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In November of 1965, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was launched in China when a Shanghai newspaper editor, Yao Wen-yuan, published an attack on the play which is translated here, Hai Jui Dismissed from Office. The fact that this event constituted the beginning of what later became a political struggle of vast proportions was recognized only belatedly by most Western analysts. When the Cultural Revolution moved into high gear with the launching of the Red Guard movement in the spring of 1966, vague references were made in some Western commentaries to the fact that the explosion seemed to have been ignited, by the public exposure of a drama which had purportedly satirized the Communist Party and Mao Tse-tung. No one appeared to have any certainty about exactly what the play had said and in what way it satirized Mao and the Party. As far as I am aware, this is the first translation of the entire text of the play, or any part of it, into English. Aside from simply translating the text of the play, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze the events of late 1965 and early 1966 and place them both in chronological order and in political perspective. In this way, it is clearly shown how the attack on Wu Han led to attacks on other "bourgeois" writers and intellectuals. Eventually, this latter group was linked to high officials in the Peking Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Finally, the "cultural" aspect of the Cultural Revolution gave way to a full-fledged political battle within the Party itself. / Arts, Faculty of / Asian Studies, Department of / Graduate

Most analysts study leadership succession in communist states as a "crisis" which ensues after the death of a dominant leader. This study takes an alternative approach. It is a survey of provisions for leadership succession in the People's Republic, of China. This involves a comparison of the strategies and motivations of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in providing for their own succession. Deng Xiaoping's more extensive provisions for leadership succession during the CCP's transition towards a more institutionalized one-party bureaucratic rule are likely to be more durable than Mao's provisions in the earlier period. Nevertheless, guarantees of smooth and regularized succession, especially of protégés promoted on the basis of personal ties within the leadership core, may be impossible to obtain. Mao's provisions were aimed largely at what he saw as a probable, but deplorable, bureaucratic future of the PRC. Deng, on the other hand, perceives an element of opportunity in the succession process. He has tried to provide leadership that will, in his estimation, be better able to bring about China's modernization. In both leaders' provisions for succession, the elevation to the status of "heir apparent" of individuals has been a political liability to those individuals, especially when their promotion is perceived to be based largely on personal ties to the dominant leader. This liability becomes more pronounced in a period of bureaucratic, collective leadership. Because of his shifting policy preferences, his status as charismatic leader, and the ambitious nature of his protégés, Mao Zedong was unsuccessful in providing for his own succession. Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, has been successful in cultivating a reserve of young, well-educated cadres. These provisions, because they are extensive and exist in a more subdued, consensus-oriented political environment, may well be Deng's most enduring legacy. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The importance of party-military relations in the People's Republic of China was succinctly stated by Mao in his dictum that "political power comes from the gun" and "the Party should command the gun." Party-military relations in the PRC have never fully conformed to Mao's warning. This study seeks to analyze the nature and types of party-military relations in the PRC during the post-Mao period and the factors affecting change in these relations.

This study evaluates Hong Kong's soft power through investigating the relations between the city's paradiplomatic ambits and performance and critically reflects on how the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) to further develop its presence in international stage and its identity as an active non-sovereign international actor. This study also enriches the literature of paradiplomacy and soft power of non-sovereign actors since the soft power analysis is still limited to state-centric research. This research also explores new angles to deal with Hong Kong-China relations by highlighting how the paradiplomacy and the soft power of Hong Kong can create space and flexibility for the city's international engagement. A theoretical framework which incorporates new institutionalism and normative theory to explain the interplay of paradiplomacy and soft power is proposed and tested. This study adopts multi-pronged method to investigate Hong Kong's soft power and its leaders' capabilities in upholding the city's international profile under "One Country, Two Systems". Through studying the international indexes, surveys of public opinion, official documents like Hong Kong Policy Addresses and conducting in-depth interviews, this study delineates and evaluates the soft power capacities within paradiplomatic ambits of the city. The key findings of the research indicate the HKSAR government has had a very restrictive understanding of the soft power for the city. In particular, the study proves that both institutions and values of Hong Kong are crucial for boosting the city's soft power. In contrast to the conventional system, the institutions of the HKSAR have limited the fostering of values of Hong Kong, but also the development of the city's soft power. This study shows that the tensions between the government and civil society have weakened some of the potential soft power resources. Moreover, the prevailing policy focus on strengthening the city's financial and economic status with respect to China's rise to power has not done justice to other stakeholders such as the film industry and the civil society who could have made considerable impacts on enriching and enhancing Hong Kong's global attractiveness. The paradiplomatic power of the HKSAR government has not been persistently pursued in the policy implementations. As the HKSAR government claimed it is committed to upholding the city's international profile and to promote its soft power globally, this study intends to make an original contribution to our understanding of the relations of the city's soft power, paradiplomacy and policy implementations.

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This research seeks to answer why and which Chinese people go to the street to protest. I argue that different sectors of Chinese society differ from each other regarding their tendencies to participate in protest. In addition to their grievances, the incentives to participate in protest and their capacities to overcome the collective action problem all needed to be taken into account. Using individual level data along with ordinary binary logistic regression and multilevel logistic regression models, I first compare the protest participation of workers and peasants and find that workers are more likely than peasants to participate in protests in the context of contemporary China. I further disaggregate the working class into four subtypes according to the ownership of the enterprises they work for. I find that workers of township and village enterprises are more likely than workers of state-owned enterprises to engage in protest activities, while there is no significant difference between the workers of domestic privately owned enterprises and the workers of foreign-owned enterprises regarding their protest participation. Finally, I find that migrant workers, which refers to peasants who move to urban areas in search of jobs, are less likely than urban registered workers to participate in protests.

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Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The research assignment examines pertinent factors affecting the political, economic and social landscape of the development of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Domestic conditions within the PRC are influencing its foreign policy behaviour in the international arena. The PRC's internal environment will thus determine the extent of its external presence. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die werkstuk bestudeer die relevante faktore wat die politieke, ekonomiese en sosiale landskap ten opsigte van die Republiek van China (PRC) se holistiese ontwikkeling beïnvloed. Omstandighede binne die Republiek beïnvloed die land se buitelandse beleidsgedrag in die internasionale arena. Dit sal dus regverdig wees om te sê dat binnelandse faktore 'n beslissende rol speel ten opsigte van hoe die land homself binne die globale arena hanteer.