Disclosure of accounting information is crucial in facilitating efficient contracts in the publicly listed firm and in reducing information asymmetries in capital markets. A well-known perception in disclosure literature is that, as the separation between managers and owners increases, so does the demand for publicly available disclosure. Many publicly listed firms around the world are controlled by a few large owners that obtain information through their insider positions in the firm. Thus, variations in ownership structures have a considerable effect on how firms’ disclosure practices are resolved. Despite the increased attention paid to the identity of controlling owners and their influence on financial reporting practices, little is known about how owner types and governance mechanisms influence corporate disclosures and capital-market effects. This thesis contributes to the disclosure literature by studying a context in which controlling owners have a large influence on the governance and disclosure practices of firms. This contrasts with the much-studied setting in which management influences the governance and reporting decisions of firms. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to examine the determinants and capital-market effects of Swedish listed firms’ annual report disclosure. This thesis uses a self-constructed disclosure index from manually gathered data from the annual reports of Swedish publicly listed firms during the years 2001 to 2013. This includes information on the notes to the financial statements, corporate governance and strategy. The findings of the four empirical studies show that the ownership structure of firms and the various contractual relationships that firms are engaged in, drive the disclosure practices. Additionally, the results indicate that higher levels of disclosure decrease information asymmetries between capital-market participants and increase trading activity. However, the findings also show that firms with controlling owners are less forthcoming with disclosure, even after a new disclosure reform. Considering the large influence of controlling owners in the studied context, these are important findings in the research field and in regulators’ processes of deriving disclosure regulation. The thesis concludes that the variety in firms’ disclosure incentives and local governance structures are important disclosure determinants to understand in framing international accounting standards.

Die vorliegende kumulative Dissertation analysiert Determinanten und Konsequenzen der Berichterstattung von Unternehmen im deutschen Kaiserreich. Das erste Papier analysiert den Zusammenhang zwischen der freiwilligen Publizität und dem Produktmarktwettbewerb. Auf der Grundlage einer Stichprobe von 570 Unternehmensjahren lässt sich ein negativer Zusammenhang zwischen der freiwilligen Publizität und dem potentiellen Wettbewerb zeigen. Darüber hinaus finde ich einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen der freiwilligen Publizität und der Branchenprofitabilität. Schließlich finde ich einen positiven Zusammenhang zwischen der freiwilligen Publizität und dem existierenden Wettbewerb. Dieser Zusammenhang ist jedoch nur für Branchenfolger statistisch signifikant. Im zweiten Papier analysiere ich den Einfluss von (überraschenden) Dividendenankündigungen auf die Berliner Börse im Jahr 1895. Auf der Grundlage einer Stichprobe von 166 Unternehmen finde ich positive (negative) kumulierte abnormale Renditen als Reaktion auf eine positive (negative) Dividendenüberraschung. Querschnittsanalysen zeigen, dass diese Effekte mit der Signaling Theorie vereinbar sind. Darüber hinaus lässt sich zeigen, dass der Handel auf dem Kapitalmarkt um die Dividendenankündigungen herum erhöht ist. Dies ist vereinbar mit der differentiellen Erwartungsrevision. Das dritte Papier analysiert schließlich den Zusammenhang zwischen der Zusammensetzung des Aufsichtsrats und dem bilanzpolitischen Verhalten von Unternehmen zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts. Bei diesen Unternehmen lässt sich der von Burgstahler/Dichev (1997) dargestellte „earnings kink“ nachweisen. Darüber hinaus lässt sich zeigen, dass dieser „earnings kink“ nicht mehr präsent ist, sobald die Gewinne um Abschreibungen korrigiert werden. Es lässt sich allerdings nicht zeigen, dass die Präsenz von Bankdirektoren im Aufsichtsrat mit dem „earnings kink“ oder der Höhe der abnormalen Abschreibungen verbunden ist. / This cumulative Ph.D. thesis analyzes determinants and consequences of financial accounting practices in Imperial Germany. The first paper analyzes the relationship between product market competition and voluntary disclosure. Based on a balanced panel of 570 firm-years, I find a negative association between voluntary disclosure and potential competition. I also find a negative association between industry profitability and voluntary disclosure. Finally, I find a positive association between existing competition and voluntary disclosure for industry followers. The second paper analyzes share price and trading effects around dividend announcements of firms listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange in 1895. Based on a sample of 166 firms, I find a statistically and economically significant positive (negative) cumulative average abnormal return following a positive (negative) dividend surprise. Cross-sectional analyses show that these effects are consistent with the dividend signaling hypothesis. I furthermore find that trading is increased around the announcements. This is consistent with a differential belief revision among individual investors. The third paper analyzes the earnings of 50 public and 50 private German firms for the fiscal years 1903-1907. I find the earnings kinks reported by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). I also find that these kinks disappear once I adjust earnings for depreciations. However, my analyses do not support a divergent probability to avoid small losses and earnings decreases when firms are monitored by bank directors. Based on a propensity score matching I do also not find systematic differences in discretionary depreciations between firms monitored by bank directors and firms without such bank attachments in general.