Med utgångspunkt i den livliga debatt som fördes kring bonusutbetalningar i samband med finanskrisen och det skadade förtroende för rörliga ersättningar den resulterade i syftar denna studie till att undersöka hur man idag återskapar legitima rörliga ersättningssystem. Studien ämnar även svara på frågan varför organisationer, trots stora kostnader, väljer att använda sig av rörliga ersättningssystem. Med agentteorin och nyinstitutionell teori som referensramar genomfördes en kvalitativ undersökning vilken bestod av sex semi-strukturerade expertintervjuer. Tre av dessa intervjuer genomfördes med representanter för tre olika organisationer, två av intervjuerna gjordes med oberoende konsulter som specialiserat sig på utformning av rörliga ersättningssystem och slutligen intervjuades en jurist som arbetar med föreskrifter gällande rörlig ersättning inom den finansiella sektorn. Analys av intervjuerna hanterades med etnografisk kvalitativ metodik som utgångspunkt för att skapa ett kodschema kopplat till vår teori. Två analysmodeller användes sedermera på de koder vi fick fram: Den komparativa analysen och den idealtypcentrerade analysen. I studien framkommer att organisationer alltmer använder sig av transparenta system för sina rörliga ersättningar i syfte att legitimera dessa. Alltfler anställda tenderar även att innefattas i det rörliga ersättningssystemet, oberoende av vilken befattning och funktion de har i organisationen, detta för att skapa en större acceptans för systemet. Resultatet visar att det dock fortfarande finns en klick anställda som i många fall står utanför de nyskapade rörliga ersättningssystemen: den högsta ledningen. Vidare finner vi i studien att organisationer använder rörliga ersättningssystem som en styrteknik; i och med att de kopplat ersättning till måluppfyllnad skapas en acceptans för systemet och ifrågasättande av de uppsatta målen minskar. / Based on the lively debate on bonus payments that took place due to the financial and damaged the trust for variable compensation systems, this study aims to answer the question of how to recover legitimate variable compensation for this present day. The study also intends to answer the question of why organizations, despite great expense, choose to use variable compensation systems. Using the New Institutional theory and the Agency theory as frameworks, a qualitative study is performed consisting of six semi-structured expert interviews. Three of these interviews were conducted with representatives of the three organizations, two of the interviews were conducted by independent consultants specializing in the design of variable compensation systems and the last interview was conducted with an expert on variable compensation in the financial sector. The analysis of the interviews was performed with an ethnographic quantitative methodology as a basis to create a coding scheme linked to the proposed theories. From this approach, the interviews were narrowed down to codes which were then analyzed with two different analytical models: the comparative analysis and the ideal type centered. The study shows that organizations tend to increasingly exceed the transparency in the compensation system in order to legitimize them. In addition, variable compensation systems tend to include a greater number of employees, at various levels and functions within the organization, with the purpose of creating a greater acceptance of the system. Despite this, there are still a group of employees which, to some extent, are outside the system: the top management and directors. Furthermore, this study finds that organizations tend use variable compensation as a control technique, due to the connection between compensation and performance that creates an acceptance of the system and decreases the questioning of goal-setting.

During the past decades, CEO and board compensation has increased substantially. Top management compensation and firm performance has been an extensively researched subject, and a large amount of previous studies have examined the relation of top management pay and firm performance. However, the findings and discussions have been contradictory and inconsistent. The purpose of this thesis is to examine if there is a relationship between the top management variable compensation and firm performance. We aim to explore this subject in further depth by focusing on the Swedish context and by studying if contextual issues, in terms of different industries, have an impact on this relation. In order to examine this relation multiple regression analysis were performed. The empirical evidence displays that on a general level, incentive systems of the top management have no significant effect on firm performance. We also conclude that the relation of variable pay and performance is contingent on industry. We therefore argue that the context in which the firm operates has an impact on the investigated relation in this thesis. Furthermore, the Swedish context and the Swedish governance model can be considered as one of the main explanations of the attained result.

Esta tese teve por objetivo verificar o impacto da influência familiar na discricionariedade da determinação da remuneração dos executivos em empresas brasileiras. Assume-se que a visão tradicional da relação principal x agente é fundamentalmente distinta nas empresas familiares, nas quais a propriedade e a gestão se confundem, se não totalmente, pelo menos em parte. Nesse caso, questionam-se o uso e função da remuneração por incentivo como mecanismo de alinhamento de interesses. Existem evidências de que as empresas familiares tendem a estruturar planos de incentivo com menor uso de remuneração variável, parte pelo controle natural e implícito da presença familiar na empresa, parte, por não ser compatível com preservação da riqueza socioemocional. Essas evidências influenciam nas relações esperadas: (a) quanto maior a influência familiar menor a tendência para fornecer remuneração variável aos executivos; (b) quanto maior a influência familiar maior a propensão para uso de flexibilidade na avaliação de desempenho para a determinação da remuneração variável dos executivos; (c) quanto maior a propensão para uso de flexibilidade na avaliação de desempenho menor a tendência para fornecer remuneração variável aos executivos. Para analisar essas relações, a pesquisa foi desenvolvida por meio de um levantamento realizado em 128 empresas familiares brasileiras de capital fechado. Os dados foram analisados por meio de modelagem de equações estruturais. Os resultados indicaram que a influência familiar captada pelo modelo F-PEC (poder, experiência e cultura) não tem relação direta com a proporção de remuneração variável fornecida aos executivos. Entretanto, a influência familiar impacta positivamente na propensão sobre a flexibilização da avaliação de desempenho para a determinação da remuneração variável dos executivos. Os achados evidenciaram que quanto maior é a propensão para uso de flexibilidade na avaliação de desempenho, maior a tendência para fornecer remuneração variável aos executivos. Esse resultado contradiz a relação esperada na pesquisa, todavia, pode ser interpretado como propício do ambiente familiar, em que a confiança, a preocupação com a reputação e a percepção de justiça são tidos como características fundamentais, indicando que quanto maior é a influência familiar, maior é a propensão ao uso de discricionariedade na determinação dos incentivos, o que resulta em maior proporção de remuneração variável em relação a remuneração total do executivo. Entretanto, a relação entre influência familiar e remuneração variável só foi constatada quando a flexibilidade tem papel de mediadora. Do ponto de vista organizacional, essa flexibilização para mudança pode trazer diferentes consequências sobre a empresa. Quando proporcionar mudança tal que o executivo perceba sua meta como inatingível, o fato pode gerar desinteresse dos executivos sobre o plano de remuneração e destruir a estratégia de motivação. Da mesma forma, se a mudança for feita e o executivo entender que foi favorável, pode ocorrer, como consequência, o descrédito perante o sistema de avaliação, sendo considerado que ele não será utilizado de fato. Todavia, a possibilidade de descrédito perante o sistema de avaliação e remuneração pode não ocorrer em ambientes nos quais a confiança, a preocupação com a reputação e a percepção de justiça são tidos como características fundamentais, o que é mais comum em empresas familiares. / The main goal of this thesis was to verify the impact of family influence in the discretionary choice of the remuneration of executives in Brazilian companies. This research assumed that the traditional view of the principal versus agent relationship is fundamentally different in family firms, where ownership and management are, at least in part, confused. In this case scenario, we question the use and function of the incentive compensation as interests alignment mechanism. Theoretical evidences support that family businesses tend to structure incentive plans with less use of variable compensation. This could be explained in part by the natural control and implicit family presence in the company, and in part by it\'s incompatibility with the preservation of socioemotional wealth. Those evidences are related with the expected relationships: (a) greater the family influence in the company, higher is the probability that the company provide variable remuneration to their executives; (b) higher family influence increase the propensity for flexibility in the use of performance assessment for determining the variable remuneration of the executives; (c) bigger propensity for flexibility in the use of lower performance evaluation tend to provide variable remuneration to the executives. To analyze these relationships, this research conducted a survey with 128 Brazilian family companies that are privately held. Data were analyzed using structural equation modeling. The results indicated that family influence captured by the F-PEC model (power, experience and culture) are not directly related to the proportion of variable compensation provided to executives. However, the family influence positively impacts the propensity on the relaxation of performance evaluation for determining the variable remuneration of executives. The results also showed that higher propensity for flexibility in the evaluation of performance, is associated with a higher tendency to provide variable remuneration to the executives. This finding contradicts the expected theoretical relationship, however, they can be interpreted as a consequence of a unique family environment, where trust, concern for the reputation and the perception of fairness are considered fundamental characteristics, indicating that the larger the family influence, greater is the propensity to use discretion in determining the remuneration incentives, which results in a higher proportion of variable remuneration in relation to total executive remuneration. However, the relationship between family influence and variable compensation was only found when flexibility works as a mediator factor. From an organizational point of view, this higher flexibility to change can bring different consequences for the company. If the change makes the executive realizes its goal as unattainable, for example, that can generate disinterest of business on the compensation plan and destroy the motivation strategy of the company. Similarly, if the change is made and the executive view this change as favorable, they tend to discredit the system of evaluation, and considered that it will not actually be used. However, the possibility of disbelief before the evaluation and remuneration system, cannot occur in environments where trust, concern with the reputation and the perception of fairness are considered fundamental characteristics, which is more common in families companies

Esta tese teve por objetivo verificar o impacto da influência familiar na discricionariedade da determinação da remuneração dos executivos em empresas brasileiras. Assume-se que a visão tradicional da relação principal x agente é fundamentalmente distinta nas empresas familiares, nas quais a propriedade e a gestão se confundem, se não totalmente, pelo menos em parte. Nesse caso, questionam-se o uso e função da remuneração por incentivo como mecanismo de alinhamento de interesses. Existem evidências de que as empresas familiares tendem a estruturar planos de incentivo com menor uso de remuneração variável, parte pelo controle natural e implícito da presença familiar na empresa, parte, por não ser compatível com preservação da riqueza socioemocional. Essas evidências influenciam nas relações esperadas: (a) quanto maior a influência familiar menor a tendência para fornecer remuneração variável aos executivos; (b) quanto maior a influência familiar maior a propensão para uso de flexibilidade na avaliação de desempenho para a determinação da remuneração variável dos executivos; (c) quanto maior a propensão para uso de flexibilidade na avaliação de desempenho menor a tendência para fornecer remuneração variável aos executivos. Para analisar essas relações, a pesquisa foi desenvolvida por meio de um levantamento realizado em 128 empresas familiares brasileiras de capital fechado. Os dados foram analisados por meio de modelagem de equações estruturais. Os resultados indicaram que a influência familiar captada pelo modelo F-PEC (poder, experiência e cultura) não tem relação direta com a proporção de remuneração variável fornecida aos executivos. Entretanto, a influência familiar impacta positivamente na propensão sobre a flexibilização da avaliação de desempenho para a determinação da remuneração variável dos executivos. Os achados evidenciaram que quanto maior é a propensão para uso de flexibilidade na avaliação de desempenho, maior a tendência para fornecer remuneração variável aos executivos. Esse resultado contradiz a relação esperada na pesquisa, todavia, pode ser interpretado como propício do ambiente familiar, em que a confiança, a preocupação com a reputação e a percepção de justiça são tidos como características fundamentais, indicando que quanto maior é a influência familiar, maior é a propensão ao uso de discricionariedade na determinação dos incentivos, o que resulta em maior proporção de remuneração variável em relação a remuneração total do executivo. Entretanto, a relação entre influência familiar e remuneração variável só foi constatada quando a flexibilidade tem papel de mediadora. Do ponto de vista organizacional, essa flexibilização para mudança pode trazer diferentes consequências sobre a empresa. Quando proporcionar mudança tal que o executivo perceba sua meta como inatingível, o fato pode gerar desinteresse dos executivos sobre o plano de remuneração e destruir a estratégia de motivação. Da mesma forma, se a mudança for feita e o executivo entender que foi favorável, pode ocorrer, como consequência, o descrédito perante o sistema de avaliação, sendo considerado que ele não será utilizado de fato. Todavia, a possibilidade de descrédito perante o sistema de avaliação e remuneração pode não ocorrer em ambientes nos quais a confiança, a preocupação com a reputação e a percepção de justiça são tidos como características fundamentais, o que é mais comum em empresas familiares. / The main goal of this thesis was to verify the impact of family influence in the discretionary choice of the remuneration of executives in Brazilian companies. This research assumed that the traditional view of the principal versus agent relationship is fundamentally different in family firms, where ownership and management are, at least in part, confused. In this case scenario, we question the use and function of the incentive compensation as interests alignment mechanism. Theoretical evidences support that family businesses tend to structure incentive plans with less use of variable compensation. This could be explained in part by the natural control and implicit family presence in the company, and in part by it\'s incompatibility with the preservation of socioemotional wealth. Those evidences are related with the expected relationships: (a) greater the family influence in the company, higher is the probability that the company provide variable remuneration to their executives; (b) higher family influence increase the propensity for flexibility in the use of performance assessment for determining the variable remuneration of the executives; (c) bigger propensity for flexibility in the use of lower performance evaluation tend to provide variable remuneration to the executives. To analyze these relationships, this research conducted a survey with 128 Brazilian family companies that are privately held. Data were analyzed using structural equation modeling. The results indicated that family influence captured by the F-PEC model (power, experience and culture) are not directly related to the proportion of variable compensation provided to executives. However, the family influence positively impacts the propensity on the relaxation of performance evaluation for determining the variable remuneration of executives. The results also showed that higher propensity for flexibility in the evaluation of performance, is associated with a higher tendency to provide variable remuneration to the executives. This finding contradicts the expected theoretical relationship, however, they can be interpreted as a consequence of a unique family environment, where trust, concern for the reputation and the perception of fairness are considered fundamental characteristics, indicating that the larger the family influence, greater is the propensity to use discretion in determining the remuneration incentives, which results in a higher proportion of variable remuneration in relation to total executive remuneration. However, the relationship between family influence and variable compensation was only found when flexibility works as a mediator factor. From an organizational point of view, this higher flexibility to change can bring different consequences for the company. If the change makes the executive realizes its goal as unattainable, for example, that can generate disinterest of business on the compensation plan and destroy the motivation strategy of the company. Similarly, if the change is made and the executive view this change as favorable, they tend to discredit the system of evaluation, and considered that it will not actually be used. However, the possibility of disbelief before the evaluation and remuneration system, cannot occur in environments where trust, concern with the reputation and the perception of fairness are considered fundamental characteristics, which is more common in families companies

Submitted by William Justo Figueiro (williamjf) on 2015-07-03T13:41:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 33.pdf: 1124727 bytes, checksum: 13f67fb58a5e7f4f1395960e55e270ff (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-03T13:41:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 33.pdf: 1124727 bytes, checksum: 13f67fb58a5e7f4f1395960e55e270ff (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-06-20 / Nenhuma / O presente trabalho teve como objetivos, discutir o papel das lideranças empresariais na implementação de um Plano de Remuneração Variável (PRV) e as repercussões de âmbito pessoal e profissional deste processo. Para tanto, foi realizado um estudo de caso em uma organização do segmento de comercialização de commodities que passou recentemente por uma joint venture e implementou o PRV. O referencial teórico desenvolvido abordou os seguintes tópicos: 1) remuneração variável e desempenho; 2) a motivação e comprometimento no trabalho; 3) aspectos da cultura e clima organizacional; 4)comunicação organizacional. A coleta de dados foi feita através de entrevistas semiestruturadas e presenciais, com 10 lideranças que atuam na empresa estudada e pesquisa documental, que teve tratamento de dados pela análise de conteúdo, sendo utilizada na análise das categorias para corroborar e/ou confrontar os dados oriundos das entrevistas. Os dados foram analisados pela técnica da Análise Textual Discursiva (MORAES, 2003), sendo identificadas as seguintes categorias de análise: 1) processo de implementação (HANASHIRO, TEIXEIRA e ZACCARELLI, 2010); 2) principais desafios na implementação do PRV (ROSSI, 2004); 3) necessidade de ajustes (BARBOSA, 1999); 4) a liderança e o papel do líder (BASS e AVOLIO, 1994); 5) sentimentos das lideranças no processo de implementação do PRV (DESSLER, 1996); 6) o mais fácil e o mais difícil na implementação do PRV (FLEURY e FLEURY, 2004); 7) o que se faria diferente na implementação do PRV (WRIGHT, 2000); 8) repercussões profissionais da implementação do PRV nas equipes (KOHN, 1998); 9) reflexões a respeito de consequências da implementação do PRV na vida pessoal dos participantes (GOMES e AMORIM, 2008); 10) alinhamento entre estratégias de crescimento da empresa e a implementação do PRV (WOOD Jr. e PICARELLI, 2004); 11) mudanças percebidas nos profissionais das equipes (HANASHIRO, TEIXEIRA e ZACCARELLI, 2010); 12) recomendações às lideranças que pretendem implementar um PRV (HANASHIRO, TEIXEIRA e ZACCARELLI, 2010). Os principais resultados apontam para a necessidade de líderes engajados no processo de implementação e conhecedores do PRV, o entendimento de que se trata de uma ferramenta estratégica de gestão e indutora de cultura organizacional, da importância de uma comunicação clara e correta para a devida compreensão do PRV nos mais diversos níveis hierárquicos e a absoluta necessidade de alinhamento entre os alvos individuais e as estratégias da organização. / The main objectives of this project are to discuss the leadership role in industrial corporations which are implementing a Variable Compensation Plan (VCP), and the personal and professional repercussions of this process. This searching project utilized an international corporation of commodities, formed recently by a joint venture, which implemented a new VCP on the last year. In the theoretical foundation of this work are appointed the following topics: 1) variable contribution and performance; 2) motivation and work engagement; 3) cultural and organizational climate; 4) communication. Data collection was performed by semi structured and present interviews, with 10 leaderships of the corporation studied. Complementary information was collected through documental search, treated by data analysis, and utilized as subject of comparison with information from interviews. These data was analyzed through Discursive Textual Analyzes method (MORAES, 2003), which determined the following categories: 1) VCP implementation process (HANASHIRO, TEIXEIRA and ZACCARELLI, 2010); 2) main challenges on VCP implementation (ROSSI, 2004); 3) adjustments identified on process (BARBOSA, 1999); 4) the leadership and its roles (BASS and AVOLIO, 1994); 5) leaderships feelings about VCP implementation process (DESSLER, 1996); 6) most difficult and easiest procedures identified on VCP implementation (FLEURY and FLEURY, 2004); 7) what should be different on VCP implementation (WRIGHT, 2000); 8) professional repercussions on work teams during VCP implementation (KOHN, 1998); 9) personal life consequences generated by VCP implementation (GOMES and AMORIM, 2008); 10) VCP and organization growth strategies alignment (WOOD Jr. and PICARELLI, 2004); 11) changes on professional behavior of work team (HANASHIRO, TEIXEIRA and ZACCARELLI, 2010); 12) recommendations to leaders wich intend to implement a VCP (HANASHIRO, TEIXEIRA and ZACCARELLI, 2010). Main results appoint to the importance of engagement and knowledge of leaders about VRP implementation; the understanding that VRP is a strategic management tool; the importance of a clear and correct communication to the right comprehension of VRP in all hierarchic levels; and the necessity of alignment between individual targets and the organization strategies.

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether institutional ownership has an influence on CEO compensation in companies where the institutions have invested. In order to fulfil the purpose of the thesis a quantitative study was carried out within the Swedish corporate context where we have studied Swedish institutional investors and companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Our period of study was the financial year of 2007.</p><p>The empirical questions at issue is; Was there a connection between Swedish institutional ownership and the size of the CEO compensation, and, does Swedish institutional ownership lead to a certain type of CEO compensation in terms of structure?</p><p>Our results did not suggest that an increased institutional ownership neither leads to a certain type of salary level nor a certain kind of salary structure. These results contradict earlier American research, which has been done within this area and has previously shown a secured connection.</p><p>The reasons for our results may be many and it is difficult to state any concrete conclusions to why we received differing results. Based on our results we can only state that institutional ownership is not decisive for the formation of CEO compensation. It remains for future research to disprove the results of this study.</p> / <p>Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka hur institutionellt ägande påverkar VD-lönerna i de företag i vilka de har investerat. För att uppfylla vårt syfte har vi genomfört en kvantitativ studie inom den svenska företagskontexten där vi studerat bolag som var noterade på Stockholmsbörsens Large Cap-lista samt svenska institutionella investerare. Den tidsperiod som studerades var räkenskapsåret 2007.</p><p>De frågeställningar som vi ämnar besvara är dels om det finns ett samband mellan svenskt institutionellt ägande och storlek på VD-lön i svenska börsbolag, dels om svenskt institutionellt ägande leder till en viss typ av VD-lönestruktur i svenska börsbolag.</p><p>Våra resultat visar på intet sätt att ökade ägarandelar för institutioner leder till vare sig en viss typ av lönenivå eller en viss typ av lönestruktur. Detta går emot tidigare amerikansk forskning på området som har funnit just dessa samband.</p><p>Förklaringarna till våra resultat kan vara flera och det är svårt att lägga fram några konkreta slutsatser om vad våra resultat beror på. Utifrån våra resultat så kan vi endast konstatera att institutionellt ägande inte är avgörande för VD-löner utformning. Det återstår för vidare forskning att motbevisa det vi kommit fram till.<em></em></p>

<p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om det finns ett samband mellan lönsamhet och storlek på rörlig samt total VD-ersättning i de största svenska aktiebolagen. I uppsatsen diskuteras även funna samband samt bakomliggande teoretiska förklaringar till VD-ersättningens storlek. För att undersöka om VD-ersättning och företags lönsamhet korrelerar utförs kvantitativa undersökningar med hjälp av regressionsanalyser för respektive år mellan 2002 och 2007. Populationen som undersökningen baseras på är de företag som i september 2009 var registrerade på Stockholmsbörsens segment Large och Mid Cap.</p><p>Undersökningen resulterade i slutsatsen att inget samband mellan vare sig rörlig eller total VD-ersättning och lönsamhet kunde styrkas. Istället gavs indikationer om andra faktorer som påverkade VD-ersättningens storlek. Studien visade en tydlig koppling mellan företagsstorlek och VD-ersättning. Andra trender indikerade att det marknadsjämförande synsättet är det vanligaste vid fastställande av VD-ersättningsnivåer. Dessutom diskuterades andra faktorers inflytande på VD-ersättningars storlek utifrån tidigare forskning.</p> / <p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether a relationship between CEO compensation and organizational profitability exists in the largest Swedish companies. Both the total and the variable compensation schemes’ dependence on organizational compensation are analyzed. The objective is moreover to discuss the observed relationships in the study as well as the theoretical explanations to the level of the CEO compensation. In order to examine if CEO compensation correlates with organizational profitability quantitative research methods are applied via regression analyses for each separate year between 2002 and 2007. The population our research is based on is the companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in September 2009 within the segments Large and Mid Cap.</p><p>It was concluded that no relationship between neither variable nor total CEO compensation and organizational profitability existed. However, indications of other factors affecting the compensation were indicated. The regression confirmed a relationship between organizational size and CEO compensation. Other trends indicated that the market-based approach was the most common when determining CEO compensation levels. In addition we discussed how other previously proved relationships as well as further theoretical research related to our study.</p>

The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether institutional ownership has an influence on CEO compensation in companies where the institutions have invested. In order to fulfil the purpose of the thesis a quantitative study was carried out within the Swedish corporate context where we have studied Swedish institutional investors and companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Our period of study was the financial year of 2007. The empirical questions at issue is; Was there a connection between Swedish institutional ownership and the size of the CEO compensation, and, does Swedish institutional ownership lead to a certain type of CEO compensation in terms of structure? Our results did not suggest that an increased institutional ownership neither leads to a certain type of salary level nor a certain kind of salary structure. These results contradict earlier American research, which has been done within this area and has previously shown a secured connection. The reasons for our results may be many and it is difficult to state any concrete conclusions to why we received differing results. Based on our results we can only state that institutional ownership is not decisive for the formation of CEO compensation. It remains for future research to disprove the results of this study. / Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka hur institutionellt ägande påverkar VD-lönerna i de företag i vilka de har investerat. För att uppfylla vårt syfte har vi genomfört en kvantitativ studie inom den svenska företagskontexten där vi studerat bolag som var noterade på Stockholmsbörsens Large Cap-lista samt svenska institutionella investerare. Den tidsperiod som studerades var räkenskapsåret 2007. De frågeställningar som vi ämnar besvara är dels om det finns ett samband mellan svenskt institutionellt ägande och storlek på VD-lön i svenska börsbolag, dels om svenskt institutionellt ägande leder till en viss typ av VD-lönestruktur i svenska börsbolag. Våra resultat visar på intet sätt att ökade ägarandelar för institutioner leder till vare sig en viss typ av lönenivå eller en viss typ av lönestruktur. Detta går emot tidigare amerikansk forskning på området som har funnit just dessa samband. Förklaringarna till våra resultat kan vara flera och det är svårt att lägga fram några konkreta slutsatser om vad våra resultat beror på. Utifrån våra resultat så kan vi endast konstatera att institutionellt ägande inte är avgörande för VD-löner utformning. Det återstår för vidare forskning att motbevisa det vi kommit fram till.

Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om det finns ett samband mellan lönsamhet och storlek på rörlig samt total VD-ersättning i de största svenska aktiebolagen. I uppsatsen diskuteras även funna samband samt bakomliggande teoretiska förklaringar till VD-ersättningens storlek. För att undersöka om VD-ersättning och företags lönsamhet korrelerar utförs kvantitativa undersökningar med hjälp av regressionsanalyser för respektive år mellan 2002 och 2007. Populationen som undersökningen baseras på är de företag som i september 2009 var registrerade på Stockholmsbörsens segment Large och Mid Cap. Undersökningen resulterade i slutsatsen att inget samband mellan vare sig rörlig eller total VD-ersättning och lönsamhet kunde styrkas. Istället gavs indikationer om andra faktorer som påverkade VD-ersättningens storlek. Studien visade en tydlig koppling mellan företagsstorlek och VD-ersättning. Andra trender indikerade att det marknadsjämförande synsättet är det vanligaste vid fastställande av VD-ersättningsnivåer. Dessutom diskuterades andra faktorers inflytande på VD-ersättningars storlek utifrån tidigare forskning. / The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether a relationship between CEO compensation and organizational profitability exists in the largest Swedish companies. Both the total and the variable compensation schemes’ dependence on organizational compensation are analyzed. The objective is moreover to discuss the observed relationships in the study as well as the theoretical explanations to the level of the CEO compensation. In order to examine if CEO compensation correlates with organizational profitability quantitative research methods are applied via regression analyses for each separate year between 2002 and 2007. The population our research is based on is the companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in September 2009 within the segments Large and Mid Cap. It was concluded that no relationship between neither variable nor total CEO compensation and organizational profitability existed. However, indications of other factors affecting the compensation were indicated. The regression confirmed a relationship between organizational size and CEO compensation. Other trends indicated that the market-based approach was the most common when determining CEO compensation levels. In addition we discussed how other previously proved relationships as well as further theoretical research related to our study.

Este trabalho procura ampliar os conhecimentos a respeito da influência do enfoque na geração do valor aos acionistas sobre as práticas de gestão de pessoas, com ênfase no ambiente da produção. Inicialmente, o trabalho resgata as origens e os fundamentos da concepção financeira e da concepção da geração de valor ao acionista das empresas, em que o principal foco é a valorização do preço das ações. Em seguida, é analisada a interface que estas concepções possuem com as práticas de gestão de pessoas, explorando o caráter bidirecional desta interface, uma vez que a função recursos humanos não só é influenciada pelas diretrizes das empresas, mas também é tida como uma das principais formas para ajudar a difundi-las, tendo em vista seu papel de agente de mudança de comportamento nas empresas. Neste sentido, são aprofundados três principais elementos que compõem, segundo a literatura, esta interface: a remuneração variável, gestão de desempenho e autonomia no trabalho. Por fim, é apresentado um estudo de casos múltiplos que busca verificar como a concepção financeira das empresas vem influenciando, de fato, estas práticas relacionadas à gestão de pessoas no nível da produção de organizações que atuam no Brasil, assim como o quanto estas práticas têm contribuído para a difusão da mentalidade de geração de valor ao acionista. O resultado deste estudo indica que, no plano conceitual, a influência da orientação à geração de valor ao acionista sobre as práticas de gestão de pessoas é nítida, mas que, na prática, ainda é pouco efetivada, apesar de mudanças já estarem ocorrendo nesta direção. / The objective of this paper is to increase knowledge about the influence of the shareholder value on people management practices, with emphasis on the production environment. Initially, the paper takes a step backwards to the origins and fundaments regarding the finance conception and the shareholder value conception of the firm, where the main focus resides in increasing share prices. The paper then goes on to analyze the interface that these concepts possess with people management practices, exploring the two-way nature of said interface, in view that the human resources function is not only influenced by company guidelines, but is also deemed one of the main forms for helping disseminate it, due to its role as a change agent of behaviors in companies. As such, it delves into the three main elements that, according to literature, comprise this interface: variable compensation, performance management and work autonomy. Lastly, the paper presents a multiple case study that aims to verify how the finance concept of companies has, in fact, been influencing these practices relating to people management at the production level of companies that operate in Brazil, as well as how much these practices have contributed to disseminate the shareholder value mentality. The result of this study shows that, at the conceptual level, the influence of shareholder value on people management practices is quite clear, but that in practice it is still used very little, despite changes that are already occurring in this sense.