Thesis (LL.M.). / Written for the Faculty of Law. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2009/06/17). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Barak A. Salmoni. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-66). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Cover title. "June 2002." AD-A406 184. Includes bibliographical references (p. 57-62). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 1999. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-180). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users. Address: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p9948015.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 112-116). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Dissertation (D.M.A.)--The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2008. / Advisor: Kelly Burke; submitted to the School of Music. Title from PDF t.p.(viewed May 28, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

Based on the author's doctoral dissertation. / Title from e-book title screen (viewed Aug. 25, 2006). Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references and index.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: From the earliest years the Middle East was known for it's wars and conflict. Religious differences and both the Jews and Palestinian Arabs lay claim to certain territories and religious sites. The fact that the conflict is based on religion makes it an explosive situation and very difficult to find a solution. When the state Israel was established the conflict took on a particular form and the existence of the Palestinian Arabs was threatened. Israel and Egypt were faced opposite each other regularly on the battlefield. Only with the help of a superpower they were able to be in active conflict with each other. Since the Second World War there were an alliance between Israel and the US and Egypt decided to approach Russia for a partnership. Both Israel and Egypt realised that they could not face each other on the battlefield if they were not getting aid and help from a superpower. The influence of the superpowers in this conflict in the Middle East brought a new dimension to the whole situation. The relationship between the superpowers after World War II was in such a bad shape that it gave way to the rise of the Cold War. The bad relationship between the superpowers had a direct influence on the countries in the Middle East. Due to the fact that the allies of the superpowers in the Middle East was entangled in a conflict that increased the mistrust between the superpowers. The course of the October war of 1973 was completely different than the rest of the Middle East wars up until 1973. The superpowers was drawn into the war because of the pressure that was put on the superpowers during this war. That what was feared by everybody were coming true. The conflict in the Middle East was developing from a regional war to the threat of a pending global war. It was very clear that the superpowers could not control their clients of the Middle East to such an extent to avoid a direct confrontation between them. The global crisis did not last long and ended very shortly after it started. During the period after the October war an intense period of negotiations took place between the relevant countries. The friendship between Israel and America was reasonably stable in comparison to the unstable relationship between Egypt and Moscow. Egypt was approaching Washington now to establish a friendship with them. America was the driving force behind the negotiations in the Middle East and with that tried to bring an end to the influence of Russia in the region. They were very succesful in doing that and agreements were signed between Israel and Syria as well as Israel and Egypt. The conflict between Egypt and Israel ended with the signing of the peace agreement between them but the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs has not ended. The grievances between them are extremely complex and a solution for peace looks very unlikely. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Midde-Ooste was vanaf die vroegste tye 'n gebied wat gekenmerk is aan oorlog en konflik. Die konflik spruit uit godsdiensverskille en die aansprake wat beide die Jode en Palestynse Arabiere het op grondgebied en heilige plekke. Die feit dat die konflik op godsdiens geskoei is maak dat dit 'n plofbare situasie is en uiters moeilik om 'n oplossing te verkry. Die konflik het 'n kenmerkende vorm aangeneem toe die staat Israel gestig is en die bestaan van die Palestynse Arabiere in die gebied bedreig is. Israel en Egipte het menigmaal te staan gekom teenoor mekaar op die oorlogsveld. Beide kon dit net doen met die hulp van hul bondgenootskap met 'n supermoondheid. Israel en die VSA was bondgenote terwyl Egipte toenadering tot USSR gesoek het. Israel en Egipte het besef dat hul die hulp en ondersteuning van 'n supermoondheid nodig gehad het om suksesvol in hul stryd te wees teen die ander. Die invloed van die supermoondhede in die konflik in die Midde-Ooste het 'n nuwe dimensie gegee aan die stryd. Na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het die verhouding tussen die supermoondhede sodanig verswak dat dit gelei het tot die ontstaan van die Koue Oorlog. Dié swak verhouding het 'n direkte invloed gehad in hul verhoudinge met die lande in die Midde-Ooste. Omdat hulle bondgenote ook in 'n stryd gewikkel was het dit verder bygedra tot die wantroue tussen die supermoondhede. Die Oktober-oorlog van 1973 het heeltemal anders as die ander oorloë verloop. Die druk wat die sitausie op die supermoondhede geplaas het, het daartoe gelei dat hulle direk in die konflik betrek is. Dit wat almal gevrees en oor gespekuleer het, het nou waar geword. Die konflik van die Midde-Ooste het nou ontwikkel van 'n streeksoorlog na 'n dreigende globale oorlog. Dit blyk baie duidelik dat beide supermoondhede nie genoegsame druk op hul bondgenote kon plaas om 'n direkte konfrontasie tussen hulle te vermy nie. So vinnig soos wat die globale krisis ontwikkel het so vinnig is dit beëindig. Die tydperk na die Oktober-oorlog was gekenmerk aan 'n intense periode van onderhandeling tussen die betrokke lande. Die verhouding tussen Israel en die VSA was baie stabiel teenoor die onstabiele verhouding tussen Egipte en die USSR. Egipte het al meer toenadering tot Washington gesoek. Amerika was die dryfveer agter die vredesonderhandelinge en het daarmee gepoog om die invloed van USSR in die Midde-Ooste tot 'n einde te bring. Hy was baie suksesvol daarmee en ten spyte van teenkanting is vredesooreenkomste gesluit tussen Israel en Egipte asook Israel en Sirië. Die konflik tussen Egipte en Israel is grootliks beëindig maar die konflik tussen Israel en die Palestynse Arabiere is nog in volle swang. Die twispunte tussen dié twee nasies is kompleks en "n vredesoplossing lyk hoogs onwaarskynlik.

This submission for PhD by Publication includes two studies I conducted during 8 years of dedicated field research examining the US role in mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict. These studies developed from my collection of in-depth oral testimonies and were buttressed by my recovery and examination of troves of original documents that had been previously denied any public, much less academic, scrutiny. The scope of this qualitative research and my political and historical analysis of it resulted in two published books that chronicle the unsuccessful American efforts to negotiate Arab-Israeli peace agreements during the presidencies of William Clinton, George W. Bush, and the first term of Barack Obama. In order of publication, they are The Truth About Camp David (New York: Nation Books, 2004) and The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road? (London: Hesperus Press, 2011). The original academic contribution of both works was the presentation of new empirical evidence to advance understanding of how heavily biased American mediation severely damaged this diplomatic undertaking. Despite being a solidly pro-Israel country, the United States had previously been able to achieve some notable mediation successes when it made efforts to adopt an “even-handed” approach. Yet in the period covered by both my books, I demonstrated how top American mediators—comprised of mostly pro-Israel partisans—dismissed any pretext of impartiality, and in most instances even escalated their mediation bias. This behavior has exacerbated the Arab-Israeli conflict and made the stated aim of a comprehensive peace a very distant prospect. The Truth About Camp David was intended as a first rough draft of history. The title references the famous summit convened by President Clinton in July 2000 that failed to forge peace between Israelis and Palestinians and the overarching US-led “peace process” around it which contributed to the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The book also details the effort to conclude an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement at Geneva just months before, which also failed. My research advanced the thesis that both the Geneva and Camp David summits were historic miscarriages of diplomacy by my presentation of granular insider accounts revealing the intensity of American mediation bias. I also exposed the general disorganization of its negotiating team, a dysfunction that was largely unknown to the public prior to my book’s release. My primary purpose in writing The Truth About Camp David was thus to enable its reinterpretation by making public new evidence about this watershed moment and the period surrounding it. Relying primarily on oral history, I interviewed US, Arab, Israeli and European officials who were first-hand participants to collect their personal narratives. I sought to identify discrepancies in their accounts, and attempted to reconcile them through further interviews, document interrogation, and my own analysis. A key challenge of The Truth About Camp David was thus to weave a thread through the various testimonies and present, as best as I could, a coherent historical narrative. Following that, my aim was to have it reviewed and discussed among credible scholars and the foreign policy community. The testimonies within The Truth About Camp David directly challenged the official narrative and prevailing media orthodoxy at the time of Palestinian blame and Syrian intransigence. As a result, it helped reframe both political debate and academic scholarship concerning this crucial period of American diplomatic intervention. In 2006, The Truth About Camp David was translated into Arabic, giving its contents even greater reach. My 2011 book “The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road?” continued my earlier line of inquiry and was largely based on documents given to me the year prior, referred to as “The Palestine Papers,” the largest leak of confidential negotiating records in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Published in full by Al Jazeera Media Network, and in limited partnership with the UK’s Guardian newspaper, the content of the files generated headlines around the world from January 24-27, 2011. My additional research for The Palestine Papers was released in May 2011 as an anthology of select papers with my accompanying qualitative analysis and interpretation rather than a stylistic mediation critique. My aim in writing “The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road?” publication was to reach beyond Al Jazeera and Guardian audiences and equip interested scholars, practitioners, and skeptics with essential highlights from the papers as well as an analytical framework to put them into context. My research for The Palestine Papers sought to help reconcile the intervening gap of negotiating history from Truth About Camp David, following the trajectory of how Israelis and Palestinians alike had grown even more conditioned to expect if not rely upon biased American mediation that excessively tilts toward Israel. The Palestine Papers also catalogues for the first time the dynamics that enabled US negotiators to escalate its role from being the self-appointed judge of Palestinian negotiating behavior during the talks (in the Camp David 2000 era) to the unilateral “juror” of its final-status positions (evidenced by the presidencies of George W Bush and Barack Obama). A supplemental essay included in this submission analyzes an earlier diplomatic era to advance my thesis of how far US mediation bias has traveled since America assumed the principal negotiator role of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the early 1970’s. Indeed, based on the overarching narrative that evolve from both those publications and this essay, it is entirely predictable to see how America’s mediation posture has matured into the era of extreme pro-Israel bias that now characterizes the approach of the Trump Administration. I will interpret this collective diplomatic history using a range of multidisciplinary academic theories addressing biased mediation in international conflict resolution. Then, by drawing on the scholarship from my previous books, I will assess and critique the theoretical benefits of employing biased mediators in conflict resolution—as some prominent scholars have advocated for. By taking a fresh look at earlier Arab-Israeli negotiations led by Henry Kissinger under President’s Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, I am able to make even greater contrast to that very limited era when biased American mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict appeared to yield limited success. The process of applying the scholarship of others against the knowledge created from my own published works enable me to demonstrate in this essay that the present day American negotiating bias toward Israel largely exceeds what the normative scholarship on mediation bias envisaged.

Israel’s spatial imaginary, as an unsettled project, is in constant negotiation, revision, and transmutation. At the heart of this dissertation is an ethnographic endeavor driven by a reading of the past, present, and future of political and religious struggles in Israel/Palestine through an analysis of actors, practices, and material palimpsests of three sites: a French Mandate building and former Syrian military base in the Golan Heights, turned into a boutique hotel by a security entrepreneur; the longed-for and imagined Third Temple in Jerusalem—today’s Temple Mount—a once marginal messianic scheme currently in revival; and the Jaffa Ottoman train station, reopened as a high-end shopping center and later as a light rail station. Through these sites, this dissertation asks how Israel understands itself vis-à-vis its narrative of a biblical past, its present ‘indigenous’ presence, and its vision or imaginaries of the future.