Submitted by Claudia Bruschi Martins (claudiabruschi@gmail.com) on 2013-06-17T01:16:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Claudia Bruschi.pdf: 397234 bytes, checksum: 3e2548337f0f74878793de011f2eae06 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2013-06-17T11:57:14Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Claudia Bruschi.pdf: 397234 bytes, checksum: 3e2548337f0f74878793de011f2eae06 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-06-17T12:30:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Claudia Bruschi.pdf: 397234 bytes, checksum: 3e2548337f0f74878793de011f2eae06 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-05-17 / Esta dissertação investiga o efeito da pressão competitiva na eficiência de empresas estatais. Ela inova ao abordar um novo meio pelo qual a competição afeta a eficiência: na escolha de presidentes mais qualificados, que consequentemente afetam a eficiência da empresa estatal. Foi construído um painel de dados históricos (1973 a 1993) de empresas estatais brasileiras e de seus presidentes, com suas características observáveis. Os resultados indicam que a competição tem efeito ambíguo na escolha de CEOs mais qualificados, no entanto estes, por sua vez, afetam positivamente a eficiência daquelas empresas. / This dissertation investigates the effect of competitive pressure on the efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It innovates, however, by approaching a new mean by which competition affects efficiency: the choice of the most qualified CEOs, which consequently affects the efficiency of such state-owned enterprises. A panel of historical data of Brazilian SOEs and their CEOs from 1973 to 1993 was created, gathering their observable characteristics. The results indicate that competition has ambiguous effect on the choice of more skilled CEOs.

Executives' compensation has been on the forefront of the public and political debate since the recent financial crisis. One of the measures publicly discussed is a general upper boundary to top management compensation packages ("salary cap", "maximum wage"). While such measures are novelties to the corporate world, the North American major sports leagues have been using maximum compensation regulations for decades. This paper exploits the 23-year experience with salary cap regulations from the National Football League (NFL). The results show a significant negative relation between the success of NFL teams and the amount of the net (after-tax) salary cap represented by the personal income tax rate of the teams' home states. A team from California (highest average tax rate) wins 2.256 games less per year and has an 11% reduced probability of making the playoffs than a team located in a no-tax state such as Florida or Texas. The paper contributes to and informs the ongoing public and political debate regarding the regulation of executive compensation, and its effects on the performance of the regulated entities. / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

Magister Commercii - MCom / The on-going displeasure displayed by the media and business commentators, relating to apparent excessive and unwarranted executive directors' salaries, has increased since the financial turmoil experienced in 2008. The commentaries and reports suggest that corporate governance interventions are not strong enough to curb the excessive remuneration packages awarded to executives and specifically to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). The purpose of the research is to examine the factors that determine and/or shape the relationship between the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO's) compensation and the wealth created for shareholders. The investigation further seeks to find the corporate governance elements, systems and processes that assist in monitoring the CEO's remuneration and performance contract. The null hypothesis is that poor corporate governance prevails in South African listed companies resulting in CEO compensation not being aligned to shareholder wealth creation. The aim is to establish the effectiveness of South African listed companies' adherence to corporate governance measures in addressing the principal/agent problem, commonly referred to as the agency problem. The research embraces a sample of the top 100 actively trading companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) using secondary data. The study builds on existing theories and provides knowledge from a South African perspective.

Chief executives (CEOs) and other senior managers do not seem to be satisfied with the performance of their corporate communication managers/practitioners. Perceptions are that practitioners fail to assume broad decision making roles in organisations. They seem to be unable to see the big picture or understand the key issues in their industry -- their thinking is tactical, rather than strategic. Practitioners are focused on their own activities and media, on the achievement of communication goals and objectives -- without necessarily linking them to business goals. There appears to be a lack of understanding between top management and the corporate communication function on the latter's role in the strategic management process. This situation might be the result of a lack of strategic management and strategic communication knowledge and skills amongst corporate communication managers, possibly caused by insufficient training in these areas (Groenewald 1998a). The research objectives addressed by this study are the following: Firstly, to conceptualise a strategic role for the corporate communication practitioner at the top management level of the organisation (the role of the PR strategist). This is done by investigating the strategic management literature to determine whether a need exists at the top management level to play a strategic role. The behavioural activities of such a role were identified both from the public relations and the strategic management literature. Secondly, to conceptualise corporate communication strategy as an activity of a corporate communication practitioner in the role of the PR manager, a strategic role at the functional or meso level of the organisation. Furthermore, to differentiate a corporate communication strategy from a communication plan. Thirdly, to hypothesise a model for developing corporate communication strategyand thereafter to implement, evaluate and improve the model by assessing and comparing the corporate communication strategy projects of third year corporate communication students at the University of Pretoria, as partners in the action research process. The research approach selected is qualitative research -- an exploratory design is employed in achieving the first three objectives by means of a literature investigation. A confirmatory design is used for the implementation, evaluation and improvement of the model through the methodology of action research. In implementing, evaluating and revising the hypothesised model, this study moves away from the traditional teacher-centred approach in the classroom to a situation where students are involved in a research inquiry to build theory. At the same time, the participant community (non-profit organisations in this case) is exposed to strategic communication knowledge. They are involved in a process whereby they become active participants (together with the students and the lecturer/researcher) in developing corporate communication strategy for their organisations. The results are twofold: firstly, staff members of the non-profit organisation (as well as the students) acquire strategic communication skills; and secondly, the researcher investigates a new area of interest, builds theory, and facilitates a learning process for students whereby they obtain experience and knowledge that is applicable to practice. In conceptualising both a new role for the corporate communication practitioner at the top management level (the role of the PR strategist), and proposing corporate communication strategy as the link between the communication plan and the corporate strategy, an attempt is made to provide possible solutions to important problems in practice. / Dissertation (MCom)--University of Pretoria, 2000. / gm2013 / Communication Management / Unrestricted

Bakgrund Börsnoterade bolag väljer idag att lämna ut en stor mängdfrivilliga upplysningar trots att dessa kan medföra kostnader samt konkurrensnackdelar. En trolig förklaringsfaktor till detta är enligt tidigare studier ledningens kompetenssignalerande.Tanken är att begåvade företagsledare vill stärka sitt egetpersonliga varumärke och marknadsföra sin egen kompetens viaupplysningarna. Med dessa antaganden i åtanke skulle det vara rimligt att anta att det sker förändringar i mängden frivilligaupplysningar när en ny VD eller CFO tillträder och vill sända signaler samt sätta sin egen personliga prägel på företagets externa kommunikation. Syfte Syftet med denna studie är att förklara hur ett byte av VD eller CFO påverkar företags frivilliga upplysningar under räkenskapsåret efter bytet. Metod Denna kvantitativa studie genomfördes med en deduktiv ansats samt en tvärsnittsdesign. Slutsats Studien visade på att ett CFO-byte resulterade i en ökad mängdfrivilliga upplysningar. Studien visade dessutom även att en externt rekryterad CFO leder till fler frivilliga upplysningar än en internt rekryterad CFO. Därutöver kunde studien också visa på vissa indikationer gällande ett positivt samband mellan VD:s ägarandel i företaget samt en ökning av de frivilliga upplysningarna under kommande räkenskapsår. Motsvarande samband för CFO gick dock inte att identifiera. / Background Listed companies choose to voluntary disclose a lot of information even though it could entail costs and competitive disadvantages. A likely explanatory factor for this in earlier studies has been the managements wish to signal their competence. The thought is that gifted managers wish to improve their own personal trademark and to promote their own competence via the voluntary disclosures. With these assumptions in mind, it would be fair to assume that changes in the amount of voluntary disclosures will occur when a new CEO or CFO steps in and wishes to signal competence and add theirown personal touch on the company’s external communication. Purpose The purpose of this study is to explain how a change of CEO or CFO will affect the corporation’s voluntary disclosures in the following fiscal year. Method This quantitative study was performed with a deductive approach and a cross-sectional design. Conclusion The study showed that a change of CFO resulted in an increased amount of voluntary disclosures by the companies. The study also found that an externally recruited CFO will disclose more than an internally recruited CFO. In addition the study also showed indications of a positive relation regarding a CEO’s share of the company and an increase of the voluntary disclosures int he next fiscal year. The same relation could not be observed to also apply for CFO’s.

The purpose of this study is to test the relation, if any, between use of fair value measurement and reported performance ratios of the firms and finally its effect on CEO compensation in Sweden. This research aims to contribute knowledge of decision makers about the performance-pay link in Sweden by comparing the changes of CEO compensations across the years, before and after the use of fair value method. In this sense, firms divided in two models of ownership structure: firms with family concentration and firms with dispersed ownership structure. This paper intent to contribute the explanations of existing researches from the USA and China about exponential increase in CEO compensation after the use of fair value method, with the data of Swedish listed companies. The data set of this study was highly dependent of the accessibility of information. In this sense, this research can be contributed with different data set, with more detailed scrutinise of data and in a longer research period. / <p>Acknowledgements</p><p>Having completed this master thesis in Linnaeus University in 2017, I would like to thank several individuals. I would like to start by thanking Andreas Jansson, Associate Professor of Accounting and Logistics at Linnaeus University, who inspired me about the subject and my supervisor Fredrik Karlsson, Senior Lecturer of Accounting and Logistics at Linnaeus University, for his sincere assistance, guidance and immensely valuable criticisms.</p><p>I owe special thanks to Ozan Uyanık for proofreading my paper, for his never-ending support and his whole year patience and endurance at times of stress. Another special thanks to my friends Ayşegül Girgin Ring and Şeniz Yılmaz for their valuable advice in econometrics and statistics.</p>

Over the past 30 years, the Upper Echelons perspective of strategic management has sought to explain a given organization’s strategies and effectiveness as a reflection of the differences in personality, background, and other characteristics of the senior executives that guides each organization. An important stream of research within this field has linked a firm’s strategy to the grandiose way that executives are often thought to view themselves – namely through examining the narcissism, core self-evaluations (CSE), and hubris of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). In this dissertation, I focus on understanding the strategic impact of CEO humility – a trait that has often been erroneously thought of to represent a poor view of oneself. Consistent with ancient writings and recent research, humility is defined herein as a multi-faceted trait that is the common core of four dimensions: self-awareness, developmental orientation/teachability, appreciation of others' strengths and contributions, and low self-focus. In the first essay, I explore the conceptual relevance and various potential implications of executive humility. Drawing on existing empirical research about the humility construct and general behavioral implications of humility, I argue that executive humility is a critical avenue toward a more rich and nuanced understanding of the delicate interplay and implications of executive self-concept. In essay two, I develop and validate an unobtrusive measure of CEO humility. Ten indicators of humility are suggested and then validated using a self-reported survey administered to a sample of 30 U.S. and Canadian CEOs. Two behaviors were found to be significantly positively related to self-reported humility: CEOs who volunteered some of their time for non-profit organizations and CEO’s who reported that part of their own firm’s success was due to the help of the board of directors. In essay three, I examine the relationship between the level of CEO humility and four firm-level outcomes. Employing a sample of 163 CEOs appointed to S&P 500 firms between 2005-2008, I show that firms led by humble CEOs (measured by the unobtrusive indicators) tend to outperform others in regards to corporate social performance, while at the same time showing that their financial performance is generally no better or worse.

Diploma thesis tests the existence of luck premium on U.S. CEOs' compensations. Luck premium means that in case of high principal-agent costs, CEOs are rewarded for random luck and not only for their productivity. Thesis uses financial crisis in 2008 as a breaking event after which attention and control of CEOs' remuneration by owners, public, and media intensified. Using regression with fixed effects on panel data between years 2004 and 2012 thesis proved impact of luck premium before 2008 while the influence was not significant after 2008. Results were not robust for other model specifications, which might be caused by selectivity of the dataset. Thesis then presents overview of theoretical approaches to CEOs' compensation analysis and recommendations for optimal compensation set-up.

Earnings management has had consequence in financial disasters, such as Enron, WorldCom and Nortel. More recently, it is alleged in the Lehman bankruptcy, which ushered in a global financial meltdown. Yet despite increased regulation and focus on governance and auditing, researchers find that earnings management remains a common practice. Accounting academics have responded to the earnings management problem by conducting studies using secondary data for governance variables and financial models to measure earnings management indirectly. Meanwhile, governance variables measured with secondary data now show little variability because of improved best practice and regulation, and there is strong evidence that the agency causal model and the earnings management measures are seriously flawed. This study uses a mixed-mode research model based on agency and stewardship theory to explain earnings management, and uses a more direct measure of its occurrence, namely the level of board information asymmetries and board monitoring and control actions, as a proxy for earnings management. Primary data is used to provide direct measures of important governance variables, which produce mixed results relative to earnings management using secondary data. In a survey of 245 Canadian public company directors, this study finds that an independent chair, less busy directors, and a smaller board does reduce earnings management, but that this impact is strongly moderated by the CEO's attributes. A CEO with stewardship attributes reduces earnings management, and a CEO with agency attributes increases earnings management. There also is evidence in the study that agency conflict variables improve governance outcomes, in this case, reducing the level of earnings management, and that board processes around monitoring and control actions could be a problem.

Orientation: The available literature has revealed a polarised picture regarding the effects of race on CEO remuneration. This division centres on whether race is a beneficial factor or not with regard to the level and sensitivity of remuneration received. Introducing South Africa’s affirmative labour policies and the growing societal calls to better explain executive remuneration creates the unique opportunity to examine the effects of race on CEO pay. Research purpose: The purpose of the research centred on two important themes. Firstly the research sought to investigate the effects of race on the sensitivity of executive pay to corporate performance. Secondly the effects of race on the level and structure of executive pay was probed. Motivation for the study: The primary motivation of the study centred on determining whether race is has an affect, if any, on the remuneration paid to CEOs in South Africa. This will assist in understanding whether the affirmative polices implemented in South Africa have made any impact in the top level of executive remuneration. Research design: The study was designed to be quantitative, descriptive and longitudinal in nature utilising valid secondary data sources. The BFA Macgregor online financial database was selected as the most appropriate source of both corporate performance information and directors’ remuneration. Nineteen black CEOs were identified along with a random sample of 45 white CEOs. Following the data been analysed for reliability and validity it was then subject to primary and secondary statistical tests to determine significance and correlation strength. Main findings/results: All components of South African CEO remuneration studied were found to strongly correlate to PAT and EBITDA and to a lesser degree ROE and HEPS. ROE and HEPS have shown correlation strength growth in recent years. This collection of measures reflects a balanced basket of accounting-­‐based and non-­‐ accounting based measures. Black and white CEO mean remuneration when compared was found to have no significant difference due to race. A notable difference found was the higher degree of pay-­‐performance sensitivity and variability seen within the black CEO sample. Practical/Managerial implications: King III compels boards and remuneration committees to ensure remuneration of directors is fair and reasonable, sensitive to performance and aligned with the strategy of the organisation. Ensuring realistic pay-­‐ performance sensitivities are not just a corporate governance requirement but also help alleviate principle-­‐agent issues while correctly incentivising the CEO. Boards looking to appoint black or minority CEOs should continue to remunerate in a equitable and fair manner and be aware of such mental biases such as the “inverse Matthew effect” and other social out-­‐group biases especially when evaluating performance. Contribution: The study showed that race doesn’t affect the level of CEO remuneration but does impact on the pay-­‐performance sensitivity and the variability. The difference in sensitivity and variability could indicate the presence of mental biases such as the “inverse Matthew effect” and other social out-­‐group biases when evaluating performance. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / lmgibs2015 / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted