There is interest in Spinoza in a range of disciplines with a focus on embodiment, agency and affect that has resulted in revisiting Spinoza as an alternative to the transcendence of dominant Cartesian thought. Spinoza offers a different understanding of reason that incorporates embodied experience through his alternative to abstract universals, the common notions. The role of affect and its relation to reason in Spinoza are discussed in relation to Descartes. Jonathan Bennett and Edwin Curley’s views on affect are discussed. It is argued that Deleuze’s discussion of expression in Spinoza is limited by the application of liberal ideas of power to Spinoza. Genevieve Lloyd and Moira Gatens offer a productive application of Spinoza’s thought to contemporary issues through a rethinking of imagination in the light of the focus in cultural studies on ‘imagined communities’. However, the inability of philosophy to distinguish abstract universals from alternatives such as Spinoza’s common notions has limited its ability to embrace embodied experience, which in turn limits the possibilities for applying Spinoza’s insights from within philosophy. The common notions are an alternative to abstract universals, and are able to confront the conflicting meanings and differences within them / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Originally presented as the author's thesis, Columbia University, 1928. / Includes indexes. Bibliography: p. 319-337.

Originally presented as the author's thesis, Columbia University, 1928. / Includes indexes. Bibliography: p. 319-337.

Originally presented as the author's Thesis (doctoral)--Ecole normale supérieure des lettres et sciences humaines de Lyon, (2004?). / Includes bibliographical references and index.

Issued also as thesis, Paris. / Bibliography: p. [269]-277.

Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2006

Issued also as thesis, Paris. / Bibliography: p. [269]-277.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1975. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [125-132]).

[pt] O presente trabalho busca analisar o conceito de multidão e a possibilidade de pensá-la como um sujeito político na pós-modernidade, tendo como referência a concepção espinosana do termo e as interpretações contemporâneas daí decorrentes. O ponto de partida é o pensamento de Antonio Negri, que, ao observar as formas de poder e de organização política após a década de 1990, propõe o conceito de Império para explicar a política na contemporaneidade e o conceito de Multidão como um sujeito político capaz de agir no interior do Império e construir uma democracia em escala global. Em seguida serão analisadas as referências ao termo multidão na obra do próprio Spinoza, dando especial atenção à expressão quae una veluti mente, contida no Tratado Político. A partir desta expressão será apresentada a discussão existente entre pensadores como Alexandre Matheron que a tomam como referência para sustentar que a multidão seria um sujeito natural, possuindo uma existência singular; e pensadores como Lee Rice e Den Uyl que a criticam e apontam que a existência do termo quae na expressão foi utilizada exatamente para diferenciar a multidão de um sujeito natural. Por fim, tomando como referência os escritos de Gilbert Simondon, Etienne Balibar e Paolo Virno, serão articulados os conceitos de multidão, transindividualidade e individuação coletiva para responder criticamente à proposta de Antonio Negri e apontar as dificuldades em considerar a multidão um sujeito político. / [en] The present work intends to analyze the concept of multitude and the possibility of thinking it as a political subject in postmodernity, having as reference Spinoza s conception of the term and the contemporaneous interpretations that follows it. The starting point is Antonio Negri s arguments, who observing the forms of power and political organization after 1990s proposes the concept of Empire to explain the politics in contemporaneity and the concept of Multitude as a political subject capable to act in Empire s interior and to construct a democracy in global scale. Next, will be analyzed the references to the term multitudo in Spinoza s own work, paying special attention to the expression quae una veluti mente, contained in Political Treaty. From this expression will be presented the discussion that exists between thinkers like Alexandre Matheron that takes it as reference to sustain that the multitude would be a natural subject, possessing a singular existence; and thinkers like Lee Rice and Den Uyl that criticizes it and defend that the existence of the term quae in the expression was used exactly to differentiate the multitude of a natural subject. Finally, taking as reference the writings of Gilbert Simondon, Etienne Balibar and Paolo Virno, will be articulated the concepts of multitude, trans-individuality and collective individuation to respond critically Antonio Negri proposal and to point out the difficulties in considering the multitude a policital subject.

Submitted by Sandra Pereira (srpereira@ufrrj.br) on 2017-03-21T16:20:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2016 - Mi?cimo Ribeiro Moreira Junior.pdf: 924413 bytes, checksum: 4ab2cab109dbbf9ad627a9bad4ead296 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-21T16:20:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2016 - Mi?cimo Ribeiro Moreira Junior.pdf: 924413 bytes, checksum: 4ab2cab109dbbf9ad627a9bad4ead296 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-06-27 / Funda??o Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo ? Pesquisa do Estado do RJ - FAPERJ / The purpose of this dissertation is to present some reasoning which support the idea of the existence of two philosophical postures characterized by Spinoza?s Theological-Political Treatise and Spinoza?s Ethics. The posture of the Treatise is a result of a civic effort of secularization pertinent to seventeenth-century. The main purpose is to promote the institutional protection of some liberties, which we identify as a liberal policy. The posture of Ethics is related to an individual effort of rational elevation. It is the result of a reasoaning that sees the desire as the human essence itself, and because of this and other reasons such as the appreciation of the body, the monism, the reflections of values and virtues without make use of transcendences, the work is identified as libertine. The purpose that guides the tree chapters of this dissertation is to show how this two books contribute to a philosophical posture which is not separated in a project of immanent philosophy. The first chapter presents the philosopher and his work in complex historical and political context, showing the fragility and the power of that time. Specially in Holland, the seventeenth-century was a very important time to the construction of the modern political thinking. To understand this, we approached some factors which have influenced the free-thinkers of that time and the tension between them and the religious authorities. The second chapter approaches some concepts and reasonings tha are fundamentally extracted from the firsts books of Ethics. The development of some questions of the third chapter depends on the approach of some subjects with the support of the conceptual web elaborated by the philosopher. The critic about the finalist thinking was the way choosen to lead to the reasonings that will be presented. To understand this critics, we tried to develop the concept of power, which is fundamental to the elaboration of the immanence plan. This issue is quite relevant, because we find in Spinoza the idea that the way the reality is seen and organized interferes in our comprehension power of things, and with it, interferes in the way men proceed. The concept of power goes through discussions about ontology and politics in a very peculiar way on spinozist thought. Having this in mind, we will lead the discussion about the power to modal level issues, in other words, issues about conatus as essence of finite modal (human) and the passion web in wich it is submited. The goal of the 3rd chapter is to present what Spinoza shows his liberal proposal of political conduction. Besides we direct our attention to books IV and V of Ethics. First, we show the possibility of institutional liberty seen by the philosopher and, after this, we explain how the Ethics point to a kind of liberty that can?t be obtained by another way unless by the individual effort of searching knowledge and virtue, which we identify as the libertin ethics / O objetivo dessa disserta??o ? apresentar alguns racioc?nios que apoiem a ideia de que existe, na filosofia de Bento de Espinosa, duas posturas filos?ficas caracterizadas nas obras Tratado Teol?gico-Pol?tico e ?tica. A postura do Tratado ? fruto de um esfor?o c?vico de seculariza??o pr?prio ao s?culo XVII. O principal objetivo da obra ? promover a prote??o institucional de certas liberdades, que identificamos como uma pol?tica liberal. A postura da ?tica ? pr?pria de um esfor?o ?ntimo de eleva??o racional. Isso ? fruto de um pensamento que v? o desejo como a pr?pria ess?ncia humana e, por esses e outros motivos tais como a valoriza??o do corpo, o monismo, a reflex?o de valores e virtudes sem recorrer a transcend?ncias, ? identificado como uma ?tica libertina. O objetivo que orienta os tr?s cap?tulos dessa disserta??o ? mostrar como essas duas obras articulam duas posturas filos?ficas que n?o se separam dentro de um projeto de filosofia imanente. O primeiro cap?tulo situa o fil?sofo e sua obra dentro de um complexo contexto hist?rico e pol?tico, mostrando a situa??o delicada e o poder daquele per?odo. O s?culo XVII, especialmente na Holanda, foi um per?odo de grande import?ncia para a forma??o do pensamento pol?tico moderno. Para compreender essa import?ncia, abordamos alguns fatores que influenciaram os livres-pensadores da ?poca e a tens?o entre eles e as autoridades religiosas. O segundo cap?tulo aborda alguns conceitos e racioc?nios fundamentalmente extra?dos dos primeiros livros da ?tica. O desenvolvimento do terceiro cap?tulo depende da abordagem de alguns temas com o apoio da teia conceitual elaborada pelo fil?sofo. A cr?tica que Espinosa faz ao pensamento finalista foi o caminho escolhido para conduzir os racioc?nios que ser?o apresentados. Para compreender essa cr?tica, desenvolvemos o conceito de pot?ncia, que ? fundamental para a constru??o do pensamento imanente espinosista. Essa quest?o ? muito relevante, pois encontramos em Espinosa a ideia de que a forma como a realidade ? compreendida e organizada interfere na nossa pot?ncia de compreender os modos e, com isso, interfere no modo de proceder dos homens. O conceito de pot?ncia atravessa as discuss?es sobre ontologia e pol?tica de forma muito singular no pensamento espinosista. Tendo isso em vista, conduziremos a discuss?o acerca da pot?ncia para as quest?es do n?vel modal, ou seja, para a quest?o da persevera??o como ess?ncia do modo finito homem e a teia afetiva ? qual ele est? submetido. O objetivo do terceiro cap?tulo ? expor o que Espinosa apresenta ao final do Tratado Teol?gico-Pol?tico, que ? onde ele apresenta de forma mais direta sua liberal proposta de condu??o pol?tica. Al?m disso, tamb?m direcionaremos nossa aten??o aos livros IV e V da ?tica. Primeiro, mostraremos a possibilidade de liberdade institucional enxergada pelo fil?sofo e, depois, mostraremos como a ?tica aponta para um tipo de liberdade que n?o pode ser alcan?ada por outro meio que n?o seja o esfor?o individual de buscar conhecimento e virtude.