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Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis is a proposed methodology for attributing correct application conditions, or 'meanings', to concepts. This methodology involves two stages: first, we seek an empirical understanding of the ways in which usage of a given concept has regularly delivered benefits, and, second, we seek an explication of that concept which is optimally capable of delivering benefits in these ways. Such an explication captures the 'pragmatic meaning' of a given concept. Chapters 1-3 articulate Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis and the notion of pragmatic meaning, and show how these are related to other philosophical methodologies and accounts of concept-meaning.Chapter 4 uses a 'bootstrapping argument' to establish that Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis has two important virtues. The first phase of this argument establishes that Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis has normative authority - it reveals explications that we have practical and epistemic reason to adopt, whether we take these explications to be semantically revisionary or not. This normative authority licenses using Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis, in the second phase, to explicate our shared concept of concept-meaning. This yields the conclusion that we have epistemic reason to adopt the notion of pragmatic meaning as our explication of 'concept-meaning'. Having explicated our concept in this way, we see that Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis also has descriptive authority - it is a semantically conservative tool that reveals concept-meaning, thus explicated.The initial presentation of the bootstrapping argument considers only one sort of work that our concept of concept-meaning does - helping to guide our application of other concepts. But this concept also regularly delivers benefits in a second way - by helping us to give good explanations for the behavior and behavioral success of various concept-users. Chapter 5 uses the normative authority of Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis to justify a particular account of how good explanations work. Chapter 6 draws upon this account to argue that, in order best to explain people's behavioral successes, we need an explication of concept-meaning that is closely related to the one presented in Chapter 4.Chapter 7 considers several objections and hard cases, and argues that Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis weathers these storms in good shape.

Genocides and wars tend to covary yet the link between them is disputed. The definition and the extension of the concept genocide is also a subject of debate. Furthermore, it is disputed if historical cases of genocide are best explained as cases of genocide, or as cases of mass killings or as cases of civilian victimization in war. This paper explores how the definitional issues that surrounds the concept of genocide affect the research that investigates the link between genocide and war. The contribution of the paper is both descriptive and prescriptive. Previous definitions of war, genocide and the link between them is mapped through a systematic review of the most prominent theoretical works in the field. The results of the review is then analyzed with help of the ladder of generality and conceptual mapping. The analysis indicates that total genocide is a relevant concept, when we explore causal links between genocide and war. The conceptual mapping showed that prominent constitutive theories has portrayed war as slaughter and war as conflict. It is concluded that redefinitions of genocide, which highlights war as a form of policing or as an art or a form of self-expression, could contribute to our explanation of how wars enable genocide.

Given the heterogeneity of symptoms allowed in the diagnosis of psychotic disorders, as well as other challenges of categorical diagnosis (e.g., First et al., 2002; Krueger, 1999), the increased specificity brought by dimensional ratings of underlying features is often important. Models using the factorial structure of psychotic symptoms perform as good as or better than traditional categorical models (Allardyce, Suppes, & Van Os, 2007). DSM-5 has provided such a system of ratings to aid clinicians, the Clinician Rated Dimensions of Psychosis Symptom Severity Scale (PSS; APA, 2013). In this approach, the clinician rates symptom severity in eight domains which emphasize traditional psychotic symptomatology, cognition, and mood. Given its accessibility and the support of the DSM-5, it is possible that the measure could achieve wide use. However, little is known about the measure and the challenges of applying it in clinical settings. This study is a conceptual analysis of the conceptual foundation of the PSS, including its psychometric properties, applications, and demonstrated validity. It is also compared to the widely used Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale – Revised (BPRS-R). The PSS is more concise that other measures, and five of the PSS domains parallel the DSM-5's "Key Features That Define the Psychotic Disorders" (p. 87-88) (although the brief instructions of the PSS differ at times from DSM-5 definitions, and little in the way of definition is offered in the PSS itself). In contrast, no rationale is given for adding the remaining three domains. The dimensional model of the PSS has similarities to the factor structure typically found for symptomatology in psychotic disorder, but a number of important differences are noted. The data required for making ratings is never defined, although the only mention of data that might be helpful for rating one of the domains depends upon extensive testing. Although anchors for the ratings might, at first glance, appear to be given in the PSS, in fact, they offer almost nothing beyond the adjectives of "equivocal," "mild," "moderate," and "severe." Finally, we found that very little research exists on the PSS, no field trial was done, psychometric properties are largely unknown, and normative data is unavailable. The PSS is brief and provides a quick way to rate the severity of the five key features of psychosis required by DSM-5 diagnoses. Thus, it can work as a quick quantification of these features. Beyond this its utility is unknown, and it appears to lack the specificity of other rating scales, such as the BPRS-R.

Traditional philosophy has been under attack from several quarters in recent years. The traditional philosopher views philosophy as an armchair discipline relying, for the most part, on reason and reflection. Some philosophers doubt the legitimacy of this type of inquiry. Their arguments usually occur along two dimensions. Some argue that the primary data source for the armchair philosopher--intuition--does not provide evidence for philosophical theories. Others argue that conceptual analysis, which is the preferred method of inquiry for armchair philosophers, can't yield the results the philosopher is looking for, since concepts like 'knowledge' or 'free-will' vary from culture to culture or even between persons within a culture. Finally, some philosophers argue that we should abandon the armchair program because philosophy should be an empirical enterprise continuous with the sciences. I argue that attempts to undermine intuition fail and that one can justify the evidential status of intuition in a non-question begging way. I then argue that attacks on the belief in shared concepts do not succeed because they often conflate the nature of scientific objects with those of interest to the philosopher. However, if concepts do vary from culture to culture, I show that the philosopher need not abandon the armchair. She can still do conceptual analysis but it will be only the entry point into the philosophical dialogue. I apply this approach to epistemology arguing that the central epistemic questions ought to be the existential and the normative. This approach helps to vindicate epistemic internalism.

This study is a conceptual analysis of specific terms and constructs that have become entrenched within education policy and practice in New Zealand within the 21st century – namely diversity , and Pasifika education. It is uncommon for users of these terms (educators, policy makers and researchers) to make their understandings and use of such terms explicit. In the absence of close and careful critique, limited and partial understandings of groups of learners constructed as diverse and different escape interrogation. The overall risks of this lack of conceptual clarity are: simplification and even misapprehensions of key dimensions of groups such as Pasifika learners and their communities. This results in unarticulated assumptions having undue influence over educators’, policymakers’ and researchers’ perspectives and their subsequent decision-making. The philosophical research questions of this study are addressed through a deconstructivist research framework that draws on the theorisations of J.R. Martin; M. Foucault’s theorisations relating to the historical analysis of ideas; and discourse theorising of a primarily post-structuralist nature. Six analyses were developed in order to address the research questions. Three focused on the level of national policies, macro-level influences, and post-colonial indigenous visioning. Three analyses are based on a selection of narrative accounts of Samoan women across time and space, examining education as a process of change, and its effects on personal identity and culture. The study critically reflects on the underlying values and belief systems of both policy and practice. It identifies and examines the tension between the state’s priorities for the provision of education for Pasifika peoples on the one hand, and Pasifika peoples’ motivations for pursuing and participating in education on the other. This is done in an effort to challenge complacency, provide alternative perspectives, deepen insights and strengthen understandings amongst those actively engaged as educators, policy makers and researchers in the education and development of Pasifika peoples in Aotearoa New Zealand.

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Many of those artefacts with which we are so familiar – including, for example, works of music, photographs, novels, essays, films, television adverts, and graphic designs – share a common ontological nature. I argue in this thesis that they are all repeatable, and set out to provide an ontological account of these entities that explains the phenomenon of repeatability. In a fruitful meeting of aesthetics and metaphysics, a great deal has been written recently on the ontological nature of musical works. More encompassing enquiries have sought to understand the ontology of artworks in general. I will be responding to and engaging with this body of literature insofar as it also offers accounts of the entities I describe as repeatable. However, my approach gives metaphysical concerns and the phenomenon of repeatability primacy over aesthetic concerns.Here I argue that repeatable artefacts fall into the ontological category of kinds. I develop an account of repeatable artefacts as kinds that has two key components. Firstly, on my view kinds are physical rather than abstract. Secondly, I argue that repeatable artefacts, as kinds, have essences that are purely relational and historical. The thesis begins with a discussion of method. The methodological issue has grown in prominence in recent years, as theorists have sought some higher level arbitration on the expanding number of theories and approaches being offered in response to ontological puzzles. Drawing on the work of Amie Thomasson, I defend a methodology according to which we should develop an ontological account using careful conceptual analysis that assesses our intuitions about the application of referring terms. This commitment to conceptual analysis is then defended from misunderstandings and objections. I apply this method in giving an ontological explanation for the phenomenon of repeatability. I argue that repeatable artefacts are kinds. Kinds are strongly individuated by their essences, which are the conditions that must be satisfied for the kind to be instanced. I then develop an account of kinds as physical multiply located entities, that exist when and where they have instances. This stands in contrast to the prevailing view according to which kinds are abstract. I then set out to give an account of the essences of paradigmatic repeatable artefacts. I argue that this can be done if we are willing to reject the default view according to which essences are at least partly structural, and replace it with an account of purely relational and historical essences. The essences of many paradigmatic repeatable artefacts, I claim, involve causal historical processes of copying.

More than a hundred years ago, the world was affected by the infamous pandemic virus, the Spanish flu, which lasted from 1918 to 1920. During this period, the First World War broke out. In the spring of 2020, the world was affected by a new pandemic virus called the Coronavirus (COVID-19). For the people who lived during 1918–1920 and the present, each virus has had enormous repercussions on their own lives and safety. For each epidemic, it has meant the political and economic stability in the world has been exposed. The world from then and now differs immensely from each other. Today, there are alternative opportunities to replace the regular lessons with digital connection. This study will make a historical comparative study between the Spanish flu and the coronavirus. In this study, two magazines aimed at teachers will be selected for each pandemic. This is done to see how the schools were affected by each epidemic, what measures were taken against the infection and what difficulties arose with it.

The Adam and Eve myth has long captured the attention of Christian and non-Christian minds alike. Tropes of paradise, serpents, fruit, and fallenness appear in works such as Milton’s Paradise Lost, Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Golding’s Lord of the Flies, Emily Dickenson’s “Awake ye Muses Nine,” Walt Whitman’s “Great are the Myths” and Joyce Kilmer’s “The Snowman in the Yard.” Religious commentary on Adam and Eve is equally pervasive; most notably the theology of St. Augustine whose work may well be considered the most influential in Western Christianity. Even though a story as old as this one may not seem relevant in a first-world culture where newness is both expected and valued, the legacy of the Adam and Eve myth has not diminished. Linda Shearing writes, “Whether they realize it or not, Americans spend a great deal of time negotiating their world with Adam and Eve” (Schearing 3). To test Shearing’s assertion, this essay seeks to illuminate the ways in which Americans negotiate Adam, Eve, and Eden in political rhetoric and how assumptions of marriage, family, labor, sacrifice, fallenness, redemption and morality are used by political leaders as a persuasive appeal to encourage their audiences to join with them in recovering a state of purity and innocence.