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L’objet de cette thèse est de permettre, par l’étude de la loi antitrust chinoise de 2008, de déterminer plus avant si les transferts juridiques, effectués dans un contexte différent, perdent de leur sens voire de leur substance une fois la transplantation réalisée dans le contexte chinois. La cohérence de transfert est souvent revendiquée par les auteurs chinois mais elle se heurte parfois à l’inadéquation du système politique et administratif dans lequel évolue le droit transféré. Considérant que les réformes économiques furent lancées à une période encore récente, il apparaît que le marché chinois est encore traversé par des turbulences de nature structurelle et institutionnelle, interdisant le transfert d’un droit antitrust sur le mode du "shock therapy". Ainsi, non seulement la mise en place d’un droit antitrust se doit d’être progressive, mais également circonstanciée pour éviter de bloquer un mode de croissance qui a montré ses fruits. Le droit antitrust de l’Union qui, sur le modèle du droit américain, ne voit plus que par le prisme de l’analyse économique d’inspiration néo-libérale, ne constitue pas un modèle « clef en main » pour la Chine. Cette dernière, si elle fait face à de nombreuses difficultés concernant la mise en place d’un droit technique dans une économie en transition, a pu montrer des indices de réussite dans la lutte contre certaines pratiques anticoncurrentielles. En ce sens, le droit chinois antitrust doit voir son transfert ajusté et modelé en fonction du contexte dans lequel il est reçu. Tant que la concurrence dispose de moyens juridiques lui assurant une « certaine » pérennité, il est primordial d’éviter que le droit antitrust ainsi transféré soit illégitimement taxé d’incohérent. Ce transfert de droit ne doit cependant pas être unilatéral et cette thèse s’emploie à démontrer que la politique chinoise aborde un patriotisme économique redorant une compétitivité industrielle laissée pour compte par la gouvernance économique de l’Union. / Following its accession to the WTO on December 11, 2001, China showed ongoing efforts to enact legal reform so as to reflect its market liberalization. From a central planned economy to a market based regulatory principles the road is long and obviously not without bumps. In order to achieve a successful economic reform (and not to say a political one) the country showed a great deal of institutional (ownership restructuring, market oriented industrial policy, decentralization of control etc.) and legal reform. This study examines how China did enact and enforce a competition regime through the 2008 antitrust law on a still recently chaotic and unruly market. If the AML clearly shows China’s willingness to implement an antitrust regime fashioned on the most advanced competition law systems, it also raised many concerns among foreign commentators and businesses that were expected a real markets-rules sacralization. Nevertheless, mainly due to its transitional state and also because of the socialist mindset, the text contend shows a peculiar set of problems that the AML is presumed to tackle from development economies which is suspiciously viewed by some as a way to implement interventionist gears. This paper will attempt to show that taping into foreign experience to shape an antitrust regime in a clearly reluctant and different economic, institutional and political context make such a legal transfer empty of meaning and risky for firm performance. By taking partially advanced antitrust EU provision, China is missing or either preventing the pro-competitive effects of some business behaviour which can only be evaluated with an advance and experienced economic analysis. The AML could be viewed as a medicine originally prescribed to cure little liberal market ills finally given to a socialist market economy facing critical transitional and political related diseases. Nevertheless, in some way, antitrust law is on the rise in China, which now experience many cases illustrating the AML enforcement and a relative success in overcoming the hurdles generated by anticompetitive behaviours. Also, the economic patriotism embodied by China’s antitrust regime could also be the starting point for EU commission to rethink its antitrust policy. That policy, always more liberal, is detrimental to a EU competitiveness in distress. Protectionism is, on that point, a Chinese medicine that could be recommended to the EU to reduce its liberal fever.

A presente dissertação de mestrado visa a estudar a responsabilidade civil por danos decorrentes da prática de cartel, a qual é considerada como a mais grave infração à ordem econômica. No primeiro capítulo, o fenômeno do cartel é estudado sob a perspectiva econômica, analisando-se as principais características e efeitos da conduta. No segundo capítulo, examina-se a disciplina jurídica do cartel no direito brasileiro, estudando-se as normas que preveem a responsabilização pela prática de cartel na lei concorrencial e na esfera penal. O terceiro capítulo pretende analisar os objetivos e o papel da responsabilidade civil no contexto mais amplo da política de defesa da concorrência. O quarto capítulo estuda a reparação civil dos danos decorrentes do cartel no direito federal norte-americano e no direito comunitário europeu. O quinto capítulo examina a responsabilidade civil por danos decorrentes da prática de cartel no direito brasileiro. Nesse contexto, são examinados os pressupostos da reparação civil (ato ilícito, culpa, nexo causal e dano), a legitimidade ativa e passiva para as ações indenizatórias, a interação entre a responsabilidade civil e o programa de leniência, bem como a prescrição da pretensão indenizatória. No sexto capítulo, são analisadas algumas propostas de reforma do ordenamento jurídico brasileiro para aperfeiçoamento do sistema de reparação civil em matéria de cartel. Finalmente, a conclusão procura expor de maneira sistematizada as principais ideias apresentadas ao longo do trabalho, bem como avaliar o estágio atual da responsabilidade civil por danos decorrentes da prática de cartel no direito brasileiro. / This dissertation aims to study the civil liability for damages arising from cartel behavior, which is considered the most serious antitrust violation. The first chapter studies the cartel from an economic perspective, analyzing the key features and effects of the conduct. The second chapter examines the legal framework regarding cartel behavior under Brazilian law, by studying the rules that provide for the responsibility for cartel under antitrust law and at the criminal level. The third chapter aims to analyze the objectives and the role of civil liability in the broader context of antitrust policy. The fourth chapter studies the civil liability for damages arising from cartel behavior in US federal law and European Community law. The fifth chapter examines the civil liability for damages resulting from cartel behavior in Brazilian law. In this context, the chapter examines the requisites for civil liability (tort, fault, causation and damage), standing to sue and to be sued, the interaction between the indemnification claims and the leniency program, as well as the statute of limitations. The sixth chapter discusses some proposals to reform the Brazilian legal framework with the purpose of improving the system of civil liability concerning cartel behavior. Finally, the conclusion seeks to expose in a systematic way the main ideas presented throughout the work, and to assess the current state of civil liability for damages resulting from cartel behavior in Brazilian law.

Thesis (doctoral)--Berlin, Humboldt-Universiẗat, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 271-285).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat Bonn, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 233-250).

A presente dissertação de mestrado visa a estudar a responsabilidade civil por danos decorrentes da prática de cartel, a qual é considerada como a mais grave infração à ordem econômica. No primeiro capítulo, o fenômeno do cartel é estudado sob a perspectiva econômica, analisando-se as principais características e efeitos da conduta. No segundo capítulo, examina-se a disciplina jurídica do cartel no direito brasileiro, estudando-se as normas que preveem a responsabilização pela prática de cartel na lei concorrencial e na esfera penal. O terceiro capítulo pretende analisar os objetivos e o papel da responsabilidade civil no contexto mais amplo da política de defesa da concorrência. O quarto capítulo estuda a reparação civil dos danos decorrentes do cartel no direito federal norte-americano e no direito comunitário europeu. O quinto capítulo examina a responsabilidade civil por danos decorrentes da prática de cartel no direito brasileiro. Nesse contexto, são examinados os pressupostos da reparação civil (ato ilícito, culpa, nexo causal e dano), a legitimidade ativa e passiva para as ações indenizatórias, a interação entre a responsabilidade civil e o programa de leniência, bem como a prescrição da pretensão indenizatória. No sexto capítulo, são analisadas algumas propostas de reforma do ordenamento jurídico brasileiro para aperfeiçoamento do sistema de reparação civil em matéria de cartel. Finalmente, a conclusão procura expor de maneira sistematizada as principais ideias apresentadas ao longo do trabalho, bem como avaliar o estágio atual da responsabilidade civil por danos decorrentes da prática de cartel no direito brasileiro. / This dissertation aims to study the civil liability for damages arising from cartel behavior, which is considered the most serious antitrust violation. The first chapter studies the cartel from an economic perspective, analyzing the key features and effects of the conduct. The second chapter examines the legal framework regarding cartel behavior under Brazilian law, by studying the rules that provide for the responsibility for cartel under antitrust law and at the criminal level. The third chapter aims to analyze the objectives and the role of civil liability in the broader context of antitrust policy. The fourth chapter studies the civil liability for damages arising from cartel behavior in US federal law and European Community law. The fifth chapter examines the civil liability for damages resulting from cartel behavior in Brazilian law. In this context, the chapter examines the requisites for civil liability (tort, fault, causation and damage), standing to sue and to be sued, the interaction between the indemnification claims and the leniency program, as well as the statute of limitations. The sixth chapter discusses some proposals to reform the Brazilian legal framework with the purpose of improving the system of civil liability concerning cartel behavior. Finally, the conclusion seeks to expose in a systematic way the main ideas presented throughout the work, and to assess the current state of civil liability for damages resulting from cartel behavior in Brazilian law.

Suivant la libéralisation du marché aérien européen, les transporteurs aériens se sont déployésdans un environnement concurrentiel nouveau. Face à l’émergence des compagnies low cost,les compagnies traditionnelles ont renforcé leurs stratégies de consolidation (alliances etfusions) autour de leur hubs afin de connecter leurs réseaux et de générer des économiesd’échelle et de densité. Ces regroupements peuvent créer et renforcer les barrières à l’entréesur certains marchés et sur les principaux aéroports saturés. De plus, certaines pratiques ontcherché à empêcher l’arrivée de ces nouveaux entrants par des comportements restreignant laconcurrence (cartels, prédation, programmes de fidélisation discriminatoires, restrictionsverticales).Depuis 2004, la régulation du transport aérien s’est renforcée notamment à travers l’adoptiondes procédures antitrust communes et l’extension du contrôle aux alliances extraeuropéennes.La Commission a développé une approche globale au regard de la définition desmarchés, de l’évaluation des effets concurrentiels et a cherché à renforcer l’efficacité desmesures correctives en imposant la libération des créneaux horaires au profit des concurrents.Pour autant, entre la nécessité de promouvoir l’apparition de nouveaux entrants, la sauvegardedes intérêts du consommateur et la création nécessaire de « champions européens », lapolitique de régulation européenne est source de complexité et d’insécurité juridique pour laplupart des compagnies aériennes. / Following the liberalisation of the EU aviation market, airlines have competed in achallenging environment. Facing the emergence of low cost carriers, traditional carriersstrengthened their consolidation strategies (mergers and alliances), connecting hubs andnetworks in order to generate economies of scale and density. This consolidation can createand reinforce barriers to entry in certain routes and in major congested airports. In addition,some practices have sought to prevent the arrival of these new entrants by adoptinganticompetitive practices (cartels, predation, discriminatory loyalty programs and verticalrestraints).Since the adoption of new antitrust procedures (2004), the European Commission extendedits control of extra-European alliances and sought to implement a more efficient policy. TheCommission’s general approach is to identify the relevant markets, to assess the likely effectson competition and to propose remedies such as the release of slots. However, between theneed to promote the emergence of new entrants, the willingness to safeguard consumerinterests and the necessity to create real "european champions", the Commission’s policyremains an increasing source of complexity and legal uncertainty for most airlines.