O presente estudo tem por objetivo avaliar o regime brasileiro de controle dos preços de transferência a partir do confronto dos princípios arms length e da praticabilidade. Inicialmente, são relatadas as principais características históricas e metodológicas do desenvolvimento da disciplina nos âmbitos internacional e brasileiro. Em seguida, é apresentada uma teoria dos conflitos normativos, amparada nas doutrinas de Dworkin e Alexy, para sustentar que a colisão de princípios deflagrada pela variedade de mecanismos que mitigam a realização do arms length em favor da praticabilidade na legislação brasileira deve ser avaliada pelo exame da proporcionalidade conduzido por uma correta fundamentação argumentativa. Defende-se, depois, que o arms length e a praticabilidade estão inseridos no ordenamento constitucional-tributário brasileiro com a natureza de princípios jurídicos respectivamente justificados pelas ideias de igualdade particular e igualdade geral. Configurado o cenário da colisão, é analisada a proporcionalidade dos seguintes mecanismos: definição do aspecto subjetivo, exclusão dos royalties e da transferência de tecnologia, restrições da comparabilidade, margens de lucro predeterminadas, liberdade de escolha de métodos, vedação de outros métodos e utilização de safe harbours. A partir dos resultados da análise, conclui-se que o regime brasileiro não é eficaz no controle dos preços de transferência. Sugere-se, então, um conjunto de medidas alternativas que constitua um meio termo entre a desproporcional praticabilidade obtida com os mecanismos do atual regime e a diminuta praticabilidade da disciplina internacional. / This study examines the Brazilian transfer pricing regime by facing arms length and practicability principles. Initially, historical and methodological characteristics of the discipline development are reported both from international and Brazilian perspectives. Then, based on Dworkin and Alexy doctrines, a normative conflicts theory supports that the collision between principles produced by a variety of mechanisms, which mitigate arms length results by promoting practicability, should be evaluated through a proportionality exam conducted under a correct argumentative discourse. Thereafter it advocates that arms length and practicability are inserted in the Brazilian constitutional tax system as legal principles justified by particular and general equality ideas respectively. Once the collision scenario is configured, proportionality of the following mechanisms is analysed: subjective aspect definition, royalties and technology transfers exclusion, comparability restrictions, predetermined gross margins, choice of methods freedom, other methods prohibition and safe harbours usage. The analysis concludes that there is no efficacy in Brazilian transfer pricing regime. Therefore it suggests a number of alternative measures which constitutes a midterm between the disproportional practicability of the current regime mechanisms and the diminished practicability of the international discipline.

O presente estudo tem por objetivo avaliar o regime brasileiro de controle dos preços de transferência sob o enfoque das diferentes visões que o tema pode apresentar. Inicialmente são relatadas suas principais características como a questão do arms length principle, seu histórico e aplicação, para em seguida falar-se acerca da disciplina no âmbito da OCDE e no direito comparado. Na sequência é abordada a legislação brasileira sobre o tema, a posição da jurisprudência, seu confronto com a valoração aduaneira, bem como sua relação com os acordos para se evitar a dupla tributação. Após configurado este cenário de introdução do estudo e seus principais contornos, são efetivamente analisadas as diferentes visões que o tema pode apresentar, notadamente em relação à recepção do arms length, a adoção de margens fixas e a questão da superioridade hierarquica dos tratados para se evitar a dupla tributação e a lei interna, no caso a lei dos preços de transferência / This study examines the Brazilian Transfer Pricing Regime from the standpoint of the different views that the issue may have. Initially the main characteristics are reported, for example, the arm\'s length principle, its history and application, thereafter it advocates the discipline within the OECD and comparative law. Following is addressed the Brazilian Transfer Pricing legislation, the position of jurisprudence facing with the customs valuation, and their relation with the double tax treaty. Once set up this introduction study scenario and its main outlines, are effectively analyzed the different views that the subject may have, especially with respect to the receipt of the arm\'s length principle, the adoption of fixed margins and the issue of hierarchical superiority of double tax treaties and domestic law, in case, transfer pricings law.

O presente estudo tem por objetivo avaliar o regime brasileiro de controle dos preços de transferência a partir do confronto dos princípios arms length e da praticabilidade. Inicialmente, são relatadas as principais características históricas e metodológicas do desenvolvimento da disciplina nos âmbitos internacional e brasileiro. Em seguida, é apresentada uma teoria dos conflitos normativos, amparada nas doutrinas de Dworkin e Alexy, para sustentar que a colisão de princípios deflagrada pela variedade de mecanismos que mitigam a realização do arms length em favor da praticabilidade na legislação brasileira deve ser avaliada pelo exame da proporcionalidade conduzido por uma correta fundamentação argumentativa. Defende-se, depois, que o arms length e a praticabilidade estão inseridos no ordenamento constitucional-tributário brasileiro com a natureza de princípios jurídicos respectivamente justificados pelas ideias de igualdade particular e igualdade geral. Configurado o cenário da colisão, é analisada a proporcionalidade dos seguintes mecanismos: definição do aspecto subjetivo, exclusão dos royalties e da transferência de tecnologia, restrições da comparabilidade, margens de lucro predeterminadas, liberdade de escolha de métodos, vedação de outros métodos e utilização de safe harbours. A partir dos resultados da análise, conclui-se que o regime brasileiro não é eficaz no controle dos preços de transferência. Sugere-se, então, um conjunto de medidas alternativas que constitua um meio termo entre a desproporcional praticabilidade obtida com os mecanismos do atual regime e a diminuta praticabilidade da disciplina internacional. / This study examines the Brazilian transfer pricing regime by facing arms length and practicability principles. Initially, historical and methodological characteristics of the discipline development are reported both from international and Brazilian perspectives. Then, based on Dworkin and Alexy doctrines, a normative conflicts theory supports that the collision between principles produced by a variety of mechanisms, which mitigate arms length results by promoting practicability, should be evaluated through a proportionality exam conducted under a correct argumentative discourse. Thereafter it advocates that arms length and practicability are inserted in the Brazilian constitutional tax system as legal principles justified by particular and general equality ideas respectively. Once the collision scenario is configured, proportionality of the following mechanisms is analysed: subjective aspect definition, royalties and technology transfers exclusion, comparability restrictions, predetermined gross margins, choice of methods freedom, other methods prohibition and safe harbours usage. The analysis concludes that there is no efficacy in Brazilian transfer pricing regime. Therefore it suggests a number of alternative measures which constitutes a midterm between the disproportional practicability of the current regime mechanisms and the diminished practicability of the international discipline.

The Formulary Approach to the Taxation of Transnational Corporations: A Realistic Alternative? Synopsis The central hypotheses of this thesis are: that global formulary apportionment is the most appropriate method for the taxation of transnational corporations (TNCs) in lieu of the present system commonly referred to as the separate accounting/arm's length method; and that it is essential, in order to implement the proposed global formulary model, to create an international organisation which would fulfil, in the taxation field, a role equivalent to that of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in international trade. The world economy is fast integrating and is increasingly dominated by the activities of transnational enterprises. These activities create a dual tax problem for various revenue authorities seeking to tax gains derived thereon: Firstly, when two or more countries entertain conflicting tax claims on the same base, there arises what is commonly referred to as a double taxation problem. Secondly, an allocation problem arises when different jurisdictions seek to determine the quantum of the gains to be allocated to each jurisdiction for taxation purposes. The traditional regime for solving both the double taxation and the allocation problem is enshrined in a series of bilateral treaties signed between various nations. These are, in general, based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Model Treaty.1 It is submitted, in this thesis, that while highly successful in an environment characterised by the coexistence of various national taxation systems, the traditional regime lacks the essential attributes suitable to the emerging 'borderless world'. The central theme of this thesis is the allocation problem. The OECD Model attempts to deal with this issue on a bilateral basis. Currently, the allocation problem is resolved through the application of Articles 7 and 9 of the OECD Model. In both instances the solution is based on the 'separate enterprise' standard, also known as the separate entity theory. This separate accounts/arm's length system was articulated in the 1930s when international trade consisted of flows of raw materials and other natural products as well as flows of finished manufactured goods. Such trade is highly visible and may be adequately valued both at the port of departure or at the port of entry in a country. It follows that within this particular system of international trade the application of the arm's length principle was relatively easy and proved to be extremely important in resolving both the double taxation and apportionment problems. Today, however, the conditions under which international trade is conducted are substantially different from those that prevailed until the 1960s. * Firstly, apart from the significant increase in the volume of traditionally traded goods, trade in services now forms the bulk of international exchanges. In addition, the advent of the information age has dramatically increased the importance of specialised information whose value is notoriously difficult to ascertain for taxation purposes. * Secondly, the globalisation phenomenon which gathered momentum over the last two decades has enabled existing TNCs to extend their global operations and has favoured the emergence of new transnational firms. Thus, intra-firm trade conducted outside market conditions accounts for a substantial part of international trade. * Thirdly, further economic integration has been achieved following the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of the globalisation phenomenon. In this new world economic order only TNCs have the necessary resources to take advantage of emerging opportunities. The very essence of a TNC is 'its ability to achieve higher revenues (or lower costs) from its different subsidiaries as a whole compared to the results that would be achieved under separate management on an arm's length basis.'2 Yet, the prevailing system for the taxation of TNCs overlooks this critical characteristic and is therefore incapable of fully capturing, for taxation purposes, the aggregate gains of TNCs. The potential revenue loss arising from the inability of the present system to account for and to allocate synergy gains is substantial. It follows that the perennial questions of international taxation can no longer be addressed within the constraints of the separate entity theory and a narrow definition of national sovereignty. Indeed, in order to mirror the developments occurring in the economic field, taxation needs to move from a national to an international level. Moreover, a profound reform of the system is imperative in order to avoid harmful tax competition between nations and enhance compliance from TNCs. Such a new international tax system needs to satisfy the test of simplicity, equity, efficiency, and administrative ease. To achieve these objectives international cooperation is essential. The hallmark of international cooperation has been the emergence, after World War II, of a range of international organisations designed to facilitate the achievement of certain goals deemed essential by various nations. The need for an organisation to deal specifically with taxation matters is now overwhelming. Consequently, this thesis recommends the creation of an international organisation to administer the proposed system. The main objective of this international organisation would be to initiate and coordinate the multilateral application of a formulary apportionment system which, it is suggested, would deal in a more realistic way with 'the difficult problems of determining the tax base and allocating it appropriately between jurisdictions'.3 The global formulary apportionment methodology is derived from the unitary entity theory. The unitary theory considers a TNC as a single business which, for convenience, is divided into 'purely formal, separately-incorporated subsidiaries'.4 Under the unitary theory the global income of TNCs needs to be computed, then such income is apportioned between the various component parts of the enterprise by way of a formula which reflects the economic contribution of each part to the derivation of profits. The question that arises is whether the world of international taxation is ready for such a paradigm shift. It is arguable that this shift has already occurred albeit cautiously and in very subtle ways. Thus, the latest of the OECD Guidelines on the transfer pricing question provides that 'MNE [Multinational Enterprise] groups retain the freedom to apply methods not described in this Report to establish prices provided those prices satisfy the arm's length principle in accordance with these Guidelines.'5 Arguably, the globalisation process has created 'the specific situation' allowed for by the OECD. This thesis, therefore, explores the relative obsolescence of the bilateral approach to the taxation of TNCs and then suggests that a multilateral system is better adapted to the emerging globalised economy. The fundamental building blocks of the model proposed in this thesis are the following: * First, the administration and coordination of the proposed system is to be achieved by the creation of a specialised tax organisation, called Intertax, to which member countries would devolve a limited part of their fiscal sovereignty. * Second, in order to enable the centralised calculation of TNC's profits, the proposed system requires the formulation of harmonised methods for the measurement of the global profits of TNCs. Therefore, the efforts of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) to produce international accounting standards and harmonised consolidation rules must be recognised and, if needs be, refined and ultimately implemented. * Third, the major function of Intertax would be to determine the commercial profits of TNCs on a standardised basis and to apportion the latter to relevant countries by way of an appropriate formula/formulas. Once this is achieved, each country would be free, starting from its share of commercial profits, to determine the taxable income in accordance with the particular tax base that it adopts and, ultimately, the tax payable within its jurisdiction. In the proposed system, therefore, a particular country would be able to independently set whatever depreciation schedules or investment tax credits it chooses, and adopt whatever tax accounting rules it deems fit relative to its policy objectives. Moreover, this thesis argues that the global formulary apportionment model it proposes is not dramatically opposed to the arm's length principle. Indeed, it suggests that the constant assumption to the contrary, even with regard to the usual formulary apportionment methodology, is extravagant because both methodologies are based on a common endeavour, that is, to give a substantially correct reflex of a TNC's true profits. It has often been objected that global formulary apportionment is arbitrary and ignores market conditions. This thesis addresses such concerns by rejecting the application of a single all-purpose formula. Rather, it recognises that TNCs operating in different industries require different treatment and, therefore, suggests the adoption of different formulas to satisfy specific industry requirements. For example, the formula applicable to a financial institution would be different to that applicable to the pharmaceutical industry. Each formula needs to be based on the fundamental necessity to capture the functions, taking into consideration assets used, and risks assumed within that industry. In addition, if the need arises, each formula should be able to be fine-tuned to fit specific situations. Moreover, it is also pertinent to note that the OECD already accepts 'the selected application of a formula developed by both tax administrations in cooperation with a specific taxpayer or MNE group...such as it might be used in a mutual agreement procedure, advance transfer pricing agreement, or other bilateral or multilateral determination.'6 The system proposed in this thesis can thus be easily reconciled with the separate accounting/arm's length which the OECD so vehemently advocates. Both models have the same preoccupations so that what is herein proposed may simply be characterised as an institutionalised version of the system advocated by the OECD. Multilateral formulary apportionment addresses both the double taxation and the allocation problems in international taxation. It resolves the apportionment question 'without depending on an extraordinary degree of goodwill or compliance from taxpayers.'7 It is therefore submitted that, if applied on a multilateral basis with a minimum of central coordination, it also seriously addresses the double taxation problem. Indeed, it is a flexible method given that different formulas may be devised to suit the needs of TNCs operating in different sectors. Consequently, formulary apportionment understood in this sense, is a realistic alternative to the limitations of the present system.

The Formulary Approach to the Taxation of Transnational Corporations: A Realistic Alternative? Synopsis The central hypotheses of this thesis are: that global formulary apportionment is the most appropriate method for the taxation of transnational corporations (TNCs) in lieu of the present system commonly referred to as the separate accounting/arm's length method; and that it is essential, in order to implement the proposed global formulary model, to create an international organisation which would fulfil, in the taxation field, a role equivalent to that of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in international trade. The world economy is fast integrating and is increasingly dominated by the activities of transnational enterprises. These activities create a dual tax problem for various revenue authorities seeking to tax gains derived thereon: Firstly, when two or more countries entertain conflicting tax claims on the same base, there arises what is commonly referred to as a double taxation problem. Secondly, an allocation problem arises when different jurisdictions seek to determine the quantum of the gains to be allocated to each jurisdiction for taxation purposes. The traditional regime for solving both the double taxation and the allocation problem is enshrined in a series of bilateral treaties signed between various nations. These are, in general, based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Model Treaty.1 It is submitted, in this thesis, that while highly successful in an environment characterised by the coexistence of various national taxation systems, the traditional regime lacks the essential attributes suitable to the emerging 'borderless world'. The central theme of this thesis is the allocation problem. The OECD Model attempts to deal with this issue on a bilateral basis. Currently, the allocation problem is resolved through the application of Articles 7 and 9 of the OECD Model. In both instances the solution is based on the 'separate enterprise' standard, also known as the separate entity theory. This separate accounts/arm's length system was articulated in the 1930s when international trade consisted of flows of raw materials and other natural products as well as flows of finished manufactured goods. Such trade is highly visible and may be adequately valued both at the port of departure or at the port of entry in a country. It follows that within this particular system of international trade the application of the arm's length principle was relatively easy and proved to be extremely important in resolving both the double taxation and apportionment problems. Today, however, the conditions under which international trade is conducted are substantially different from those that prevailed until the 1960s. * Firstly, apart from the significant increase in the volume of traditionally traded goods, trade in services now forms the bulk of international exchanges. In addition, the advent of the information age has dramatically increased the importance of specialised information whose value is notoriously difficult to ascertain for taxation purposes. * Secondly, the globalisation phenomenon which gathered momentum over the last two decades has enabled existing TNCs to extend their global operations and has favoured the emergence of new transnational firms. Thus, intra-firm trade conducted outside market conditions accounts for a substantial part of international trade. * Thirdly, further economic integration has been achieved following the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of the globalisation phenomenon. In this new world economic order only TNCs have the necessary resources to take advantage of emerging opportunities. The very essence of a TNC is 'its ability to achieve higher revenues (or lower costs) from its different subsidiaries as a whole compared to the results that would be achieved under separate management on an arm's length basis.'2 Yet, the prevailing system for the taxation of TNCs overlooks this critical characteristic and is therefore incapable of fully capturing, for taxation purposes, the aggregate gains of TNCs. The potential revenue loss arising from the inability of the present system to account for and to allocate synergy gains is substantial. It follows that the perennial questions of international taxation can no longer be addressed within the constraints of the separate entity theory and a narrow definition of national sovereignty. Indeed, in order to mirror the developments occurring in the economic field, taxation needs to move from a national to an international level. Moreover, a profound reform of the system is imperative in order to avoid harmful tax competition between nations and enhance compliance from TNCs. Such a new international tax system needs to satisfy the test of simplicity, equity, efficiency, and administrative ease. To achieve these objectives international cooperation is essential. The hallmark of international cooperation has been the emergence, after World War II, of a range of international organisations designed to facilitate the achievement of certain goals deemed essential by various nations. The need for an organisation to deal specifically with taxation matters is now overwhelming. Consequently, this thesis recommends the creation of an international organisation to administer the proposed system. The main objective of this international organisation would be to initiate and coordinate the multilateral application of a formulary apportionment system which, it is suggested, would deal in a more realistic way with 'the difficult problems of determining the tax base and allocating it appropriately between jurisdictions'.3 The global formulary apportionment methodology is derived from the unitary entity theory. The unitary theory considers a TNC as a single business which, for convenience, is divided into 'purely formal, separately-incorporated subsidiaries'.4 Under the unitary theory the global income of TNCs needs to be computed, then such income is apportioned between the various component parts of the enterprise by way of a formula which reflects the economic contribution of each part to the derivation of profits. The question that arises is whether the world of international taxation is ready for such a paradigm shift. It is arguable that this shift has already occurred albeit cautiously and in very subtle ways. Thus, the latest of the OECD Guidelines on the transfer pricing question provides that 'MNE [Multinational Enterprise] groups retain the freedom to apply methods not described in this Report to establish prices provided those prices satisfy the arm's length principle in accordance with these Guidelines.'5 Arguably, the globalisation process has created 'the specific situation' allowed for by the OECD. This thesis, therefore, explores the relative obsolescence of the bilateral approach to the taxation of TNCs and then suggests that a multilateral system is better adapted to the emerging globalised economy. The fundamental building blocks of the model proposed in this thesis are the following: * First, the administration and coordination of the proposed system is to be achieved by the creation of a specialised tax organisation, called Intertax, to which member countries would devolve a limited part of their fiscal sovereignty. * Second, in order to enable the centralised calculation of TNC's profits, the proposed system requires the formulation of harmonised methods for the measurement of the global profits of TNCs. Therefore, the efforts of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) to produce international accounting standards and harmonised consolidation rules must be recognised and, if needs be, refined and ultimately implemented. * Third, the major function of Intertax would be to determine the commercial profits of TNCs on a standardised basis and to apportion the latter to relevant countries by way of an appropriate formula/formulas. Once this is achieved, each country would be free, starting from its share of commercial profits, to determine the taxable income in accordance with the particular tax base that it adopts and, ultimately, the tax payable within its jurisdiction. In the proposed system, therefore, a particular country would be able to independently set whatever depreciation schedules or investment tax credits it chooses, and adopt whatever tax accounting rules it deems fit relative to its policy objectives. Moreover, this thesis argues that the global formulary apportionment model it proposes is not dramatically opposed to the arm's length principle. Indeed, it suggests that the constant assumption to the contrary, even with regard to the usual formulary apportionment methodology, is extravagant because both methodologies are based on a common endeavour, that is, to give a substantially correct reflex of a TNC's true profits. It has often been objected that global formulary apportionment is arbitrary and ignores market conditions. This thesis addresses such concerns by rejecting the application of a single all-purpose formula. Rather, it recognises that TNCs operating in different industries require different treatment and, therefore, suggests the adoption of different formulas to satisfy specific industry requirements. For example, the formula applicable to a financial institution would be different to that applicable to the pharmaceutical industry. Each formula needs to be based on the fundamental necessity to capture the functions, taking into consideration assets used, and risks assumed within that industry. In addition, if the need arises, each formula should be able to be fine-tuned to fit specific situations. Moreover, it is also pertinent to note that the OECD already accepts 'the selected application of a formula developed by both tax administrations in cooperation with a specific taxpayer or MNE group...such as it might be used in a mutual agreement procedure, advance transfer pricing agreement, or other bilateral or multilateral determination.'6 The system proposed in this thesis can thus be easily reconciled with the separate accounting/arm's length which the OECD so vehemently advocates. Both models have the same preoccupations so that what is herein proposed may simply be characterised as an institutionalised version of the system advocated by the OECD. Multilateral formulary apportionment addresses both the double taxation and the allocation problems in international taxation. It resolves the apportionment question 'without depending on an extraordinary degree of goodwill or compliance from taxpayers.'7 It is therefore submitted that, if applied on a multilateral basis with a minimum of central coordination, it also seriously addresses the double taxation problem. Indeed, it is a flexible method given that different formulas may be devised to suit the needs of TNCs operating in different sectors. Consequently, formulary apportionment understood in this sense, is a realistic alternative to the limitations of the present system.

O presente estudo tem por objetivo avaliar o regime brasileiro de controle dos preços de transferência sob o enfoque das diferentes visões que o tema pode apresentar. Inicialmente são relatadas suas principais características como a questão do arms length principle, seu histórico e aplicação, para em seguida falar-se acerca da disciplina no âmbito da OCDE e no direito comparado. Na sequência é abordada a legislação brasileira sobre o tema, a posição da jurisprudência, seu confronto com a valoração aduaneira, bem como sua relação com os acordos para se evitar a dupla tributação. Após configurado este cenário de introdução do estudo e seus principais contornos, são efetivamente analisadas as diferentes visões que o tema pode apresentar, notadamente em relação à recepção do arms length, a adoção de margens fixas e a questão da superioridade hierarquica dos tratados para se evitar a dupla tributação e a lei interna, no caso a lei dos preços de transferência / This study examines the Brazilian Transfer Pricing Regime from the standpoint of the different views that the issue may have. Initially the main characteristics are reported, for example, the arm\'s length principle, its history and application, thereafter it advocates the discipline within the OECD and comparative law. Following is addressed the Brazilian Transfer Pricing legislation, the position of jurisprudence facing with the customs valuation, and their relation with the double tax treaty. Once set up this introduction study scenario and its main outlines, are effectively analyzed the different views that the subject may have, especially with respect to the receipt of the arm\'s length principle, the adoption of fixed margins and the issue of hierarchical superiority of double tax treaties and domestic law, in case, transfer pricings law.

Transfer pricing compliance related issues continue to pose challenges to leaders of multinational entities (MNEs) and tax regulators. MNE leaders strive to mitigate the risks of non-compliance violations and double taxation, while tax regulators seek to minimize profit shifting and revenue losses. This multiple case study explored strategies for managing transfer pricing risks against the backdrop of various risks MNE leaders face for non-compliance violations. The cost contribution agreement theory served as the conceptual framework for this study. Data were collected from organizational documents and semistructured interviews conducted with 6 finance executives representing 2 multinational entities in the midwest and southwest regions of the United States who have implemented successful strategies to manage transfer pricing risks. Data were analyzed using Yin's multiple-step thematic analysis process. Following the thematic data analysis 5 themes emerged, including commitment to tax compliance, tax minimization, advance pricing agreement (APA), comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP), and cost plus method (CPM). MNE leaders favor commitment to tax compliance as an effective strategy as penalties for non-compliance increases risks to business functionality. The findings of this study may help business leaders to follow compliance procedures and adopt risk mitigation strategies, while also informing regulators to update tax regulations to reflect current economic realities. The findings of this study could result in positive social change through an enhanced governmental revenue that stimulates economic growth, improves productivity, and promotes technological innovations.

Les prix de transfert sont les prix auxquels les services, les biens corporels et les biens incorporels sont échangés entre parties ayant un lien de dépendance dans le cadre d'opérations transfrontalières. Les prix de transfert des transactions avec les droits de la propriété incorporelle adoptés par un groupe de parties ayant un lien de dépendance ont une incidence directe sur les bénéfices déclarés par chacune de ces parties dans leur pays respectif. Les dispositions législatives françaises et brésiliennes incorporent le principe de pleine concurrence, néanmoins de façon implicite. La question de savoir si un contribuable a respecté le principe de pleine concurrence est une question de fait devant être examinée dans chaque cas. / Transfer pricing are the prices to which services, the tangible property and intangibles are exchanged between parties with a link dependency in cross-border operations. The transfer pricing of the transactions with the intangible property rights adopted by a group of parties having a bond of dependence have a direct incidence on the benefit declared by each one as of these parts in their respective country. The French and Brazilian legislative measures incorporate the principle Řarms, however implicitly. The question of whether a taxpayer has respected the principle Řarms, however implicitly is a matter of fact to be examined in each case.