<p>A clear picture describing cognitive change in pregnant women has yet to emerge. Recent work investigating pregnancy-induced cognition in women focuses on memory deficits, in contrast to the cognitive advantage and neural plasticity described in the nonhuman literature. The following thesis reviews the literature investigating pregnancy-induced cognitive change, and then reports three empirical studies investigating cognition in pregnant and postpartum women. I hypothesized that, given the high stakes associated with pregnancy and the postpartum period, adaptive mechanisms designed to keep the mother safe exist in the cognitive domain, in much the same way that Nausea and Vomiting in Pregnancy is now believed to buffer the mother and fetus from harm. The results of a meta-analysis and a longitudinal study comparing cognitive performance in pregnant and non-pregnant women suggest that there are cognitive costs associated with becoming a mother, in both pregnancy and the postpartum period. Recent research suggests that pregnant women possess an advantage in processing social stimuli: I report that pregnant women show facilitated recognition of faces. Finally, I examined nesting, and developed a questionnaire that tracked women through pregnancy and into the postpartum period, comparing non-pregnant women at similar time points. I report that nesting peaks in the third trimester, and involves space preparation and social withdrawal. Reproductive state affects cognition in ways that are distinct, and perhaps specialized, including a deficit in some areas (processing speed), and a cognitive advantage in others (face recognition), some of which may serve a protective function.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

<p>During task-switching, if we occasionally encounter stimuli that cue more than one task (i.e. bivalent stimuli), response slowing is observed on all univalent trials within that block, even when no features overlap with the bivalent stimuli. This observation is known as the bivalency effect. Here, I show that the bivalency effect reflects a form of top-down cognitive control that is not easily explained by most current models of control in the literature. The research presented within my thesis reveals that the bivalency effect reflects an adjustment in cognitive control that is highly dependent on past experience with response conflict (chapters 4 and 5), violations of expectancy (chapter 3 and 5), and recent inhibition (chapters 3, 4, and 5). Furthermore, the processes in response to these factors are likely captured by the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and the temporal parietal junction (TPJ) (chapters 2 and 5), reflecting responses to inhibitory demands, and extra visual feature extraction after encountering bivalent stimuli, respectively. These findings provide support for a recent cognitive control model that suggests that the role of the ACC is to track current and recent changes in the environment in order to optimize future performance by predicting changes in cognitive demand (Sheth et al., 2012).</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

<p>Recent research on cognitive control has focused on the learning consequences of high selective attention demands in selective attention tasks. The current study extends these ideas by examining the influence of selective attention demands on remembering. In Experiment 1, participants read aloud the red word in a pair of red and green interleaved words. Half of the items were congruent (the interleaved words were the same), and the other half were incongruent (the interleaved words were different). Following the study phase, participants completed a recognition memory test with a remember/know classification. A mirror effect was observed in the recognition memory data, with better memory for incongruent than for congruent items. In Experiment 2, context was only partially reinstated at test, and again better memory for incongruent compared to congruent items was observed. However, the processes supporting recognition decisions varied depending on context reinstatement, with only full context reinstatement resulting in differences in recollection for congruent and incongruent items. These results demonstrate that selective attention process demands associated with incongruent items affect episodic learning.</p> / Master of Science (MSc)

<p>Application of previously learned knowledge to new problems or contexts is a cognitive process known as transfer. Undergraduate medical education is optimized when learners are able to transfer basic science knowledge to clinical learning. A long history of transfer research suggests that spontaneous transfer of conceptual knowledge is not easy for learners, thus creating an educational challenge during undergraduate training. However, not all transfer tasks are equally difficult. When conceptual problems are presented in familiar contexts (e.g. similar surface details or semantic content in word problems), this <em>near </em>transfer is facilitated for learners. But when contextual familiarity does not exist, the problem is one of <em>far </em>transfer and becomes more difficult. Previous research suggests that using contextual information and focusing on conceptual teaching can improve transfer performance for novices.</p> <p>This thesis investigates how emphasizing contextual information versus conceptual information can impact transfer of principles of physics relevant to physiology (the concepts) to different organ systems (the contexts). Across three experimental studies, students were assigned to different learning and practice conditions where conceptual and contextual teaching were manipulated. The results showed 1) while emphasizing conceptual information can improve transfer, contextual alignment (near transfer) between learning and problem solving had the highest performance for all students. 2) Novices use contextual information as</p> <p>recognition cues for new problems but can be shifted to examine deep conceptual structure when provided with in-depth conceptual teaching as well as varying the number of contexts used to practice concepts. This shifts novices to equal success at near and far transfer. 3) Novices can revert to relying on contextual information if teaching interventions do not provide contextual variation and instead promote a close association between contextual details and conceptual information.</p> <p>This research suggests that shifting novices to examine conceptual problems at the deep structure level should be a key goal for teaching basic science for transfer. Novices default to using surface details to encode and retrieve conceptual information. While in some near transfer problems this can be an effective strategy, for far transfer it can lead to errors. Basic science teaching during undergraduate training must emphasize transferability of concepts by providing more relatable ways to understand conceptual information and showing the variation of a concept’s presentation.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

<p>There are various dual process models of human cognition. While many models of cognitive control propose processes that are selected exclusively or in combination, a default-interventionist model of reasoning assumes that processing occurs in serial stages. System 1 processes are believed to recruit unconscious memory retrieval processes by default and precede System 2 processes (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). System 1 processes are also considered to be overly sensitive to the automatic influences of the environment and thereby also to various cognitive biases and errors; hence System 1 is inferior. On the other hand System 2, which represent conscious logic and normative reasoning processes, is not considered susceptible to such automatic influences and thereby capable of overriding errors made through System 1 reasoning; hence System 2 is superior. This default-interventionist model has become highly influential in theories about best practices in medical education (Croskerry, 2009; 2003; Klein, 2005; Redelmeier, 2005), and has encouraged a view that increased conscious processing and reflective thought will improve performance. Such a view is in stark contrast to models of human memory in psychology that suggest contextual or automatic influences of the environment are not only critical for learning, but also critical for adaptive processing and the development of expertise (Yonelinas, 2002; Larsen & Roediger, 2012). In this thesis I investigate and critique several assumptions of the default-interventionist model by testing the relationship between processing time, reflective thought, experience and accuracy. The results of two large studies do not support basic assumptions presented in the literature and instead demonstrate that experience and knowledge are better predictors of performance.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

<p>Evidence suggests that a change in the firing rate of dopamine (DA) cells is a major neurobiological correlate of learning. The Temporal Difference (TD) learning algorithm provides a popular account of the DA signal as conveying the error between expected and actual rewards. Other accounts have attempted to code the DA firing pattern as conveying surprise or salience. The DA mediated cells have also been implicated in several neuropsychological disorders such as obsessive compulsive disorder and schizophrenia. Compelling neuropsychological explanations of the DA signal also frame it as conveying salience. A model-based reinforcement learning algorithm using a salience signal analogous to dopamine neurons was built and used to model existing animal behavioral data.</p> <p>Different reinforcement learning models were then compared under conditions of altered DA firing patterns. Several differing predictions of the TD model and the salience model were compared against animal behavioral data in an obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) model using a dopamine agonist. The results show that the salience model predictions more accurately model actual animal behavior.</p> <p>The role of context in the salience model is different than the standard TD-learning algorithm. Several predictions of the salience model for how people should respond to context shifts of differing salience were tested against known behavioral correlates of endogenous dopamine levels. As predicted, individuals with behavioral traits correlated with higher endogenous dopamine levels are far more sensitive to low salience context shifts than those with correlates to lower endogenous dopamine levels. This is a unique prediction of the salience model for the DA signal which allows for better integration of reinforcement learning models and neuropsychological frameworks for discussing the role of dopamine in learning, memory and behavior.</p> / Doctor of Science (PhD)

<p>The psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm has been used extensively to investigate the cognitive processing stages involved in dual-task performance. Interpretations of PRP data have often attributed the difficulty in simultaneously performing two cognitive tasks to a strict serial processing bottleneck in the response selection stage. However, a number of studies have also demonstrated backward response compatibility effects (BCEs) on Task 1 reaction time in dual-task performance, which suggest that response information for Task 2 may be activated in parallel with Task 1 response selection. The goal of this thesis was to examine the nature of the Task 2 processing that operates in parallel with Task 1 response selection in a PRP task, and to consider the implications of this parallel processing for models of dual-task performance. The results of the empirical studies presented here provide converging evidence that the BCE represents automatically activated response information for Task 2 acting on Task 1 response selection. This Task 2 response information can also contribute to Task 2 performance. Models of dual-task performance must account for both the parallel activation of response information and the serial selection of a response for each task.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Psychology / Gary Brase / Consumers’ choice behaviors are influenced by multifaceted decision factors. Information processing theory (Bettman, 1979) predicts that consumers’ decision processes are constructed at the time of a decision, and consumers’ meta-goals model (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998) posits that their choice behaviors are generally guided by the minimization of cognitive effort and negative emotion, and the maximization of accuracy and justification. Insightful as this model may be at describing how consumers’ choices are shaped, it does not specify the interactions among the goals, assess the benefits of cognitive effort, or fairly evaluates the importance of emotion and justification in consumer decision making. Thus, the current studies collectively propose an alternative meta-goals choice model. Particularly, the current studies speculate on the importance of regret in consumer decision making. Consistent with previous research, Study 1 shows that participants trade-off between cognitive effort and accuracy goals depending on the monetary value of the products at hand, suggesting that the cognitive effort-accuracy trade-off may be moderated by price. Study 2 investigated the impact of cognitive effort on the experience of regret, showing the effectiveness of cognitive effort in attenuating the experienced regret. This relationship is explored with respect to the role of cognitive effort as a means of the justification factor in Study 3. Results showed that unjustified (wasted) cognitive effort did not make a substantial difference in post-purchase regret, but under spent cognitive effort generated more post-purchase regret. Study 4 examined both anticipated and experienced regret in relation to cognitive effort and justification; results showed that an exertion of cognitive effort is helpful in reducing the experience of regret but the justification of the choice also affects this relationship especially when the choice during the decision search is incongruent with the final decision. These results from current studies suggest interrelations between consumers’ four meta-goals. Based on these findings, an alternative meta-goals model is proposed which includes the benefits of cognitive effort exertion on consumer decision making, shedding light on how and when consumers choose to exert effort in an attempt to alleviate the potential future experience of regret.

Résumé : La psychologie cognitive s'intéresse depuis quelques années à un effet de positivité qui semble apparaître avec l'avancement en âge. Cet effet serait également lié à la diminution, voire la disparition, d'un biais attentionnel négatif, naturellement présent chez les jeunes adultes. Celui-ci consiste en une plus grande perturbation de l'attention sélective en présence de stimuli négatifs. Une tâche cognitive d'attention sélective très utilisée pour étudier ce biais cognitif est le Stroop émotion. Présentant des mots à valence négative, positive et neutre, il permet de vérifier l'effet d'interférence que produisent ces stimuli sur la capacité d'inhibition. Jusqu'à présent, les rares études utilisant le Stroop émotion auprès d'une population âgée sans trouble cognitif ne présentent pas de consensus permettant de statuer clairement sur la modification de ce biais cognitif dans le vieillissement. La présente étude proposait d'utiliser le Stroop émotion pour observer l'effet du vieillissement sur l'attention sélective, en répondant aux principales recommandations méthodologiques tirées des études précédentes. Il était attendu que les âgés ne devaient pas présenter d'effet d'interférence en réponse aux stimuli négatifs, contrairement aux jeunes adultes. Les résultats obtenus ont toutefois révélé la présence d'un biais attentionnel négatif tant chez les âgés que chez les jeunes adultes. L'interprétation de ces performances est discutée en regard des exigences cognitives du Stroop émotion. Il pourrait ainsi être plus facile de mettre en évidence la diminution du biais attentionnel négatif à l'aide d'une présentation différente des stimuli qui permettrait la mise en place de l'effet de positivité chez les âgés.||Abstract : For some years now, cognitive psychology has taken an interest in a positivity effect that appears with increased age. This effect is claimed to be related to the decrease in, or even disappearance of, a negative attentional bias that is naturally present in young adults; this effect consists in a greater disruption of selective attention in the presence of negative stimuli. A cognitive task measuring selective attention that is often used to study this cognitive bias is the emotional Stroop test. This task presents words with negative, positive and neutral valence and tests how these stimuli interfere with inhibition capacity. To date, the few studies that have used the emotional Stroop in an elderly population without cognitive disorders have not produced a consensus that would give us a clear sense of the change in this cognitive bias with aging. This study proposed to use the emotional Stroop to observe the effect of aging on selective attention by following the main methodological recommendations arising from earlier studies. It was expected that elderly people would not present an interference effect in response to negative stimuli, unlike young adults. However, the results revealed a negative attentional bias in both older and younger adults. This finding is interpreted in relation to the cognitive demands of the emotional Stroop. It could therefore be easier to highlight the decrease in negative attentional bias by using a different method of presenting stimuli, which would reveal the positivity effect in elderly people.

There are substantial data exploring the link between religiosity and health, yet there is no consensus regarding the appropriate measurement tool for assessing religiosity in health psychology settings. The purpose of this study was to identify a set of items that could serve as a reliable and valid proxy measure of religiosity. Participants included 251 (M=19.02; range = 17-25) young adults who completed self-report measures of religiosity (Intrinsic-Extrinsic/Revised, Quest Scale, Faith Maturity Scale), psychological distress (SCL-90-R), and personality (NEOPI-R). Individual item pools for religiosity were developed by identifying significant correlations between each of the religiosity measures and the SCL-90-R items. Exploratory factor analyses and item-level analyses were conducted and convergent and discriminant validity were examined for each proposed measure. A group of items were identified that were associated with previously validated measures of religiosity. These religiosity measures were also associated with the personality domains of Openness to Experience and Agreeableness but were not associated with Neuroticism. There was insufficient evidence, however, to conclude that the proposed measures could serve as true proxy measures of religiosity as they were more strongly associated with Neuroticism than the religiosity measures from which they were derived. The results of this study underscore the importance of the religiosity construct to health-related outcomes, yet much work remains to delineate the optimal means of measuring the construct and the specific pathways by which religiosity may exert its influence on both mental and physical health.