While popular management literature discusses ‘exit’ as a successful outcome of entrepreneurship, empirical research have frequently considered exit as a negative outcome. This dissertation suggests that exit may be the outcome of both failing and successful venturing. Using advanced research designs and high-quality data that follow over 7,000 individual entrepreneurs and the evolution of their firms for 14 years, I show that while the resources and skills of entrepreneurs affect their possibilities to stay in business, exit is to a considerable extent a voluntary decision that entrepreneurs take if the performance of their venture is less than what they aspired to. The empirical evidence presented in the dissertation indicates that the high failure rates among new firms reported in both the academic and popular press may be, at least partially, misinterpreted positive exit decisions rather than failures. The dissertation contains five empirical studies that provide theoretical and empirical contributions to the research fields of entrepreneurship and organization studies. Taken together, the dissertation represents a comprehensive picture of entrepreneurial exit that highlights the importance of entrepreneur(s)’ skills and experiences, as well as contextual factors such as industry structure, geography, and social interaction among similar entrepreneurs. / <p>Diss. (sammanfattning) Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2009, Härtill 5 appendix</p>

Cette thèse est organisée en trois chapitres. Chaque article analyse les déviations systématiques des décideurs par rapport aux prédictions économiques classiques dans certaines expériences bien connues. Les agents s’écartent de la voie optimale et explorent ou exploitent de manière excessive dans le problème du bandit manchot, ils exigent des taux d’intérêt bien plus élevés par rapport aux taux du marché financier afin de reporter leurs dépenses lorsqu’ils prennent des décisions de choix intertemporel, et ils ne se contentent pas de recevoir des petites sommes d’argent, même si, objectivement, ils devraient accepter cette offre, dans des expériences de négociation comme le jeu de l’ultimatum. Ces soi-disant «irrégularités» sont documentées dans les trois essais de thèse. Le essaies représentent une première étape afin de formuler des stratégies adaptées au profile psychologique de chaque individu, nécessaires pour surmonter les biais de décision. / This dissertation is organized in three chapters. Each chapter analyzes decision makers’ systematic deviations from economic predictions in well-known experiments. People deviate from the optimal path and excessively explore or exploit in n-armed bandit games, demand interest rates well above financial market averages in order to defer consumption in intertemporal choice settings, and do not settle for receiving small amounts of money, even though they would be better off objectively, in bargaining games such as the ultimatum game. Such “irregularities” are documented in the three dissertation essays. The essays are intended as a first step to formulate individual specific, customized decision aids, useful to overcome such decision biases.

Recent studies find that mutual funds exhibit differential and persistent performance which is frequently attributed to superior managerial decision making. We extend the literature by examining the impact of the fund's management structure on performance outcomes. Specifically, we examine directly whether superior outcomes, in terms of risk-adjusted returns, may be explained by behavioral decision making theory that asserts that teams make better decisions than individuals. Empirical results are consistent with the classical decision making theory and the efficient market hypothesis.

Beeinflussen Emotionen ökonomische Entscheidungen? Können Emotionen einen strategischen Wert in Markteintrittsentscheidungen haben? Die vorliegende Doktorarbeit verfolgt einen interdisziplinären und experimentellen Ansatz um diese Fragen zu adressieren. Relevante Literatur und theoretische Modelle aus den Bereichen der Psychologie, den Neurowissenschaften und der Ökonomie werden dargestellt und diskutiert. Zwei anreizkompatible Experimente mit Unternehmern und Studenten wurden durchgeführt mit dem Ziel zu untersuchen, inwiefern induzierte Freude sowie Angst (i) individuelle Risikopräferenzen und (ii) Markteintrittsentscheidungen beeinflussen. Freude und Angst wurden mit Hilfe von ausführlich validierten Videoclips im Labor induziert. Während kein systematischer Einfluss von induzierten Emotionen auf Risikopräferenzen festgestellt werden kann, wird ein strategischer Wert von Emotionen sichtbar. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass Menschen Informationen über die Emotionen von anderen Personen zur Koordination nutzen. Schließlich werden Implikationen und Limitationen diskutiert. / Do specific emotions influence economic decisions? Can emotions be of strategic value in market entry decisions? This dissertation takes an interdisciplinary and experimentalist’s approach to address these questions. Relevant literature and models from standard psychology, neuroscience, and economics are synthesized and discussed. Two incentive compatible experiments conducted with entrepreneurs and students examine whether induced happiness and fear (i) influence risk taking behavior and (ii) market entry decisions. Happiness and fear are induced with film clips validated in an extensive laboratory test. We can conclude that although risk preferences are not systematically influenced by induced emotions; there is strategic value of emotions. Specifically, the findings indicate that people use the information about others’ emotional states to coordinate. Limitations and implications are discussed.

<p>Facing increasingly sophisticated attacks from external adversaries, interdependent systems owners have to judiciously allocate their (often limited) security budget in order to reduce their cyber risks. However, when modeling human decision-making, behavioral economics has shown that humans consistently deviate from classical models of decision-making. Most notably, prospect theory, for which Kahneman won the 2002 Nobel memorial prize in economics, argues that humans perceive gains, losses and probabilities in a skewed manner. While there is a rich literature on prospect theory in economics and psychology, most of the existing work studying the security of interdependent systems does not take into account the aforementioned biases.</p> <p><br></p> <p>In this thesis, we propose novel mathematical behavioral security game models for the study of human decision-making in interdependent systems modeled by directed attack graphs. We show that behavioral biases lead to suboptimal resource allocation patterns. We also analyze the outcomes of protecting multiple isolated assets with heterogeneous valuations via decision- and game-theoretic frameworks, including simultaneous and sequential games. We show that behavioral defenders over-invest in higher-valued assets compared to rational defenders. We then propose different learning-based techniques and adapt two different tax-based mechanisms for guiding behavioral decision-makers towards optimal security investment decisions. In particular, we show the outcomes of such learning and mechanisms on four realistic interdependent systems. In total, our research establishes rigorous frameworks to analyze the security of both large-scale interdependent systems and heterogeneous isolated assets managed by human decision makers, and provides new and important insights into security vulnerabilities that arise in such settings.  </p>