Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2005. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 203-209) and index.

This dissertation explores the growing epidemic of academic dishonesty in the United States in order to propose an Aristotelian-inspired model for developing moral character to curtail this epidemic. The task is laid out in four parts. Chapter one responds to the problem of akrasia, adopting a modified version of Devin Henry's distinction between drunken akrasia and genuine akrasia, holding that the akratic individual experiences an internal struggle similar to that of the self-controlled individual, but the improper desire is stronger than the desire for the proper pleasure. Chapter two responds to the challenges to virtue ethics set forth by social situationists, John Doris (2002) and Gilbert Harman (2000) with a model consistent with Rachana Kamtekar's (2004) depiction of character in Aristotelian virtue ethics that adopts a holistic view of character incorporating motivation and proper intellect as necessary elements in practical reason. Chapter three provides a summary of empirical research into the prevalence of academic dishonesty and the internal and external factors influencing academic dishonesty. This assemblage of data suggests that an effective sustainable solution for curbing academic dishonesty must focus upon the development of internal character rather than the mere modification of external or situational factors. Chapter four applies the findings of the existing data to the development of core principles for a proper moral education intended to offer a foundation for possible solutions towards reducing academic dishonesty in the United States. In light of the current research into academic dishonesty, chapter four outlines core principles essential for developing practical solutions inspired by Aristotle's character-based virtue ethics while recognizing the short-term benefits of situation modification.

Aristotle endorses a very striking doctrine connecting necessity with what seems to be a non-modal notion -- that of 'being or happening always'. He also forges a connection between the idea of 'happening by chance' and 'happening neither always nor for the most part'. These two connections form the subject of this essay. My guiding aim is to provide an account of what the 'always/necessary' doctrine involves and of why Aristotle might have held it. Reflection on the nature of the connection between 'by chance' and 'neither always nor for the most part' throws light on what Aristotle means by 'happening always', and, in consequence, on the nature of the link between 'always' and 'necessary'; it also suggests that the basis of this link is to be found in Aristotle's general conception of the natural world as the object of explanation and knowledge. The primary texts upon which discussion of these connections must focus are <u>De Caelo</u> I. 12 and the analysis of chance in <u>Physics</u> II. 4—6. I discuss these two texts in turn, after a opening chapter which surveys the evidence for Aristotle's acceptance of the 'always/necessary‘ doctrine and considers the nature of the restrictions which he places on it. Chapter 2 comprises a translation of and commentary on <u>Cael.</u> I. 12, together with a translation and discussion of its companion chapter, I. 10. In Chapter 3, I examine the nature of Aristotle's argument in I. 12, and criticise various interpretations which see it as evidence that Aristotle's 'always/necessary' doctrine rests on a distinctive conception of possibility. The translation of and commentary on <u>Phys.</u> II. 4-6 (Chapter 4) are followed in Chapter 5 by a discussion of issues relating to the association of chance with 'neither always nor for the most part'. The final chapter returns to the question of the connection between 'always' and 'of necessity'.

Orientador: Trajano Augusto Ricca Vieira / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-07T07:28:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Barriviera_Alessandro_M.pdf: 27896667 bytes, checksum: 2b246e86e231acf8419b696321599ee5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: O presente trabalho consiste numa tradução da Poética de Aristóteles, acompanhada do texto grego e notas. A poesia sempre teve papel predominante na cultura grega antiga. Conduta moral e religiosa, por exemplo, tinham suas regras - mesmo se criticadas por alguns - estabelecidas nos poemas homéricos. Ao contrário de seu mestre Platão, que excluía a poesia do domínio da investigação racional, atribuindo-a antes ao entusiasmo e inspiração das Musas e inserindo o poeta na mesma classe dos profetas e adivinhos, Aristóteles julgava que a poesia podia ser submetida à reflexão racional e sistematizada num corpo de conhecimentos a que os gregos davam o nome de techne, e que nós traduzimos por "arte" ou "técnica". A Poética constitui o esforço de Aristóteles para cumprir tal tarefa. A obra é constituída de 26 capítulos e pode ser dividida em três principais partes: (a) dos capítulos 1 a 5 Aristóteles teoriza sobre a natureza da poesia em geral, subsumindo-a no gênero das artes miméticas; (b) os capítulos 6 a 22 consistem num estudo minucioso da tragédia e de suas partes constitutivas; (c) a partir do capítulo 23 até ao final, Aristóteles volta-se para o estudo da poesia épica. A Poética culmina com uma comparação entre esses dois gêneros poéticos e o julgamento da tragédia como superior à epopéia / Abstract: This work consists in a translation of Aristotle's Poetics, with greek text and notes. Poetry has always had a predominant role in ancient greek culture. For instance, moral and religious behaviour had their rules - even if criticized by some - laid down in Homeric poems. Contrary to his master Plato, who excluded poetry from the scope of rational investigation, ascribing it rather to enthusiasm and Muses' inspiration, and ranging the poet with prophets and diviners, Aristotle considered that poetry could be subjected to rational reflection and systematized in a body of knowledge which the Greeks called techne ("art" or "craft"). The Poetics constitutes Aristotle's effort to fulfill such a task. The work is formed by 26 chapters and can be divided up into three main parts: (a) from chapter 1 to 5, Aristotle theorizes about the nature of poetry in general, subsuming it into the genre of mimetic arts; (b) chapters 6 to 22 consist in a meticulous study of tragedy and its constitutive parts; (c) from chapter 23 to the end, Aristotle turns towards the study of epic. The Poetics culminates in a comparison between both these poetic genres, tragedy being judged superior to epic / Mestrado / Mestre em Linguística

Plato and Aristotle both believe that in ideal circumstances the best form of government obtains when virtuous and knowledgeable people rule. But surprisingly, alongside their well-known views in ideal political philosophy, they also have rich and complex views on non-ideal political philosophy, and these views turn out to be deeply conservative. In the Statesman, Laws, and Politics, Plato and Aristotle recognize stability problems generated by non-ideal circumstances. Specifically, their views on the law’s role in habituation of character, and habituation’s role in ensuring the authority of the law lead them to think that the high costs of changing the existing legislation and constitutional arrangements normally outweigh the benefits gained.

The guiding question of this project is, "Why does it count as a critique of Heidegger that he does not defend a particular moral position?" A standard criticism levied against Heidegger is that, since he has nothing positive to say about post-Enlightenment moral theory, he has nothing to contribute to moral philosophy, and this marks his greatest shortcoming as a philosopher. Why is there a demand for Heidegger, or any other philosopher, to theorize about morality, when we do not have this expectation for, say, aesthetics, theology, or various other regional domains of human life? Why should we expect Heidegger to theorize about what humans must be like in order to care about and engage in moral thought? Answering these questions involves an extended discussion of ways of understanding ethics in Western philosophical thought, as well as, Heidegger's own view of ethics. I begin with a detailed exposition of the paradigmatic shift from premodern ethics, as it is based on an understanding of ethos (a form of life with its practical and normative dimensions), to modern conceptions of ethics based on Enlightenment (1750-1850) individualism and the fact-value distinction. This account of the history of ethics in philosophy attempts to demonstrate that the transition to modernity is marked by a schism between Being (ontology) and Ought (ethics) which makes any post-Enlightenment justification of ethics impossible (and helps us see why Heidegger always scoffs at the project of working out an ethics). My primary goal is to prove that Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle's thought not only challenges the underlying metaphysical assumptions of mainstream moral philosophy, but also shows us a way back to the unity of ethics and ontology. My claim is that Being and Time is an ethics in the same way Nicomachean Ethics is an ethics: both are based on an understanding of the human ethos and attempt to show what is characteristic of a life that is structured by the "ought." This argument sets the stage for uncovering the underlying presuppositions governing two prominent objections raised against Heidegger: the existentialist and nihilistic critiques. I find that these critiques are grounded on the assumption of "ontological individualism." In contrast to this individualistic ontology of the social world, I argue that, for Heidegger, individuality is not an ontological or biological given; rather, it is a relatively rare accomplishment of members of a linguistic community. What is important, in Heidegger's view, is that the ethos is the ontological bedrock of ethics. The ethos does not offer us universal principles or morals rules of the kind modern morality seeks, but it does provide paths, ways of being, and possibilities for living meaningful lives. In the end, all we have are understandings of life in certain domains (art, religion, love, etc.) that provide character ideals that, together with meaningful goals and projects for the whole of our lives, make possible a flourishing ethos. My secondary goal is to demonstrate that Heidegger undercuts the uncritical presuppositions of much of mainstream moral philosophy and provides an alternative account of ethics that picks up the stick from the other end. I formulate my thesis as an extension of the recent scholarship on Heidegger's work, arguing that Heidegger's emphasis on the human ethos puts forth a proper way of dwelling and Being-at-home within the current of the historical essence of a community. What is original about Heidegger's post-humanist ethics is that it denies the modern Being-Ought distinction and calls us to be ready and prepared to be claimed by Being. Refusing to give an absolute position to anthropomorphism, Heidegger's ethics serves as an attempt to specify what it is to be fully human in the sense of being a respondent who receives an understanding of Being and has to own up to the task of being claimed by Being. If I am correct, then it is a mistake to judge Heidegger's ethics according to whether he succeeds at formulating a list of responsibilities, rights, and obligations of individuals. Whereas modern moral theory is concerned with providing impartial and value-free guidelines and principles for individual behavior, Heidegger is asking about the conditions for the possibility of transforming how one lives. This puts the burden of proof on those who think there is something important about moral theory. The onus of proof rests with those who want to claim that a right way to be human exists and that there is an absolute, unchanging, timeless ground for understanding the right.

In my thesis, I examine the role of character friendship for the agent’s moral development in Aristotle’s ethics. I contend that we should divide character friendship in two categories: a) character friendship between completely virtuous agents, and, b) character friendship between unequally developed, or, equally developed, yet not completely virtuous agents. Regarding the first category, I argue that this highest form of friendship provides the opportunity for the agent to advance his understanding of certain virtues through the help of his virtuous friend. This process can be expressed in two ways. In the first way, I take character friendship in (a) as a relationship that is based on mutual relinquishing of opportunities for action or giving up external goods based on each agent’s needs. This process helps the agents develop their character in certain virtues which have remained slightly underdeveloped than others due to nature (NE 1144b4-7), or development (Politics 1329a9ff). This means, for instance, that if agent A is wealthy and his friend B is a middle class worker and they win the lottery together, A will relinquish his share of money to his friend so that he will be able to practice the virtue of magnificence; a virtue that his previous financial condition prevented him from developing appropriately. The second process is rather different and new in scholarly debate concerning Aristotle’s theory of moral development. I suggest that the completely virtuous agent is able to further develop his character through a process I will describe as interpretative mimesis. In this process, the agent receives the form of his friend’s action and is able to apply this pattern of behaviour in a situation that he thinks is appropriate. I have to highlight though the fact the fact that he does not just ape his friend’s action. Instead, he interprets the action based on his skills and abilities and the demands of the situations he faces. Thus, this pattern works as an extra epistemological tool in the agent’s hand in new and challenging moral situations. Now, case (b) comes on the opposite side of the majority of scholars’ view on character friendship. They think that Aristotle reserves character friendship only for completely virtuous agents. I argue that this is not the correct approach, and that less than completely virtuous agents can take part in character friendships as well. This view has the advantage of making character friendship in (b) a tool in Aristotle’s hands for his agents of lower moral level to develop their understanding of virtue and its applications. I propose that the route of moral development in case (b) resembles the one in the second process of case (a). Namely, the agent receives the form of his friend’s action and uses it as a pattern in some new situation he has to face. I will not name the process though as “interpretative” or any kind of mimesis. The reason for this is that Aristotle gives us textual evidence (NE 1172a9-14) for an imitative method of moral development only for the second process of case (a). I will take case (b) then as a pattern guide application of my friend’s action which we could call pre-interpretative mimesis period of the agent’s moral development. If my arguments are correct then character friendship is much more valuable than scholars thought. Our friends turn out to be examples of good action who guide us through the sweaty and painful path that is called virtue. And this path never stops; even if we have become “moral heroes”; or, put it differently, “masters” of practical wisdom.

Doctorat en sciences médicales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Rosalind Hursthouse, Mark LeBar, Martha Nussbaum, and other contemporary philosophers have brought virtue ethics into conversation with political philosophy. These philosophers agree with Aristotle that the function of political authority is to enable persons to live well. But we still lack an account of how the virtues, as characteristics of persons, relate to political authority as a property of institutions. I argue that the authority of political institutions depends on performing the function of enabling persons to live well, while the virtues require, but also limit, the authority of political institutions. According to the account I develop, living well consists in the exercise of practical wisdom within a socially embedded institutional context. Political institutions enable living well by means of institutionally defined rights such as property rights that protect the exercise of practical wisdom, and they promote its development through the institutions of civil society such as the family. But, I argue, political authority is limited by the individual virtue of justice, understood as balancing conformity to the existing social norms and laws of a community with their necessary updating through ideals of virtue. Ultimately, I conclude that political authority properly functions to promote an indirect conception of the common good, according to which persons relate to each other virtuously through their shared institutions.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / This dissertation undertakes to do two things: to defend the thesis that Hegel, via his concept of relation, solves certain inconsistencies germane to that concept present in both Aristotle and Aquinas, and to clarify, if not solve, some of the traditional problems that surround the concept of relation. It is suggested that a decision as to the nature of relation is not simply a logical decision but a metaphysical and epistemological one. The aims of chapter I are to set forth the Aristotelian doctrine of the category of relation and to consider its effects on Aristotle's logic, epistemology and ontology. It is suggested that the theory of relation Aristotle defends and the theory of relation his philosophy requires, and at points presupposes, are mutually opposed and inconsistent. [TRUNCATED]