory innovation cases illustrates its effectiveness.The second addresses sanctions – or remedies – to predatory innovation practices. It appears that respecting the strategic choice of companies in terms of interoperability should be recognized as an immutable principle. Also, negotiated procedures shall not be systematized and the development of "soft law" must take a new direction aiming at supporting highly innovative companies.

During the last century, not only the legal literature but also the literature in many fields along with government efforts on all levels, were all mainly devoted to the debate of trade liberalization in general, and specifically to the case of the expected gains from using international agreements as a tool to remove the trade barriers. Meanwhile, all the parties have paid little attention to profound questions about identifying the impediments that they are facing and the other possible options that might maximize the general welfare, which are the cross-border merger and acquisition transactions. This dissertation will address that under-researched question, and it will try to identify some of those impediments that are facing the cross-border merger and acquisition transactions. The dissertation will mainly focus on the different premerger control laws that are adopted around the globe, as an impediment that faces the cross-border mergers and acquisitions, and it will try to identify the drawbacks of those laws and most importantly develop and examine reforming proposals. The underlying result of this dissertation will reveal that the multijurisdictional premerger control laws across the globe have numerous drawbacks that are actual impediments that face mergers and acquisitions in general, and especially the cross-border transactions. In addition to that, the best reformative option is the abolishing of the premerger control laws, or in other words the deregulation of the cross-border merger and acquisition transactions. The conclusion of this dissertation is that using the law as a useful tool should be reinvented on two dimensions, at one end of the spectrum the law should enable the state possibilities that are required to give a hand and facilitate the entry to markets, by abolishing the premerger control laws i.e. deregulating mergers and acquisitions, and at the other end of the spectrum the law should grant the state the power to monitor and challenge those practices that might cause harm to employees or consumers, before the courts, along with the primary power to challenge anticompetitive behaviors.

Univ., Diss.--Hamburg, 2005. / Literaturverz. S. 259 - 286.

Univ., Diss. u.d.T.: Gey, Peter: Die Bedeutung des potentiellen Wettbewerbs bei der Bestimmung marktbeherrschender Stellungen im deutschen, europäischen und US-amerikanischen Kartellrecht--Hamburg, 2004.

No description available.

This thesis seeks to contribute to solving the debate about the framework of rules and institutions applicable to public utility sectors, by adopting both economic theories, such as natural monopoly, network effects, and public goods, and practical analysis of the telecommunications sectors for both Australia and the United States. Governments must reevaluate the framework regulating public utility sectors whenever rapid technological advancements occur. This thesis argues that the antitrust authority better enforces competition rules, and that the sector-specific authority better enforces technical and universal service rules. The justification of the special competition rule concerning bottleneck facilities access should be limited. As for the universal service scheme, the enforcer should ensure competitive neutrality and adopt pro-competitive instruments. This framework would allow for a more market-oriented and economy-wide regulatory administration, as well as enforcement of the universal service scheme based on a more accurate reflection of the fundamental values of citizens.

Universiẗat, Diss., 2006--Köln.

Zugl.: Hamburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 307-323).

Univ., Diss.--Köln, 2001. / Literaturverz. S. 209 - 223.

Univ., Diss.--Köln, 2002.