The theme of this thesis is the financial sector regulators' response to the recent financial crisis. The aim of the thesis is to evaluate new approaches to financial sector regulation and to answer the question whether financial regulators could learn from their past experience. The introductory section is devoted to a brief study of the reasons for the crisis and mistakes on the part of regulation and supervision. The analytical part deals with the analysis of the most significant changes in the regulation of the financial sector, which were a reaction to the financial crisis: the reform of supervision in the European Union, especially the new architecture of the supervisory and management approaches used for banks in crisis, changes of CRD and the taxation of financial institutions.

The thesis brings self-contained review of the bank regulation and control. The first part deals with the theory of the bank regulation and control and then the regulation and control of the bank sector in the Czech Republic is introduced. Next part deals with the brief analysis of the formation and development of the global financial crisis in the USA and chosen European countries. The last part introduces the changes in the field of the bank regulation and control that arose after the break out of the finacial crisis in the European Union. The conclusion of the thesis to a certain degree includes the attutide of the Czech Government and the Czech National Bank towards the newly introduced arrangements.

En 1850, la banque Lehman Brothers est créée. Cette institution est considérée comme l’une des banques les plus prestigieuses du secteur bancaire international jusqu’au 15 septembre 2008. De cette faillite, les uns se souviennent d’une comparaison avec le jeudi noir de 1929, les autres analysent les causes d’une défaillance systémique des établissements bancaires. Les crises bancaires sont des phénomènes économiques récurrents. Elles entrainent des vagues de licenciements, la perte d’une épargne, le retrait des investisseurs, le frein du développement des économies nationales.Gérer le risque de défaillance bancaire oblige à connaître les acteurs et le fonctionnement du système bancaire. A travers un prisme volontairement historique, le développement de la norme supervisant ce secteur économique est mis en évidence. Sans solution de prévention contre les faillites, la quête est vaine. Pour ce faire, la puissance publique contraint les établissements bancaires à adapter leurs structures aux opérations spéculatives et à se doter de fonds propres. Parallèlement, des solutions doivent limiter les conflits d’intérêts issus des rémunérations du risque financier et de l’interdépendance des banques et des agences de notation. Sans prévention des risques, un traitement proportionné est la seule solution aux défaillances. Cette finalité laisse supposer l’application d’une norme relevant du droit commun. En effet, une banque en faillite peut être liquidée. Néanmoins, les enjeux financiers et l’internationalisation des relations interbancaires contraignent les Etats à développer un traitement de résolution unique. Dérogeant aux normes de droit commun, le traitement des défaillances résulte de procédures extra-judiciaires spéciales. Elles mettent en place des dispositifs efficaces rétablissant la viabilité de l’entité économique, conservant la stabilité du système bancaire et garantissant l’épargne des clients. Cette analyse des défaillances bancaires menée par l’auteur vise à considérer un phénomène économique juridiquement encadré par un droit autonome et éviter la survenance du risque de défaut. / In 1850, Lehman Brothers was created. This institution is considered as one of the most prestigious banks of the international banking sector until September 15, 2008. Some people compared this bankruptcy with the Black Thursday of 1929 whereas the others analyse the causes of a bank institutions systemic failure. Bank crisis is a recurrent economic phenomenon. It leads to waves of redundancies, loss of savings, withdrawal of investors, and brake of national economies development.Managing the risk of a bank failure requires the knowledge of the players and the bank system functioning. Through a deliberate historical prism, the development of the standard overseeing this economic sector is highlighted. Without a solution of prevention against bankruptcy, the quest is futile. To do this, the public authorities force banks to adapt their structures to protect themselves from speculative operations and to acquire their own funds. At the same time, some solutions are to take into account to limit conflicts of interest arising from the financial risk remuneration and the interdependence of banks and rating agencies. In the absence of risk prevention, a treatment in proportion is the only solution to failures. This purpose suggests the application of a standard under common law. Indeed, a bankruptcy leads to liquidation. Nevertheless, the financial stakes and the internationalization of the interbank relations force the States to develop a single resolution treatment. In going against the ordinary law rules common law norms, the treatment of the bank failures results from special extra-judicial procedures. These procedures put in place effective mechanisms that restore the viability of the economic entity and contribute to maintain the stability of the bank system and to guarantee the savings of customers. This analysis of bank failures led by the author aims to consider an economic phenomenon legally governed by an autonomous law and to avoid the occurrence of the payment default risk.

Current Legal Issues of Bank Regulation - Resume This thesis paper deals with issues that can be found in relation with bank regulation. At present, globalized world, banks as important financial intermediaries play a major role. Banks are present in our daily lives and whether or not we want to, they facilitate our everyday operations with the money, investment of free monetary resources, and also borrowing of money. We got accustomed to the convenience that the use of various banking services provides. Equally important are the services of banks for businesses enterprises, various investment companies and funds, and also the countries themselves (the governments). Failure of this system, now that so many subjects are dependent on it, could have far-reaching negative consequences. The bank regulation and its instruments serve as a protection against the rise of adverse consequences. With the growing importance of banks in our society, the importance of their regulation grows as well. But even this may not represent perfect protection and bank regulation may conceal other unforeseen problems. This thesis on "Current legal issues of bank regulation" reflects the legal status of May 31 2012 and is trying to highlight the problems that occur in specific instruments of banking regulation. The aim of this work...

Magister Legum - LLM (Public Law and Jurisprudence) / Zimbabwe is a Southern African country which has witnessed frequent bank collapses in the last two decades. This has eroded consumer and business confidence in the banking sector due to the irreparable financial prejudice suffered by most sectoral consumers. The side effect of this lack of trust in the sector has been the hoarding and preference of cash in most, if not all transactions, as opposed to the use of plastic money. Between April 2015 and March 2016, it is estimated that between US$3 billion and US$7.4 billion was circulating outside the banking system in the informal sector thus exposing the depth of mistrust crippling the banking sector. Together with other factors beyond the scope of this study, it is submitted that this lack of trust and confidence in the sector has contributed to the current cash shortage which, according to Latham and Cohen, has left .a black hole in the financial system that's crushing the rest of the economy'.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-13T14:09:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cristiane Maria de Moura de Guedes.pdf: 2405740 bytes, checksum: 360deab68373672bcad752061307a0f5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-30 / This study has as main objective to analyze whether the financial organizations and interacted significantly influenced the regulatory institutions producing changes or adjustments to the conditions of the banking environment due to the sharing of knowledge and information on the regulation and international prudential supervision, the Basel Accord. It is a qualitative research, justified by the complexity of the phenomenon and the multiple aspects involved which would hardly be captured by quantitative approaches. The method used is the only case study with in-depth interviews and content analysis for collection and processing of information. The theoretical lens is the institutional co-evolution, as a theory with dynamic perspective when considering that in the interactive process between organizations, institutions and the environment, the agents adapt to distinct and independent ways forward to new conditions. Changes in regulation may be attached to strategic maneuvers of financial organizations in the search for development of the environment, is innovating instruments and influencing the other participants or articulating cooperation actions. In this regard, we look at how the international regulation influenced local organizations and how these, in the process of interaction with the regulator, eventually influenced changes in the banking environment. It was observed that developments in the regulatory and supervisory spheres (preventive prudential measures) occurred before adverse scenarios of the global economy where organizations anticipated regulatory changes that would allow them leeway and greater conservatism in the face of external crises scenarios. Examples of best management practices, more dynamic governance and pricing instruments coming from the international market led to strategic changes in the organizational field, to adapt the organization to the environmental context and the strategic changes of choices that resulted in strong and influential interaction, individual and deliberate or collective response to threats and opportunities perceived, with other market organizations and the regulator through technical cooperation and exchange of knowledge, influencing strategic practices of interest to leading organizations and their stakeholders. / Este estudo tem como objetivo geral analisar se as organizações financeiras interagiram e influenciaram significativamente as instituições regulatórias produzindo mudanças ou ajustes nas condições do ambiente bancário razão do compartilhamento de conhecimento e informações sobre a regulação e supervisão prudencial internacional, o Acordo de Basiléia. Trata-se de uma pesquisa qualitativa, justificada pela complexidade do fenômeno e os múltiplos aspectos envolvidos os quais dificilmente seriam capturados por abordagens quantitativas. O método utilizado é o estudo de caso único, com entrevistas em profundidade e análise de conteúdo para coleta e tratamento das informações. A lente teórica é a co-evolução institucional, por ser uma teoria com perspectiva dinâmica ao considerar que no processo interativo entre organizações, instituições e o ambiente, os agentes se adaptam de maneiras distintas e independentes frente às novas condições. Mudanças na regulação podem ser associadas às manobras estratégicas das organizações financeiras na busca por evolução do ambiente, seja inovando instrumentos e influenciando os demais participantes ou articulando ações de cooperação. Neste sentido, analisa-se como a regulação internacional influenciou as organizações locais e como estas, no processo de interação com o regulador, acabaram por influenciar mudanças no ambiente bancário. Observou-se que a evolução nas esferas de regulação e supervisão (medidas prudenciais preventivas) ocorreu diante de cenários adversos da economia global, onde organizações anteciparam mudanças regulatórias que lhes permitissem margem de manobra e maior conservadorismo diante de cenários de crises externa. Os exemplos de melhores práticas de gestão, governança e de instrumentos de precificação mais dinâmicos vindos do mercado internacional geraram mudanças estratégicas no campo organizacional, de adaptação das organizações ao contexto do ambiente e das escolhas de mudanças estratégicas que resultaram em forte e influente interação, individual e deliberada ou resposta coletiva às ameaças e oportunidades percebidas, com outras organizações do mercado e com o regulador através de cooperação técnica e troca de conhecimento, influenciando práticas estratégicas de interesse de organizações líderes e seus stakeholders.

Les autorités régulatrices ont décidé l’instauration de Bâle III car les procédures internesde gestion des risques bancaires et la discipline de marché n’ont pas suffi à éviter l’une despires crises de l’histoire de la finance internationale. L’Accord doit rendre les systèmes bancaires etfinanciers internationaux plus sûrs en s’assurant que les banques traversent les périodes de crise parleurs propres moyens, sans faire appel aux contribuables. Néanmoins, les effets de ces normes sontincertains : la réglementation prudentielle bancaire semble résulter d’un arbitrage entre ses effets positifsqui stabilisent l’économie en réduisant la fréquence et l’ampleur des crises et ses effets négatifsqui limitent l’activité bancaire et le financement de l’économie.Nous nous proposons d’évaluer les effets de Bâle III sur le financement bancaire des pays émergentset des petites et moyennes entreprises françaises. Ces emprunteurs risqués et dépendants des banquessont les plus consommateurs en fonds propres et en actifs liquides. Ils sont donc susceptibles d’être lesplus fortement affectés par Bâle III. Nous présentons les nouveaux standards ainsi que la manière dontla littérature en analyse les effets. Ensuite, nous proposons une évaluation empirique de l’impact del’Accord sur le financement bancaire des pays émergents et des petites et moyennes entreprises françaises.La croissance des créances bancaires transfrontières à destination des pays émergents pourraitêtre réduite de 20%. Les PME devraient subir un effet en forme de M avec un report des banques versles expositions offrant les meilleurs couples rendements/risques ajustés des exigences réglementaires. / Regulatory authorities of BCBS member countries decided to enforce Basel III as bankinternal risk management and market discipline have failed to avoid one of the worst crises in the historyof international finance. This Accord promotes a more resilient banking sector fostered by banks’increased ability to absorb shocks without relying on taxpayers. However, the overall effect remainsambiguous and seems to result from a bargaining between its positive and negative impacts : on theone hand, borrowers could benefit from a more stable banking system that reduces crises’ frequencyand magnitude. On the other hand, more stringent requirements could slow down banking activityand projects’ funding.We aim at evaluating Basel III effects on emerging market economies and French small and mediumsizedenterprises’ bank funding. Such bank-dependant risky borrowers are more prone to shoulder theimpact of the new regulatory requirements as they are the largest consumers of equity and liquidassets. Eventually, a more binding regulatory environment could reduce world growth. Therefore, weintroduce all the new adequacy standards and how the literature analyses them. Afterwards, we offeran empirical assessment of Basel III likely impact on emerging countries and French SMEs. We provideevidence that the new regulation could result in an overall decrease of 20% in the inflow of cross-borderbanking claims held on emerging countries. Regarding SMEs, Basel III effects could produce an Mshapedimpact pushing banks towards positions offering the best regulatory adjusted risks/returns.

<p>Syftet är att evaluera Baselramverkets riskreglering i en konjunkturcykel med hänsyn till Östersjöregionens storbankers systemviktiga funktion.</p><p>Studien antar främst en kvantitativ ansats i de två första delarna, nyckeltalsanalysen och buffertsimuleringen men även en kvalitativ ansats antas i den tredje delen, intervjuer.<strong> </strong></p><p>Studien utgår från teorierna om Basel I och Basel II, nyckeltalsteori samt från tidigare forskning.</p><p>Resultatet i studien består av nyckeltalanalys och simulering av åtta, i Östersjöregionen verksamma, bankers nyckeltal och buffert under 21 år samt sex djupintervjuer med representanter för såväl banker som regulatorer.</p><p><strong> </strong><strong>Slutsatser</strong></p><p>Att det inte finns något samband mellan Baselregleringens kapitaltäckning och bankernas risk eller konjunktur, att riskvägningen tenderar till att vara godtycklig och har större påverkan på buffert än Baselregleringens kapitaltäckning samt att mer transparens behövs i bankerna tyder på att Baselregleringens kapitaltäckningskrav i mycket liten utsträckning visar Östersjöregionens storbankers faktiska risk.</p> / <p>The purpose is to evaluate the Basel framework risk regulation in an economic cycle, in account to the systemic function of the large banks in the Baltic Sea region.</p><p>The study mainly adopts a quantitative approach in the two first parts, the key ratio analysis and the buffer simulation. A qualitative element is also implemented in the third part, interviews.</p><p>In a theoretical perspective the study is based on the Basel I and Basel II framework, key ratio theories and previously conducted research. </p><p>The result<strong> </strong>consists of key ratios analysis and buffer simulation for eight banks in the Baltic Sea region for a period of 21 years and interviews with six representatives of banks and regulatory institutions.</p><p> <strong>Conclusion                                   </strong></p><p>The absence of correlation between the Basel regulation capital adequacy and the bank risk nor economic cycle, that risk weighting tends to be arbitrary and have greater impact on bank buffer than capital adequacy regulation has, and that more transparency is needed in banking; suggests that the Basel capital adequacy to a small extent reflect actual risk.</p>

Syftet är att evaluera Baselramverkets riskreglering i en konjunkturcykel med hänsyn till Östersjöregionens storbankers systemviktiga funktion. Studien antar främst en kvantitativ ansats i de två första delarna, nyckeltalsanalysen och buffertsimuleringen men även en kvalitativ ansats antas i den tredje delen, intervjuer.  Studien utgår från teorierna om Basel I och Basel II, nyckeltalsteori samt från tidigare forskning. Resultatet i studien består av nyckeltalanalys och simulering av åtta, i Östersjöregionen verksamma, bankers nyckeltal och buffert under 21 år samt sex djupintervjuer med representanter för såväl banker som regulatorer.  Slutsatser Att det inte finns något samband mellan Baselregleringens kapitaltäckning och bankernas risk eller konjunktur, att riskvägningen tenderar till att vara godtycklig och har större påverkan på buffert än Baselregleringens kapitaltäckning samt att mer transparens behövs i bankerna tyder på att Baselregleringens kapitaltäckningskrav i mycket liten utsträckning visar Östersjöregionens storbankers faktiska risk. / The purpose is to evaluate the Basel framework risk regulation in an economic cycle, in account to the systemic function of the large banks in the Baltic Sea region. The study mainly adopts a quantitative approach in the two first parts, the key ratio analysis and the buffer simulation. A qualitative element is also implemented in the third part, interviews. In a theoretical perspective the study is based on the Basel I and Basel II framework, key ratio theories and previously conducted research.  The result consists of key ratios analysis and buffer simulation for eight banks in the Baltic Sea region for a period of 21 years and interviews with six representatives of banks and regulatory institutions.  Conclusion                                   The absence of correlation between the Basel regulation capital adequacy and the bank risk nor economic cycle, that risk weighting tends to be arbitrary and have greater impact on bank buffer than capital adequacy regulation has, and that more transparency is needed in banking; suggests that the Basel capital adequacy to a small extent reflect actual risk.

This thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, titled "Aggregate Risk and Bank Risk-Taking", I propose a general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and a drop in investment and output. With some opacity in bank balance sheets, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on bank deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, bank lending is crowded out by risky asset purchases and weak economic fundamentals lead to a banking crisis. Policy interventions face a trade-o¤ between alleviating banks' funding conditions and strengthening their risk-taking incentives. Due to this trade-off, liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when it is not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate the bad equilibrium. The second chapter, titled "Gambling Traps", analyzes macroeconomic dynamics under this framework in a dynamic general equilibrium model. I show that self-fulfilling expectations about high bank risk-taking may lead to 'gambling traps' associated with slow recovery from crises. In a gambling trap, high bank funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank net worth, leading to a prolonged period of financial fragility and a persistent decline in economic activity. I bring this model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-capitalized banks in default-risky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantified using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010-2016. Finally, I show that subsidized loans to banks, similar to the European Central Bank's longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) may perpetuate gambling traps. The third chapter, titled ''Shadow Banking and Market Discipline on Traditional Banks'', is joint work with Matthieu Darracq-Paries, Christo¤er Kok, and Dawid · Zochowski. In this chapter, we present a general equilibrium banking model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines market discipline on traditional banks. We show that depositors' ability to re-optimize in response to crises imposes market discipline on traditional banks: these banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early withdrawals. With costly commitment, shadow banking emerges as an alternative banking strategy that combines high risk-taking with early liquidation in times of crisis. We bring the model to bear on the 2007-09 financial crisis in the United States, during which shadow banks experienced a sudden dry-up of funding and liquidated their assets. We derive an equilibrium in which the shadow banking sector expands to a size where its liquidation causes a fire-sale and exposes traditional banks to liquidity risk. Higher deposit rates in compensation for liquidity risk also weaken threats of early withdrawal and traditional banks pursue risky portfolios that may leave them in default. Financial stability is achieved with a tax on shadow bank profits or collateralized liquidity support to traditional banks.