This thesis uses Cicero’s letters as evidence for an interpretation of Cicero’s φιλίαι that is at variance with his professed views on φιλία as well as with the conclusions of modern scholars. As the use of the term φιλία over amicitia or “friendship” suggests, the thesis provides a discussion of Cicero’s philosophical beliefs as reflected by his relationship not only with his friends and allies, but also with his family. While there have been several noteworthy studies of his relationship with Atticus and with his family, there is a tendency to accept his claims in his letters to them as genuine. This approach differs significantly from the caution that can be found in the studies of his public speeches and the letters to his allies. This thesis examines the discrepancies between his words and deeds in order to determine the degree of his sincerity. It argues that the inconsistencies and contradictions in his correspondence and philosophical treatises suggest a deliberate effort to use their mutual φιλία for his personal gain. Scholars have assumed that Cicero’s public affiliation with the Academy and his well-attested attack on Epicureanism prove that he did not see any merit in Epicurean philosophy. This thesis rejects this assumption. On the contrary, it argues that his negative attitude towards Epicureans stemmed from a concern about his public persona and a desire to distance himself from Epicurus. After examining Cicero’s relationship chiefly with Atticus, his family, and some of his allies, the thesis concludes that his φιλίαι with them resembled more the Epicurean than the Aristotelian account of φιλία.

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Thesis (doctoral)--Københavns Universitet. / Includes texts in Greek and Latin. Includes indexes. Includes bibliographical references (p. 308-333).

This thesis explores Aristotle's theories of habituation and voluntariness and their impact on his ability to attribute moral responsibility to agents. Ultimately, I conclude that Aristotle should drop his assertions that we are morally responsible for our states of character in order to accommodate a compatibilist view that will still allow him to attribute moral responsibility for action to agents.

Aristotle famously claims that we become virtuous by performing virtuous actions. He also recognizes the potential puzzle this claim gives rise to: How can we perform virtuous actions unless we are already virtuous? After all, virtuous actions require virtuous motives – they are performed “for the sake of the noble” – and virtuous motives characteristically belong to virtuous people. Many modern commentators presume that Aristotle’s solution rests upon characterizing the actions of learners as actions that are the right things to do in the circumstances but are not done with virtuous motivation. But this leaves Aristotle with the problem of bridging what I call “the moral upbringing gap” – i.e. the gap between the motivationally-neutral actions of learners and the dispositions to act reliably from a virtuous motive that such actions are supposed to produce. This gap emerges because the weaker the link between the way in which the actions of learners are performed and the way in which virtuous actions are done by virtuous agents, the more difficult it will be to understand how the repeated performance of the learners’ actions produce genuinely virtuous dispositions. The main aim of this thesis is to show that (and how) shame plays a crucial role in the process of moral development as the moral emotion that provides continuity between the actions of the learners of virtue and the corresponding dispositions that those actions eventually yield. My view is that Aristotle understands shame not as mere fear of external disapproval, nor as mere tendency to find pleasure in the noble, but as an emotion responsive to praise and blame and consequently to considerations about the nobility and shamefulness of one’s own actions and one’s character. Understood this way, shame provides learners with the sort of motivation that allows them to perform genuinely virtuous actions before they have acquired practical wisdom and the stable dispositions characteristic of virtuous agents. Shame thus bridges the “moral upbringing gap” by providing the kind of motivation that, when entrenched by understanding, constitutes moral virtue.

Aristotle famously claims that we become virtuous by performing virtuous actions. He also recognizes the potential puzzle this claim gives rise to: How can we perform virtuous actions unless we are already virtuous? After all, virtuous actions require virtuous motives – they are performed “for the sake of the noble” – and virtuous motives characteristically belong to virtuous people. Many modern commentators presume that Aristotle’s solution rests upon characterizing the actions of learners as actions that are the right things to do in the circumstances but are not done with virtuous motivation. But this leaves Aristotle with the problem of bridging what I call “the moral upbringing gap” – i.e. the gap between the motivationally-neutral actions of learners and the dispositions to act reliably from a virtuous motive that such actions are supposed to produce. This gap emerges because the weaker the link between the way in which the actions of learners are performed and the way in which virtuous actions are done by virtuous agents, the more difficult it will be to understand how the repeated performance of the learners’ actions produce genuinely virtuous dispositions. The main aim of this thesis is to show that (and how) shame plays a crucial role in the process of moral development as the moral emotion that provides continuity between the actions of the learners of virtue and the corresponding dispositions that those actions eventually yield. My view is that Aristotle understands shame not as mere fear of external disapproval, nor as mere tendency to find pleasure in the noble, but as an emotion responsive to praise and blame and consequently to considerations about the nobility and shamefulness of one’s own actions and one’s character. Understood this way, shame provides learners with the sort of motivation that allows them to perform genuinely virtuous actions before they have acquired practical wisdom and the stable dispositions characteristic of virtuous agents. Shame thus bridges the “moral upbringing gap” by providing the kind of motivation that, when entrenched by understanding, constitutes moral virtue.

In my thesis I will discuss Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher” in relation to the expectations that scholars have of the gothic genre. I will break this project into four chapters, along with an introduction: (Ch.1) a critical review of scholarship on Poe’s “Usher” that will demonstrate the difficulty in coming to a critical consensus on the tale, (Ch.2) a discussion of Brown’s outline of Gothic conventions, (Ch.3) a look at Poe’s “The Philosophy of Composition” juxtaposed with Aristotle’s Poetics to illumine aspects of Poe’s approach to writing and how it has been informed, and (Ch.4) a close reading of Poe’s “Usher.”

The main purpose of this essay is to analyze the relationship between the two main characters George and Lennie in John Steinbecks novella Of Mice and Men (1937) and determine what kind of relationship they share, how their relationship is built and whether they are genuine friends or not. The definition of friendship which will mainly be employed and used is the one defined and created by Aristotle and published in his work Nicomachean Ethics. In order for the analysis to be as precise and proper as possible, the questions of how and why will constantly be asked and answered throughout the analysis in order to operate and act as guidelines for the final conclusion. Besides Aristotle’s definition of friendship, the novella will be examined from a perspective with primary focus on the concept of friendship and it will also to some extent touch the field of interpersonal relationships. The concept will then be applied to the examination of their relationship and will only take the content of the novella itself into account. To assist the theory and provide with an extended view upon friendship, the works of Allan (Kinship and Friendship in Modern Britain: 1996), Lynch (Philosophy and Friendship: 2005), Spencer (Rethinking Friendship: Hidden solidarities today: 2006) and Pahl (On Friendship: 2000) will be applied.         The conclusion derived from the analysis shows that it is possible to interpret their relationship differently depending on which aspect of their friendship one decides to highlight, but the aspect of George and Lennie’s unequal stature due to the Lennie’s mental disability is a fact impossible to not take into account. This aspect makes it impossible for them to be genuine friends, as their relationship becomes based on one person having more responsibility than the other, making their friendship non-genuine according to Aristole.

Alasdair MacIntyre is one of the key philosophers in contemporary revival of virtue ethics, and often labeled as a representative of communitarianism in liberal-communitarian debate. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a narrative of the development of MacIntyre's philosophy, from his early Marxist thought to the later virtue ethics, and to examine the continuities and discrepancies between different stages of his philosophy. This thesis argues that the central theme of MacIntyre's philosophy is a diagnosis of the crisis of modernity and the ways through which we can overcome the predicament of alienation. In other words, MacIntyre's critique of capitalism and liberalist individualism shows the sophistication of his political thought and therefore cannot simply be described as "communitarian." To demonstrate MacIntyre's analysis of the crisis of modernity, this thesis focuses on four sets of binary concepts that constitute the foundations of his critiques, that is, "is-ought", "theory-practice", "individualism-holism", and "philosophy-history". The key to his theory of overcoming alienation, in this interpretation, is to understand the dialectic relations within each set of binary concepts respectively. This thesis illustrates how young MacIntyre tried to combine Marxism and Christian theology to answer these problematics, as well as how the later MacIntyre turned to Aristotle and Aquinas for theoretical inspirations. Aside from re-articulating the role of virtues in ethics, other MacIntyre's important theoretical innovations include transcending modern instrumental rationality by elevating the significance of teleological rationality and reconstructing the dynamic relations between rationality and traditions.

Some comparative studies of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas put emphasis on the similarities between Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics. In this study, however, I have attempted to show a salient difference; a respect in which Thomas's system cannot accommodate certain Aristotelian tenets. I have argued that, although Thomas tries to incorporate Aristotle's account of intellection, he cannot consistently do so. For an integration of this sort entails that the created intellect is identical with God when it contemplates him. This, however, is a conclusion that would rightly be rejected as metaphysically implausible in Thomas's system. Aristotle's view of intellection entails that the intellect is identical with whatever it contemplates when that object possesses no matter. For, intellection, which is itself immaterial, assumes the form of whatever it contemplates, and furthermore, matter is what individuates distinct entities that share the same form. If all this is so, then the human intellect becomes identical with Aristotle's god when it contemplates him. In Aristotle's system, this would not present any problems, for a very interesting reason: Aristotle, on an interpretation of his thought that seems textually plausible, teaches that part of the human mind is identical with divine intellect, or nous; that this part is "implanted" in the human being "from outside" and is the most divine part?and so, part of the human being can rightly be said to be eternal.1 Thomas, however, in accordance with Christian doctrine, holds that the human intellect has its own created identity, and differs numerically from person to person. But Thomas's adoption of prominent theses from Aristotle's account of intellection unfortunately entails that the human intellect, in contemplatio, becomes identical with God, since God is immaterial and identical with his essence. After looking at some possible solutions, I argue that this is not a desirable outcome in Thomas's Christian metaphysic, for several good reasons.