This thesis examines the British army and its legacy of counterinsurgency from the 20th century. It analyses the effects of post-colonial counterinsurgency and the army’s ability to learn from previous counterinsurgency conflicts to create new doctrine from earlier examples that could have had lessons for the UK forces in southern Iraq. Doctrine (both official and unofficial) ranges from endorsed army field manuals to theory written by experts while on defence fellowships. The army’s ability to create new doctrine from previous campaigns lessons and how it is diffused across the armed forces is also assessed. The conflicts used as post-colonial counterinsurgencies scrutinise Oman and Northern Ireland. These two case studies provide mixed lessons, that should advance and expand British counterinsurgency theory and models. The previous historical occurrences of counterinsurgency have created a British approach which has established a four-pillar framework which encompasses minimum force, civil-military co-operation, use of intelligence and tactical flexibility. This approach could identify lessons for a modern British army deployed to Iraq. If lessons and previous outcomes are analysed to create new doctrine, strategy and tactics that encompass the four pillars framework, what went wrong in southern Iraq? Could lessons from earlier campaigns have assisted British efforts?

This thesis examines the values and attitudes of the British Army’s officer corps during the period from 1871 to 1901, and how these values were linked to those of the British landed classes. Through studying the memoirs and other writings produced by the officers of this period, this thesis confirms that the link between these two systems was extremely close, and that the landed classes’ ideas of what constituted ‘gentlemanly’ behaviour were vitally important in shaping army officers’ conduct. This thesis argues that the acceptance of these values by the officer corps was not merely a product of their own social origins, but that officers subscribed to these values because they believed them to be particularly appropriate to military service. This attachment to gentlemanly values produced a deeply imbalanced set of competencies in the officer corps’ members, the effects of which remained present in the institutional culture of the army well beyond the end of this period. / Graduate / 2021-08-28

Most people’s perceptions of the Second World War leave little room for static, attritional fighting; instead, free-flowing manoeuvre warfare, such as Blitzkrieg, is seen as the norm. In reality, however, much of the terrain fought over in 1939-45 was unsuitable for such a war and, as a result, bloody attritional battles and trench fighting were common. Thus ordinary infantrymen spent the majority of their time at the front burrowing underground for protection. Although these trenches were never as fixed or elaborate as those on the Western Front a generation earlier, the men who served in Italy, Normandy, Holland and Germany, nonetheless shared an experience remarkably similar to that of their predecessors in Flanders, Picardy, Champagne and Artois. This is an area which has been largely neglected by scholars. While the first war produced a mountain of books on the experience of trench warfare, the same cannot be said of the second war. This thesis will attempt to fill that gap by providing a comprehensive analysis of static warfare in the Second World War from the point of view of British infantry morale. It draws widely on contemporary letters and diaries, psychiatric and medical reports and official documentation – not to mention personal narratives and accounts published after the war – and will attempt to interpret these sources in light of modern research and organise them into a logical framework. Ultimately it is hoped that this will provide fresh insight into a relatively under-researched area of twentieth century history.

The Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-49, was intended to transform the war-torn Third Reich into a peaceable nation through a series of far-reaching political, economic, and social reforms. But amid the growing tensions between East and West these radical plans would be significantly altered, culminating in the formation of two German states in 1949. Historians have tended to view the occupation as a backdrop to the nascent Cold War or a transitional period in the history of modern Germany. Yet this thesis suggests that British participation in the Allied occupation was, in fact, much more than simply an exercise in political pragmatism or a contribution to the rebuilding of war-torn Europe. Rather, this undertaking catalysed Britain's political and public confrontation with Nazism, laying some of the most significant and durable foundations of the postwar Anglo-German relationship. This research utilises contemporary mass media sources and official records to explore British images and perceptions of Germany under occupation, scrutinising the interactions of decision-makers, the media, and the public. It begins with an examination of the pervasive culture war that emerged in wartime Britain over the precise interpretation and resolution of the so-called 'German problem'. The thesis then goes on to consider public portrayals of the occupation vis-à-vis the evolution of official policy, beginning in the summer of 1945 when British policymakers responded to popular demands for a 'hard peace' and approved a rigorous programme of denazification, re-education, and demilitarisation. In the coming years, scandals engulfed the public image of the British occupiers, threatening to undermine Britain's claims on 'winning the peace' and even prompting an official public relations campaign. The mass market press led calls for an abrupt end to the occupation, fearing it was undermining the nation's prestige while failing to adequately address the threat still posed by Germany. At around the same time, Britain's political and military leaders reassessed their position in the face of the Cold War, turning towards the reconstruction and rehabilitation of western Germany. By 1949, a clear dichotomy had emerged, with implications reaching far beyond the immediate postwar period: while anxieties over the 'German problem' remained largely intact amongst substantial sections of the British press and public, with many regarding the occupation as an abject failure, policymakers were firmly set on the path towards Anglo-German reconciliation and alliance.

This is the first monograph to be published on the work of the Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service (QAIMNS) in the Great War. The historiography of British military nursing during this period is scant, and research based monograph are negligible. What exists, does not focus specifically on the work of the Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service, (QAIMNS) the Reserve, (QAIMNSR) or the Territorial Force Nursing Service (TFNS) but tends to concentrate on the work of the volunteer, untrained, Voluntary Aid Detachment (VAD) nurses. Unfortunately, this has resulted in factually inaccurate representations of British WW1 nursing. The mass mobilisation of nurses by professional and voluntary nursing services led to rivalry between the different groups and my research addresses the relationship that develop between the trained and volunteer nurses. Also, my research examines the climatic and environmental conditions that impacted upon the effective delivery of nursing and casualty care and the mismanagement of services and supplies by the War Office and the Army Medical Services. Additionally, the political controversies and scandals over inadequate planning for the care, treatment and transportation of mass casualties is addressed. Furthermore, diseases and traumatic injuries sustained by nurses on active service are examined and, shell-shock, hitherto considered a combatants' condition is cited in relation to mental health issues of nurses on active service. Moreover, my research examines the deaths and disability rates within the ranks of nursing services. My research features individual awards for acts of bravery and mentioned in Dispatches. On the Home Front the politics of nursing are addressed. Nurses campaigned for professional recognition and many were supportive of universal suffrage and they argued for both professional and personal liberation. The struggle for professional recognition led to divisions within the civilian nursing leadership because they failed to arrive at a consensus on the content of the Nurse Registration Bill. Also, the supply of nurses for the war effort was consistently problematic and this led the Government to establish the Supply of Nurses Committee. Before it had its first sitting it had already become contentious and controversial. The issues are discussed. Using extensive primary sources, the monograph moves away from the myths, and uncritical and overly romanticised views of WW1 military nursing. It is hoped that by examining the personal, professional and political issues that impacted upon nurses the monograph will make a significant contribution to the historiography of WW1 military nursing and to the history of the Great War more generally.

Between 1870 and 1901, seventeen officers from the British army were appointed by the governments of the Australian colonies and New Zealand as commanders of their colonial military forces. There has been considerable speculation about the roles of these officers as imperial agents, developing colonial forces as a wartime reserve to imperial forces, but little in depth research. This thesis examines the role of the imperial commandants with an embryonic system of imperial defence and their contribution to the development of the colonial military forces. It is therefore a topic in British imperial history as much as Australian and New Zealand military history. British officers were appointed by colonial governments to overcome a shortfall in professional military expertise but increasingly came to be viewed by successive British administrations as a means of fulfilling an imperial defence agenda. The commandants as ???men-on-the-spot???, however, viewed themselves as independent reformers and got offside with both the imperial and colonial governments. This fact reveals that the commandants occupied a difficult position between the aspirations of London and the reality of the colonies. They certainly brought an imperial perspective to their commands and looked forward to the colonies playing a role on the imperial stage but generally did so in terms of a personal agenda rather than one set by London. This assessment is best demonstrated in the commandants??? independent stance at the outset of the South African War. The practice of appointing British commandants in Australasia was fraught with problems because of an inherent conflict in the goals of the commandants and their colonial governments. It resembles the Canadian experience of the British officers which reveals that the system of imperials military appointments as a whole was flawed. The problem remained that until a sufficient number of colonial officers had the prerequisite professional expertise for high command there was no alternative. The commandants were therefore the beginning rather than the end of a traditional reliance upon British military expertise. The lasting legacy of the commandants for the military forces of Australia and New Zealand was the development of colonial officers, transference of British military traditions, and the encouragement of a colonial military identity premised on the expectation of future participation in defence of the empire. The study provides a major revision to the existing historiography of imperial officers in the colonies, one which concludes that far from being ???imperial agents??? they were largely marching to their own drum.

Between 1870 and 1901, seventeen officers from the British army were appointed by the governments of the Australian colonies and New Zealand as commanders of their colonial military forces. There has been considerable speculation about the roles of these officers as imperial agents, developing colonial forces as a wartime reserve to imperial forces, but little in depth research. This thesis examines the role of the imperial commandants with an embryonic system of imperial defence and their contribution to the development of the colonial military forces. It is therefore a topic in British imperial history as much as Australian and New Zealand military history. British officers were appointed by colonial governments to overcome a shortfall in professional military expertise but increasingly came to be viewed by successive British administrations as a means of fulfilling an imperial defence agenda. The commandants as ???men-on-the-spot???, however, viewed themselves as independent reformers and got offside with both the imperial and colonial governments. This fact reveals that the commandants occupied a difficult position between the aspirations of London and the reality of the colonies. They certainly brought an imperial perspective to their commands and looked forward to the colonies playing a role on the imperial stage but generally did so in terms of a personal agenda rather than one set by London. This assessment is best demonstrated in the commandants??? independent stance at the outset of the South African War. The practice of appointing British commandants in Australasia was fraught with problems because of an inherent conflict in the goals of the commandants and their colonial governments. It resembles the Canadian experience of the British officers which reveals that the system of imperials military appointments as a whole was flawed. The problem remained that until a sufficient number of colonial officers had the prerequisite professional expertise for high command there was no alternative. The commandants were therefore the beginning rather than the end of a traditional reliance upon British military expertise. The lasting legacy of the commandants for the military forces of Australia and New Zealand was the development of colonial officers, transference of British military traditions, and the encouragement of a colonial military identity premised on the expectation of future participation in defence of the empire. The study provides a major revision to the existing historiography of imperial officers in the colonies, one which concludes that far from being ???imperial agents??? they were largely marching to their own drum.

In 1945, as the Second World War ended, British troops serving under 5 Corps in southern Austria encountered a number of critical problems which hindered their ability to occupy the region and enact the policy of repatriation as set out in the Yalta Agreement. Fragile lines of supply and communication, and the need to feed and house diverse groups of hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war and refugees impeded British attempts to administer the area. Further complicating the situation was the infiltration of Yugoslav Partisans, supposed allies, fighting under Josip Broz Tito who claimed northern Italy and southern Austria as part of a “Greater Yugoslavia.” In preparation of an anticipated forceful ejection of these Partisans, the British military prioritized the fighting effectiveness of its troops over a consistent application of repatriation. The British military issued orders which interpreted Soviet citizenship, and therefore liability for repatriation, in very broad terms. This resulted in an inconsistent application of the policy, in which non-Soviets were either retained or handed over, with both courses of action seemingly in keeping with orders. While subsequent authors, most notably Nikolai Tolstoy and Christopher Booker, have written on this topic, none have yet recognized the connection between the chaotic circumstances in the region and the haphazard application of repatriation. By re-examining archival records of communications between military units involved, this thesis rectifies that lacuna and acknowledges for the first time the irregular and inconsistent nature of these repatriations. / Graduate / 2018-08-11

In questo lavoro è stata studiata l’evoluzione della strategia di sicurezza imperiale della Gran Bretagna. Il periodo preso in esame è compreso tra la fine dell’Ottocento e i primi anni del Novecento. Alla luce di questa evoluzione e del contesto internazionale che l’ha generata, è studiata la strategia seguita da Londra durante il primo conflitto mondiale, analizzando il caso dell’intervento della British Army in Italia dopo la battaglia di Caporetto. La tesi mostra come l’immobilità del fronte occidentale spinse il Governo britannico a cercare nuovi fronti al fine di garantire i suoi obiettivi strategici. In questo contesto è inserito l’ingresso dell’Italia nel conflitto. Lo studio evidenzia come la Gran Bretagna intendesse il fronte italiano quale strumento per sottrarre risorse alla Germania. Dopo Caporetto gli inglesi, giunti in Italia per supportare l’esercito italiano, cercarono di utilizzarlo con il fine di escludere l’Austria-Ungheria dal conflitto e isolare la Germania. La tesi dimostra come, dal punto di vista inglese, il fronte italiano fosse un esempio di expeditionary strategy, ma che divenne una componente veramente integrata della difesa imperiale britannica solo nel momento in cui l’Italia isolò la Germania e si preparò a invaderla da sud, dopo la battaglia di Vittorio Veneto. / The aim of this work is to study the evolution of the British Imperial security strategy. The work investigates the period between the end of the 18th Century and the beginning of the 19th. In the light of the evolution and the international contest that created it, it is studied the strategy applied by London during the First World War and will be analysed the case of the British Army’s expedition in Italy after the battle of Caporetto. The thesis shows that the immobility of the western front led the British Government to seek new fronts in order to gain its strategic objectives. The study shows how Great Britain interpreted the Italian front such as a tool to take resources away from Germany. After Caporetto the British came to Italy to support the Italian Army, they tried to use it to exclude Austria-Hungary from the conflict and to close off Germany. The thesis proves that, by the British point of view, the Italian front was an example of expeditionary strategy, but it became an integrated part of the Imperial British strategy only when Italy isolated Germany and organised its invasion from the South, after the battle of Vittorio Veneto.

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD / During the South African War of 1899-1902 captured civilians were directed by the British army into military controlled zones and into refugee camps which became known as concentration camps. Established near towns, mines and railway sidings these camps were separated along racial lines. The British forced black men, women and children through the violence of war into agricultural and military labour as a war resource, interning over 110,000 black civilians in concentration camps. Unlike Boer civilians who were not compelled to labour, the British forced black civilians into military labour through a policy of no work no food. According to recent scholarly work based only on the written archive, at least 20,000 black civilians died in these camps. This project uses these written archives together with archaeological surveys, excavations, and oral histories to uncover a history of seven such forced labour camps. This approach demonstrates that in constructing an understanding and a history of what happened in the forced labour camps, the written archive alone is limited. Through the work of archaeology which uncovers material evidence on the terrain and the remains of graves one can begin to envisage the scale an extent of the violence that characterized the experience of forced laborers in the 'black concentration camps' in the South African War.