Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan. / Bibliography: leaves 380-411.

"The writing of constitutions in Africa in the 1990s seems to have become fashionable after years of political wilderness following decades of one-party rule, military dictatorships and no-party regimes. African states engaged in the process of crafting new and democratic constitutions in search of democratic and legitimate governance based on the free will of the peoples, and to foster democratic traditions. Transition to democracy is a sacred undertaking, the challenge of which is to develop constitutional and institutional mechanisms in the hope of building viable and durable democratic values and practices that would guarantee political stability, peaceful and orderly change of government, the rule of law and the complete respect for human rights. Constitution-making must be seen as a means of bringing peace and creating a stable and prosperous African continent where the people take charge of the governance and their political and economic destiny in complete freedom. This study inquires into the extent to which this goal has been achieved, with particular reference to Swaziland and Uganda. Swaziland is the only absolute monarchy in the Southern Africa region after Lesotho adopted a democratic constitution in 1993, with the King becoming a constitutional monarch. Uganda has been operating under the Movement Political System (MPS) that, until recently, did not allow free political activity. ... The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 focuses on the circumstances (context) and gives an overview of the organizational structure. Chapter 2 deals with the concepts and basic principles of constitutionalism, democracy, and human rights. Chapter 3 scrutinises the legislative mechanisms that set the process in motion and how the constiutional mandate was executed. The chapter considers the effect of the enabling legislation on ratification and implementation of the rights enshrined in the African Charter. It also looks at the role of civil society in influencing the process. To a limited extent, a comparative case study of other processes in Africa, especially the South African and Zambian experiences, is made. Chapter 4 is a discussion of human rights instruments providing for the right to participate; article 13 of the African Charter, article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR). A discussion of the content and meaning of the right to participate in international law is made, focusing on the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, as well as the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (HRC). Chapter 5 is conclusions and recommendations." -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2005. / Prepared under the supervision of Dr. Henry Onoria at the Faculty of Law, Peace and Human Rights Centre, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

"The constitutions of Rwanda and Burundi both contain provisions to support democracy as well as the notion of power sharing. Despite the fact that democracy can be enhanced by a government that comes to power through the popular will of the people, that is, universal adult suffrage, it must be noted that this shall depend on the use of [an] electoral system that ensures greater proportionality of representatives to the popular vote. This paper aims to analyse the impact of power sharing on democracy. Furthermore, this paper compares the approach of Burundi and Rwanda in their constitutions to the concept of power sharing. ... To achieve its objective, the study is structured as follows: the first chapter contains the general introduction, which encompasses the background of the study, the relevance of the study, the research methodology, the literature review and the limitation of the study. The second chapter deals with the concept of power sharing and analyses its application in the constitutions of Rwanda and Burundi. Chapter three will focus on the concept of constitutionalism, analysing if the constitutional provisions of Rwanda and Burundi comply with [it], and chapter four will analyse [if] the constitutions of Rwanda and Burundi comply with democracy. In chapter five a general conclusion will be drawn and recommendations will be made." -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2005. / Prepared under the supervision of Professor Pierre de Vos, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

"While public participation in constitution-making is recognised under international law, its extent is not elaborated. This has resulted in governments pursuing constitution-making processes that, despite involving public participation, do not involve meaningful public participation. As shall be illustrated in this study, this is the dilemma faced in Zambia. Zambia has experienced constitutional instability since independence. It has had four constitutions since then, and is currently in the process of making its fifth. This will represent an average of a new constitution every eight years: one of the highest rates of constitutional change in Commonwealth Africa. This is an unimpressive record in so far as it is generally accepted that a constitution defines and limits the exercise of governmental power, and regulates major political activities in a country. It cannot, therefore, be frequently subjected to change like any other ordinary piece of legislation. ... This study constitutes five chapters. Chapter one introduces the study. Chapter two analyses the origins and nature of government and constitution. Chapter three examines and analyses the constitutional development process in Zambia from the pre-colonial period to the current time. In chapter four, the making of the current constitution of South Africa is duscussed and analysed. Chapter five provides the conclusion and recommendations." -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2006. / Prepared under the supervision of Prof. Edward Kofi Quashigah at the Faculty of Law, University of Ghana, Legon / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

A literal reading of the United States Constitution finds no mention of education.  Because no fundamental federal mandate exists to provide public education for citizens, the Tenth Amendment gives states the authority for public education policy.  Because states have different constitutional standards for education, civics requirements have little national consistency.  This thesis explores the connections between state constitutional provisions for public education and graduation requirements for civics in each state. The research examined how state constitutions address education policy and whether states with language specifically connecting education to the maintenance of democracy required more stringent civics requirements for students to graduate from secondary school.  Further investigation explored whether and how state constitutions in Minnesota and Wisconsin appeared to influence the development of graduation requirements.  Indeed, Minnesota, whose constitution connects education to the maintenance of democracy, had a curriculum policy process far more rooted in its constitutional traditions than did Wisconsin, which had no such constitutional language or curriculum process. / Master of Arts

No description available.

La Côte d’Ivoire a connu quatre transitions démocratiques avec des trajectoires similaires depuis son indépendance en 1960. Ces transitions impulsées par des influences internes et externes, à travers de nombreuses réformes constitutionnelles, n’aboutissent guère à la démocratisation et à la mise en place d’un État de droit. Cette étude de cas a pour but d’expliquer pourquoi les expériences de démocratisation entre 1990 et 2012 ne parviennent pas à la consolidation démocratique, et ce, malgré les changements constitutionnels majeurs engagés dès 1990. La première partie définit notre cadre théorique et notre démarche expérimentale. La seconde partie analyse les transitions démocratiques et le poids des institutions ivoiriennes. La troisième partie montre de quelles manières le comportement des acteurs politiques locaux et étrangers, à l’égard de la Constitution ivoirienne, affecte positivement et négativement la démocratisation. Enfin, en guise de conclusion l’étude livre des pistes de réflexion pour la réussite du processus en cours. / Since its independence in 1960, Côte d'Ivoire has experienced four similar democratic transitions. These transitions, driven by internal and external factors, through many constitutional reforms, have not succeeded. Thus, the Ivorian transitions did not lead the country to democratization nor to the implementation of a rule of law. ‪This case study aims to explain why the experiences of democratization between 1990 and 2012 fail to reach democratic consolidation, despite the major constitutional changes undertaken since 1990. The first part defines our theoretical framework and our experimental approach. The second part analyzes the transitions and the power of Ivorian institutions. The third part shows ways in which the behavior of local and foreign politicians, with regard to the Constitution, positively and negatively affect democratization. Finally to conclude, the study suggests further reflection opportunities for the success of the current transition process.‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

Tableau d’honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2013-2014. / Les obstacles aux grandes modifications constitutionnelles poussent de plus en plus les acteurs politiques à préférer l’unilatéralisme au multilatéralisme en privilégiant la voie de la modification unilatérale et de la para-constitutionnalité. Dans cette perspective, ce mémoire analyse dans quelle mesure le Parlement fédéral peut faire évoluer certains aspects du Sénat, en proposant et en appliquant une grille d’analyse permettant d'envisager les réformes que ce dernier peut mener seul, en marge des procédures multilatérales de modification constitutionnelle. En plus d'aborder la procédure de modification et les réformes institutionnelles, cette étude traite du statut et de la hiérarchie des normes constitutionnelles qui sont visées par ces réformes. Elle permet d'envisager les questions qui pourraient faire l'objet de décisions judiciaires dans les prochaines années, que ce soit pour la réforme du Sénat, mais plus largement pour les situations impliquant la délimitation du pouvoir constituant unilatéral du Parlement fédéral ou des assemblées législatives provinciales. / The obstacles facing great constitutional reforms increasingly push political actors to prefer unilateralism over multilateralism by way of privileging both the path of unilateral modification and para-constitutionality. Accordingly, this paper analyses the extent to which the federal Parliament can alter certain aspects of the Senate, by proposing and applying an analytical framework for assessing the reforms that the latter may make without the use of multilateral procedures for constitutional amendment This study not only addresses the modification procedure and institutional reforms but also deals with the status and the hierarchy of the constitutional norms being aimed by these reforms. It takes into consideration the questions which could become subject of judicial decisions in the years to come, whether it be for the reform of the Senate or more broadly for situations involving the delimitation of the unilateral constituent power of the federal Parliament and provincial legislatures.

Le 17 avril 1982, le système politique canadien, qui prenait racine dans les doctrines du parlementarisme classique anglais, s’est vu bouleversé par des changements constitutionnels d’envergure. En effet, la constitutionnalisation du droit effectuée en 1982 – par l’entremise de l’enchâssement de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés – a eu pour effet d’octroyer au pouvoir judiciaire un accroissement de sa prérogative constitutionnelle de révision judiciaire des lois donnant cours, selon certains, à la judiciarisation du politique au Canada. Cette problématique a fait l’objet de nombreuses recherches menées par des juristes et des politologues, tout particulièrement. Ce faisant, ces auteurs ont élaboré des théories constitutionnelles variées qui ont toutes comme objectif singulier de rendre compte de cette judiciarisation du politique. À ce titre, les théories émanant du corpus documentaire étudié sont celles : (1) de la critique de la Charte, (2) du dialogue, (3) de l’interprétation constitutionnelle coordonnée et, enfin, (4) du comportement stratégique du pouvoir judiciaire.

Thèse en cotutelle : Université Laval, Québec, Canada et Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve,Belgique / La présente thèse de doctorat porte sur la révision constitutionnelle dans les sociétés fragmentées. Elle ambitionne d’analyser et de comparer de quelle manière sont aménagées les procédures de révision constitutionnelle dans les États qui sont aux prises avec d’importants clivages linguistiques, ethniques ou religieux. Pour analyser cette problématique, nous mobilisons le cadre théorique du fédéralisme consociatif. Ce dernier est une articulation particulière du principe fédératif qui prend forme dans le respect des enseignements et des postulats du consociationalisme (ou démocratie consociative). Le fédéralisme consociatif est particulièrement pertinent pour étudier les procédures de révision constitutionnelle dans les sociétés fragmentées, puisqu’il recommande un ensemble d’arrangements institutionnels et de propositions normatives qui ont pour vocation de faciliter l’atteinte et le maintien de la stabilité politique dans un État marqué par d’importants clivages. Entre autres choses, le fédéralisme consociatif propose, comme principal postulat normatif, que les élites politiques des différents segments de la population sont plus susceptibles d’établir les consensus nécessaires à la conduite des affaires de l’État que ne l’est la population de ces mêmes groupes. Cette proposition est au cœur de notre démonstration, qui cherche à établir dans quelle mesure le rôle et l’influence des élites politiques sont un moteur de consensus lors du processus constituant, de même que de quelle manière les procédures de révision intégrant le peuple peuvent se faire en évitant d’exacerber les tensions entre les segments démotiques de la société. À partir d’une démarche comparative, nous étudions les processus constituants en place en Belgique, au Canada et en Suisse, tout en nous alimentant de certains autres systèmes. Nos résultats nous amènent à conclure qu’effectivement, la présence d’une grande coalition consociative est un important moteur de consensus, mais également que, parfois, les procédures de démocratie directe peuvent avoir pour effet d’accentuer la recherche de consensus entre élites, et donc de s’inscrire dans une dynamique consociative. Nous en venons donc à confirmer le postulat au fondement du consociationalisme, tout en le nuançant à certains égards. / This doctoral thesis focuses on constitutional change in divided societies. The aim is to analyse and compare how constitutional change processes are organized in states that are divided along linguistic, ethnic or religious lines. To analyse this problem, we mobilise the theoretical framework of consociational federalism. The latter is a particular articulation of the federal principle that takes shape in accordance with the teachings and postulates of consociationalism (or consociational democracy). Consociational federalism is particularly relevant to the study of constitutional chance processes in divided societies, since it recommends a set of institutional arrangements and normative proposals that are intended to facilitate the achievement and maintenance of political stability in states marked by important cleavages. Among other things, consociational federalism proposes, as its main normative premise, that political elites from the different segments of the population are more likely to build the consensus necessary for the conduct of state affairs than the population of those same groups. This proposition is central to our demonstration, which seeks to establish the extent to which the role and influence of political elites is a driver of consensus in the constituent process, as well as how people-inclusive constitutional change procedures can be achieved without exacerbating tensions between the demotic segments of a society. Using a comparative approach, we study the constituent processes in place in Belgium, Canada and Switzerland, while also drawing on some other systems. Our results lead us to conclude that the presence of a large consociational coalition is indeed an important driver of consensus, but also that, at times, direct democratic processes can have the effect of accentuating the search for consensus among political elites, and thus become part of a consociational dynamic. We therefore come to confirm the premise underlying consociationalism, while at the same time tempering it in certain respects