Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-05, Section: A, page: 1811. Adviser: Alexander L. Mayer. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 304-329) Available on microfilm from Pro Quest Information and Learning.

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The goal of this thesis is to influence a re-evaluation of self conceptions in America in order to influence an alternative relational understanding of one’s self and others. This thesis begins based on the premise that individualism is a prominent aspect of American societies meaning its member’s understandings of their selves are self-centered, often non-empathetic, and in general more concerned with their own lives than that of others. The first half of this thesis is dedicated analyzing the American situation through an analysis of the sources of individualism and proving that individualism is actually an illusion that individuals falsely believe in. American Pragmatists John Dewey and George Herbert Mead are primarily discussed to offer a more socially oriented understanding of the self that begins the process of this thesis in defending a relational model of selfhood. The second half of this thesis introduces Ancient Chinese philosophy where the relationally constituted model of self is thoroughly fleshed out. An analysis of Confucian and Daoist philosophy is given to explain those traditions unique vocabulary and drastic differences from traditional Western theories of morality and self-understanding. The third half of this thesis uses an hybrid self conception derived from a combination of Pragmatist and Chinese thought to argue the Philosophy For Children (P4C) pedagogical model is the medium in which Americans can learn to re-evaluate their selves starting with educating their children. P4C is shown to be itself a model of relationality where children begin from younger ages to be more other-focused, empathetic, and communally involved.

This thesis is an investigation into the phenomenon which Shozo Ohmori (1921-1997) considered “a peculiar manner of awareness”, and to which he attributed the term ‘fancy’. The objective is to achieve an approximate understanding of Ohmori’s theory of ‘fancy’, as it relates to awareness of entities in three-dimensional space, and the extensions mentioned in his only publication in English: “Beyond Hume’s Fancy” (1974). This objective will be realized by asking three questions. The first question is how we are to understand the demarcation of the different phenomena of awareness which Ohmori identifies. The second question that this thesis asks is what applications that the phenomenon ‘fancy’ mentioned in Ohmori’s account have, as Ohmori saw it. Having answered these questions, I will then make an assessment of another salient consideration: how does Ohmori’s employment of the term ‘fancy’ relate to Hume’s employment of the same term (seeing as the name of Ohmori’s article makes such a reference). As we shall see, Ohmori is attempting to identify a more specific phenomenon than the widely discussed issue of thinking about something that is not currently perceivable in our perceptual field. The third and final question that this thesis asks is whether there are any salient issues with Ohmori’s theory of ‘fancy’ and, if so, whether those issues can be resolved. When we are aware of entities in three-dimensional space, we are subject to various mental processes. Our awareness, seemingly, uses different modes of interpretation and orientation. In other words, our ‘point of view’ (which is something that not only pertains to the use of our visual sensory organs) determines both our place and relation towards other entities. One salient issue when considering the notion of awareness is how and by which order awareness emerges. Impressions, as David Hume would call them, seemingly precede our ideas. Sense-data, as Shozo Ohmori phrased it, is unquestionably inseparable from conceptions. Our conceptions, in turn, seem to inform our perceptions with expectations and predictions of how things are. When we perceive an entity, we are ready to make judgements about its being at this moment. When we see the front of a desk, we are ready to claim awareness of said desk-front as part of a desk (which entails the ontology of a desk, namely, being a three-dimensional construction of a particular variety). In everyday situations we simply speak of such an awareness as ‘perception’ when in actuality, all we see (which constitutes the sense-data or content of a perception) is the front of a desk. It seems we cannot regard our awareness of a desk (a three-dimensional entity) as a perception simpliciter. Of course, by having a notion of what a desk is, our awareness is pregnant with a ‘conception’ in the form of an idea that is informing our awareness of said desk. But our conceptual understanding of the notion of something being a desk is not enough to explain what our awareness of a desk-at-this-moment is. At least, that is what Ohmori thought.