This dissertation consists of two essays, both co-authored with Ugur Lel. The first essay (Chapter 1) examines whether high CEO pay inequality (CPI), the share of total managerial pay captured by the CEO, is an outcome of poor corporate governance, and its implications for shareholder wealth. We exploit the 2002 NYSE and NASDAQ governance reforms that mandated firms to have majority independent boards as a quasi-exogenous source of variation in the internal governance environment of firms. Results show that CPI decreases following the passage of these exchange listing regulations, but only in firms with entrenched CEOs affected by the exchange listing regulations. Firm value also increases for these firms. These results are robust to a variety of robustness checks such as a matched sample analysis and placebo tests. Overall, our results suggest that poor governance environments are associated with high managerial pay differences and consequently lower firm valuations, supporting the view that high CEO pay inequality reflects managerial entrenchment. The second essay (Chapter 2) examines whether shareholders use executive compensation channel to align managerial horizon with their investment horizon. We utilize a newly emerged empirical measure, pay duration, to measure managerial horizon. For shareholder horizon, we use the fraction of long-term institutional ownership in the firm. Results show that there is a positive association between long-term institutional ownership and CEO pay duration, suggesting that shareholder horizon is a determining factor in compensation contracts. We address reverse causality using indexer institutions. We also establish a causal link from investor horizon to CEO pay duration using institution mergers as a source of exogenous variation in investor horizon of the firm. We extend our results to hedge fund activism and document a negative relation between hedge fund activism and pay duration, which is consistent with our argument. Overall our results suggest that shareholders structure CEO pay in a way that is consistent with their investment horizon. / Ph. D. / CEOs play a crucial role in today’s financial world. They are the ultimate decision makers in companies and their goal is to maximize the shareholder wealth. Motivating the CEO to work hard and maximize shareholder wealth hinges on optimally designed compensation contracts. Shareholders delegate company directors to design these pay contracts. However, conflicts of interest between directors and CEOs, between shareholders and CEOs, and even among shareholders, affect the design of CEO pay contracts. It is important to study these conflicts of interest and their effect on CEO compensation to ensure well-functioning companies and a fair market. The objective of the first chapter is to examine whether the CEOs are overpaid when the company directors are not able to monitor the actions and decisions of the CEOs. We document that powerful and established CEOs are overpaid, both in dollar terms and relative to other managers in the company, when they are not properly monitored. We also document that regulations that aim to improve monitoring quality in companies bring CEO pay to fair levels, leading to an increase in company valuations. These findings point out the importance of regulations that improve the governance of companies. In the second chapter, we examine short-termism (or myopia) in the context of CEO pay. Basically, short-termism is any action that saves today but is costly in future. While short-term shareholders invest in companies for short periods to take advantage of temporary changes in company valuation, long-term investors invest for long periods and aim to benefit from long-term increase in company valuation. We document that the conflict of interest among shareholders with different investment periods is reflected in the design of CEO pay contracts. In particular, CEOs wait more to receive their compensation if the dominant investor type in the company has longer investment period. This finding explains how shareholders use CEO compensation to achieve wealth maximization, highlighting the power and importance of CEO pay contracts.

Nuvarande redovisningsregler och principer under IFRS är till viss del öppna för subjektiva bedömningar om hur kostnader och intäkter ska redovisas. Denna subjektivitet går stundom under benämningen resultatmanipulering och innebär då att företagets resultat antingen justeras i positiv eller negativ riktning beroende på bakomliggande incitament. De subjektiva valen kan delas in i operationella åtgärder eller diskretionära periodiseringar, beroende på om de påverkar kassaflödet eller ej. Denna studie fokuserar på hur redovisningsreglerna kan användas för att uppnå resultatmanipulering och inriktas därför på de diskretionära periodiseringarna. Forskning har påvisat att möjligheten till resultatmanipulering är särskilt påtaglig i samband med att företag byter vd. Det baseras på teorierna om horisontproblemet och stålbad, att vd:n i varje given situation ämnar uppnå maximal personlig vinning. Då tidigare studier sällan undersökt den svenska marknaden avser vi uppnå kontribution om hur teorierna om resultatmanipulering är applicerbara under svenska regelverk och normer, från dess att IFRS infördes till dags dato. Via syftet att undersöka sambandet mellan ett byte av vd och resultatmanipulering har vi för avsikt att hjälpa investerare till att bättre förstå marknaden och till förbättrade investeringsbeslut. Via kvantitativ analys av årsredovisningar har vi med hjälp av den modifierade Jonesmodellen tagit fram ett mått på företags diskretionära periodiseringar. Måttet har likställts med resultatmanipulering och ställts i relation till företags vd-byten. Kopplat till horisontproblemet har nivån på resultatmanipulering jämförts mot vd-byte som sker efterföljande räkenskapsår. Teorin om stålbad har i sin tur testats genom att undersöka om resultatmanipulering nyttjas under en vd:s första verksamma år, alternativt i något av de efterföljande två räkenskapsåren. Resultaten påvisade att den svenska marknaden skiljer sig mot både bakomliggande teori och tidigare forskning. Förekomsten av horisontproblemet eller stålbad kunde inte bevisas, däremot fann studien att resultatet skrivs upp via resultatmanipulering i de två efterföljande åren efter att ett byte av vd skett. Anmärkningsvärt bevisades även att resultatminskande åtgärder utförs året innan ett rutinmässigt vd-byte inträffar. Sett till orsakssambanden bevisades därutöver att sannolikheten för att ett vd-byte kom att inträffa ökade vid användning av negativ resultatmanipulering samt när företagets lönsamhet var lägre än marknadsgenomsnittet. Studien belyser att kausalitetsproblem föreligger mellan resultatmanipulering, vd-byte och företagets lönsamhet. De exakta orsakssambanden kan studien inte förmå förklara utan vi påvisar att ytterligare forskning behöver genomföras för att klargöra det sanna orsaksförhållandet. Avslutningsvis renderar studien teoretiskt bidrag då den påvisar att teorierna om horisontproblemet och stålbad i samband med vd-byte inte stämmer in på den svenska marknaden.

L’obtention de nanoparticules d’or nécessite le contrôle de nombreux paramètres et la compréhension du mode d’interaction entre l’or et le support. Pour cela, le choix du support est très important. Le premier volet de la thèse concerne la préparation contrôlée des catalyseurs à base d’or supporté sur les oxydes mésoporeux réductibles TiO₂, CeO₂ et Fe₂O₃ synthétisés via deux stratégies Soft et hard template en utilisant respectivement comme agents structurants le tribloc copolymère (Pluronic 123) et la silice mésoporeuse SBA-15. Les différentes techniques de caractérisation mettent bien en évidence que le taux de dépôt de l’or dépend de la concentration initiale de HAuCl₄, de la méthode de préparation (DPU, DP NaOH), de la teneur en or visée et de la nature du support ; Ces résultats sont à relier à la spéciation des espèces or en solution en fonction du pH final de la solution. Les taux de dépôt de l’or sont plus importants sur CeO₂ et ceci quelle que soit la teneur en or visée dans ce travail. Une dispersion très élevée est obtenue (la taille moyenne des particules d’or est de 2nm) sur les catalyseurs à 1% et 2%Au/CeO₂ préparés par la méthode DPU et calcinés à 400°C. Le deuxième volet de cette étude concerne l’oxydation en phase gaz d’une molécule organique modèle le toluène et l’oxydation en phase liquide d’une molécule organique modèle le phénol par des réactions de type Fenton et photo Fenton. Dans l’oxydation du toluène en phase gazeuse, les catalyseurs à base d’or supportés sur oxydes mésoporeux sont totalement sélectifs en CO₂ et H₂O. Les performances catalytiques dépendent des conditions de synthèse des catalyseurs et de la nature de l’oxyde utilisé ; le catalyseur 1%Au/CeO₂ est très actif et très stable au cours de quatre cycles successifs et au cours du temps. L’oxydation en phase liquide d’une molécule organique modèle le phénol par des réactions de type Fenton et photo Fenton a été effectuée sur les catalyseurs FeSBA-15 synthétisés via différentes stratégies : introduction du fer par voie postsynthétique et par voie hydrothermale en milieu faiblement et fortement acide respectivement à pH=6 et pH=3. Les performances catalytiques dépendent du rapport Si/Fe et de la taille des particules des espèces de fer, la taille des particules étant directement liée à la stratégie de synthèse des catalyseurs. Le catalyseur FeSBA-15(Si/Fe=60) synthétisé à pH=6 est un candidat potentiel dans la dégradation de polluants organiques par procédé Fenton et photo-Fenton en milieu neutre. / Well dispersed gold nanoparticles are the key to obtain an active gold catalyst. Obtaining gold nanoparticles requires control of many parameters and understanding of the interaction mode between gold and the support. For this reason the choice of the support is very important. The first part of this thesis concerns the controlled preparation of gold catalysts supported on reducible mesoporous oxides TiO₂, CeO₂ and Fe₂O₃ synthesized via two strategies Soft and Hard template using respectively. triblock copolymer (Pluronic 123) and mesoporous silica SBA-15 as template. This study clearly shows that the gold loading depends on the initial concentration of HAuCl₄, the method of preparation (DPU DP NaOH), theoretical gold content and the nature of the support. These results are to relate to the gold speciation which is a function of pH of the solution. The gold loading is higher on CeO₂ than on TiO₂ and Fe₂O₃ whatever the theoretical gold content. Very high gold dispersion is obtained (the gold particle size is 2 nm) on 1wt% and 2wt% Au/CeO₂ prepared by DPU and calcined at 400°C. The second part of this study concerns the toluene oxidation in the gas phase on Au/mesoporous oxide catalysts and the Fenton and photo-Fenton degradation of phenolic aqueous solutions by H₂O₂ on FeSBA-15 catalysts prepared following different synthesis routes, direct synthesis by adjusting pH at 3 and 6 and with post synthesis procedure. In the toluene oxidation in the gas phase Au/mesoporous oxide catalysts are totally selective for CO₂ and H₂O. The catalytic performances depend on the synthesis conditions of catalysts and the support; the 1wt% Au/CeO₂ catalyst is very active and exhibits a long-term stability. In the Fenton and photo-Fenton degradation of phenolic aqueous solutions the catalytic performances depend on the Si/Fe ratio and the particle size of the iron species, the particle size being directly related to the synthesis strategy of the catalysts. The catalyst FeSBA-15 (Si/Fe = 60) synthesized at pH = 6 is a potential candidate in the degradation of organic pollutants by Fenton and photo-Fenton process in neutral medium. / م لخصمسقني لمعلا يف هذه ةحورطألا ىلإ نيئزج:OiT 2ب وا سطة OeC 2و , Fe2O ي خ تص الاول ال ق سم ب تح ض يرمح فزات من ال ذهبن وع من م يزوب ري ة ب مواد مدعم 3ان واع مخ ت لف ال تح ض ير. ت شخ يص ف ي ال م س ت عم لة ال ت ق ن يات مخ ت لفت ب ين ال مح ضرة ل مح فزات انال دعم ط ب ي عة ك ذا و ال مح فز ت ح ض ير وطري قة HAuCl ت ر سب معدل ي ت ع لق ل ذه با ت رك يز ع لى 4ي ع ضو جزيء و سطغازي enèuloT أك سدة ف ي ال مواد هذه ب تط ب يق ي ت ع لق ال ثان ي ال ق سم ف يال مح فز ت ح ض ير Ò طرق ك ذا و ل ت فاعل هذا ع لى ال مؤث رة ل عوامل ب درا سة ق م نا سال فا ال مذك ورة ل لمح فزات ال ف عال ية ع لان واع مخ ت لف ب وا سطة FeSBA- ي ع ضو جزيء lonehP ت فاعل ب وا سطة notneF سائ ل و سط ف ي وعمن 51 ن مح فزات ع لىوHp ال و سط Si/Fe قلعتي ةبسنب FeSBA- ريضحتلا.ادأء 1515FeSBA-15, Fenton, Phenol, Toluène, TiO و 2 CeO2, Fe2O3, SBA- ال ك لمات ال م ف تاح ية ׃م يزوب وري ة ,

Sammanfattning   Titel: Avkastningskrav och riskpreferenser – En studie om sambandet mellan ägarnas avkastningskrav och företagsledningens riskpreferenser.   Nivå: Examensarbete på kandidatnivå i företagsekonomi   Författare: Pontus Gelin   Handledare: Peter Lindberg   Datum: Februari 2019   Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka om det finns ett samband mellan ägarnas avkastningskrav och en kvinnlig verkställande direktör.   Metod: Kvantitativ forskningsdesign med multipel linjär regressionsanalys.   Resultat och slutsats: Det går inte att fastställa någon korrelation mellan ägarnas avkastningskrav och en kvinnlig verkställande direktör. Resultatet visar på att den eventuella risken, som en kvinnlig vd medför, har diversifierats bort av investerare.   Vidare forskning: En given fortsättning på studien vore en kategorisering av aktuella bolag, där de bolagen med en kvinnlig vd ställs mot övriga. Detta test skulle visa på om ägarnas avkastningskrav är lägre för de bolag som har en kvinnlig vd, än övriga.   Nyckelord: Avkastningskrav, kapitalstruktur, risk, CAPM, betavärde (β), verkställande direktör (vd), riskpreferenser.

<p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om det finns ett samband mellan lönsamhet och storlek på rörlig samt total VD-ersättning i de största svenska aktiebolagen. I uppsatsen diskuteras även funna samband samt bakomliggande teoretiska förklaringar till VD-ersättningens storlek. För att undersöka om VD-ersättning och företags lönsamhet korrelerar utförs kvantitativa undersökningar med hjälp av regressionsanalyser för respektive år mellan 2002 och 2007. Populationen som undersökningen baseras på är de företag som i september 2009 var registrerade på Stockholmsbörsens segment Large och Mid Cap.</p><p>Undersökningen resulterade i slutsatsen att inget samband mellan vare sig rörlig eller total VD-ersättning och lönsamhet kunde styrkas. Istället gavs indikationer om andra faktorer som påverkade VD-ersättningens storlek. Studien visade en tydlig koppling mellan företagsstorlek och VD-ersättning. Andra trender indikerade att det marknadsjämförande synsättet är det vanligaste vid fastställande av VD-ersättningsnivåer. Dessutom diskuterades andra faktorers inflytande på VD-ersättningars storlek utifrån tidigare forskning.</p> / <p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether a relationship between CEO compensation and organizational profitability exists in the largest Swedish companies. Both the total and the variable compensation schemes’ dependence on organizational compensation are analyzed. The objective is moreover to discuss the observed relationships in the study as well as the theoretical explanations to the level of the CEO compensation. In order to examine if CEO compensation correlates with organizational profitability quantitative research methods are applied via regression analyses for each separate year between 2002 and 2007. The population our research is based on is the companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in September 2009 within the segments Large and Mid Cap.</p><p>It was concluded that no relationship between neither variable nor total CEO compensation and organizational profitability existed. However, indications of other factors affecting the compensation were indicated. The regression confirmed a relationship between organizational size and CEO compensation. Other trends indicated that the market-based approach was the most common when determining CEO compensation levels. In addition we discussed how other previously proved relationships as well as further theoretical research related to our study.</p>

Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om det finns ett samband mellan lönsamhet och storlek på rörlig samt total VD-ersättning i de största svenska aktiebolagen. I uppsatsen diskuteras även funna samband samt bakomliggande teoretiska förklaringar till VD-ersättningens storlek. För att undersöka om VD-ersättning och företags lönsamhet korrelerar utförs kvantitativa undersökningar med hjälp av regressionsanalyser för respektive år mellan 2002 och 2007. Populationen som undersökningen baseras på är de företag som i september 2009 var registrerade på Stockholmsbörsens segment Large och Mid Cap. Undersökningen resulterade i slutsatsen att inget samband mellan vare sig rörlig eller total VD-ersättning och lönsamhet kunde styrkas. Istället gavs indikationer om andra faktorer som påverkade VD-ersättningens storlek. Studien visade en tydlig koppling mellan företagsstorlek och VD-ersättning. Andra trender indikerade att det marknadsjämförande synsättet är det vanligaste vid fastställande av VD-ersättningsnivåer. Dessutom diskuterades andra faktorers inflytande på VD-ersättningars storlek utifrån tidigare forskning. / The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether a relationship between CEO compensation and organizational profitability exists in the largest Swedish companies. Both the total and the variable compensation schemes’ dependence on organizational compensation are analyzed. The objective is moreover to discuss the observed relationships in the study as well as the theoretical explanations to the level of the CEO compensation. In order to examine if CEO compensation correlates with organizational profitability quantitative research methods are applied via regression analyses for each separate year between 2002 and 2007. The population our research is based on is the companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in September 2009 within the segments Large and Mid Cap. It was concluded that no relationship between neither variable nor total CEO compensation and organizational profitability existed. However, indications of other factors affecting the compensation were indicated. The regression confirmed a relationship between organizational size and CEO compensation. Other trends indicated that the market-based approach was the most common when determining CEO compensation levels. In addition we discussed how other previously proved relationships as well as further theoretical research related to our study.

台灣金管會在2015年首年「強制」化工、食品、金融業及資本額百億以上逾200家企業需編製企業社會責任報告書。但是，金管會統計，過去採自願性質，主動編製CSR報告書的有200多家上市櫃企業，本研究想探討在政府未針對這個議題做具體的法律要求，甚麼因素會影響這些企業發布CSR報告書。 以往文獻對於企業社會責任（Corporate Social Responsibility，CSR）之探討，多將焦點在CSR和財務績效之關聯性。而CSR揭露的文獻中，主要探討影響CSR揭露的相關因素，而較少針對CSR報告書決策之前置因素進行研究。故本研究以CSR績效、CEO在位期限及擁有MBA學位的CEO探討影響企業發布CSR報告書決策之因素。 Clarkson（1995）指出一個企業若主動執行CSR相關政策，即產生卓越的CSR績效，他們將會向利害關係人自願性地揭露環境相關訊息。本研究第一個假設為CSR報告決策與該企業CSR績效有正相關。另外，Finkelstein（2009）認為，CEO在位期間與組織改變有反相關係。因此，本研究的第二個假設為在位期限較久的CEO比起新上任的CEO，較不願意發布CSR報告書。一個企業若其CEO擁有MBA學位相較於其他公司較主動揭露CSR相關訊息（Finkelstein，2009），本研究第三個假設為發布CSR報告書之決策與有MBA學位的CEO正向關係。本研究的研究對象為台灣上市（櫃）在鋼鐵工業、半導體業、資訊服務業及金融服務業等四個產業之企業；收集樣本的時間為2008年至2012年。經過迴歸分析，研究結果顯示，一個企業若其CSR績效越好將會越願意發布CSR報告書，以及CEO的在位期限越長，該企業發布CSR報告書的機率越低；有MBA學位的CEO與發佈CSR報告書之決策並沒有任何關係。企業若想加強發布CSR報告書之決策，必須全面提升CSR績效為優先；同時，在位期限較長的CEO亦須改變自己的想法，影響組織行為，積極推動CSR相關政策 。

In the first essay I examine the cash policies of female-led firms. Recent research finds that female CEOs eschew riskier corporate policies, but it makes contradicting claims whether this is due to risk aversion. Benchmarking risk aversion by the management of firms’ cash, I find that female CEOs are risk averse relative to male CEOs. Specifically, they hold significantly (18%) more cash, even for the same level of dividend payout as male CEOs. Further, they have significantly higher speed of adjustment for cash deficits, are more likely to use excess cash to increase dividends, but are equally likely to use it to increase investment. Collectively, these results indicate that greater risk aversion in the general female population continues beyond the glass ceiling and likely influences female CEOs’ corporate policies. Nonetheless, cash held by female CEOs has greater marginal value, suggesting a dividend-clientele effect. In the second essay I examine the impact of CEO gender on compensation keeping in view the corporate outcomes that they beget. Risk aversion may influence CEOs’ intertemporal choices and effort regarding short-term and long-term corporate activities. Given that females are more risk averse, I examine whether there are gender-based differences in short- and long-term corporate outcomes and whether these lead to gender-based disparity in CEO compensation. I find that female CEOs have significantly (10%) superior performance on short-term firm outcomes, but inferior (24%) performance on long-term outcomes, relative to male CEOs. However, for a given level of short-term (long-term) performance female CEOs obtain relatively more (less) short-term (short-term and long-term) compensation. The end result is that there is no difference in the total compensation between male and female CEOs. This suggests that female CEOs are well rewarded for their short-termism, enough to make up for their relative underperformance on long-term goals.

abstract: 竞争日益激烈的市场环境对企业管理者提出了更高的挑战，首席执行官(CEO)作为企业管理层的核心，其个人特征对企业绩效有着重要影响。已有研究主要基于高阶理论，系统研究了CEO具体特征对企业战略选择及其绩效的影响。但是已有研究较为零散，并且大多数集中在CEO人口统计学特征，对其政治联系、受教育年限、社会关系和人格特质等关注较少。基于此，本文结合高阶理论和信号理论，深入分析CEO个人特征对其绩效的影响，并且探讨了CEO结构权力在CEO个人特征与其绩效关系之间发挥的调节作用。 在文献回顾和案例研究基础上，首先，从CEO人口统计学特征、政治联系、受教育年限、职业特征、社会关系和人格特质等6个维度构建了CEO个人特征指标，将CEO上任后前3年营业收入年均增长率和利润年均增长率作为衡量CEO业绩的衡量指标，并提出了10个研究假设。其次，基于问卷调查数据，采用多元线性回归方法，对研究假设进行了验证和分析。实证结果表明，CEO性别、政治联系、受教育年限、社会关系和人格特质（外向性、开放性和宜人性）均对CEO绩效具有显著影响，而CEO年龄和多样化的职业特征对其绩效具有显著的负向影响。此外，CEO的结构权力在受教育年限、社会关系与CEO绩效之间的关系中发挥着显著的正向调节作用，而在多样化职业特征与其绩效之间发挥着显著的负向调节作用。最后，本文从CEO多维度个人特征构建和CEO结构权力两方面深入阐述了理论贡献，结合企业实践提供了可操作化的建议和对策，并提出了本文存在的不足及未来研究展望。 关键词：CEO业绩；CEO个人特征；高阶理论；社会关系；结构权力；影响因素 / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2020

This dissertation consists of three essays on the effect of excess compensation and corporate governance changes on the firm’s performance. The first paper utilizes a cost minimization stochastic frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of director total compensation. Our findings suggest that board members are over compensated. We show that, on average, the director actual compensation level is above the efficient compensation level by around 63%. Our results suggest that an increase in director excess compensation decreases the likelihood of CEO turnover, reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity, and increases managerial entrenchment. Thus, the surplus in director compensation is directly associated with managerial job security and entrenchment. Furthermore, although director excess compensation is not significantly inversely related to the firm’s future performance, it has an indirect negative effect on future performance through its impact on the entrenchment-performance relationship. Therefore, this essay proposes that the overcompensation of directors is directly associated with a board culture predicated by mutual back-scratching and collusion between the CEO and the board members. The second essay tests the effect of an exogenous shock, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, on the structure of corporate boards and their efficiency as a monitoring mechanism. The results suggest an increase in the participation of independent directors at the expense of insiders. Consequently, we investigate the implications of board composition changes on CEO turnover and firm value. We document a noticeable reduction in CEO turnover in the post-SOX period. We also demonstrate that, after SOX, a board dominated by independent directors is less likely to remove a CEO due to poor performance. Finally, we highlight a negative association between the change in board composition and firm value. We propose that our findings are predicated on an off equilibrium result whereby firms were forced to modify iv their endogenously chosen board composition. Therefore, contrary to the legislators’ objectives, we suggest that the change in board structure brought about inefficient monitoring and promoted an unfavorable tradeoff between independent directors and insiders. The third essay examines the relationship between the firm’s governance structure and its value during different economic conditions. We show that both relative industry turnover and CEO entrenchment increase during economic downturns. We also find that relative industry turnover and managerial entrenchment have opposite impacts on the value of the firm throughout the recessionary period. While industry turnover leads to an appreciation in firm value, managerial entrenchment reduces shareholders’ wealth. The negative impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value, however, outweighs the positive impact of industry turnover. Accordingly, we propose that a recession provides managers with a good opportunity to camouflage their behavior and extract more private benefits and, thus, blame the poor performance on bad economic conditions.