This study examined Scottish Highlanders who defended the southern border of British territory in the North American theater of the War of the Austrian Succession (1739-1748). A framework was established to show how Highlanders were deployed by the English between 1745 and 1815 as a way of eradicating radical Jacobite elements from the Scottish Highlands and utilizing their supposed natural superiority in combat. The case study of these Highlanders who fought in Georgia and Florida demonstrated that the English were already employing Highlanders in a similar fashion in North America during the 1730s and 1740s. British government sources and correspondence of colonial officials and military officers were used to find the common Highlander's reactions to fighting on this particular frontier of the Empire. It was discovered that by reading against what these officials wrote and said was the voice of the Highlander found, in addition to confirming a period of misrepresentation of Highland manpower in the colony of Georgia during the War of Jenkins' Ear that adhered to the analytical framework established.

From 1689 through 1746 the supporters of the deposed House of Stuart, known as Jacobites and composed largely of Highland Scots, staged periodic rebellions against the new Hanoverian rulers in London. During this period, the Highlanders of Scotland experienced a period of military triumph unlike any other in their history. Through the combination of the ancient tactic of the charge, the use of the broadsword as their primary weapon, and the implementation of the musket, the Highlanders blended the best elements of the ancient and early modern military tactics and technology to develop a unique tactic, the Highland Charge. Essentially, the Highlanders would assemble preferably on high ground, charge down upon their enemy, fire their muskets and throw them to the ground, regroup into wedge shaped formations behind the musket-fire smokescreen, and then charge sword-in-hand into the opposing army's lines. The Highland Charge repeatedly defeated the British forces, which should have been superior in virtually every respect. The British army was an early modern force using the latest tactics and technology. The British forces that fought the Highlanders were a mix of militiamen and seasoned veterans of the continental wars. In essence the military engagements between the Jacobites and British were a contest between an undisciplined archaic force and a disciplined thoroughly modern force. The combination of ancient and early modern elements, the change in formation, and the great success of the Highland Charge generates immense interest in this subject. / Master of Arts

The purpose of this research project is to examine the role of conflict resolution in training programmes for military peacekeepers. It offers a significant contribution to the conflict resolution literature by providing contemporary analysis of where further manifestations exist of the links between military peacekeeping and the academic study of conflict resolution. The thesis firstly provides a thorough analysis of where conflict resolution scholars have sought to critique and influence peacekeeping. This is mirrored by a survey of policy stemming from the United Nations (UN) in the period 1999-2010. The thesis then undertakes a survey of the role of civil-military cooperation: an area where there is obvious crossover between military peacekeeping and conflict resolution terminology. This is achieved firstly through an analysis of practitioner reports and academic research into the subject area, and secondly through a fieldwork analysis of training programmes at the UN Training School Ireland, and Royal Military Training Academy 4 Sandhurst (RMAS). The thesis goes on to provide a comprehensive examination of the role of negotiation for military peacekeepers. This examination incorporates a historical overview of negotiation in the British Army, a sampling of peacekeeping literature, and finally fieldwork observations of negotiation at RMAS. The thesis discusses how this has impacted significantly on conceptions of military peacekeepers from both the military and conflict resolution fields. The thesis adds considerably to contemporary debates over cosmopolitan forms of conflict resolution. Firstly it outlines where cosmopolitan ethics are entering into military training programmes, and how the emergence of institutionalised approaches in the UN to 'human security' and peacebuilding facilitate this. Secondly, the thesis uses Woodhouse and Ramsbotham's framework to link the emergence of cosmopolitan values in training programmes to wider structural changes at a global level.

This thesis examines the influence of the Boer War 1899 – 1902 upon tactics and training in the regular British Army 1902 – 1914. The work argues that several key lessons drawn from South Africa became the tactical cornerstones for infantry, artillery and cavalry throughout the pre-First World War period and shaped the performance of the B.E.F. during the early battles of 1914. The experience of combat against well armed opposition in the Boer War prompted the British Army to develop improved tactics in each of the three major service arms. For example, infantry placed new emphasis on dispersion and marksmanship; cavalry improved their dismounted work and reconnaissance skills; and artillery adopted methods of concealment and strove to improve accuracy and co-ordination. Across the army as a whole, the experience of combat lead to an overall downgrading of the importance of drill and obedience, replacing it instead with tactical skill and individual initiative. In addition, the thesis also examines the impact of the Boer War upon overall British Army doctrine and ethos. The process of reform prior to the First World War was marked by wide ranging debates upon the value of the South African experience, and not all lessons drawn from the conflict endured, with tactical restructuring being further complicated by changes of government and financial restrictions. Nevertheless, key lessons such as dispersion, marksmanship, concealment and firepower were ultimately retained and proved to be of great value during initial clashes against the Germans in 1914. Additionally, the Boer War caused the British to place new emphasis upon overall training of the individual, allowing advanced tactical skills to be inculcated more easily than had been possible in earlier years. However, the short duration of the conventional period of the Boer War meant that there was less opportunity to derive operational lessons for future employment. Furthermore, the colonial policing role of the British Army and the likelihood of small scale deployments meant that developing an operational doctrine was of less immediate value than ensuring flexibility and tactical skill. This meant that the British Army took a somewhat skewed developmental path in the 1902 – 1914. The process of reform ultimately produced a highly adaptable force that was tactically skilled, but which was ill-prepared for the operational complications posed by large scale deployment. While the Boer War was the principal factor in driving reform during the 1902 – 1914 period, there were additional influences at work, including examples from the Russo-Japanese War 1904 – 1905 and various ideas drawn from the armies of the continent. However, this thesis argues that while these outside influences contributed to ongoing debate, they did not offer any particular fresh ideas and were therefore of less importance than the Boer War in shaping British Army development.

(in English): The author's main focus was on development and causes of military art changes which British infantry has undergone, especially in the years 1775 - 1815. In author's work, given the magnitude and the topic specificity, the only focus was primarily on the study of official documents, which were used for British infantry training and to form a tactical doctrine. Work is divided into five chapters, which consist of an introductory part to the topic issue and analyse warfare factors in the 16th and 17th century that survived throughout the 18th and early 19th century. The second chapter was devoted into two main streams, including tactical ways of thinking related to the 18th century, which Great Britain army faced and socialised with. The second part of the chapter deals with causes and ways of how the first infantry introduces its training with a prescription of all-army presence. The third chapter, as the most comprehensive part of my thesis, analyses the main training document that the British infantry used since 1792. This was meant to be a turning point to the introductory of similar legislation in the Great Britain. The fourth chapter deals with firearms, which the British line infantry used to use throughout the periods of process analysis. The last fifth chapter analyses the...

In terms of the British Army in the Great War, the study of whether or how the army learned has become the dominant historiographical theme in the past thirty years. Previous studies have often viewed learning and institutional change through the lens of the 'learning curve', a concept which emphasises that the high command of the British Army learned to win the war through a combination of trial and error in battle planning, and through careful consideration of their collective and individual experiences. This thesis demonstrates that in order to understand the complexities of institutional change in the Great War, we must look beyond ill-defined concepts such as the learning curve and adopt a more rigid framework. This thesis examines institutional change in the British First Army in the 1915 campaign on the western front. It applies concepts more commonly found in business studies, such as organisational culture, knowledge management and organisational memory, to understand how the First Army developed as an institution in 1915. It presents a five-stage model - termed the Organisational Development Model - which demonstrates how the high command of the First Army considered their experiences and changed their operational practices in response. This thesis finds that the 'war managers' decision-making was affected by a number of institutional and personal 'inputs' which shaped their approach to understanding warfare. This thesis examines the manner in which new knowledge was created and collated in the immediate post-battle period, before studying how the war managers considered new information, disseminated it across the force and institutionalised it in the organisation's formal practices, structures and routines. In a broad sense, this thesis does three things. First, by examining how the army learned it moves beyond standard narratives of learning in the British Army in the Great War and highlights the complex interplay between personal and institutional learning processes. Second, by focusing on institutional change in the 1915 campaign, it sheds new light on an understudied yet crucial part of the British war experience. Finally, in creating the Organisational Development Model, it provides a robust platform on which future research can be built.

This dissertation examines the policies pursued by the British Army with respect to Native Americans between 1759 and 1774, when the British Army was in occupation of the colonial American frontier and how and why those policies changed. During this time the army’s policy on Native Americans altered greatly; prior to Pontiac’s War Native American grievances were seen as a low priority by the army, but after that conflict the army started to pay a great deal of attention to Native American concerns. To explain these changes it is necessary to explore the changing conditions on the frontier, the changing relationship between the colonies and Britain, and the differing ideas about Native Americans possessed by General Jeffery Amherst, the commander of the British Army in the colonies at the end of the Seven Years’ War, and his replacement, General Thomas Gage. In particular it is only by examining the very different attitudes towards Native Americans possessed by Amherst and Gage that the changes in British Army policy can be fully explained.

The purpose of this research project is to examine the role of conflict resolution in training programmes for military peacekeepers. It offers a significant contribution to the conflict resolution literature by providing contemporary analysis of where further manifestations exist of the links between military peacekeeping and the academic study of conflict resolution. The thesis firstly provides a thorough analysis of where conflict resolution scholars have sought to critique and influence peacekeeping. This is mirrored by a survey of policy stemming from the United Nations (UN) in the period 1999-2010. The thesis then undertakes a survey of the role of civil-military cooperation: an area where there is obvious crossover between military peacekeeping and conflict resolution terminology. This is achieved firstly through an analysis of practitioner reports and academic research into the subject area, and secondly through a fieldwork analysis of training programmes at the UN Training School Ireland, and Royal Military Training Academy 4 Sandhurst (RMAS). The thesis goes on to provide a comprehensive examination of the role of negotiation for military peacekeepers. This examination incorporates a historical overview of negotiation in the British Army, a sampling of peacekeeping literature, and finally fieldwork observations of negotiation at RMAS. The thesis discusses how this has impacted significantly on conceptions of military peacekeepers from both the military and conflict resolution fields. The thesis adds considerably to contemporary debates over cosmopolitan forms of conflict resolution. Firstly it outlines where cosmopolitan ethics are entering into military training programmes, and how the emergence of institutionalised approaches in the UN to ¿human security¿ and peacebuilding facilitate this. Secondly, the thesis uses Woodhouse and Ramsbotham¿s framework to link the emergence of cosmopolitan values in training programmes to wider structural changes at a global level.

This thesis examines the British army and its legacy of counterinsurgency from the 20th century. It analyses the effects of post-colonial counterinsurgency and the army’s ability to learn from previous counterinsurgency conflicts to create new doctrine from earlier examples that could have had lessons for the UK forces in southern Iraq. Doctrine (both official and unofficial) ranges from endorsed army field manuals to theory written by experts while on defence fellowships. The army’s ability to create new doctrine from previous campaigns lessons and how it is diffused across the armed forces is also assessed. The conflicts used as post-colonial counterinsurgencies scrutinise Oman and Northern Ireland. These two case studies provide mixed lessons, that should advance and expand British counterinsurgency theory and models. The previous historical occurrences of counterinsurgency have created a British approach which has established a four-pillar framework which encompasses minimum force, civil-military co-operation, use of intelligence and tactical flexibility. This approach could identify lessons for a modern British army deployed to Iraq. If lessons and previous outcomes are analysed to create new doctrine, strategy and tactics that encompass the four pillars framework, what went wrong in southern Iraq? Could lessons from earlier campaigns have assisted British efforts?

This research is about innovation. Using the example of the British Army, which underwent great changes during the First World War, I focus on the role of soldiers and civilian in its process of adaptation to the new tools of warfare. Innovation was not a process forced from the top of the Army or produced solely by officers. Change came from a complex interaction between soldiers, army institutions, and civilians at home. Technology was the topic of this interaction: soldiers used technology to lobby for change and improve their effectiveness on the battlefield, civilians used it to help and participate to the war, while institutions transformed their own structures to adapt to the fast-paced changes, providing a common place to absorb and redistribute innovation. I try to break the common narrative that portrays the inventor producing a weapon, a committee of the army adopting it, and the weapon changing warfare. Ideas surfaced from a complex environment that looked for solutions in a constant dialogue between the experience of the battlefield, the personal competencies of soldiers and civilians, and the necessities of the British Army to simplify, streamline, and standardize. / History