The thesis covers the topic of sustainable finance regarding its terminology, policy strategies and overall goals. In addition, it specifically deals with the way sustainable finance is perceived by central banks and other financial market regulators. The first chapter explains terms like "ESG investing," "positive finance," "socially responsible investment, "principles for responsible investing" "or "green finance" and points out the differences between them. The second chapter concerns with sustainable finance policy strategies adopted both by private businesses and public institutions. Mentioned are, among others, the types of ESG screening methods used by investors, the EU Green Taxonomy, the EU Shareholders' Rights Directive and its framework, the European Green New Deal or the concept of a sustainable fiduciary duty principle. It also touches on sustainable, green taxation in the shape of carbon taxes or emission trading schemes. The third chapter explores the objectives sustainable finance try to meet, specifically the ones having to do with climate change. The chapter entails a summary of the potential climate change scenarios as laid out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The fourth chapter deals with the role that central banks can play in sustainable finance as they gradually step...

The U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) acted in an unprecedented fashion to drive interest rates aggressively and creatively to the zero lower bound (ZLB) and employed other unconventional monetary policy (UMP) tools to provide stimulus to the U.S. economy during the financial crisis and the subsequent extended recovery period. However, despite these innovative policy tools, the U.S. economy realized a historically weak recovery. The unconventional monetary policy tools, including the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet by purchasing longer dated securities, paying interest on reserves, and providing forward guidance, structurally changed the conduct and implementation of monetary policy from the post-WWII experience. Significant research has been developed that describes and analyzes the impact and effectiveness of this experiment in using unconventional monetary policy tools to stimulate the economy. However, very little research has been conducted that studies the response of various economic actors to the Fed’s reversal of these emergency measures as it sought to rein in a potentially overheated economy or counter incipient inflation. When the Fed methodically raised interest rates from 2015 until the end of 2018 investment spending, as indicated by private nonresidential investment spending, did not slow as expected according to mainstream economics or as evident in prior periods of monetary tightening. This anomaly should also be evident in measures at the firm level as firm investment outlays comprise the bulk of the GDP reported private nonresidential investment spending. This research study determined that firm level investment spending, as represented by the growth of total assets, did not respond negatively to the Federal Reserve’s actions that raised interest rates. Other factors such as the general improvement in GDP growth, improved business confidence in the national economy, and greater optimism of near-term firm prospects explain to a far greater degree the growth in total assets compared to Fed activity. Effectively, factors contributing to improved business confidence overwhelmed the Federal Reserve’s intention to slow investment growth by raising interest rates. This research supports the Bernanke et al. (2019) proposal and Hebden and López-Salido’s (2018) research that indicate a stimulative monetary policy when rates are constrained by the effective lower bound and characterized by a lower for longer (L4L) monetary posture results in better output and inflation outcomes. Further, this research offers empirical evidence of Bernanke’s caution that although L4L results in better outcomes, there is a potential for output and/or inflation overshoot forcing the Federal Reserve to abruptly reverse policy stance, a scenario played out by the Federal Reserve soon after it stopped tightening at the end of 2018. The results here expand the work completed by Khan and Upadhayaya (2018), and Konstantinou and Tagkalakis (2011) that business confidence has a significant influence on business investment spending by analyzing the response of business decision makers during an unprecedented time as the Federal Reserve removed emergency measures and turned to a tightening regime. / Business Administration/Interdisciplinary

Este trabalho presta-se a analisar a adequação da execução da política monetária pelos Bancos Centrais, com enfoque especial dado ao Banco Central do Brasil e ao arcabouço normativo atualmente em vigor sobre a matéria. A necessidade de desenvolver este tema sobreveio da verificação, especialmente nas duas últimas décadas, de um distanciamento dos Bancos Centrais em relação às orientações do Poder Executivo. O regime de metas inflacionárias, tido como o ideal para orientar a atuação dos Bancos Centrais e assegurar a estabilidade da moeda foi assumido como o objetivo-fim da política monetária, em detrimento das previsões constitucionais acerca da promoção do desenvolvimento equilibrado do País, da busca do pleno emprego e da redução das desigualdades sociais. Para a análise desenvolvida, partiu-se do método histórico, por meio do qual foi possível verificar, a partir do Século XIX até o presente, de que forma os Bancos Centrais surgiram e galgaram posições de relevo enquanto agentes do Estado orientados a intervir na economia para fins de promoção social, especialmente a partir do surgimento e consolidação do Direito Econômico como ciência jurídica legitimadora da intervenção estatal. Em seguida, buscou-se explorar as funções dos Bancos Centrais, os instrumentos dos quais dispõem para o exercício da política monetária e a adequação dos objetivos dessa política no contexto da política econômica desenvolvida pelo Estado. Por fim, passou-se à análise do Banco Central do Brasil no que concerne a evolução da execução da política monetária, paralelamente às conquistas sociais e políticas do país, com especial destaque para as décadas de 1960 e 1990. / This work is to examine the appropriateness of implementing monetary policy by central banks, with particular emphasis given to the Central Bank of Brazil and the regulatory framework currently in force on the matter. The need to develop this theme came to check, especially in the last two decades, from a distance of central banks in relation to Executive guidelines. Inflation targeting system, seen as the ideal to drive central banks actions and ensure currency stability was adopted as the end goal of monetary policy at the expense of constitutional statements upon balanced development of the country, in pursuit of comprehensive employment and the reduction of social inequalities. For the developed analysis, historical method has been adopted which enabled the understanding from the nineteenth century until present days upon how Central Banks emerged and have risen to prominent positions as agents of the Stated driven to intervene in economy for social advancement, especially since the emergence and consolidation of Economic Law and legal science legitimating state intervention. Then Central Banks central banks functions were explored, theirs tools for monetary policy undertaking and the adequacy of such objectives in the context of economic policy developed by the state. Finally, we have assessed Brazil Central Bank in regards of monetary policy implementation development, along with social and political local achievements, with particular emphasis to the 60s and 90s.

Este trabalho presta-se a analisar a adequação da execução da política monetária pelos Bancos Centrais, com enfoque especial dado ao Banco Central do Brasil e ao arcabouço normativo atualmente em vigor sobre a matéria. A necessidade de desenvolver este tema sobreveio da verificação, especialmente nas duas últimas décadas, de um distanciamento dos Bancos Centrais em relação às orientações do Poder Executivo. O regime de metas inflacionárias, tido como o ideal para orientar a atuação dos Bancos Centrais e assegurar a estabilidade da moeda foi assumido como o objetivo-fim da política monetária, em detrimento das previsões constitucionais acerca da promoção do desenvolvimento equilibrado do País, da busca do pleno emprego e da redução das desigualdades sociais. Para a análise desenvolvida, partiu-se do método histórico, por meio do qual foi possível verificar, a partir do Século XIX até o presente, de que forma os Bancos Centrais surgiram e galgaram posições de relevo enquanto agentes do Estado orientados a intervir na economia para fins de promoção social, especialmente a partir do surgimento e consolidação do Direito Econômico como ciência jurídica legitimadora da intervenção estatal. Em seguida, buscou-se explorar as funções dos Bancos Centrais, os instrumentos dos quais dispõem para o exercício da política monetária e a adequação dos objetivos dessa política no contexto da política econômica desenvolvida pelo Estado. Por fim, passou-se à análise do Banco Central do Brasil no que concerne a evolução da execução da política monetária, paralelamente às conquistas sociais e políticas do país, com especial destaque para as décadas de 1960 e 1990. / This work is to examine the appropriateness of implementing monetary policy by central banks, with particular emphasis given to the Central Bank of Brazil and the regulatory framework currently in force on the matter. The need to develop this theme came to check, especially in the last two decades, from a distance of central banks in relation to Executive guidelines. Inflation targeting system, seen as the ideal to drive central banks actions and ensure currency stability was adopted as the end goal of monetary policy at the expense of constitutional statements upon balanced development of the country, in pursuit of comprehensive employment and the reduction of social inequalities. For the developed analysis, historical method has been adopted which enabled the understanding from the nineteenth century until present days upon how Central Banks emerged and have risen to prominent positions as agents of the Stated driven to intervene in economy for social advancement, especially since the emergence and consolidation of Economic Law and legal science legitimating state intervention. Then Central Banks central banks functions were explored, theirs tools for monetary policy undertaking and the adequacy of such objectives in the context of economic policy developed by the state. Finally, we have assessed Brazil Central Bank in regards of monetary policy implementation development, along with social and political local achievements, with particular emphasis to the 60s and 90s.

Negli ultimi dieci anni siamo stati testimoni di una delle più grandi crisi che il mondo ha visto. Il lavoro dei macroeconomisti è diventato più attivo, nell'urgenza di trovare la via d'uscita, molti degli strumenti applicati per la professione di economista sono stati rispolverati ed aggiornati per le nuove esigenze della crisi economica. Tra gli strumenti per la ricerca economica c'è lo modello dinamico stocastico di equilibrio generale (DSGE). Questa tesi è composta da quattro capitoli che coinvolgono l'intermediazione e/o politiche condotte dai governi o banche centrali finanziarie. I primi tre capitoli partono sul modello DSGE mentre l' ultimo su un modello macroeconomico principale-agente. Il primo (scritto come una rassegna delle principali indagini in DSGE) trata dei cicli di credito, di acceleratori finanziari, del mercato immobiliare, del settore bancario, dell'assunzione dei rischi e delle politiche monetarie. Il secondo analizza l'impatto delle variazioni tra il rapporto di leva e le riserve necessarie all'interno, che al giorno d'oggi regolano alcune delle politiche popolari. Il terzo capitolo incorpora un mercato dei prestiti interbancari per l'analisi degli shock di rischio generato nel settore bancario e come si sviluppa l'economia. Il quarto invece è un'indagine che si scosta dal modello macroeconomico principale-agente; comprende un governo attivo con le tasse e sussidi di disoccupazione. / During the last decade we were witness of one of the biggest crises that the world has seen. The job of the macroeconomists became more active, in the urgency for finding the way out; many of the tools applied for the economist profession were dusted off and updated for the new needs of the economic crisis. Among the tools for economic research there is the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model (DSGE). This dissertation consists of four chapters involved in financial intermediation and/or policies conducted by the governments or central banks. The first three chapters depart from the DSGE model while the last is a macroeconomic agent based model. The first, written as a review of the main investigations in the DSGE, covers several fields as credit cycles, financial accelerator, housing market, banking sector, risk taking and monetary policies. The second chapter analyses the impacts of changes in the leverage ratio and the required reserves within, some of the popular regulation policies nowadays. The third chapter incorporates an interbank lending market for the analysis of risk shocks generated in the banking sector and how it is spread to the economy. The fourth chapter is an investigation that departs from the macroeconomic agent based model; it incorporates an active government with taxes and unemployment subsidies.

The Czech National Bank, its legal position and scope of activities Abstract As the theme of my thesis, I have chosen the Czech National Bank, its legal position and scope of activities. The aim is to analyze the legal position and activities of the CNB. This is a very large topic, due to the wide activities of the CNB at national, European and international level. The CNB is and independent, highly credible and very powerful institution. The CNB is the central bank of the Czech Republic, the financial market supervision authority and the authority to solve crisis. Its main objective is to maintain price stability. Due to the wide range of tasks, I focused on the assessment its monetary policy as its most important business. The implementation of monetary policy is based on the ability to choose the level of interest rates that will keep inflation at a low but stable level and there will be no unnecessary slowdown or acceleration of the growth rate of the economy. The aim of the CNB's transmission mechanism is to keep the overall inflation in the narrow corridor at 1-3 %. By comparing the real development of the average quarterly inflation rate and the forecast of monetary policy-relevant inflation for the period from 3.Q 2008 to 2.Q 2019, it can be concluded that the caused fluctuations could be hardly...

Os Bancos Centrais executam a primordial função de buscar a estabilidade monetária em seus respectivos países. Além disto, são também responsáveis pela condução e gerenciamento do sistema de pagamentos e pela condição de prestamista de última instância. As atividades de fiscalização do sistema bancário, no entanto, podem ou não ser de incumbência das autoridades monetárias. Percebe-se, ao longo das décadas mais recentes, que alguns países vêm promovendo mudanças em suas estruturas de alocação das áreas de supervisão, tanto no sentido de delegar esta responsabilidade a uma agência quanto na possibilidade de integrar a supervisão bancária com outras áreas, tais como a de seguros e a do mercado de capitais e títulos. Estas questões, como a de deixar ou não a supervisão inserida dentro dos bancos centrais, e a da sua integração ou não com outras áreas, têm proporcionado diversos debates, tendo sido apontados tanto pontos favoráveis quanto desfavoráveis, em cada uma das situações propostas. No entanto, estes discursos são ainda incipientes, e tal análise ainda carece de novas reflexões. Foi a dificuldade teórica em se definir um modelo de maior eficiência institucional para os países que serviu como ponto de partida e incentivo para o presente estudo. Desta forma, o trabalho aqui apresentado teve como objetivo principal o de identificar características comuns entre alguns dos países que adotam modelos similares. Com base em testes econométricos, foram buscadas associações por meio de probabilidades. Os demais objetivos foram os de mostrar e discutir as experiências de alguns destes países, bem como evidências empíricas encontradas até o presente momento relacionadas ao tema principal deste trabalho. Além disto, a pesquisa descrita também procurou levantar as vantagens e as desvantagens de cada modelo. Os resultados encontrados mostraram haver relação entre os modelos adotados e os poderes do órgão supervisor, os poderes da auditoria externa, a localização geográfica, os índices de inflação, de renda, de nível de consolidação da supervisão financeira, de envolvimento do banco central no processo de supervisão e avaliação do sistema legal. Foi possível concluir que, seja qual for o modelo escolhido, a autoridade monetária deve continuar com alguma forma de participação no processo, seja de forma direta ou indireta, através de canais de comunicação abertos entre esta e os demais órgãos ou agências envolvidos. Isto se deve, principalmente, à ligação estreita que existe entre a solidez do sistema financeiro e a estabilidade monetária de um país, bem como pelo fato das funções de prestamista de última instância e de responsável pelos sistemas de pagamento permanecerem inseridas dentro dos bancos centrais. / Central Banks perform as their main function the search for monetary stability in their respective countries. Besides, they are also responsible for conducting and managing the national payments systems as well as for the condition of lender of last resort. The activities of banking supervision, however, may fall or not under the responsibility of Central Banks. One can realize, along the last decades, that some countries have been implementing some changes in their institutional allocation of banking supervision, either by delegating this responsibility to an agency (external to Central Bank) or by integrating banking supervision with different areas, such as supervision of insurance companies and capital/securities markets. Questions such as “to leave or not banking supervision under the responsibility of central banks?” or “to integrate or not banking supervision with different areas?” have generated several debates, and different aspects, favourable or not, have been pointed out, in each of the proposed situations. However, those discussions are still incipient, and this analysis is still lacking further reflection. It was exactly the theoretical challenge to define a model which should present a bigger institutional efficiency for different countries that has served both as a starting point and as a motivation for the present study. This way, the main goal of the present work was to identify some characteristics in common among some of the countries which have adopted similar models. Based in econometric tests, some associations between selected variables were searched, by means of probabilities estimation. The remainder objectives of the present research are described as follows: to present and to discuss the related experiences of a few selected countries which had adopted some of the analyzed models; to show some empirical evidences which are associated to the same analysis. Moreover, the here described research was also directed to collect the advantages and disadvantages that could be found out in each model. The achieved results pointed out to the existence of a relationship between the adopted model and the powers that the supervisory agency may possess; the powers of external auditing; geographical localization; income indexes; inflation indexes; indexes of level of consolidation of financial supervision; indexes to estimate the involvement of a central bank in the banking supervision process; and finally, an evaluation of the respective national legal system. It was also possible to conclude that, whatever is the selected model, the monetary authority should maintain some sort of participation in this process, either directly or indirectly; by means of communication channels that must be established between this authority and the remainder involved hierarchical structures or agencies. This conclusion is chiefly due to the close link that exists between the strength of a financial system and the monetary stability of a country, as well as to the fact that the functions of lender of last resort and the responsibility for the national payments system are still being under the responsibility of central banks.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Os Bancos Centrais executam a primordial função de buscar a estabilidade monetária em seus respectivos países. Além disto, são também responsáveis pela condução e gerenciamento do sistema de pagamentos e pela condição de prestamista de última instância. As atividades de fiscalização do sistema bancário, no entanto, podem ou não ser de incumbência das autoridades monetárias. Percebe-se, ao longo das décadas mais recentes, que alguns países vêm promovendo mudanças em suas estruturas de alocação das áreas de supervisão, tanto no sentido de delegar esta responsabilidade a uma agência quanto na possibilidade de integrar a supervisão bancária com outras áreas, tais como a de seguros e a do mercado de capitais e títulos. Estas questões, como a de deixar ou não a supervisão inserida dentro dos bancos centrais, e a da sua integração ou não com outras áreas, têm proporcionado diversos debates, tendo sido apontados tanto pontos favoráveis quanto desfavoráveis, em cada uma das situações propostas. No entanto, estes discursos são ainda incipientes, e tal análise ainda carece de novas reflexões. Foi a dificuldade teórica em se definir um modelo de maior eficiência institucional para os países que serviu como ponto de partida e incentivo para o presente estudo. Desta forma, o trabalho aqui apresentado teve como objetivo principal o de identificar características comuns entre alguns dos países que adotam modelos similares. Com base em testes econométricos, foram buscadas associações por meio de probabilidades. Os demais objetivos foram os de mostrar e discutir as experiências de alguns destes países, bem como evidências empíricas encontradas até o presente momento relacionadas ao tema principal deste trabalho. Além disto, a pesquisa descrita também procurou levantar as vantagens e as desvantagens de cada modelo. Os resultados encontrados mostraram haver relação entre os modelos adotados e os poderes do órgão supervisor, os poderes da auditoria externa, a localização geográfica, os índices de inflação, de renda, de nível de consolidação da supervisão financeira, de envolvimento do banco central no processo de supervisão e avaliação do sistema legal. Foi possível concluir que, seja qual for o modelo escolhido, a autoridade monetária deve continuar com alguma forma de participação no processo, seja de forma direta ou indireta, através de canais de comunicação abertos entre esta e os demais órgãos ou agências envolvidos. Isto se deve, principalmente, à ligação estreita que existe entre a solidez do sistema financeiro e a estabilidade monetária de um país, bem como pelo fato das funções de prestamista de última instância e de responsável pelos sistemas de pagamento permanecerem inseridas dentro dos bancos centrais. / Central Banks perform as their main function the search for monetary stability in their respective countries. Besides, they are also responsible for conducting and managing the national payments systems as well as for the condition of lender of last resort. The activities of banking supervision, however, may fall or not under the responsibility of Central Banks. One can realize, along the last decades, that some countries have been implementing some changes in their institutional allocation of banking supervision, either by delegating this responsibility to an agency (external to Central Bank) or by integrating banking supervision with different areas, such as supervision of insurance companies and capital/securities markets. Questions such as “to leave or not banking supervision under the responsibility of central banks?” or “to integrate or not banking supervision with different areas?” have generated several debates, and different aspects, favourable or not, have been pointed out, in each of the proposed situations. However, those discussions are still incipient, and this analysis is still lacking further reflection. It was exactly the theoretical challenge to define a model which should present a bigger institutional efficiency for different countries that has served both as a starting point and as a motivation for the present study. This way, the main goal of the present work was to identify some characteristics in common among some of the countries which have adopted similar models. Based in econometric tests, some associations between selected variables were searched, by means of probabilities estimation. The remainder objectives of the present research are described as follows: to present and to discuss the related experiences of a few selected countries which had adopted some of the analyzed models; to show some empirical evidences which are associated to the same analysis. Moreover, the here described research was also directed to collect the advantages and disadvantages that could be found out in each model. The achieved results pointed out to the existence of a relationship between the adopted model and the powers that the supervisory agency may possess; the powers of external auditing; geographical localization; income indexes; inflation indexes; indexes of level of consolidation of financial supervision; indexes to estimate the involvement of a central bank in the banking supervision process; and finally, an evaluation of the respective national legal system. It was also possible to conclude that, whatever is the selected model, the monetary authority should maintain some sort of participation in this process, either directly or indirectly; by means of communication channels that must be established between this authority and the remainder involved hierarchical structures or agencies. This conclusion is chiefly due to the close link that exists between the strength of a financial system and the monetary stability of a country, as well as to the fact that the functions of lender of last resort and the responsibility for the national payments system are still being under the responsibility of central banks.

This thesis consists of three empirical papers on central bank institutional design.Chapter 1 contributes to the debate on the importance of central bank independence (CBI) in lowering inflation rates. It stresses the relevance of employing indices of central bank independence computed dynamically in two ways. First, it recomputes the evolution of the Grilli et al. (1991) index of CBI and shows that the timing of large legislative reforms is closely related to inflation rate dynamics. Using unit root tests with endogenous structural breaks, I find that reforms that modify the degree of CBI represent structural breaks in the inflation rate dynamics. Second, employing the dynamic Grilli et al. (1991) index of independence confirms the negative relationship between CBI and inflation in a sample of 10 advanced economies.Chapter 2 presents a new and comprehensive database of central bank institutional design for 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. This chapter describes in detail the sources of information and the coding rules used to create a new index of central bank independence. It also compares this new index with the classical measures of CBI and highlights the new aspects of central bank institutional design included in this database such as financial independence and accountability. An important innovation of this new index is its dynamic nature. This enables an investigation of the endogenous determination of the level of independence of central banks and suggests several instruments for the CBI index. Using an instrumental variable approach, this chapter provides strong support for a causal, negative CBI-inflation nexus.Chapter 3 uses a political economy framework to investigate the drivers of reforms in central bank institutional design. Using the new CBI index developed in Chapter 2, this Chapter investigates the determinants of central bank reforms in a sample of 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. The results obtained suggest that the incentives generated by initial reforms which increased the level of independence, as well as a regional convergence, represent important drivers of reforms in central bank design. At the same time, an external pressure to reform, such as obtaining an IMF loan or joining a monetary union, also increases the likelihood of reforms, while government changes or crises episodes have little impact. / This thesis consists of three empirical papers on central bank institutional design.Chapter 1 contributes to the debate on the importance of central bank independence (CBI) in lowering inflation rates. It stresses the relevance of employing indices of central bank independence computed dynamically in two ways. First, it recomputes the evolution of the Grilli et al. (1991) index of CBI and shows that the timing of large legislative reforms is closely related to inflation rate dynamics. Using unit root tests with endogenous structural breaks, I find that reforms that modify the degree of CBI represent structural breaks in the inflation rate dynamics. Second, employing the dynamic Grilli et al. (1991) index of independence confirms the negative relationship between CBI and inflation in a sample of 10 advanced economies.Chapter 2 presents a new and comprehensive database of central bank institutional design for 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. This chapter describes in detail the sources of information and the coding rules used to create a new index of central bank independence. It also compares this new index with the classical measures of CBI and highlights the new aspects of central bank institutional design included in this database such as financial independence and accountability. An important innovation of this new index is its dynamic nature. This enables an investigation of the endogenous determination of the level of independence of central banks and suggests several instruments for the CBI index. Using an instrumental variable approach, this chapter provides strong support for a causal, negative CBI-inflation nexus.Chapter 3 uses a political economy framework to investigate the drivers of reforms in central bank institutional design. Using the new CBI index developed in Chapter 2, this Chapter investigates the determinants of central bank reforms in a sample of 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. The results obtained suggest that the incentives generated by initial reforms which increased the level of independence, as well as a regional convergence, represent important drivers of reforms in central bank design. At the same time, an external pressure to reform, such as obtaining an IMF loan or joining a monetary union, also increases the likelihood of reforms, while government changes or crises episodes have little impact.