The purpose of this study is to determine whether the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) can be applied to Chief Executive Officer (CEO) remuneration of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) by defining inputs in terms of remuneration factors and outputs in terms of business factors in order to establish a benchmark for CEO remuneration. An exploratory study is conducted, using cross-sectional data from a secondary source. The sample consists of 221 companies listed on the JSE that disclosed their financial and non-financial information during 2010. The DEA was performed to estimate the relative technical efficiency of CEOs to convert their remuneration into company performance indicators. Base Pay, Perquisites and Pension, Annual Bonus Plans and Long-term Incentives were used as the inputs to the DEA model and company performance and size, measured by Return on Equity (ROE) and Total Assets respectively, were used as the outputs to the model. The empirical results prove that the DEA can be successfully applied as a benchmarking model for CEO remuneration that incorporates multiple inputs and outputs and establishes benchmarks and potential improvements for overpaid, inefficient CEOs. The CEOs from 80 of the 221 companies included in the sample emerged as the benchmark CEOs and formed the efficiency frontier against which inefficient CEOs were compared in order to determine the potential improvements for these CEOs. From a research perspective, this study contributes to the advancement of CEO remuneration research by introducing an alternative model by which CEO remuneration can be analysed. Future studies can analyse CEO remuneration by using other variables or time series data in the DEA model or combine the DEA with other methods like the regression analysis to perform more comprehensive investigations. From a practical perspective, the DEA can be used to establish a benchmark for CEO remuneration. Remuneration committees can use the results of the DEA as a guide to determine acceptable remuneration levels and decrease the pay gap between CEOs and the average worker. The originality of this study lies in the fact that it is the first South African study that used the DEA instead of the regression analysis to analyse CEO remuneration of companies listed on the JSE. This study also disaggregated Total CEO Remuneration into Base Pay, Perquisites and Pension, Annual Bonus Plans and Long-term Incentives to provide more accurate benchmark information. In addition, this is the first study that established benchmark CEO remuneration levels and suggested improvements to the remuneration package structure of overpaid, under-performing CEOs of companies listed on the JSE. / Thesis (MCom (Management Accountancy))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013.

The purpose of this study is to determine whether the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) can be applied to Chief Executive Officer (CEO) remuneration of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) by defining inputs in terms of remuneration factors and outputs in terms of business factors in order to establish a benchmark for CEO remuneration. An exploratory study is conducted, using cross-sectional data from a secondary source. The sample consists of 221 companies listed on the JSE that disclosed their financial and non-financial information during 2010. The DEA was performed to estimate the relative technical efficiency of CEOs to convert their remuneration into company performance indicators. Base Pay, Perquisites and Pension, Annual Bonus Plans and Long-term Incentives were used as the inputs to the DEA model and company performance and size, measured by Return on Equity (ROE) and Total Assets respectively, were used as the outputs to the model. The empirical results prove that the DEA can be successfully applied as a benchmarking model for CEO remuneration that incorporates multiple inputs and outputs and establishes benchmarks and potential improvements for overpaid, inefficient CEOs. The CEOs from 80 of the 221 companies included in the sample emerged as the benchmark CEOs and formed the efficiency frontier against which inefficient CEOs were compared in order to determine the potential improvements for these CEOs. From a research perspective, this study contributes to the advancement of CEO remuneration research by introducing an alternative model by which CEO remuneration can be analysed. Future studies can analyse CEO remuneration by using other variables or time series data in the DEA model or combine the DEA with other methods like the regression analysis to perform more comprehensive investigations. From a practical perspective, the DEA can be used to establish a benchmark for CEO remuneration. Remuneration committees can use the results of the DEA as a guide to determine acceptable remuneration levels and decrease the pay gap between CEOs and the average worker. The originality of this study lies in the fact that it is the first South African study that used the DEA instead of the regression analysis to analyse CEO remuneration of companies listed on the JSE. This study also disaggregated Total CEO Remuneration into Base Pay, Perquisites and Pension, Annual Bonus Plans and Long-term Incentives to provide more accurate benchmark information. In addition, this is the first study that established benchmark CEO remuneration levels and suggested improvements to the remuneration package structure of overpaid, under-performing CEOs of companies listed on the JSE. / Thesis (MCom (Management Accountancy))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:26:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Matheus Fernandes Junior.pdf: 862744 bytes, checksum: 7ae0f1de3ba158af12066864631a3dad (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-10 / Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa / Family control and management can be considered efficient and beneficial to corporate performance by reducing conflicts between shareholders and managers, lowering administrative myopia, reducing information asymmetry and profiting from social and political family influence. On the other hand, they may also be inefficient and harmful to performance by bringing conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, by being subject to nepotism and particularism, by obstructing takeovers and by extending family conflicts into the firm. It ends in doubts about positive, negative or null correlation of family control and management and corporate performance. This study investigated this issue, bringing two main contributions: the analysis of family or individual control, founding family control and founder CEO administration and its relation with performance for the Brazilian environment, and the deployment of a specific measurement index for corporate governance, which is usually approached via proxies in existing literature. Empirical analysis evaluating the performance of 230 companies with higher liquidity (on the Sao Paulo stock exchange BM&FBOVESPA) in the years of 2006, 2007 and 2008 and evaluated taking into consideration family control, founding family control and CEO position occupied by the person who founded the company (CEO founder). They were compared with control groups without such characteristics. Econometric models showed no evidence of different market performance for family or founding family control. However, CEO founder showed superior market performance compared with non CEO founder firms. Operational performance measured by accountancy parameters of family controlled, founding family controlled and founder CEO managed companies was lower than operational performance of other companies. Such results differ from the ones obtained in the US and Western Europe, which showed both superior market and operational performance for family, founding family control and founder CEO administration. / As estruturas de controle e administração familiares são apontadas, por um lado, como eficientes e benéficas ao desempenho das empresas pelo seu potencial de redução de conflitos entre acionistas e administradores, menor miopia administrativa, reduzida assimetria de informação e possível influência social e política das famílias, entre outros fatores. Por outro, são apontadas como estruturas prejudiciais ao desempenho, por serem fonte de conflitos entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários, estarem sujeitas ao nepotismo e particularismo, pela inibição de takeovers, por estenderem os conflitos familiares à empresa e assim por diante. As conclusões sobre a correlação (positiva, negativa ou inexistente) destes fatores com o desempenho das empresas seguem dúbias. Este trabalho investigou esta questão, trazendo duas contribuições principais: o estudo da relação entre controle familiar ou individual, famílias fundadoras e administração do fundador no contexto nacional e o uso de um índice específico para a medida da governança corporativa como variável de controle, o qual usualmente é tratado pela literatura estrangeira através de proxies. Na análise empírica foi investigado o desempenho das 230 empresas mais líquidas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA, nos anos de 2006, 2007 e 2008 frente ao controle familiar, ao controle da família fundadora da empresa e ao fato do cargo de CEO ser ocupado pela pessoa que fundou a firma, comparandoas aos grupos de controle não familiares ou não geridos pelo fundador. Modelos econométricos indicaram que, sob o ponto de vista de mercado, não há evidências claras de diferenças de desempenho entre empresas cujo controle é familiar ou individual e das famílias fundadoras e as empresas em geral. Já as empresas administradas pelo fundador (CEO fundador) apresentaram desempenho de mercado (Valor de Mercado sobre o Valor Contábil e Q de Tobin) superior às demais. Por outro lado, o desempenho operacional, medido por critérios contábeis, foi menor para o controle familiar, da família fundadora e para a administração do CEO fundador, comparado às empresas em geral. Os resultados referentes ao desempenho operacional diferem dos obtidos em estudos realizados nos Estados Unidos e Europa Ocidental que apontam relações positivas entre o desempenho de mercado e operacional - e o controle e administração familiares.

This study investigates the personal experience of newly appointed chief executives in transitioning into the CEO role. Adopting an exploratory qualitative design, data was obtained from two semi-structured interviews with 19 newly appointed chief executives, for a total of 38 interviews. The main contribution of this thesis to the extant literature is to show the ways in which CEOs go through an identity construction process when transitioning into the role, which is characterized in two ways. First, there exists a bi-directionality of influence between the personal identity of the CEO and the organizational identity. Second, this process comprises strong identity demands (lack of specificity of the role and weak situation) and identity tensions (personal identity intrusion and identity transparency) that dispose new CEOs towards an unbalance that promotes individuality. This disequilibrium might hinder the integration of new chief executives into the organization, since the data suggests that new CEOs are responsible for fostering their own integration by connecting aspects of their personal identity with the identity and culture of the organization. The thesis offers a theoretical model of the CEO identity construction process and concludes with a series of propositions that address the ramifications of these findings to our understanding of CEO succession.

No description available.

Orientation: Over the years, the increase in executive remuneration in both the private sector and state-owned entities (SOEs) has been the subject of intense discussions. The poor performance of some SOEs with highly remunerated executives begs the question whether chief executive officers (CEOs) in South African SOEs deserve the high levels of remuneration they receive. Research purpose: The main purpose of the study was to determine whether there is a relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and company performance in South Africa’s Schedule 2 SOEs. Motivation for the study: A greater understanding of the relationship between CEO remuneration and organisational performance would expand knowledge when developing optimal CEO remuneration systems to ensure sustainability of SOEs in the South African context. If a relationship exists, it could justify the high remuneration received by CEOs. Research design, approach, and method: This quantitative, longitudinal study, conducted over a nine-year period, collected secondary data from the annual reports of 18 Schedule 2 SOEs. The primary statistical techniques used in the study included were OLS multiple regression analysis and correlational analysis on a pooled dataset. Main findings/results: The primary finding was that there is a relationship between CEO remuneration and company performance (mainly an inverse relationship), with no consistent trend between the constructs. Turnover appears to be an important component, as it was the most stable measure of company performance during the study period. The results indicate that the CEOs’ remuneration continued to increase, even when the SOEs were performing poorly. Practical managerial implications: Since the study focused on the relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and company performance, it may aid policymakers in forming new rules and regulations that would help improve the country’s economic performance while attracting international investors. Contribution/value-add: The study provides new knowledge to the limited research available on SOEs in South Africa. Further, this research focused on three different components of CEOs’ remuneration, thereby shedding more light on the relationship between their remuneration and company performance. / Business Management

It is widely held that CEOs are central to the successful financial performance of companies. Yet, little attention has been given to the correlation between CEO tenure and financial performance of companies specifically. The purpose of this study was to determine whether CEO tenure has an impact on financial performance of companies in South Africa. The financial performance variables for the study were ROA and ROE. The performance of 30 JSE listed companies from three industries, namely, mining, retail and real estate, between 1995 to 2007 was examined. This gave a total of 62 data observations across the selected three tenure categories: short tenure (one to three years); medium tenure (four to five years); and long tenure (six or more years). The results showed that the average tenure for South African CEOs was four years; this was slightly lower than the findings of previous studies conducted in the USA. Medium and long tenure showed better financial performance for ROA than short tenure, while there was no statistically significant finding for ROE. Therefore from an ROA point of view, as tenure increases so does financial performance, until a certain point at which it is anticipated that lengthy tenure will lead to a decline in financial performance. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Aim: We find that there is a gap in the current research where the research available tends to focus on a narrower time frame and with performance based variables. This study aims to examine how the stock market has reacted to the announcement of a CEO-change between the years 2001-2021 on the Swedish stock market. Method: The study is carried out with a positivistic and a deductive approach, which are frequently used in quantitative studies. The study also uses an event study as its research design, where 786 CEO-changes and 358 companies are subject of the study Results and conclusion: The results show that as a whole, there is no significant abnormal return when CEO-changes are announced on the Swedish stock market. When external CEO:s are appointed, there is a statistically significantly negative abnormal return. When internal CEO:s are appointed, there is a statistically significantly positive abnormal return. Contributions of the thesis: The descriptive results could possibly give a better understanding of CEO-changes between the years 2001-2021 depending on recruitment-type and the nature of the departure. The results of the event study gives rise to an understanding of the behaviors of the stock market and the reaction to a CEO-change. Suggestions for future research: To conduct an equivalent study but focusing on company- specific factors to see if there is significant abnormal returns based on the companies performances. One could also study whether it makes a difference if the CEO has been in his position for a long time or if the performance of the CEO makes a difference.

No description available.

This dissertation studies the association between CEO ability and various aspects of corporate governance, specifically firm performance, executive compensation contracts and firm opacity. In the first essay of this dissertation (Chapter 2), I examine the effect of CEO ability on firm performance. My analysis uses a unique instrument of CEO ability that is based on a CEO's commitment decisions in US presidential elections. Intuitively, CEO ability is measured based on how well they forecast US presidential elections, one year prior to the race, relative to the candidates expected chances of winning. I find that this instrument of CEO ability is positively related to firm performance. Interestingly, I find that high ability CEOs have a greater impact on Tobin's q in small firms than in large firms. Yet, high ability CEOs have the greatest dollar impact on shareholder value in large firms. In addition, CEO ability appears to be quite important to outside shareholders in high growth firms. Lastly, I find that CEO ability is positively associated to merger announcement returns, which implies that higher ability CEOs engage in value-creating merger activities. The results are robust to industry and time controls, as well as various tests that consider an alternative explanation focusing on political influence. The second essay (Chapter 3) explores the effect of CEO ability on the structure and level of compensation contracts. I find that CEO ability is positively associated with total compensation level. CEOs in the highest quartile of the ability proxy earn almost $2.2 million more than CEOs in the lowest quartile of CEO ability. Further analysis indicates that CEO compensation structure differs markedly between the highest and lowest ability CEOs. Specifically, I find that the high ability CEOs receive 2.1% more stock based incentives than low ability CEOs. Thus, the low ability CEOs receive more of their pay in the form of cash compensation than do high ability CEOs. Further tests indicate that high ability CEOs have significantly greater variance in their pay than low ability CEOs, specifically due to the higher variance in stock based incentives. Overall, I provide evidence that CEO pay is associated with CEO ability and that CEO ability appears a key issue in designing CEO compensation contracts. In the third essay (Chapter 4), I examine whether CEO ability is related to corporate opacity. I argue that high-ability CEOs may seek to create greater transparency to convey their ability to the market. Simultaneously, low-ability CEOs may be signal-jamming the market's inferences about their talent by limiting the available information. An alternative aspect is that the results are driven by low-ability CEOs who seek to work in opaque firms. My analysis indicates that firms with high-ability CEOs are significantly less opaque than firms with low-ability CEOs. These findings are also robust to using a propensity score matched sample. Finally, I show that the deteriorating impact of corporate opacity on firm performance decreases when the decision belongs to a high-ability CEO, suggesting that opacity is not necessarily value-destructing decision for corporations. Overall, my analysis suggests that CEO ability is an important factor for corporate opacity. / Business Administration/Finance