本研究從家族治理、機構投資人持股、董事會組成、董事會效能之角度探討公司治理機制對企業績效與董監薪酬之影響。家族治理方面，家族持股愈多，企業績效愈好，但家族參與經營程度愈高，企業績效卻愈差；而家族治理下，董監薪酬水準、薪酬績效連結性均較低。機構投資者方面，本國金融機構持股愈高，企業績效愈高。董事會組成方面，董事長兼總經理下，企業績效較差、董監薪酬績效連結性較低，而執行董事、獨立董監席次比例愈高，企業績效、董監薪酬績效連結性均愈高；董事長兼總經理下及執行董事席次比例愈高時，董監薪酬水準愈低，而獨立董監席次比例愈高，董監薪酬水準愈高。董事會效能方面，正常營運下之企業，董事會開會次數愈多、出席率愈高，企業績效均提升；董事會出席率愈高，董監薪酬水準、薪酬績效連結性均愈高。 / The study uses family governance, institutional ownership, board structure, and board activities to empirically investigate the influence of corporate governance on firm performance and board compensation. Empirical result shows that the firm performance is higher when family ownership, institutional ownership, executive directors, independent board members, and board activities increase, and that the firm performance is lower when family involvement increase and when chairman and CEO is the same person. In addition, the board compensation is higher when independent board members and board activities increase, and the board compensation are lower when family governance, institutional ownership, executive directors increase and when chairman and CEO is the same person. Moreover, the pay-performance sensitivity is higher when institutional ownership, executive directors, independent board members, and board activities increase, and the pay-performance sensitivity is lower when family governance increase and when chairman and CEO is the same person.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-11-12T15:20:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Jane Marusa Nunes Luiz_.pdf: 565579 bytes, checksum: 13fdbf6433de47f1951a5c703acbbd78 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-12T15:20:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jane Marusa Nunes Luiz_.pdf: 565579 bytes, checksum: 13fdbf6433de47f1951a5c703acbbd78 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-07-05 / Nenhuma / O objetivo deste estudo é investigar empiricamente o comparecimento dos membros do conselho às reuniões e seus efeitos na remuneração do conselho de administração das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto listadas na BM&FBOVESPA, no período de 2015 a 2016. Para a consecução desta pesquisa, testou-se um grupo abrangente de variáveis considerando os argumentos da teoria de agência e a literatura anterior, mediante a utilização de regressão linear múltipla. Os resultados indicam que o tamanho do conselho e o número de conselheiros ocupados afetam negativamente a remuneração, enquanto que a independência do conselho, a participação em comitês, a idade e a área de formação são positivamente associadas com a remuneração do conselho de administração. Também se verificou que há relação entre o tamanho, a rentabilidade e o controle acionário da empresa com a remuneração do conselho. Identificou-se ainda que o percentual de frequência dos membros do conselho é de aproximadamente 93%, e que são realizadas em torno de 12 reuniões anuais, todavia o esforço do conselho de administração, medido pela frequência e o número de reuniões, não demonstrou significância estatística para explicar a remuneração. Essas descobertas fornecem implicações para futuras pesquisas a respeito do desempenho dos conselheiros no monitoramento da gestão e a remuneração do conselho de administração e dos executivos. / The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the attendance of direcors at meetings and their effects on board compensation of Brazilian companies listed on BM&FBOVESPA, from 2015 to 2016. To achieve this research, a comprehensive set of variables was tested considering the arguments of agency theory and previous literature, using multiple linear regression. The results indicate that the size of the board and the number of busy direct affect negatively the compensation, while board independence, participation in committees, age and graduation are positively associated with compensation of the board of directors. It has also been found that there is a relationship between size, profitability and the shareholding control of the company with the board compensation. It was also identified that the percentage of board members' attendance is approximately 93%, and which are held around 12 annual meetings, however, the effort of the board of directors, as measured by the frequency and number of meetings, showed no significance statistical analysis to explain the compensation. These findings provide implications for future researches into the performance of directors in monitoring the management and compensation of the board of directors and executives.

本研究主要探討我國上市櫃公司的董監薪酬影響因素，採用新制董監薪酬揭露制度，將董監事兼任經理人、兼任員工的薪酬與分紅排除後，以董監薪酬合計和平均董監薪酬作為研究對象。本研究以2005年至2013年所有上市上櫃(含下市下櫃)的公司為研究樣本，並使用普通最小平方法則和固定效果模型進行檢測影響董監薪酬因子。 研究結果發現我國上市櫃公司的董監薪酬確實受到董事會特性、公司特性以及公司經營績效影響。董事會特性中以董事會規模、董監事持股比例和董事兼任經理人比例具有顯著之影響；公司特性以公司規模、負債比例、股價日報酬波動度和投資機會均對董監薪酬具顯著影響；最後，公司經營績效指標中以Tobin's Q、資產報酬率、營業收入淨額與股利殖利率與董監薪酬呈顯著正向影響。這表示我國公司在制定公司董監薪酬時，確實會考量其董事會特性、公司特性以及公司之經營績效。 最後，本研究使用迴歸式的殘差項由大至小組合投資組合以觀察其績效表現，殘差項最大(小)投資組合表示支付過高(低)董監薪酬的公司，研究發現並無法從投資組合的績效表現看出支付過高(低)董監薪酬對公司股價報酬表現之影響，本研究認為這可能是因為支付過高董監薪酬可能同時包含因為該公司的董監事之能力佳而支付較高的薪酬亦可能該公司的董監事僅為坐領高薪的肥貓。 / This study empirically examines variables that influence director compensation of Taiwanese companies. With new disclosure rule for board compensation, we exclude the salaries and bonus of concurrently serving as managers or employees, and divide board compensation as total director compensation and average director compensation. We collect 2005 to 2013 listed companies on Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei Exchange as research samples. In our regression analysis, we distinguish three types of determinants: board characteristics, firm characteristics and corporate performance. Using ordinary least squares estimator method and fixed effect method, our results show that board characteristics, firm characteristics and corporate performance do affect board compensation. We find board size, directors’ equity holding ratio and the ratio of director concurrently serving as manager that significant influence director compensation. From the aspect of firm characteristics, results show that firm size, leverage ratio, daily stock returns volatility and investment opportunity also significant influence director compensation. We also provide evidence that higher Tobin’s Q, ROA, sales and dividend yield, higher director compensation. Finally, we use residuals from the regression to construct portfolios and observe their performance. The portfolio with highest (lowest) residuals considers as companies overpaying (underpaying) their directors. However, from performance of portfolios, we cannot conclude that directors are overpaid or underpaid can reflect companies future performance, since directors are overpaid may because of their extraordinary ability or simply because they are fat cats.