第三人效果研究已經過三十餘年的發展，但比較第三人效果認知對於行為層面預測力的研究仍然相當有限。本研究以霧霾調查紀錄片《穹頂之下》為研究主題，從心理學利己、利他動機的視角出發，探討第三人效果認知層面與行為層面間的關係。本研究在上海、深圳兩地進行問卷調查，共訪問926名大學生，研究結果顯示，受訪者會傾向於認為環保資訊對他人產生的影響大於對其自身產生的影響；然而，本研究發現，「對自己影響的認知」比「對他人影響的認知」更能顯著預測受訪者的蒐集資訊與響應性行為。同時，本研究結果顯示，「議題與個人的關聯程度」、「對訊息的涉入程度」均會影響「對自己影響的認知」和「對他人影響的認知」對行為意願的預測力。這些研究發現對於豐富第三人效果的理論框架有一定貢獻，同時亦為環境保護資訊的傳播提供了一定的實踐啟示。 / The third-person effect (TPE) hypothesis has been developed for over 30 years. However, very limit amount of TPE research have focus on comparing the predictive power of "perceived influence on self" and "perceived influence on others". This research fills the research gap by examining the relation between perceptual and behavioral components in the context of a Chinese documentary concerning haze weather, Under the Dome. Using the data from a survey concerning public opinion towards the haze documentary involving a sample of 939 college students in Shanghai and Shenzhen, results indicate that respondents tend to perceive the haze documentary have a larger influence on others than on themselves regardless of their perceived desirability of the documentary, and the perceived influence on self is a better predictor of the behavioral component compared to the perceived influence on self. Furthermore, issue relevance and media message involvement both have an influence on the predictive power of perceived influence on self and perceived influence on others. The research findings can contribute to the theoretical framework of TPE, as well as provide empirical implication for pro-environment communication. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 張晓. / Thesis (M.Phil.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-82). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Zhang Xiao.

Thesis. 1977. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND HUMANITIES. / Vita. / Includes bibliographies. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 246-250). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xiii, 156 p.; also includes graphics. Includes bibliographical references (p. 147-156). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

This dissertation constructively explores the implications for natural theology of (especially) John McDowell’s anti-Cartesian philosophy of mind and perception. Traditionally, an important element within natural theology is the idea that nature testifies to its creator, thereby making knowledge of a creator available to humans. In traditional accounts, the relevant knowledge is usually conceived as inferential. From observations of “the things that have been made” (Rom 1: 20), we may reason our way to the existence of a creator. The dissertation presents an alternative construal of creation’s testimony. It argues that biological nature may have expressive properties of a similar kind as human behaviour and art seem to have. We may be able to perceive nature as creation, i.e., as expressive of the mind of a creator. The knowledge of a creator acquired from nature is, according to this construal, perceptual rather than inferential. The viability of the dissertation’s suggestion depends, however, on the rejection of certain common and fundamental assumptions about the nature of mind and perception – assumptions that may rightly be called “Cartesian.” In chapters 1-3, a radically anti-Cartesian outlook on mind and perception, drawn mainly from McDowell’s work, is presented. The outlook (labelled “open-mindedness”) conceives the mind as a system of essentially world-involving capacities. One such capacity is perception, which is portrayed as (when all goes well) a direct, cognitive openness to the world. Chapter 4 argues that open-mindedness makes an attractive construal of our knowledge of “other minds” available. Human behaviour may, as McDowell suggests, be construed as having expressive properties, i.e., perceivable properties the instantiation of which logically entails the instantiation of certain mental properties. The main problem confronting this idea is the so-called “argument from pretence” – a version of the more general “argument from illusion.” The fact that behaviour that is the result of pretence can be indistinguishable, for an observer, from behaviour that is genuinely expressive of the mental property pain, can seem to entail that it is impossible to perceive that somebody else is in pain. It is argued that accepting the outlook of open-mindedness and the view of perception it includes dissolves this problem and makes it possible to construe (some of) our knowledge of the mental states of other people as perceptual rather than inferential knowledge. Chapter 5 argues that the same philosophical moves that dissolve the “problem of other minds” also can be used to overcome the problems confronting the (from a Christian perspective) attractive idea that nature may be perceptibly expressive of the mind of a creator. It is argued that the idea that other phenomena than human behaviour can be genuinely expressive of mind is not at all counter-intuitive. Artworks have, for instance, (according to a common view) expressive properties that make something of the mental life of the artist available to others. Furthermore, many people seem to have experiences in which natural structures appear to them as intentionally created. Even atheists report that biological organisms strike them as “designed.” Experiences in which natural phenomena appear to the subject as intentionally created or “designed” are candidates for being veridical perceptions of expressive properties in nature. It is argued that the suggested construal of biological nature as expressive of the mind of a creator is completely compatible with the fact that biological species have evolved by natural selection. Chapter 6 briefly reflects on the consequences of the dissertation’s argument for Christian theology.

This dissertation consists in a defence of the claim that belief is a state on which its bearer can reflect only deliberatively. That partial characterization of the concept is intended to throw light on the status of belief as a rational phenomenon. I defend it by appeal to features of our actual and imagined practices of ascribing belief linguistically, both to others and ourselves. Having set out the characterization in the first of four chapters, in the second chapter I survey the ways of learning from words: evidentially, by report, and by belief-expression. I go on to propose that where a person’s words afford belief of his belief, they do so through the belief-expressive character of assertoric speech. In the third chapter, I defend that claim as it applies to the case of ascribing belief to another. I argue that my characterization best explains the fact that we do not ordinarily report our beliefs or invite others to do so. I explain our ordinarily ascribing belief from the expressive character of assertoric speech by appeal to the relation between assertion and belief. In the fourth chapter, I turn to the prospect of ascribing oneself belief based on one’s own words. I argue that self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of words is alone consistent with the self-ascriber’s basic psychological and linguistic integrity. I recommend my characterization of belief for its capacity to explain the disintegrating effects of self-ascribing belief by one’s own report. I again appeal to the relation between assertoric speech and belief to explain the feasibility of self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of one’s words.

This dissertation consists in a defence of the claim that belief is a state on which its bearer can reflect only deliberatively. That partial characterization of the concept is intended to throw light on the status of belief as a rational phenomenon. I defend it by appeal to features of our actual and imagined practices of ascribing belief linguistically, both to others and ourselves. Having set out the characterization in the first of four chapters, in the second chapter I survey the ways of learning from words: evidentially, by report, and by belief-expression. I go on to propose that where a person’s words afford belief of his belief, they do so through the belief-expressive character of assertoric speech. In the third chapter, I defend that claim as it applies to the case of ascribing belief to another. I argue that my characterization best explains the fact that we do not ordinarily report our beliefs or invite others to do so. I explain our ordinarily ascribing belief from the expressive character of assertoric speech by appeal to the relation between assertion and belief. In the fourth chapter, I turn to the prospect of ascribing oneself belief based on one’s own words. I argue that self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of words is alone consistent with the self-ascriber’s basic psychological and linguistic integrity. I recommend my characterization of belief for its capacity to explain the disintegrating effects of self-ascribing belief by one’s own report. I again appeal to the relation between assertoric speech and belief to explain the feasibility of self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of one’s words.

Mémoire (M.E.S.R.)--Université du Québec à Chicoutimi, 1999. / Document électronique également accessible en format PDF. CaQCU

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1) Objetivo El planteamiento de esta tesis tiene como objeto de investigación la representación del “otro” en el retrato fotográfico. El contexto histórico que manejamos incluye dos polaridades: por un lado los retratos documentales elaborados durante la colonia entre el s. XIX y principios del s. XX y por otro, obras de artistas contemporáneos cuyo marco conceptual pone a debate la herencia colonial en la contemporaneidad, mediante retratos de estilo documental. A partir de aquí han surgido cuestiones que vertebran el desarrollo de la investigación. ¿Cuáles son los estereotipos e imaginarios creados a partir del retrato antropológico colonial?, ¿Qué aspectos de estos estereotipos son utilizados por los artistas contemporáneos?, ¿Es la fotografía documental una construcción simbólica?, ¿Qué aporta el género documental en la construcción de imaginarios contemporáneos? 2) Metodología La metodología escogida es el análisis cualitativo de fotografías, con un énfasis en la perspectiva sociológica, que engloba el contexto cultural, social y político en el que se desarrollaron dichas imágenes. 3) Conclusiones La fotografía, tanto documental, como artística, es una construcción simbólica. A través de los artistas contemporáneos que hemos analizado a lo largo de ésta investigación, se demuestra que desde el arte se transgreden los modelos de representación del otro realizados durante la colonia. En los casos de estudio, se definen dos modelos de representación del retrato fotográfico: algunos artistas se apropian de fotografías documentales e históricas de la época colonial, para hacer un uso artístico de ellas y construir su propio proyecto de creación. Mientras que otros artistas generan fotografías nuevas, mimetizando las formas del documental, para aportar a sus proyectos una apariencia de veracidad histórica. La consecuencia final es la creación de un discurso en el que se evidencia la “colonialidad” contemporánea. La representación del “otro”, desde nuestro momento actual, desde la fotografía artística contemporánea, es una constante re-evaluación de paradigmas y de estereotipos, en donde la pluralidad, la multiplicidad y la hibridación son inherentes a la identidad del sujeto contemporáneo. . / 1) Objective The main object of this researching is the representation of the otherness in photo portraits. Our historical context includes two polarities: one is about documental portraits doing during colonial period, between XIXth Century and beginnings XXth century; and by another hand, contemporary art works that discuss the contemporary colonial heritage through documentary-style portraits. During this itinerary of the development of research, we propose four main questions: What are the stereotypes and imaginaries created from colonial anthropological portraits?, What aspects of these stereotypes are used by contemporary artists?, Is documentary photography a symbolic construction?, What brings the documentary genre in contemporary imaginary building?. 2) Metodología The methodology is the qualitative analysis of photographs, with an emphasis on the sociological perspective, into the cultural, social and political context in which these images were developed. 3) Conclusiones The documentary and artistic photography are a symbolic construction. Through contemporary artists projects, the representation of the otherness transgress the prototypes made during the colony. In this researching we define two models of representation of photographic portraiture: some artists appropriate documentary and historical photographs from the colonial period, for making an artistic use and building your own creative projects. While other artists generate new photographs imitate the documentary genre, to bring to their projects a semblance of historical accuracy . The representation of the otherness, in our present time, into the contemporary art photography is a constant reassessment of paradigms and stereotypes, wherein the plurality, multiplicity and hybridization are inherent to the identity of the contemporary subject.