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Orientador: Omar Ribeiro Thomaz / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-17T09:53:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Peres_AndreaCarolinaSchvartz_D.pdf: 10660559 bytes, checksum: 71a38dbde9e434ec7f46703f12dcfb11 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Resumo: A partir de pesquisa de campo em Sarajevo sobre fixers e outros que trabalharam para os jornalistas estrangeiros durante a guerra na Bósnia-Herzegóvina, pretendo pensar o lugar desses sujeitos na constituição de uma fala sobre o conflito. Paralelamente, penso a guerra enquanto um contexto de elaboração de discursos e identidades, que se revelaria de modo especial por meio destes sujeitos que procuro analisar. Os fixers são os intérpretes, os guias que tornaram possível o fazer jornalístico durante a guerra - em um lugar estrangeiro e de língua estrangeira para os grandes veículos internacionais de imprensa, predominantemente norte-americanos e europeus, que realizaram a cobertura do conflito e a transmitiram para todo o globo. Penso os fixers, portanto, como reveladores dos processos elencados acima e, também, como emblemáticos para se pensar o próprio fazer antropológico e o lugar do intermediário, sempre presente no campo, mas, na maioria das vezes, ausente nas etnografias. Esse trabalho é sobre eles, e como contam e entendem a sua história e a construção do estado na Bósnia / Abstract: Considering the field research in Sarajevo about fixers and those people ho worked for foreign journalists during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I analyze their role in the making of the history about the conflict. Besides that, I consider the war as a context of elaboration of discourses and identities that can be noticed through the subjects I analyze. Fixers are the translators, the guides who made the work of journalists during the war possible - in a foreign country, a strange language - for the great Media Corporations, mainly American and European, who covered the conflict and broadcasted it worldwide. I think that the research about fixers shed light on the processes quoted before, and eventually, on the anthropological work itself, concerning the role of the "intermediary", always present on the field, but mostly absent in the ethnographies. Hence, this thesis is about those people and about how they are telling history and thinking the building of the State / Doutorado / Antropologia Social / Doutor em Antropologia Social

The role of the European Union (EU) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was strengthened in 2011, when the mandate of the EU Special Representative was transferred from the High Representative of the International Community, to the Head of the EU Delegation in BiH. The EU thus assumed a leading role within the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a state-builder and as democratiser. The EU’s growing prominence puts on it even more responsibility for the future of democratisation in BiH, but it continues to suffer from inconsistencies between its principles and actions, weak legitimacy, and a lack of credibility. Although I subscribe to Ian Manners’ concept of the EU normative power, I argue that the EU does not act as normative power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This thesis argues that the EU is a normative power in principle, but not in practice, and provides a critique of the EU’s role in promoting and strengthening democracy in BiH. I attribute the exceptionalism of BiH to a restrictive context that is saturated with ethnic nationalism, which permeates all aspects of political life, including constitutional structures, institutions, decision-making, political parties, their policies and rhetoric. I argue that in this post-conflict society in which democracy has not consolidated, the promotion of EU norms is hampered by elite agency, an unfavourable context, and the exiting norms and values that are incompatible with EU norms. Based on my findings about the quality of democracy in BiH, I label it an eclectically unconsolidated democracy, which contains many features of different types of unsuccessful democracies. I argue that the legitimacy, identity, and effectiveness of the EU normative power have been compromised and weakened in the context of an unconsolidated democracy. The case of BiH is exceptional, which the EU fails to recognise, and it falsely applies a ‘cookie-cutter approach’ that treats it as any other aspiring democracy and potential member state. Rather than having a distinct international identity (Manners & Whitman, 1998), the EU suffers from a ‘confused international identity’, which is a consequence of many discrepancies in the way in which various EU actors see their own role in BiH, and how they see the role of the EU. My intention is not to dismiss some aspects of EU normative power, but rather to enrich a debate by providing an alternative perspective. For that purpose, I apply a tailor-made framework of analysis which assesses the level of normative transformation under EU democratisation in the case of two dimensions of democratic quality: equality and trust.

Why and how do societies change institutions governing access to land after experiencing collectivism and conflict, and what form of economic governance emerges as a result? This empirically-focussed thesis examines changes in land governance in two successor states of Yugoslavia transitioning from inter-ethnic war to fragile peace, and from a command- to a more market-driven economy: Bosnia and Kosovo. The subject of analysis is explaining what drives processes of land governance change; how these occur; who engages in them; and the form of economic governance that appears to emerge. The thesis contributes to knowledge on international state-building in contexts where after conflict and collectivism, liberal state-builders are positioned to influence land governance alongside informal networks and domestic governing elites. Using process tracing and extensive field work data from semi-structured elite interviews and primary documentation, it investigates and compares six case studies of institutional change in land registration, use and alienation governance. It applies Ostrom's rational choice institutionalist analytical framework to identify the situational rules that created status quos of unregulated land access and enduring opportunities for rent-seeking in post-conflict Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as commonalities and differences between the cases. The framework suits taking a long-term perspective on change, from the end of conflict to 2015, and helps consider how structural influences, like Yugoslav and post-conflict legacies and liberal state-building agendas, may have (re)shaped enduring problems of unregulated land access. Finally, it permits using three different theories to explain why, how and with what outcome domestic and external actors change such status quos in land governance. All case study findings show that in quadruple transition contexts, land governance change processes emerge when domestic leaders learn and recognize the economic problems of unregulated land access. In particular, the lack of reliable information about land rights was seen to scare (foreign) real estate investors. This recognition was helped along by liberal state-builders that pressured for land governance change in both countries. However, in Bosnia,their pressure was short-term, and persistent only in land registration reform. Institutionalizing this liberalizing reform proved sufficient to attract foreign investors. Yet to access other land rents, like building permits, personal and political connections remained crucial for land investment. Having clearer land records thus appeared to consolidate rather than undermine more impersonal forms of economic governance. By contrast, Kosovo's land registration, use and alienation governance changed in far-reaching ways. Yet institutional changes often failed to resolve uncertainty about land rights. As such situations endured, elites recognized that Kosovo's economic problems grew. This motivated continued external, national and local-level support for land governance change. The concluding analysis gives reason to explain Bosnian land governance change as Limited Access Order Consolidation, while Kosovo's as Problem- Driven Iterative Adaptation. That suggests, on the one hand, that Bosnian and Kosovar elites tend to change situational rules in land governance differently: the former by only aligning them with narrow elite interests to consolidate their control over rent-seeking opportunities; the latter with a more inclusive, trial and error processes that have more fragile, open-ended outcomes. The difference seems to arise from Kosovo's economic predicament in land governance: it more strongly incentivizes local and national-level elites to cooperate and institutionalize changes that makes accessing land rents both easier and more impersonal. Yet on the other hand, the analysis shows commonality. The possibility of increasing land rents more powerfully explains land governance change than the introduction of a new external agenda, best practice or standard (Solution and Leadership Driven Change). I.e. observed over a longer period, it appears that post-conflict societies have strong endogenous reasons to rise above situations of unregulated resource access, and to collaborate and overcome collective action problems. Liberal state builders still have a potential role to play. They may help liberalize land governance to some extent, yet only so long as they commit with long-term support and a readiness to adapt to the interests of local governing elites. The thesis therefore underscores earlier findings that contest that liberal state-building agendas, including European integration, are principal drivers of institutional change in quadruple transition contexts. Simultaneously, it challenges findings that overemphasize the domestic constraints on (externallysupported) attempts at liberalizing economic governance. The thesis thus adds to debates between new institutionalists highlighting domestic 'deep structures' and those stressing external incentives and agency.

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In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a paradigmatic example of a transitional post-conflict society governed by an externally-driven process of neo-liberal state-building, police reforms have played an important role in supporting the transposition of a particular variant of liberal order through security governance at the national and sub-national levels. This order is primarily constructed to reflect the interests of BiH’s supranational architect and benefactor since 2003: the European Union. It is less responsive to the interests or the needs of BiH citizens or constitutionally established governing institutions (Chandler 1999). Historically, prescriptions for police reform in BiH have been defined by various representatives of the international community in BiH rather than domestic policy makers or practitioners. They have also been glocally-responsive in their design. In other words, they have been introduced to generate policy alignment and to support the harmonisation of local policing mentalities and practices with the EU’s security interests in the Western Balkans as well as dominant ‘European’ approaches to controlling crime (Juncos 2011; Ryan 2011). In practice, however, it is evident that the outputs and outcomes generated by police reforms in BiH regularly deviate from their initial design. This is particularly evident in relation to a handful of community policing initiatives introduced in BiH over the past decade (e.g. Deljkic and Lučić‐Ćatić 2011). Using a meso-level analysis of two community-oriented policing projects implemented in 2011, this research draws on the conceptual framework of ‘policy translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2006) to illuminate the agentive capacities of international development workers and local police practitioners and their role in shaping the conceptual and programmatic contours of glocally-responsive policing reforms in BiH. My first case study examines the translational capacity of international development workers at a major multi-lateral international development agency in BiH using an ethnographic account of my three-month placement with the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) ‘Safer Communities’ project in BiH in 2011. My second case study is used to illustrate the translational capacities of police practitioners working to implement an externally-initiated community policing project in Sarajevo Canton. Drawing from these case studies, I determine that the international political economy of global liberal governance and the interests of powerful global actors play only a limited role in affecting outputs and outcomes generated by internationally-driven police reforms. Rather, I argue that the concept of policy translation demonstrates that relatively disempowered actors like international development workers and local police practitioners can draw upon their agency and institutional resources to shape these policy making processes and in doing so, potentially contribute to more democratically responsive policing outputs and structures. My findings further suggest that important opportunities do exist for motivated reformers to foster deliberative forms of security governance in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH and recognising and enhancing these can help to alleviate the potential consequences of introducing contextually or culturally inappropriate Western policing models to these societies. This is significant because it highlights the prospect of addressing the structural inequalities associated with global and transnational policing (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012), police reforms pursued in the context of liberal state-building projects (Ryan 2011) and donor-driven international police development assistance projects (Ellison and Pino 2012).

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The issue with achieving a balance between a stable democratization process and peacebuilding is an ongoing difficulty. Scholars argue that the long-term effects are not properly considered when constructing a peace accord and is affecting the process of nation-rebuilding. The integrationalist and consociationalist perspectives, two major strands within this field, disagree on the point of incorporating ethnicities in the political arena, in which both parties argue that the outcome is negative for a state's developmental process.  An analysis of state reports conducted by the U.S. Department of State and the cases´ peace accords, will be conducted using Freedom Houses indicators for political rights. This is to observe if there is a difference in efficiency between the two perspectives and to what degree it can be mirrored in the level of political rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The Most Similar System Design is used to isolate the similar variables that the two case countries share in order to compare a possible difference in the level of political rights. The results show that there is a difference seen from the start to the end point for both cases, as well as a difference in the level of political rights between the two. This lines up with the findings of present scholars on this topic thus amplifying the need for more research to be conducted.

In the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the critical elements of the ethnic cleansing regimes was rape and impregnation of women. When the international justice system was created to criminally try the perpetrators of the atrocities, including the rape victims was a new development. Looking at the tribunals and court system from a gendered perspective reveals that the efforts to include rape victims have not taken into account their specific needs, stemming from their trauma. A critical look the ICTY and other criminal courts are presented, as well as recommendations for improving inclusivity and reconciliation.

<p>The purpose of this study is to analyze how the parties (USA, Great Britain, UN and the European Union) legitimize their intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina as seen from without the conceptions of sovereignty and intervention. </p><p>USA and the UN have legitimized their intervention on security reasons. The American president, George W. Bush, claimed that democracies never engage in war with each other and that democracies were prosperous just because they were democracies. According to the president, that is why it is important to democratise the whole Balkan region to protect the international community from terrorism which grows in unstable and undemocratic states. UN resolutions claim that the situation in Bosnia is a threat to international peace and security and urged all state members to do everything they can for stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina. </p><p>European Union and Great Britain saw the organized crime that spreads through Balkan as a major threat to Europe. To be able to deal with his problem, EU is asking for more cooperation among the European states. Bosnia is a member of the Council of Europe and is also involved in the Stabilisation and association process for South eastern Europe with the EU. The purpose of these memberships is to foster the political and economic development in Bosnia and lead to full membership in the European Union, but only if Bosnia fulfils all the reforms that EU demands. To get economic aid from the EU, Bosnian leaders are forced to reform and engage in regional cooperation. </p><p>In the long run democratisation is the goal for all the parties, while security is the main issue at short-term. That is why the main concern for USA is for now the war on terrorism and organized crime for the EU. When signing the Dayton peace agreement, Bosnian leaders have agreed upon sharing sovereignty with the international community indefinitely. Dayton agreement calls also on all the parties to help Bosnia develop stable and democratic institutions and help the Bosnian leaders in theirs strive for peace. </p><p>The international community is based on principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. Sovereignty can be defined as the right for autonomy and the right for non-intervention. These principles are not as important today as they were during the Cold War. Globalisation and marginalisation has made it more acceptable to intervene and share sovereignty with other states and ganisations. That means that the traditional view on sovereignty as a mean for maintaining order and view on interventions as a threat to the sovereignty is less significant in modern times. The reason for this is that the definition on sovereignty and intervention changes to able to adjust its self to the political situation in the world. That is, definition on sovereignty and interventionwill differ from time to time.</p>