Issued also as diss., Pontificia università gregoriana. / "Literatur-Verzeichnis": p. [ix]-xii.

Thesis (M. Div.)--Emmanuel School of Religion, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 78-82).

My basic concern in this thesis is to examine the details behind Dennett's attempt to reconcile the notions of mechanism and responsibility. In the main this involves an examination of how he tries to secure a compatibilism between mechanistic and intentional explanations by developing a systematised conception of intentional explanation. I begin by briefly discussing the various notions needed for understanding what is at stake in the area and where the orthodoxy on the matter lies. As such the first three sections of the work are not focussed on Dennett's work itself and playa stage-setting role for the deeper work to follow. These notions include the likes of the rationale behind attributing moral responsibility, agency and action, mechanism and mechanistic explanation, and intentional explanation. I suggest that the basic intuition regarding mechanism and responsibility is such that the two are seen to be incompatible with each other. The main reason for this lies in an intuition that mechanism undermines intentional explanation and so renders the notion of action largely empty. Action, I show, is at the heart of our attribution of responsibility and is dependent on intentional explanation. Having presented these issues, I turn to the details of Dennett's 'intentional systems theory'. I argue that Dennett attempts to avoid the intuition that mechanism is incompatible with responsibility by developing a specialised account of intentional explanation. Dennett calls it the intentional stance. r highlight the two important features of this intentional stance, namely rationality and intentionality. r show that Dennett's position on rationality and intentionality is such that it does allow him to secure an explanatory compatibilism between mechanism and his sort of intentional explanation. I argue, however, that his sort of intentional explanation does not fulfil our requirements for ascribing agency or moral responsibility. This is accomplished in part by developing alternative conceptions of the two notions. Out of this I develop a different sort of intentional stance, which I call the folk stance. I show finaIly that Dennett's compatibilist move is incapable of being applied to the folkstance from which we do in fact make attributions of responsibility, and so conclude thatDennett fails to make the case for reconciling mechanism and responsibility.

[No abstract submitted] / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

Thesis (Ph. D.)--College of Fine Arts, University of New South Wales, 2004. / Also available online.

The author's Habilitationsschrift--Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn. / Summary in Italian. Includes indexes. Includes bibliographical references (p. 201-214).

Thesis (Dr.phil.)--Leipzig, 1906. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [88]-90).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1942. / Reproduced from type-written copy. "Select bibliography": p vii-ix.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Humanidades, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Gradução, 2009. / Submitted by Elna Araújo (elna@bce.unb.br) on 2010-05-06T20:07:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2009_JulianadeOrioneArraesFagundes.pdf: 449603 bytes, checksum: d6eb5059bd95a2eda0e9bf6540a7f5f4 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Daniel Ribeiro(daniel@bce.unb.br) on 2010-05-07T19:18:14Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2009_JulianadeOrioneArraesFagundes.pdf: 449603 bytes, checksum: d6eb5059bd95a2eda0e9bf6540a7f5f4 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-05-07T19:18:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2009_JulianadeOrioneArraesFagundes.pdf: 449603 bytes, checksum: d6eb5059bd95a2eda0e9bf6540a7f5f4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Esta dissertação discute alguns dos problemas contemporâneos da consciência. Não basta a consciência ser evidente de um ponto de vista de primeira pessoa. Uma explicação do mental deve passar pela compreensão de seu lugar na natureza. Para Chalmers, a consciência não pode ser explicada a partir dos conceitos e teorias científicas atuais. Ele sugere sua incorporação em nossa ontologia como uma propriedade fundamental. Dennett, por outro lado, defende a possibilidade de uma explicação da consciência a partir de uma perspectiva de terceira pessoa. Para isso, o trabalho das diversas disciplinas científicas deve ser levado em consideração. Como Dennett, a autora desta dissertação acredita que uma explicação apropriada da consciência deve partir da compreensão do ser humano em suas dimensões biológica e cultural. A primeira parte deste trabalho discute criticamente as idéias de Chalmers. A segunda apresenta as propostas de Dennett para tratar do tema, além de dois modelos apresentados pelo autor. A última parte trata da evolução cultural e da sua relevância para a discussão sobre a mente humana. _________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This thesis discusses some of the contemporary problems of consciousness. It's not enough for consciousness to be evident from a first person point of view. An explanation of consciousness depends on a comprehension of its place in nature. According to Chalmers, consciousness cannot be understood in terms of the present scientific concepts and theories. Instead, it must be assimilated into our ontology as a fundamental property. Dennett, on the other hand, argues that it is possible to give an account of consciousness in terms of the current scientific framework. In order to accomplish this, scientific advances in many disciplines must be taken into consideration. For him, the correct perspective should be the third person point of view. Like Dennett, the author of the present work thinks that a proper theory of consciousness must be based on an understanding of how human beings fit in both their biological and cultural dimensions. The first part of this thesis tackles Chalmers’s ideas on consciousness and its shortcomings. The second part of the thesis deals with Dennett's views on consciousness and two models he advances. Its last part discusses cultural evolution and its relevance to the discussion concerning the human mind.

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