This dissertation discusses the life and the writings of the seventeenth-century Dutch Cartesian Johannes Swartenhengst (1644-1711). Thus far Swartenhengst has always been an obscure and little-noticed figure in the history of the Early Dutch Enlightenment, who is only briefly mentioned in a couple of secondary sources due to his intellectual association with the Flemish philosopher Arnold Geulincx (1624-69). In recent years I have discovered fourteen previously unknown disputations that Swartenhengst presided over during his career as lector at Leiden in the early 1670s. Swartenhengst’s appointment at this university was, however, soon terminated on account of his overzealous defence of Cartesian philosophy, and no significant details have remained from his life hereafter. Although Swartenhengst’s disputations bear a somewhat concise and impersonal character (as is typical for the genre), they touch upon all the major philosophical disciplines that were then taught at the university. Swartenhengst’s dismissal occurred at a particularly heated moment, when the ecclesiastical pressure that had been building up since the political changes of 1672 now finally culminated at the university. His disputations, therefore, provide us with an interesting example of the Cartesian views that were circulating in academic circles, but which were apparently no longer tolerated. More importantly, however, Swartenhengst’s disputations also provide us with an interesting case study of the immediate continuation of Geulincx’s philosophy at Leiden, whose views soon disappeared into oblivion on account of their association with Spinozism during the early eighteenth century. Apart from offering a detailed account of Swartenhengst’s biographical details and a discussion of the major theological problems that were associated with René Descartes’ philosophy, this dissertation also includes an analysis of the content of his disputations, which focuses on the topics of occasionalism, epistemology, and natural law. Finally it will be asked how closely Swartenhengst’s disputations related to the views of his teacher Arnold Geulincx; and whether he should be labelled a ‘radical Cartesian’ on account of the content of his teaching? Although Swartenhengst was only a minor player in the history of the Early Dutch Enlightenment, the details of his life and writings certainly represent a unique and interesting story, which can also contribute to our general understanding of the period.

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Cette thèse propose une étude du débat entre Descartes et Pierre Bourdin par la reconstruction historique des évènements et par une analyse des concepts qui ressortent de la controverse. Née autour de questions concernant la dioptrique et soulevée par la publication du Discours et des Essais (1637), et en particulier après la soutenance par Charles Potier de trois thèses contre la Dioptrique en 1640, la controverse passe à la fin de 1641 sur le plan métaphysique avec la rédaction par Bourdin d’une Dissertatio qui sera incluse dans la deuxième édition des Méditations (1642) avec l’Épitre au Père Dinet. L’intervention du Père Dinet, précisément, sera décisive pour la résolution de la dispute, qui coïncide avec la publication des Principia Philosophiæ (1644), dont des copies destinées aux jésuites seront distribuées à Paris par Bourdin. Le premier chapitre est consacré aux thèmes de la critique de la Dioptrique à partir du contexte scientifique de Bourdin, en incluant les thèses de certains de ses élèves et trois manuscrits. Dans le deuxième, j’identifie par l’analyse des Objectiones et Responsiones VII un développement essentiel de la critique de Bourdin. De la méthode du doute, où les commentateurs voient généralement l’essentiel de la critique de Bourdin, dépend selon lui la faiblesse de la théorie de la distinction entre l’âme et le corps. Dans le troisième chapitre, par l’analyse de l’Épitre au Père Dinet, je reconstruis la fin de la controverse et les dynamiques qui la lient à la publication des Principia. La transcription d’une Optique, présente dans un des trois manuscrits, conclut la thèse. / This study looks at the controversy between Descartes and Pierre Bourdin, providing a historical reconstruction and analysing the concepts in their debate. The dispute arose after the publication of Discours and Essais (1637) and, particularly, when Charles Potier defended three theses against the Dioptric in 1640. The dispute evolved from the scientific to the metaphysic plane with Bourdin’s redaction of a Dissertatio, which was included in the second edition of Meditations (1642) as the Seventh Set of Objections with Replies and, together with the Letter to Father Dinet, form an Appendix to Meditations. Dinet’s intervention made possible a reconciliation between Descartes and Bourdin, which coincided with the publication of Principia (1644). The first chapter is dedicated to the themes of the critic to the optic starting from Bourdin’s scientific context, using the theses of the students of the Jesuit College and the contents of three manuscripts. In the second chapter, with the analysis of Objections VII, Bourdin’s critic, which is usually considered to have its focus on the method and, precisely, on doubt, undergoes a crucial development concerning the Cartesian demonstration of real distinction. Bourdin identifies the weakness of the theory of real distinction based on the doubt. This chapter also scrutinizes a lecture of Descartes’ answer that underlines points of tension between Meditations and Answers. The third chapter, analysing Letter to Father Dinet, reconstructs the end of controversy and the dynamic that links it to the publication of Principia. A transcription of an Optic from one of three manuscripts concludes the dissertation.

Ce mémoire a pour objectif de préciser le sens du verbe « abêtir » dans les Pensées de Blaise Pascal. Le sort ayant voulu que l’Apologie de la religion chrétienne demeure à jamais inachevée, le philosophe a emporté un secret épineux dans sa tombe : Qu’a-t-il bien pu vouloir signifier en écrivant que le remède à l’incroyance – répéter les gestes et les paroles liés au culte chrétien – abêtit ? Nous montrons à titre préliminaire que s’abêtir signifie devenir-bête, et que ce changement d’état entretient des liens étroits, tant par le contexte de son énonciation que par son champ lexical, avec le « discours de la Machine » et la notion d’« automate ». Notre analyse permet d’inférer que d’un point de vue strictement formel, s’abêtir renvoie à la préparation des habitudes humaines en vue de la foi. Nous montrons dans les chapitres suivants que le vocabulaire de la Machine/automate/bête est susceptible d’éclaircir trois dimensions de cette préparation. En distinguant les perspectives psycho-physiologique, morale et gnoséologique sur le problème de la conversion religieuse, nous montrons que l’abêtissement peut renvoyer simultanément 1) à l’acquisition d’habitudes corporelles et intellectuelles qui conduisent à la foi ; 2) au renforcement de la vertu d’humilité contre l’orgueil hérité du péché originel et qui fait obstacle à la croyance ; 3) et à l’acquisition passive d’une panoplie de connaissances factuelles tirées des Écritures et de l’histoire, nécessaires à une bonne entente des preuves de la vérité du christianisme. Chacune de ces perspectives fait l’objet d’un chapitre. / This Master’s thesis aims to clarify the meaning of “s’abêtir” in Blaise Pascal’s Pensées. As the Apologie de la religion chrétienne was left unfinished, the French philosopher took his secret to the grave: What did he mean by the idea that the cure for unbelief – repeating actions and words related to Christian worship – results in “s’abêtir” ? I argue that “s’abêtir” means becoming-beast, and that the context in which the notion is uttered as well as the lexical field it covers relate to the “discours de la Machine” and the notion of “automate”. My analysis allows me to say that, formally, “s'abêtir” refers to the preparation of human habits to faith. In the following chapters, I show that the vocabulary of Machine/automate/bête is likely to clarify three dimensions for such a preparation. Depending on the position we adopt with respect to the problem of belief, that is, from a psycho-physiological, moral or epistemological perspective, “s’abêtir” can simultaneously mean 1) acquiring corporeal and intellectual habits that lead to faith ; 2) strengthening the virtue of humility against pride, inherited from original sin ; 3) passively acquiring a range of factual knowledge from Scripture and history necessary to understand the evidence of the truth of Christianity. Each one of these perspectives is the topic of one of the successive chapters of this thesis.

Rembrandt's use of light in his self-portraits has received an abundance of scholarly attention throughout the centuries--and for good reason. His light delights the eye and captivates the mind with its textural quality and dramatic presence. At a time of scientific inquiry and religious reformation that was reshaping the way individuals understood themselves and their relationship to God, Rembrandt's light may carry more intellectual significance than has previously been thought. Looking at Rembrandt's oeuvre of self-portraits chronologically, it is apparent that something happened in his life or in his understanding that caused him to change how he used light. A distinct and consistent shift can be observed in the location and intensity of light to the crown of the forehead. This change indicates that light held particular significance for Rembrandt and that its connection to the head was a signifier with intentional meaning. This meaning could have developed as a result of Rembrandt's exposure to and interest in the contemporary theological and philosophical debates of the seventeenth-century Netherlands, particularly those relating to the physical and eternal nature of the soul stemming from the writings of René Descartes. The relative religious and intellectual freedom of the Dutch Republic provided a safe place for Descartes to publish and defend his metaphysical ideas relating to the nature of the soul and know-ability of God through personal intellectual inquiry. The widespread disturbance to established thought caused by his ideas and methods sped their dissemination into the early seventeenth-century discourse. Rembrandt's associations with the educated elite, particularly Constantijn Huygens and Jan Six, increases the probability that he knew of this new philosophy and had the opportunity to consider its relevance to his own quest for self-knowledge. With his particular emphasis on self-exploration and expression, demonstrated through his prolific oeuvre of self-portraits, and his inclination toward emotive, complex, and interdenominational religious works, it follows that Rembrandt would be eager to embrace Descartes' metaphysics and demonstrate his awareness through his self-portraits. Light on the forehead becomes a metaphor for enlightenment and is the key to reading Rembrandt's late self-portraits through the lens of Cartesian influence.