This paper is an analysis of Aristotle’s Politics in its critique of Plato’s Republic in reference to the topics of the ideal state and the role of the family. I focused on books I-III in Aristotle’s Politics to gain a deep understanding on Aristotle’s conception of the state and it’s goals in relation to its citizens as well as his critique on Plato’s ideal state. I also read book V and parts of book III of Plato’s Republic to gain a strong understanding of Plato’s requirements of the ideal state. In exploring the ideal states put forth by Plato and Aristotle, it became clear that the two sources of friction are in the state and the family. The first chapter of this paper discusses the general themes of Aristotle’s Politics such as how the state came to exist and the relationship between the good man and the good citizen. The second chapter offers insight to book V of Plato’s Republic but its majority is a focus on the critique of Plato’s proposed guardian or ruling class. The third and final chapter is an examination of how seriously one should take both Plato and Aristotle in their implications for the state and a tongue-in-cheek analysis of Aristotle’s critique of Plato in relation to the role of philosophy. This paper is concluded by considering the true implications of these philosophers on the role of reason and politics; more specifically considering how much of a role reason can have in promoting the state or the family. In understanding the guidelines of these two ideal states, one is better prepared in discussing the role of the family in modern government and to what extent both the family and the state can thrive together.

According to some logicians and philosophers, future contingent propositions pose a specific problem. Many of those who look into this problem now and those who looked into it (even hundreds) years ago, refer to Aristotle. Nevertheless not in agreement. Our aim is to give an overview of traditional and non-traditional interpretations of the part of Aristotle's work which deals with this issue. On the basis of their comparison we will try to uncover what causes the variety of readings. That will allow us to assess whether the truth of future contingent propositions really is a specific problem and what is its actual nature.

Thesis advisor: Arthur Madigan / Thesis advisor: Jorge L. Garcia / The relationship between intention, intentional action, and moral assessment is of fundamental importance to ethical theory. In large part, moral responsibility is based on an assessment of agent responsibility, which in turn is based on the connection between an agent's intentions and the actions which they cause. In the last twenty-five years, there has been a debate in contemporary action theory about the relationship between intentions and intentional action. Objecting to what he calls the "Simple View," which he characterizes as the view that all intentional actions are intended under some description, Michael Bratman, among others, argues that not all intentional actions are intended. In this dissertation, we will defend the Simple View by appealing to Aristotle's theory of action as developed in his psychological and ethical works. In the first part of the dissertation, we argue that all intentional actions are intended under some description; however, we argue that distinctions between different types of intention are essential: specifically, the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate intentions and the distinction between the intention of the end and the intention of the means. Our account centers on Aristotle's concept of prohairesis, which he identifies as the distinctly human principle of action. The term prohairesis in Aristotle's works seems to have at least three senses: 1) primarily, the deliberate intention with which a person acts, an `occurent' choice; 2) the habitual or `dispositional' choice or resolve of `decent' people; and 3) general purposes that men have which may encompass voluntary action as a whole. The first sense of the term is the primary one that properly signifies the concept. Prohairesis fits within the general framework of animal motion which Aristotle sets out in the De Anima and De Motu Animalium. For Aristotle, orexis or desire is the cause of all animal motion, including human motion. Prohairesis is a deliberate desire for the means to an end. It is a principle of action peculiar to mature human beings capable of deliberating, as it is the intention which is the result of deliberation. It marks off a narrow but important stretch of intentional action. Prohairesis is set off against other types of intention, like boulesis, which is an intention of the end, and epithumia (bodily appetite) and thumos (anger), which are non-deliberate intentions relating to non-rational appetites like lust and anger. Aristotle, in contrast to contemporary accounts of intentional action, is unusually specific in his designation of the different kinds of intention. Different orexeis differ not only with regard to specific objects but also with regard to time, planning, and detail. Aristotle traces both the causal and moral responsibility agents have for their actions to the action of these internal principles of desire. Moral assessment is linked to the operative internal principle of an act. This allows for an action to be voluntary and intentional, even if the agent does not fully understand or plan for the consequences of an action. Intention, for Aristotle, if we correctly understand it as orexis and what results from orexis, is not reducible to one mode but is irreducibly plural. Furthermore, each person's capacity for intentional action is shaped by his character, and each character has correspondingly different kinds of intention, both with respect to the objects of intention and in their relation to action. Finally, the scope of intention is not definite, and depending on the agent, can include those things which attend to the means of which he has cognizance, for instance, harmful side-effect consequences or other costs of his action. In the second part of the dissertation, we examine at length the objections to the Simple View, lodged by Bratman, Gilbert Harman, and Joshua Knobe. We give an overview of objections by Bratman, Harman, and Knobe which center on three cases and four objections. The cases are: 1) a hypothetical video game; 2) unexpected success; and 3) unintended consequences. The objections are: 1) with respect to the hypothetical video game, the Simple View ascribes an irrational intention to a gamer playing the game; 2) When agents are doubtful of the success of an action they undertake, the Simple View requires that they intend the act the perform rather than that they merely try to perform the act, which opponents argue that this is irrational and false; 3) The Simple View entails the rejection of the distinction between intention and foresight which itself entails that agents intend all the results of their actions, even when those results are merely foreseen and not intended; 4) The Simple View does not adequately explain ordinary language usage with respect to ascriptions of intention for side-effect consequences, and therefore does not reflect basic, commonly shared notions of intentional action. The first two objections center on cases where it seems irrational for an agent to intend the act he performs. In the case of the video game, the scenario is so set up that the player wins a prize for hitting either target but knows that he cannot hit both or the game will shut down. It seems irrational for him to intend to hit both if he cannot; however, in order to maximize his chance winning, it would be rational to aim at both. In the case of unexpected success, it seems that agents do not intend acts whose chances of success they doubt because intending seems to require the positive belief that one will succeed; rather, it is argued that agents merely try but do not intend the act they perform. Against these cases and objections, we argue that agents are capable of conditional and complex intentions, such that one may conditionally intend to hit whichever target is opportune, while aiming at both. Likewise, we argue that intending to act does not require the positive belief that one will succeed; only that it is possible for one to succeed. Furthermore, the distinction between trying and intending is specious. Finally, we respond to the third and fourth objections centering on the intentionality of side-effect consequences. It is argued by Bratman et al. that the Simple View entails the rejection of the distinction between intention and foresight, and that such a rejection further entails consequentialism. Likewise it is also argued that the Simple View fails to account for ordinary language ascriptions of intentionality for side-effect consequences. We agree that the Simple View entails rejecting the distinction between intention and foresight as it is currently applied, but deny that this entails consequentialism, i.e., the view that the consequences of an action are the primary basis for moral evaluation and not the agent's intentions. Likewise, we agree that the Simple View does not model ordinary language ascriptions of intention; however, this is not necessarily a defect since such ascriptions are inconsistent and imprecise. Furthermore, we argue that the Simple View might be used to more adequately explain such usage. We center our response to these objections on the Doctrine of Double Effect. We argue that the doctrine arises from a mistaken interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas' treatment of defensive killing. We argue that Aquinas does not hold that the death of an attacker is a foreseen but not intended side-effect, as proponents of Double Effect and opponents of the Simple View hold; rather it is intended as a means to the end of self-defense. Therefore, the two effects are not the desired end and a side-effect but rather the intended end and the intended means. Furthermore, we argue that this does not entail doing evil for the sake of good because Aquinas' Aristotelian account of action specification incorporates circumstances as essential components of intentions which give an act its moral quality. Furthermore, the necessary references to an agent's intentions show how the rejection of the application of the distinction between intention and foresight does not entail consequentialism. Finally, we tackle the underlying assumptions about intention and desire which lead to the rejection of the Simple View. Opponents of the Simple View hold that intention is not a form of desire because then it would not have an essential role in the genesis of action or in rational deliberation. We, however, argue that the major objections to the Simple View are defeasible once one understands intention as a species of desire, i.e. a deliberate desire, whose scope includes consequences beyond acts performed and goals achieved. The paradoxes at the heart of the debate hinge on the ambiguity of the English word `intention' and its usage, as well as the inherent difficulty of examining psychological concepts. `Intention' has several senses unified by the purposiveness of the mental states to which the word is referred. These senses can often, but not always, be distinguished in English usage by the degree and kind of deliberation attendant to them. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Esta dissertação tem por escopo a questão das emoções - ?à ???? - na obra de Aristóteles, principalmente nos livros I e II da Retórica e da Ética Nicomaquéia. A definição aristotélica de como ????? \'emoção\' foi compreendida de diversas formas, porém sempre a partir dos seguintes elementos: como integrante da porção não-racional da alma, habituável à tutela da razão, como manifestação psicofísica, como causada por cognições. O problema é, portanto, reencontrar e reunir todos esses elementos na obra do Estagirita. / This thesis aims at the question of emotions - ?à ???? - in the works of Aristotle, mainly in the first and second books of Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics. The Aristotelian definition of ????? as \'emotion\' was understood in different ways, but always from the following elements: as part of the nonrational portion of the soul; as something that can grow accustomed to reason; as a psychophysic manifestation; as caused by cognitions. The problem is to find and gather all these elements from the works of Aristotle.

Thesis advisor: Marina McCoy / In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the project of developing virtue and of being virtuous is always realized in one's immediate, particular circumstances. Given that perception is the faculty that gains access to the particular, Aristotle seems to afford perception a central role in ethical life. Yet Aristotle does not provide an account of ethical perception: he does not explain how the perceptual faculty is able grasp ethically relevant facts and how the perceptual capacity can do so well, nor does he explain the manner in which perception influences ethical decisions and actions. It is the project of this dissertation to provide such accounts. There are two main difficulties in the notion of ethical perception in Aristotle's thought: first, perception appears ill-suited to ethical life because the objects of perception are always perceived with respect to the individual's subjective condition--her desires, fears, etc. The information relayed by perception is always relative to the perceiver, i.e. merely the apparent good. Second, virtue is the excellence of the rational soul, while perception is a faculty shared by non-rational animals. It appears, then, that perception must be limited to playing an instrumental role in ethical reasoning and action. This dissertation addresses these difficulties by developing an account of uniquely human perception that is influenced and informed by the intellectual element of the soul. I argue that the project of ethical development, for Aristotle, is the project of integrating one's perceptual faculty with the intellectual capacity, such that one's perception transcends the natural relativity to the perceiver and gains access to the true good as it emerges in one's particular situation. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett / This dissertation investigates Aristotle’s famous claim that “the human being is by nature a political animal.” This claim seems to express a basic disagreement between Aristotelian political philosophy and the contractarian political philosophy that informs modern liberalism. Aristotle asserts, contrary to Hobbes, for instance, that the political community is not a convention between naturally individual human beings but a natural entity in its own right prior to and authoritative over the individual. Yet not only are Aristotle’s reasons for supposing that we are naturally political obscure and questionable, but the meaning of Aristotle’s claim that we are naturally political is not altogether clear. For not only does Aristotle suggest that we are naturally political because the city is naturally prior to and authoritative over us, but he suggests we are political animals above all due to our distinctive faculty of reason, or speech, which, because it is the medium of the perception of advantage and justice that informs our actions, is what constitutes the city. Speech, in other words, is what brings the city to sight as the natural whole Aristotle asserts it to be. This suggests, however, that the naturalness of politics must be evaluated on the basis of such speech, which admits of clarification, and not on the basis Aristotle originally offers, which is speculation about the origins of the city. We argue that Aristotle’s dialectical examinations of despotic, political, and kingly forms of rule provide an outline of this task of clarification, which alone can permit us to evaluate the naturalness of politics. A close reading of these examinations, however, indicates that Aristotle ultimately rejects the view that the city is the natural whole it presents itself as being. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis advisor: Mary J. Hughes / Thesis advisor: Brian J. Braman / Drawing different people with unique tastes into relationships with one another, the dinner table acts as an anchor for the human community. Though a daily practice for most, can we mark one meal as being more significant, or more influential, or more artistic than another? While we may not consciously realize the forces at work while attending a dinner ourselves, examining the retelling of the shared human experience with meals and meal preparation allow us to analyze more objectively the multi-faceted meanings behind the event. One way in which to do this is through examining the role that mealtime has played in literature. Virginia Woolf's novel, To the Lighthouse, Isak Dinesen's short story Babette's Feast, and Frances Osbourne's biography Lilla's Feast explore the unique human transformation present as their heroine hostesses go beyond simply feeding to truly cater to their guests. Although three very different narratives, the works share the same heart as their presentation of grandiose meals, creative spirit, mystical energy, and ultimate human transcendence express the unique power each hostess has to create warmth in even the coldest of homes.Yet, what about each hostess' artistic, culinary masterpieces, their mode of self-expression, allow those who partake in their creations to better themselves? Can the meal, like art, do anything for the soul? Our psyches can be affected by the ritual act of dining. Through reflection on the communal culinary experience, as presented to us in ready-to-analyze literature, we may almost spiritually experience the art and its encouragement of the perfectibility of our own human natures. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2008. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

Atualmente a Ética Nicomaqueia apresenta-se como uma obra fraturada. O tratamento do conceito de eudaimonia feito por Aristóteles não parece ser muito claro. Por um lado, ele privilegia explicitamente a atividade contemplativa como a eudaimonia perfeita e dessa forma dá ao conceito uma acepção dominante. Por outro lado, muito do tratamento teórico dispensado à atividade das virtudes éticas faz supor que a vida ideal deveria combinar contemplação e atividade prática em um todo coerente, e o resultado deveria ser uma eudaimonia inclusivista. A essa falta de coalizão somam-se ainda outros problemas. Por exemplo, qual é a correta interpretação de certos argumentos, notadamente o argumento de abertura do segundo capítulo do primeiro livro da Ética Nicomaqueia (EN I.2), sobre o qual pesa a acusação de ser falacioso, o argumento da finalidade e o argumento da autossuficiência (apresentados em EN I.7). Este trabalho tem como objetivo estabelecer uma interpretação coerente da eudaimonia. Apresento razões para considerar consistente o argumento de abertura de EN I.2, razões que o fazem coeso com os argumentos apresentados em EN I.7. A interpretação procura conciliar aspectos volitivos, prescritivos e lógicos do conceito de eudaimonia e dessa forma explicar a divisão entre as concepções inclusivista e dominante. Para tanto, é necessário ter em mente o escopo intensional da ética aristotélica e a distinção proposta por Aristóteles entre ação produtiva e ação prática. / Nowadays, Nicomachean Ethics presents itself as a fractured work in which Aristotles treatment of the concept of eudaimonia doesnt appear to be very clear. On one hand Aristotle explicitly endorses contemplation as perfect eudaimonia, thus giving this concept a dominant aspect. On the other hand much of the theoretical account dedicated to activity of practical virtues makes us believe that the ideal life should combine contemplation and practical activity in one coherent whole. The result should be an inclusivist eudaimonia. This lack of union also highlights other problems. For instance, which is the correct interpretation of some arguments - namely the opening argument of the second chapter of the first book of Nicomachean Ethics (EN I.2), against which there is a charge of being fallacious. Then there are the finality and the self-sufficiency arguments (both in EN I.7). The present work aims to establish a coherent interpretation of eudaimonia. I will present reasons to consider the opening argument of EN I.2 consistent, reasons that make it coherent with the arguments of EN I.7. This interpretation seeks to conciliate volitional, prescriptive and logical aspects of the concept of eudaimonia and thus explain the division between inclusivist and dominant views. To achieve this result, its necessary to bear in mind the intensional scope of Aristotelian Ethics and the distinction between productive and practical activity proposed by Aristotle.

This thesis represents a systematic analysis of one of the commentaries of Adam of Buckfield on the physical works of Aristotle. The aim is to indicate how natural philosophy was taught in the early universities and how Aristotle's text became canonical in the arts course. The evidence, from extensive palaeographical research, is used to assess Buckfield's influence at an important time when Oxford was a young university, still shaping its curricula. It is argued that since natural philosophy was forbidden in the university of Paris during the time when Buckfield was teaching, a particular importance attaches to Oxford's interpretation of the physical works of Aristotle. The subsequent revival of natural philosophy in Paris and other universities that followed the Parisian model, it is argued, therefore owes a considerable debt to Oxford and its early masters, among whom Adam of Buckfleld was the earliest to complete a commentary on all the major physical works. The thesis examines the manuscript traditions in which Buckfield's works survives: separate copies of commentaries; whole commentaries written out in the Corpus vetustius collections of physical works; fragments of commentaries in the standard gloss in the same collection. Reasons are suggested for the difference between the natures of these manuscripts in the context of thirteenth-century teaching. A special study of Buckfleld's commentary on the De dfferentia spirilus et anime illuminates these kinds of manuscripts, indicates where further work will be profitable, and allows a reconstruction of the teaching material and techniques of Oxford regent masters of the thirteenth century.

This thesis considers the different forms of knowledge and ways of knowing generated through the processes and products of practitioner research from an Aristotelian relational perspective. I adopt the term 'gnoseology', which encompasses many different knowledge types, rather than the narrower, yet more commonly used term 'epistemology', and detail the development of a gnoseology framework. I use this framework to examine the understandings generated by a group of international postgraduate learners on a 10-week, intensive English for Academic Purposes course at a private UK institution as they explore the things that puzzle them about their language learning lives. Their explorations are grounded in the principles of Exploratory Practice (EP), a form of practitioner research that proposes learners themselves be viewed as 'key developing practitioners' alongside the teacher. The principles of EP also inform both my research methodology and my approach to classroom pedagogy for the purposes of this study, and the data used is generated naturalistically through the daily activity of the classroom. The thesis offers an account of both the processes and products of the learners' explorations, highlighting some of the potential benefits and tensions that surface as learners engage in exploring their language learning puzzles. It discusses the possibilities of viewing learners as 'key developing practitioners' for the learners themselves, teachers and the academy. Using my gnoseology framework I explore the emergent and developing understandings of the learners that arise through this work as they develop their praxis. I conclude that in contrast to the traditional separation of knowledge types into scientific (episteme), craft (techne) and practical wisdom (phronesis), my data shows these different forms and ways of knowing are multifaceted, interrelated and often operate simultaneously. I suggest that my gnoseology framework is the principle contribution of this thesis as it provides a potentially new way of examining and understanding the nature of, and relationships between, the different forms and ways of knowing produced through practitioner research. I also relate these developing and emerging learner understandings to the principled framework of EP, offering suggestions for its development, with particular regard to issues of relevance, learner expectations, and the processes of puzzling and puzzlement. This critique of EP is also a key contribution of this thesis.