This study examined Scottish Highlanders who defended the southern border of British territory in the North American theater of the War of the Austrian Succession (1739-1748). A framework was established to show how Highlanders were deployed by the English between 1745 and 1815 as a way of eradicating radical Jacobite elements from the Scottish Highlands and utilizing their supposed natural superiority in combat. The case study of these Highlanders who fought in Georgia and Florida demonstrated that the English were already employing Highlanders in a similar fashion in North America during the 1730s and 1740s. British government sources and correspondence of colonial officials and military officers were used to find the common Highlander's reactions to fighting on this particular frontier of the Empire. It was discovered that by reading against what these officials wrote and said was the voice of the Highlander found, in addition to confirming a period of misrepresentation of Highland manpower in the colony of Georgia during the War of Jenkins' Ear that adhered to the analytical framework established.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 11, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The unwillingness to correct deficiencies in current COIN Doctrine or to follow the correct methods within current doctrine will lead to continued instability and possible failure of counterinsurgency operations and governments in states with large Islamic populations. The conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq is insurgent in nature, therefore requires a Counterinsurgent strategy. Current US Army Doctrine focuses entirely on the Counterguerilla aspect of an insurgency, rather than viewing the insurgency in its entirety. Therefore, not only is the COIN doctrine is inadequate, it also requires an overall governing strategy which must include the engagements of both the populace, and the infrastructure of the insurgency, as well as counterforce operations against the guerillas. The entire hierarchy of COIN Doctrine is skewed in favor of the conventional units who write it. Currently all COIN operations fall under Support and Stability Operations, as do Counterguerrilla Operations in doctrinal hierarchy that is written by the US Army Infantry Branch. However, US Army Special Forces Branch writes Insurgency and Foreign Internal Defense Doctrine (COIN falls under FID for all Internal Defense and Development [IDAD] Programs). The unique qualifications of Special Forces units make them ideal for creating, developing, instituting, and commanding these operations. Special Forces soldiers are language and culturally trained to operate within these nations, and normally have habitual associations previously developed with the people and militaries of these nations. / Major, United States Army

abstract: Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a long process that even great powers struggle with. Nevertheless, South Korea as a middle power was successful with COINs in Vietnam and Iraq. What were the drivers for the Republic of Korea (ROK) military's success? This dissertation maintains that the unusual nature of missions coupled with political/socio-cultural advantages are sufficient conditions for success of the middle power COIN. COIN missions are seen as unusual to middle powers. A rare mission stimulates military forces to fight harder because they recognize this mission as an opportunity to increase their national prestige. COIN mission success is also more probable for middle powers because their forces make the best of their country's political/socio-cultural advantages. The ROK military's COINs are optimal cases to test these hypotheses. The ROK military's COIN in Vietnam was an extremely rare mission, which increased its enthusiasm. This enthusiasm was converted into appropriate capabilities. By identifying battleground dynamics, the ROK forces initially chose an enemy-oriented approach based upon the method of company-led tactical base, and then later introduced a population-led method. South Korea's political/socio-cultural advantages also contributed to its military success in Vietnam. The Confucius culture that South Koreans and Vietnamese shared allowed the ROK forces to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese population. The mission in Iraq was also a rare and important one for national prestige. Accordingly, South Korean forces were equipped with pride and were enthusiastic about missions in Arbil. They changed their organization from a rigid one to a more flexible one by strengthening civil-military units. The ROK military possessed the ability to choose a population-centric approach. South Korea's political and cultural climate also served as an advantage to accomplish COIN in Iraq. The culture of Jung allowed ROK soldiers to sincerely help the local Iraqis. This project contributes to developing a theory of the middle power COIN. The findings also generate security policy implications of how to deal with contingent situations led by the collapse of the North Korean regime and how to redefine the ROK military strategy for the future. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Political Science 2011

Doctor of Philosophy / Security Studies Interdepartmental Program / Emizet N. Kisangani / This study examines the effects of regime type on support to foreign insurgent groups. Theoretically, it relies on structural and normative characteristics of democracies by arguing that leaders in these regimes tend to encounter multiple disincentive mechanisms generally not found in non-democracies. Thus, leaders of democratic regimes are less likely to actively support foreign insurgent groups as a component of strategy below the threshold of military intervention. When they do choose to lend their support, they tend to choose either low-level types of support (simple material support) or high-level support (full military intervention). Leaders of non-democratic regimes, however, can employ the full spectrum of support types to seize strategic opportunities and tailor strategies that are more costly and more risky. The dissertation tests this theory by using both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The statistical analysis of a dyadic, cross-sectional, time-series dataset of 179 countries from 1975 to 2009 provides some support for the proposed hypotheses. Structured, focused comparison of three conflicts with multiple within-case observations (cases) also reveals modest support for the hypothesis that democracies are unlikely to support insurgent groups in general and have multiple disincentives toward providing mid-level types of support that expose the democratic leaders to additional costs and risks. Unexpectedly, the qualitative case studies reveal that in addition to the structural disincentives initially identified, leaders of democratic regimes may have a harder time managing the principal-agent relationship between the supporting state (principal) and the insurgent groups (agents). The need to maintain a large winning coalition to survive as a leader in a democracy presents multiple principal-agent problems and allows rebel leaders and rebel factions to resist integration, prevent the loss of autonomy, and facilitate the establishment of alternative avenues of resource mobilization. While previous literature in political science and international relations provides evidence that structural characteristics of democratic regimes make them good at winning interstate wars, this study provides initial evidence that those same structural characteristics make democracies’ success more elusive when applying unconventional strategies short of war.

The purpose of this thesis to to investigate if the complex and ambiguous means of a hybrid warfare strategy in the context of the ‘armed attack’ threshold. The ‘armed attack’ threshold sits within the UN Charter article 51 and it constitutes the legal provision that the right to self-defence, both unilaterally and collectively, is only triggered in the event of an ‘armed attack’. It is therefore important to determine if this threshold can through the ambiguous and complex structure of hybrid warfare be circumvented or obfuscated to prevent, delay or weaken a State’s ability to act in self- defence or by other means. To examine this problem, this thesis approached it by describing the concept of hybrid warfare and the legal framework that constitute the ‘armed attack’ notion in the context of self-defence. And by, to the extent possible analysed if the hybrid warfare means; cyber warfare, information warfare and the use or support of proxy forces could individually amount to an ‘armed attack’ by viewing how these means were used in Ukraine by Russia. This thesis argues, that a hybrid adversary can through the inherently complex and ambiguous nature of hybrid warfare and its means, obfuscate its attribution under certain circumstance to prevent, limit or delay the ability of a State to act in self-defence or by other means.

No description available.

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / The level of violence has not only increased constantly over the last decades, but has also shifted in nature from conventional to unconventional. Given these circumstances, Romania's national interests call for the development of unconventional capabilities that are necessary in order to deal with current and future low intensity conflicts. This thesis analyzes the influence of language training and cultural understanding on the overall success of counterinsurgency campaigns. Examining some situations where the U.S. and British forces carried out counterinsurgency operations, this project reveals that ground troops with foreign language skills and cultural training were able to work more efficient with the local population. Cultural awareness facilitated communication and developed interpersonal trust. Additionally, language and cultural training enhanced military personnel's ability to understand the operational environment and to make a more selective use of force. The purpose of this thesis is not to promote a departure from conventional military training, but rather to propose the development of new Romanian military capabilities, the performance of which will increase through a better exploitation of language and cultural resources. / Captain, Romanian Army

Smaller states face conventional force strength asymmetry against larger states like Russia and, it is in their interest to find ways to mount an effective and multifaceted resistance. Being able to sustain operations on occupied territory against an occupying force could be one of these ways. These operations can be categorized as part of a state’s special operations capacity and furthermore sub-categorized as unconventional warfare. Military logistical theories are based primarily on logistical supply chains where the force largely has its own geographical control or dominance. However special operations in occupied or enemy controlled territory faces the challenge that the geographical area is controlled or dominated by the enemy, effectively blocking sustainment, the question then becomes: How can sustainment for a military force, operating in enemy controlled territory, be achieved? The aim of this study is therefore to make a contribution to theoretical military logistic literature by conducting a theory developing study. This by deductively developing a tentative theoretical framework from existing theories of conventional military logistics combined with special operations theory. The framework is then tested in a qualitative multiple historical case study by using the cases as a testing ground for the theory. The study concludes that the logistical options (methods) needed to sustain the unconventional force are determined by taking into account operational environmental factors such as geography, climate and enemy actions in order to achieve physical access and concealment for supplies. Together access, concealment and planned combat events influence the choice of logistical option or combination of options and as result a build-up time of supply levels is needed before sufficient sustainment is reached. Furthermore, this build-up time is always present no matter if the unconventional operation is planned or not. But, an advantage in force availability and execution exists when planning and preparing campaigns.