Thesis (M.A.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Philosophy, 1976.

No description available.

陳偉昌. / 論文(哲學碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部, 1996. / 參考文献 : leaf 44. / Chen Weichang. / 論文撮要 --- p.i / 本論文中援引的奧斯丁著作的縮寫 --- p.ii / 導論 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章 --- 從實際的話語開始 --- p.4 / Chapter 第二章 --- 在約定與事實之間 --- p.18 / Chapter 第三章 --- 「意義」的蔓衍 --- p.31 / 本論文所涉及的關鍵術語的英漢對照 --- p.43 / 參考書目 --- p.44

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1983.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 84-85). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Orientador: Kanavillil Rajagopalan / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-13T23:17:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ottoni_Paulo_D.pdf: 3618389 bytes, checksum: 04d9364331ded77135fa1b8ac761e00c (MD5) Previous issue date: 1990 / Resumo: O objetivo principal deste trabalho é discutir as idéias de John Langshaw Austin enfocando o fenômeno da performatividade. Analiso como sua abordagem da linguagem ordinária, associada aos seus procedimentos da filosofia analítica inglesa, produziu importantes reflexões que influenciaram de maneira definitiva a linguística e a filosofia da linguagem¿Observação: O resumo, na íntegra poderá ser visualizado no texto completo da tese digital / Abstract: The basic objective of this thesis is to discuss the ideas of John Langshaw Austin, with special emphasis on the notion of performativity. It seeks to explore how his approach to ordinary language, associated with the methodological procedures of English Analytical Philosophy ...Note: The complete abstract is available with the full electronic digital thesis or dissertations / Doutorado / Doutor em Ciências

The thesis presents a development of J. L. Austin's analysis of truth and its accompanying analysis of sentence structure. This involves a discussion and refinement of Austin's notions of the demonstrative and descriptive conventions of language and of the demonstrative and descriptive devices of sentences. The main point of the thesis is that ordinary language must be treated as an historical phenomenon: one that has evolved its more complex features through a long series of variations upon a small number of rudimentary conventions and locutions. The utility of Austin's analysis is shown to lie in the description that it provides of the functions of these rudimentary conventions and locutions. The analysis is used to illuminate a number of problematic sentences and expressions of ordinary language, including identity sentences, definite descriptions, existential sentences, and conditionals.

This work's main thesis is that a theory of action provides a more appropriate framework than a theory of language for furthering the purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts. The main purpose of that conception was the elucidation of the species of language-use that is exemplified by illocutionary acts and is distinct from those species exemplified by locutionary and perlocutionary acts. Austin's conception of locutionary acts isolates those features of a speech act situation which are amenable to subsumption under a theory of language. This conception is expounded, developed and defended in Chapter One. The orthodox "reject-and-replace" view of the relationship between Austin's performative-constative distinction and his distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts threatens several of Austin's insights concerning the type of theory appropriate for developing his conception of speech acts. In Chapter Two the performative-constative distinction is expounded, the "reject-and-replace" is shown to be false, and an alternative view, which retrieves the threatened insights, is advanced. Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and his parallel distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force, are also established in the course of defending them against objections. The terms in which Austin drew the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - those of a conventional act distinct from its non-conventional outcomes indicate the theoretical framework required for a development of his conception. In Chapter Three this distinction is expounded and a partial analysis is made of the concepts of some outcomes of acts, viz., effects, consequences and results. Illocutionary acts are not constituted in toto by agents' bodily movements - a point captured in Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts. In Chapter Pour the interpretation customarily imposed on that thesis is discussed and shown to be unfaithful. An alternative interpretation is constructed from points in Austin's own lectures. The solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts provided by this interpretation is that such acts are constituted by the conventional procedures as part of which locutionary acts are performed. Some other suggested solutions are canvassed. In Chapter Five an account is given of the conventional procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts. In Chapter Six the claim embodied in the main thesis of this work is defended against the counter-claims implicit in Schiffer's, Strawson's and Searle's work. In the Appendix Austin's performative-constative distinction and his later views on truth are defended. An analytical table of contents is included.

La tesis doctoral consiste en la proposición de un modelo de aproximación1 que permitiría elucidar la dimensión ética de las ‘acciones comunicativas’. Este modelo de aproximación se elabora a partir del análisis y comentario crítico de la estructura de los ‘actos de habla’propuesta por John Searle. Luego de fundamentar y describir el modelo de aproximación propuesto, se aplica a dos ‘acciones comunicativas’ que sirven como ejemplos paradigmáticos. Con tal propósito, esta tesis se desarrolla en cuatro fases. En la primera fase exponemos el marco teórico y conceptual que fundamenta esta investigación. En la segunda fase presentamos las propuestas teóricas de J. L. Austin y de J. R. Searle. Luego, elaboramos un análisis crítico de ciertos elementos de la teoría de los ‘actos de habla’ de Searle. Nos proponemos cuestionar la calidad de constitutivas que Searle atribuye a ciertas condiciones de los ‘actos de habla’; en particular nos referimos a tres conceptos: la intención, la condición de sinceridad y la fuerza ilocucionaria. El estudio de la fuerza ilocucionaria nos lleva necesariamente al análisis de los conceptos de institución y simetría, en el marco de lo que denominaremos las ‘acciones comunicativas’. La tercera fase deviene del análisis crítico realizado en la fase previa. Aquí se introduce el diseño de un modelo de aproximación a las ‘acciones comunicativas’. Tal modelo permitiría elucidar los significados que están en juego en ciertas ‘acciones comunicativas’ en que aparece lo ético. A través de ello se trata de mostrar que lo ético no es un protocolo, en tanto mera aplicación de reglas, sino una dimensión que surge en el encuentro entre las personas, en la interrelación humana. Se trata de una perspectiva de la dimensión ética inspirada en la definición que Hanna Arendt propone para su concepto de política. Nos referimos a su concepto de ‘espacio entre’, aquél que surge cuando las personas se comunican. Postulamos que cuando las personas se comunican -por lo general- se enjuician mutuamente, juzgan, justifican, prometen, mandan, obedecen, se rehúsan, entre tantas otras ‘acciones comunicativas’; es decir, intercambian acciones cuyos significados se ponen en juego en las conversaciones que sostienen. Y esas acciones comunicativas compartidas poseen una dimensión ética. Es de esta forma como lo ético emerge en las acciones comunicativas. La cuarta fase consiste en la aplicación del modelo de aproximación a dos ‘acciones comunicativas’ en las que aparece la dimensión ética. Las acciones seleccionadas son: ‘pedir perdón’ y ‘rehusarse’. En síntesis, tomando como base y referencia la teoría de los ‘actos de habla’ descrita por Searle, elaboramos y aplicamos un modelo de aproximación para mostrar que aquello que denominamos ‘dimensión ética’ está presente en las acciones comunicativas’.

Orientador: Kanavillil Rajagopalan / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-21T02:52:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Santos_KarlaCristinados_D.pdf: 926752 bytes, checksum: a71d12758b5675d00b8f1fd019a6c1fc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: Quando se trata de combater as ações preconceituosas ou discriminatórias realizadas por meio da linguagem, a lei brasileira estabelece dois tipos de condutas que são consideradas crimes: a injúria qualificada e o crime de preconceito ou discriminação. A injúria qualificada, segundo a definição do Código Penal Brasileiro, é um tipo de insulto que utiliza elementos referentes à raça, cor, etnia, religião, origem ou à condição da pessoa idosa ou portadora de deficiência. Já o crime de preconceito ou discriminação consiste em praticar, induzir ou incitar a discriminação ou o preconceito com base em raça, cor, etnia, religião ou procedência nacional. Nesse caso, "praticar" inclui não apenas atos físicos ou materiais (como negar um emprego, por exemplo), mas também significa qualquer conduta capaz de expressar preconceito ou discriminação, incluindo manifestações simbólicas, como gestos, sinais, além da linguagem falada e escrita. Embora os dois crimes possam ser realizados por meios linguísticos, o sistema judicial estabelece uma diferença fundamental entre eles: o crime de preconceito ou discriminação é uma ofensa direcionada a um grupo racial, étnico, religioso (ofensa coletiva), enquanto a injúria qualificada é um a ofensa direcionada a uma pessoa específica (ofensa individual). No entanto, essa distinção é bastante controversa. Nesta tese, comparo as formas como o sistema judicial brasileiro e os movimentos sociais interpretam a relação entre insultar e discriminar, que está na base dessa distinção entre injúria e crime de preconceito ou discriminação. Essa comparação é baseada num levantamento de dados sobre casos de injúria qualificada no Brasil e em duas entrevistas com militantes de movimentos negros brasileiros. A partir da abordagem dos atos de fala proposta por J. L. Austin, reflito sobre duas tensões básicas do conceito de performativo, a relação entre dizer e fazer e o conflito entre convenções e atos individuais, ou seja, entre o ato de insultar alguém individualmente e a história de discriminação que certos insultos podem invocar, estendendo os efeitos ofensivos para além do indivíduo. Em geral, os militantes entrevistados defendem que qualquer injúria relacionada à raça, cor, etnia etc. deve ser considerada crime de discriminação. No entanto, as decisões judiciais raramente acatam esse argumento, porque entendem que a injúria, mesmo quando faz referência à raça, por exemplo, é um dizer direcionado a uma pessoa em particular e não à raça como um todo. Analisando alguns dos critérios linguísticos usados pelo sistema judicial, tais como a referência do enunciado, a situação e o efeito pretendido pelo falante, demonstro que esses critérios possibilitam uma interpretação final (um veredito), mas não resolvem todos os conflitos de interpretação relativos às decisões sobre linguagem injuriosa e discriminatória. Alguns desses conflitos são relacionados ao problema dos limites do ato de fala (onde ele começa e onde ele termina) / Abstract: When it comes to combat biased or discriminatory language, Brazilian law establishes two types of behaviors that are considered crimes: the aggravated verbal injury and the crime of prejudice or discrimination. The aggravated verbal injury is a type of insult that makes use of words or phrases pertaining to race, color, ethnicity, religion, origin or to the condition of the elderly or disabled person. The crime of prejudice or discrimination consists in practicing, inducing or inciting discrimination or prejudice based on race, color, ethnicity, religion or national origin. In this case, "practicing" includes not only physical or material acts (such as denying a job, for example), but also means any conduct capable of expressing prejudice or discrimination, including, for example, gestures, signs, expressions, and spoken and written words. Although the two crimes may be performed by linguistic means they have a very different legal definition within Brazilian law: the crime of prejudice or discrimination is an offense directed against a racial, ethnic or religious group (collective), and the aggravated verbal injury is an offense aimed at a particular person (individual). Yet this difference is very controversial. In this thesis, I compare how the Brazilian judicial system and social movements interpret the relationship between insulting and discriminating, which underlines the distinction between the aggravated verbal injury and the crime of prejudice or discrimination. This comparison is based on a survey of data on legal cases of aggravated verbal injury and on interviews with two Brazilian black movements' activists. Following the Austinian approach to speech acts, I reflect on two basic problems of the performative. The first is the intricate relationship between saying and doing and the second is the conflict between conventions and individual acts, viz., between the act of insulting someone individually and the history of discrimination and prejudice that some insults can invoke, spreading the offensive effects beyond the individual. In general, the activists interviewed support that all verbal injury related to race, color, religion, etc. must be considered crimes of discrimination. However, the judicial decisions seldom accept this argument, because they understand that verbal injury, even when related to race, for example, is a saying addressed to a singular person and not to the race as a whole. Analyzing some of the linguistic criteria used by the judicial system, such as the reference of the utterance, the situation and the effect intended by the speaker, I demonstrate that these criteria allow for a final interpretation (a verdict), but do not resolve all the conflicts of interpretation concerning the decisions about offensive and discriminatory language. Some of these conflicts are related to the problem of the limits of the speech act (where it begins and where it ends) / Doutorado / Linguistica / Doutora em Linguística