The purpose of this thesis to to investigate if the complex and ambiguous means of a hybrid warfare strategy in the context of the ‘armed attack’ threshold. The ‘armed attack’ threshold sits within the UN Charter article 51 and it constitutes the legal provision that the right to self-defence, both unilaterally and collectively, is only triggered in the event of an ‘armed attack’. It is therefore important to determine if this threshold can through the ambiguous and complex structure of hybrid warfare be circumvented or obfuscated to prevent, delay or weaken a State’s ability to act in self- defence or by other means. To examine this problem, this thesis approached it by describing the concept of hybrid warfare and the legal framework that constitute the ‘armed attack’ notion in the context of self-defence. And by, to the extent possible analysed if the hybrid warfare means; cyber warfare, information warfare and the use or support of proxy forces could individually amount to an ‘armed attack’ by viewing how these means were used in Ukraine by Russia. This thesis argues, that a hybrid adversary can through the inherently complex and ambiguous nature of hybrid warfare and its means, obfuscate its attribution under certain circumstance to prevent, limit or delay the ability of a State to act in self-defence or by other means.

This master's thesis deals with the response of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Russian hybrid threat, which is examined using a case study of the so-called "Lisa case" from January 2016. The thesis aims to place the "Lisa case" in the context of German-Russian relations and hybrid threats in the security reality of the 21st century. Germany and Russia have long had a special relationship, which, however, fell into crisis after the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. The main goal of Russia's efforts to influence social and political development in Europe has become Germany, which must deal with new methods and strategies of hybrid warfare. The advent of hybrid threats is a challenge not only for Germany but also for its allies. Russia's view of hybrid threats proves that the term has different meanings for different actors. One of the manifestations of the Russian hybrid threat is the case of a thirteen-year-old girl of German-Russian origin Lisa F. who was missing in Berlin for several hours and allegedly raped by migrants. Although the German police promptly refuted the case, the Russian media misused the event to fuel an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, especially among a significant minority of Russian Germans. The incident spread to the intergovernmental level when Russian...

With a changing state of security in Europe, defined by instability and unpredictability, the use of hybrid threats presents itself as an international security challenge. Characterized by the antagonistic use of both conventional and unconventional means, the hybrid threat actor coordinates these means in an attempt achieve specific goals, often under a guise of ambiguity. The complexity of hybrid threats deepens as advancing technology and globalisation enables the hybrid threat actor to use tools not only bound by geographical constraints, but tools that makes use the cyber domain and the constant flow of information. Tools ranging from military, political, economic, civil, and informational tools can, in various combinations, take advantage of specific vulnerabilities in the target state. Identifying and countering such a wide range of multifaceted tools provides a difficult task for most states.                                            This study aims to investigate the Swedish hybrid threat scenario by focusing on the authorities concerned with national defence and security and their identification of potential hybrid threats that faces Sweden. For countering such hybrid threats the study investigates the highly topical Swedish defence act 2021-2025. Its focus being on investigating potential goals, strategies and abilities for building resilience and countermeasures regarding hybrid threats. The study finds that Sweden is subject to the use of hybrid threats by antagonistic state actors, mainly Russia and China. Tools being used against Sweden include for example espionage, strategic acquisition of businesses and real estate, disinformation, and cyberattacks. For countering these threats, the study fails to find a specific set of goals for hybrid threat defence. Instead, the study finds a broad effort to strengthen national defence and security including among others the rebuilding of the Total Defence, founding of a national cybersecurity centrum, instituting an agency for psychological defence as well as lifting the perspective of hybrid threat among relevant national agencies.

This thesis strives to raise and answer three questions about the concept of hybrid warfare: What concepts of hybrid warfare exist so far? How similar or different are they? How useful are they from conceptual standpoint? The questions are answered by a conceptual analysis consisting of survey of existing concepts, their comparison and detailed evaluation of two of them on the basis of criteria of conceptualization. The answers revealed several important issues of the concept. Firstly, there are too many different concepts of hybrid warfare, often formulated with insufficient care for previous debates and already established concepts. Secondly, the formulated concepts of hybrid warfare are often different to a degree, which calls into question the claim, that all of them are trying to capture the same phenomenon. Lastly, even the better elaborated of the hybrid warfare concepts seem to be rather poorly conceptualized and not very useful. These three answers together cast shadow of doubt on the currently popular concept of hybrid warfare. The results of this work call for more careful thinking on whether and how the use of this concept is helping or hurting both our understanding of contemporary conflicts and our defence efforts against contemporary threats.

The thesis aims to give readers a more precise knowledge of how narratives in the information environment, mainly social media platforms, can be created and structured by agents of influence operations to subvert and influence a target audience. As a case study, the thesis focuses on the influence agent “Shuoun Islamiya”, as the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency pointed out, to be the initiator of the influence operation targeting Swedish Social Services and the LVU-act. The research in this paper explores the narratives used by the agentto reveal three central narratives propagated by Shuoun Islamiya: Sweden as a fascist state, Swedish authorities as abusive towards children, and depicting Swedish authorities as targeting Muslim families in particular. The findings suggest that these narratives are strategically designed to weaken the existing narrative of Sweden as a democratic state and evoke strong emotions in the targeted audience to align with the influence agent's objectives. Construction of these narratives involves setting up antagonistic actors, portraying the Swedish state and the social services as villains who unfairly and systematically target families of immigrant and Muslim backgrounds. The families are, on the other hand, depicted as helpless victims,emphasising a conflict between the state and the families by using provocative and inflammatory language related to allegations of child kidnapping and abuse carried out by Swedish authorities. These narratives are conveyed mainly through social media platforms, showing a strong visual component in which non-related visually evocative images are oftenused to elicit emotional responses from the target audience. Further, results show how non-state actors can influence a sizable audience and take advantage of the digital information environment, combining false and misleading content taken out of context. Moreover, the analysis highlights potential security implications, including the risk of undermining social trust and cohesion. The study emphasises the need for a critical mindset among information consumers. It suggests avenues for future research, including examining other actors and assessing a potentially more profound impact of the influence operation.