The study used the partial equilibrium WITS-SMART Simulation Model to assess the impact of liberalization under the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) of a free trade area between the EU and South Africa. The findings of the study reveal that total trade effects in South Africa are likely to surge by US$ 1.036 billion with a total welfare valued at US$ 134 million. Dismantling tariffs on all EU goods would be beneficial to consumers through net trade creation. Total trade creation would be US$ 782 million. However, South African producers are likely to contribute a trade diversion of US$ 254 million which has a negative impact on consumer welfare. The country might also experience a revenue loss amounting to US$ 562 million due to the removal of tariffs. On trade, the country’s export and import to the EU is expected to increase by US$ 12.419 million and US$ 1.266 million respectively. To mitigate revenue loss, the country should try to diversify its current tax base.

This thesis models trade flows between countries as a function of several variables, including those representing membership in multilateral trade agreements (MTAs). The objective of this research is to evaluate the impact of trade policies, trading costs, trade agreements and other demographic characteristics on exports of food and agriculture products. More specifically, the paper uses a gravity model augmented with three sets of dummy variables to estimate the impact of 13 trade arrangements on intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade. Results indicate that several MTAs enhance intra-bloc trading at the expense of non-members while others have been successful at increasing both intra-bloc trade and trade with the rest of the world. Findings further suggest that several arrangements had no significant effect on member trading and that a few have effectively reduced trade for members.

Thesis (MScAgric)--Stellenbosch University, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: European-South African trade relations concerrnng wine and spirits are characterized by various opportunities and, at the same time, a range of conflicts. The latter notably relates to the dispute over geographical indications and designations of origin. Considering this confusing amalgamation of discord and harmony, it is the purpose of this study, entitled "International Trade in Wine and Geographical Indications - Common Interests between the EU and South Africa", to understand the rationale for trade in wine from both sides of the coin. Moreover, this research assesses possible multilateral and bilateral solutions for dealing with trade frictions between the EU and South Africa and identifies common interests with a view to establish a lasting foundation for blossoming trade in wine and sustained growth. The underlying methodology is a qualitative interpretative approach and bases on insights into modern marketing and international management theory. On this basis the "objective" interests of the EU and South Africa in trade in wine are analysed in order to assess the coming into existence of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement as well as the Wine and Spirits Agreement. Pivot of these trade negotiations is the dispute on geographical indications, which is scrutinized by looking into relevant chapters of the WTO and its TR.IPS Agreement. With regards to the Wine and Spirits Agreement it is salient to ask whether it is economically and politically reasonable for South Africa to accept a financial package from the EU to secure the 'voluntary' phasing out of a number of trademarks and geographical indications. The study concludes with an outlook regarding the globalisation of the world's wine market, potential future investment flows between the EU and South Africa and the need for an effective marketing strategy in order to become or remain global player in an increasing competitiveness caused by globalisation. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Europese en Suid-Afrikaanse handelsverhoudinge in wyn en spiritualieë word gekenmerk deur verskeie geleenthede en terselfdertyd 'n reeks konflikte. Laasgenoemde hou merkbaar verband met die twis oor geografiese indikatore en aanwysings van oorsprong. Gegewe hierdie verwarrende tweedrag en harmonie, is die doel van hierdie studie, getiteld "Internasionale Handel in Wyn en Geografiese Aanwysings - Gemeenskaplike belange tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika", om die 'rationale' agter die wynhandel van twee kante te beskou. Verder ondersoek hierdie navorsing moontlike multi- en bilaterale oplossings vir die handelswrywing tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika en identifiseer gemeenskaplike belange met die doelom 'n fondament te bou vir volhoubare groei in die wynhandel. Die onderliggende metodologie is 'n kwalitatiewe verklarende benadering, gebaseer op insigte uit moderne bemarkings- en bestuursteorie. Op hierdie vlak word die 'objektiewe' belange van die EU en Suid-Afrika in die wynhandel ontleed om gevolgtrekkings oor die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en Samewerkingsooreenkoms en die Wyn- en Spiritualieë- Ooreenkoms te maak. Onderliggend aan hierdie onderhandelinge is die twis oor geografiese aanwysings, wat noukeurig ondersoek is deur relevante hoofstukke van die WHO Ooreenkoms en sy TRIPS-komponent te raadpleeg. Met verwysing na die Wyn- en Spiritualieë- Ooreenkoms is dit voor die hand liggend om te vra of dit ekonomies en polities verstandig vir Suid-Afrika is om 'n finansiële pakket van die EU te aanvaar in ruil vir die vrywillige uitfasering van 'n aantal handelsmerke en geografiese aanwysings. Die studie sluit af met '11" blik op globalisering van die wêreld se wynmarkte, die potensiële toekomstige vloei van beleggings tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika, en die behoefte aan 'n effektiewe bemarkingsstrategie om 'n globale speler te word.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: During the negotiating stages of the TOCA, the EU and South Africa could not reach an agreement on the use of certain EU geographical indications related to wine products. The geographical indication issue threatened the signing of the entire TOCA. At the request of the EU, South Africa agreed to negotiate a separate Wine and Spirits Agreement, in order to finalise the TOCA. The EU-SA Wine and Spirits Agreement was eventually negotiated and came into effect on 1 January 2002. The initial issue relating to the geographical indications remained controversial throughout the negotiations and matters were made worst when the initial contentious denominations of Port and Sherry were expanded by the EU to include Grappa, Ouzo, Korn, Kornbrand, Jagertee, Jaqertee, Jagatee and Pacharan. South Africa eventually agreed to phase out the use of these denominations over specified time periods. The current wording of the agreement will also result in South Africa having to yield a variety of well known trade marks such as Nederburg and Roodeberg. Article 7(8) of the Wine Agreement implies that in the case of conflict between a South African wine trade mark and an EU geographical indication for wine, the South African trade mark will always have to yield to the EU geographical indication. The entire geographical indication matter is being contested by South Africa and is still under negotiation. South Africa and the EU agreed to allocate reciprocal duty free tariff quotas to wine products. These tariff quotas will remain effective until the FTA has been established, following the transitional periods as agreed upon in the TOGA. The duty free funds will however not have such a direct impact on the wine industry as have been envisaged initially, because the funds are in the hands of the EU importers. Various business plans are being implemented to allow the South African wine industry to benefit from these and any future funds. The EU offered financial assistance to the value of €15 million for the restructuring of the South African wine industry as well as for the marketing of the South African wine and spirits products. To date none of these funds have been allocated and various proposals have been made to the South African government in order to obtain these funds from the EU. The EU-SA Wine and Spirits Agreement is a continuous evolving agreement, where both parties are allowed to modify the existing agreement with the consent of the other party. Such modifications are allowed with the premise that it would contribute to the facilitation and promotion of trade in wine and spirits products between South Africa and the EU. South Africa must take cognisance of the implications of the EU-SA Wine and Spirits Agreement and ensure that they do not end up losing more than what they are gaining. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Sien volteks vir opsomming

This dissertation analyses and appraises factors that lead SADCC/SADC to restructure in 1992 and in 1999 respectively. Regime theory is used as an analytical tool of these factors throughout this study. The restructuring of regional organisation in the world is often associated with a decision that is taken by regional leaders, only to hide failures of these organisations to deliver. Studies of this phenomenon, however, frequently fail to research the underlying causes. In the case of SADCC/SADC, apart from the fact that the organisation failed to achieve its intended objectives, such as regional integration, economic independence, regional security, and more, this study argues that there were a lot of elements that influenced the pace and the operations of SADCC/C in achieving regional integration and other objectives. The basic debate in this study thus revolves around the fact that the restructuring exercise in SADCC/SADC was a result of many factors and this argument is supported by the regime theory. / Political Science / M.A. (Political Science)

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2007. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As the world globalises there is need for economic integration. These integration processes can be both regional and global Africa as one of the world's continents is not immune to these integrations; regions within the continent have formed trade blocs which enhance economic development for individual member states of such blocs. Even though these countries are not equal in terms of economic development the ultimate goal is to have sustainable economic development and be able to compete in the global world. Botswana is one country with such aspirations and dreams. This paper addresses the role of Botswana in the global economy; highlighting its opportunities and challenges. Botswana has been a success story in Africa, with its GOP per capita increasing from less than US$2 000 in 1975 to around USSIO 000 in 2005, recording economic growth rates of over seven per cent. The country's economy has been heavily reliant on mining. tourism. manufacturing and agriculture. Diamonds are by far the most important source of income for Botswana, accounting for more than 70 per cent of total export earnings. The satisfactory performance of the financial sector impacts on overall development and the diversification of the economy. In its efforts to integrate and strengthen bilateral relations with bigger market economies, Botswana is a signatory to a number of trade agreements such as World Trade Organisation (WTO), Cotonou, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Southern African Customs Union (SA CU). As a member of the WTO, the inclusion of China into the organisation implies that Chinese products are now highly competitive when compared to Botswana products due to lower production costs enjoyed by Chinese finns. Chinese finns also enjoy competitive advantage in US markets where Botswana exports some of its textile products under AGOA. However, the country has enjoyed productive relationships with the European countries since its colonial period and through the Cotonou agreement, which was signed between the European Community and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Botswana is also a signatory to regional blocs such as the SADC through which it has agreed on a number of economic issues such as trade, gender, water resources, peace and security, democracy and good governance. Through the SADe, member states such as Botswana are able to lobby for support or form partnerships with developed nations such as Sweden. By being a member of SACU, Botswana can export to a large market and complement its smaller domestic market. As players in the global economy, countries are exposed to many challenges and opportunities. There are opportunities for attracting more investment into the country due to its excellent economic performance. Investment can be attracted in financial and manufacturing sectors through encouraging private-public partnerships. This paper discusses some of the growth sectors in the economy and how they can be enhanced to contribute to sustainable development. It is also worth mentioning that Botswana faces challenges such as HIV/AIDS and unemployment. By being landlocked, the country is relatively expensive for investors to manufacture locally and export to foreign countries, which dampens the attraction of foreign direct investment. Some of these challenges and opportunities experienced by Botswana can serve as lessons for other African countries. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Soos die globaliseringsproses wereIdwyd vorder is daar ook 'n proses van toenemende ekonomiese integrasie, wereldwyd en op 'n streeksbasis. Afrika neem ook deel aan die proses. In die verskillende streke van die kontinent is handelsblokke besig om te ontplooi. AI is hierdie lande nog ver agter in die internasionale mededingingsproses strewe hulle daarna om op 'n volhoubare manier internasionaal mee te ding. Botswana het beslis die mikpunt. Hierdie studie spreek Botswana se rol in die wyer streeks- en internasionale ekonomie aan. Die land word algemeen beskou as 'n ontwikkelingsukses, met 'n BBP per capita toename van US$2 000 in 1975 tot US$I0 000 in 2005, en 'n gemiddelde jaarlikse groeikoers van meer as sewe persent. Die landsekonomie is sterk afhanklik van die mynbousektor, landbou, toerisme en fabriekswese, met diamante tot 70 persent van uitvoere. As deel van die proses om nouer in te skakel by die groter markte het Botswana by 'n reeks ooreenkomste aangesluit, naamlik die Wereld Handelsorganisasie, die Cotonou-ooreenkoms, die SADC, AGOA en SACU. Terwyl die aansluiting by hierdie ooreenkomste Botswana se uitvoermarkte uitgebrei het, het Sjina se aansluiting by die WTO vir Botswana se nywerhede groter mededinging veroorsaak. Aan die ander kant het die lidmaatskap van Botswana by die SADC en Sacu vir die land baie geleenthede geopen om meer effektief te pleit en te onderhandel vir ekonomiese, sosiale en ander ontwikkelingsvoordele, veral waar Botswana se eie bevolking en markte so klein is. Om 'n beeld te kry van die uitwerking van die stappe van Botswana word in die studie ook gekyk na ontwikkelingstendense in spesifieke sektore asook na pogings om buitelandse kapitaal na die land te trek. Terselfdertyd moet besef word dat Botswana vanwee sy hoe HIV/Vigs koers tans en in die toekoms te kampe het met 'n reeks heel spesiale struikelblokke wat die ontwikkelingsproses beinvloed.

No abstract available. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2013.

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009